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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the conflict between intellectual property and competition law. 
There have been many attempts by noted scholars, regulatory authorities and courts to 
resolve this conflict, and determine how competition laws should be applied to 
dealings in intellectual property. Issues at the interface of intellectual property and 
competition law are exemplified by bargaining breakdowns in high technology, 
innovative industries. This thesis examines an issue arising from the balance between 
intellectual property and competition law in the context of a particular industry. 
Specifically, it analyses competition law regulation of refusals to license patents 
within the Australian medical biotechnology industry. A foundation for this analysis 
is provided through consideration of some characteristics of the medical 
biotechnology industry. This preliminary material allows the conclusion that there are 
a number of preconditions that make the Australian medical biotechnology industry 
particularly prone to refusals to license patents. 
Against this backdrop, the issue of refusals to license patents is considered in an 
empirical context. The thesis presents the results of an empirical study that 
investigated the preponderance of restrictive licensing practices within Australian 
medical biotechnology. While the potential for refusals to license exist within this 
industry, the empirical data suggests that this issue is occurring to only a limited 
extent in practice. This evidence is relevant to the analysis contained in the remainder 
of the thesis, because it assists in informing policy debate over the appropriate 
parameters for competition law in monitoring refusals to license intellectual property. 
The issue of regulation of refusals to license patents is far from resolved in the 
literature or by the judiciary. This thesis proposes that the issue is one that must be 
approached flexibly, and any attempt to circumscribe rigid rules for analysis is likely 
to fail. As such, it considers the role competition law plays in regulating dealings in 
intellectual property, and establishes a flexible framework for assessing the legality of 
refusals to license patents. This framework provides a basis for examining existing 
legislative provisions under which refusals to license will be evaluated. 
There is no Australian case law dealing with the issue of refusals to license 
intellectual property. The analysis contained in this thesis therefore proceeds from 
first principles. A refusal to license a patent will be dealt with pursuant to s 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The existing law and its limitations are considered in 
some detail, and it is concluded that recent judicial interpretations of this provision 
have rendered it virtually redundant. Due to the lack of judicial guidance in relation to 
this issue in Australia, some comparative case law from the United State and 
European Union is examined. Consideration of this case law provides some basis for 
assessing the flexible framework established in the thesis, and it would be taken into 
account if an Australian court were required to consider the issue of refusals to license 
intellectual property. 
The thesis considers the likely application of s 46 to refusals to license patents in 
medical biotechnology. It concludes that although there may be some circumstances 
where a refusal to license a patent will be anti-competitive, s 46 will not operate to 
provide redress. General deficiencies in the section are likely to be intensified where 
dealings in intellectual property are at issue. Accordingly, it argues that legislative 
amendment is necessary to rectify these problems, and makes a number of 
recommendations to this effect. It also considers the relevance of the empirical 
evidence presented in shaping regulatory policy. 
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Introduction 
CONTEXT 
Intellectual property and competition law are often perceived as being in conflict. 
Intellectual property laws convey exclusivity in the form of a privilege to use a right 
to the exclusion of others.' Competition laws promote competitive markets as the 
cornerstone of economic efficiency. Friction between intellectual property and 
competition law centres on the extent to which competition law should defer to 
intellectual property laws in allowing the exercise of exclusive privileges. At the heart 
of the debate are efficiency concerns, and a desire to determine how innovation and 
consequently consumer welfare may best be achieved. 
This tension between the two bodies of law is not a recent phenomenon, but has been 
evident for the best part of the last century. 2 Competition law authorities have 
grappled with how to treat dealings in intellectual property, where those dealings have 
anti-competitive implications. At certain points in the history of the conflict, 
competition law regulators and courts have exhibited an overly deferential preference 
toward intellectual property laws. At other times, regulatory and judicial policy have 
favoured competition law, with many intellectual property dealings treated as highly 
suspect. This lengthy struggle to identify an appropriate balance has been evident in 
many different jurisdictions including Australia, and has given rise to a vast body of 
literature.' While it is generally recognised that the two bodies of law are reconcilable, 
areas of difficulty persist. 
1 This thesis focuses on patent protection; see further below, n9. Other forms of intellectual property 
protection include copyright, trade marks, and trade secrecy. In Australia, copyright is conveyed by 
virtue of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which provides creators of literary, musical, dramatic and 
artistic works, computer software, films, sound recordings, broadcasts and printed editions of works 
with copyright over the works. This entitles the copyright owner to exclusively publish, copy, perform, 
communicate or adapt the subject matter of the protected work. The Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) 
allows the owner of a trade mark to register the right to exclusively use that mark. Trade secrecy, or 
confidential information, also protections inventors, but is governed by common law. Other forms of 
intellectual property protection have evolved. For example, the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Oh) 
gives the exclusive right to produce, sell and import particular plant varieties, while the Designs Act 
2003 (Cth) provides the owner of a design with the exclusive right to use that design. 
2 See, eg, Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark A Lemley and Mark D Janis, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2002) vol I, [1.14-1.17]. 
3 For recent discussion in the Australian context, see, eg, Ian Eagles and Louise Longden, 'Competition 
in Information and Computer Technology Markets: Intellectual Property Licensing and Section 51(3) 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974' (2003) 3 Queensland University Journal of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 28; Justice Kevin Lindgren, 'The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: 
Some Current Issues in Australia' (2005) 16 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 76. Note that the 
matter has also been the subject of recent government review in Australia; see, eg, Independent 
Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, Parliament of Australia, National 
Competition Policy (1993); National Competition Council, Parliament of Australia, Review of Sections 
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New technologies have given rise to novel challenges at the intersection of intellectual 
property and competition law. 4 High technology industries are characterised by 
cumulative research pattems5 and unique market structures. A hallmark of high 
technology industries is high levels of intellectual property protection, fuelled by the 
research environment in which industry participants operate, and the rapid pace at 
which innovation within these industries proceeds. Finding a balance between 
intellectual property and competition policy is invariably problematic, and these 
difficulties are intensified where issues associated with highly technological industries 
arise.' The question is whether competition law is adequately equipped to deal with 
intellectual property enforcement issues that arise in respect of new technologies.' 
One industry that possesses the distinctive traits of a high technology industry is 
medical biotechnology. 8 This industry is highly innovative, and is characterised by a 
cumulative research structure. Increasingly, industry participants are seeking to 
commercialise their research results through patenting. This has resulted in an 
industry that relies heavily on patent protection. 9 Patents are important because they 
51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Final Report (1999); Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation 
Under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2002). 
4 See, eg, Robert P Merges, Peter S Menell and Mark A Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New 
Technological Age (3`d ed, 2003), especially ch 8. 
5 'Cumulative' innovation refers to a pattern of research where technological developments build on 
the inventiveness of others. In many industries where research is cumulative, a considerable period of 
time exists between initial invention and a resulting product. Some degree of follow-on invention will 
be required before a 'product' in the sense of a product available to consumers, can be brought to 
market. Other terms used in this thesis to refer to this research structure include incremental or 
sequential innovation. 
6 See Robert Pitofsky, 'Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property' (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 903. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines biotechnology as 'the 
application of science and technology to living organisims, as well as parts, products, and models 
thereof, to alter living and non-living materials for the production of knowledge, goods and services.' 
This definition is used in conjunction with a list-based definition of biotechnology techniques available 
at http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,2340,en_2649_37437_1933994_1_1_1_37437,00.html > at 19 
August 2005. Medical biotechnology includes those techniques that have medical application. 
The broad definition employed by the Australian Government generally accords with this definition: 
Biotechnology is the application of biological processes to make products that are useful to 
society, some of which include food, medicine and chemical compounds. Biotechnology is 
providing improvements in health care and the treatment of disease ... 
See Biotechnology Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Developing Australia's Biotechnology 
Future: Discussion Paper (1999) i. 
9 In Australia, patent protection is granted over patentable inventions by examination of an application 
made pursuant to the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). A patent provides a patent holder with the exclusive right 
to exploit the patent, or to make, hire, sell, use or import the invention; see further below, 2.5. 
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enable the realisation of revenue on biotechnology inventions. Upstream patents are 
also crucial inputs into more downstream research applications. th Combined, these 
factors result in difficulties in determining how innovation within the industry may 
best be facilitated. 
This thesis examines the complex issue of the interaction between intellectual 
property and competition law, in addressing the particular issue of refusals to license 
patents. Access to a patented invention may be required in order to enable follow-on-; 
research. Whether or not there are circumstances in which a patent holder may be 
compelled to license a patent gives rise to difficult questions, because it impinges on a 
patent holder's exclusive privilege to practice an invention. The issue of refusals to 
license intellectual property is therefore one of the most fundamental problems arising 
at the intellectual property/competition law divide. Thus, this thesis takes a specific 
example of a potentially anti-competitive practice and examines the issue of refusals 
to license patents in the context of medical biotechnology. This analysis takes place 
within the framework of Australian legislation dealing with anti-competitive conduct, 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA). In particular, it examines the operation 
of s 46 of the TPA given that this provision will be invoked where a refusal to license 
a patent is alleged to be anti-competitive. Section 46 has been described as 'a 
potentially powerful compulsory licensing tool.' n This thesis will evaluate whether 
Australian regulators and the judiciary are equipped to deal with the issue of refusals 
to license in a high technology industry such as medical biotechnology. 
The terms 'upstream' and 'downstream' are used here to describe the position of institutions and 
companies in the research and development continuum. Researchers and companies at the furthest 
upstream end of the continuum produce 'raw' genomic data and broadly enabling technologies that are 
primarily useful as inputs into further research, while companies at the furthest downstream end 
produce drugs, diagnostic products and other therapeutics. Many researchers and companies fall 
somewhere between these two extremes, and are classified broadly as 'intermediate'. Note, however, 
that this distinction is not static. Some sectors of medical biotechnology operate outside the confines of 
the applications described. For example, the medical devices segment of the industry produce devices 
for consumer use, while bio-informatics research focuses on the development of enabling software. In 
both these instances, the divide between upstream and downstream research is narrower than in other 
segments of the industry described. See also Arti K Rai, 'Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust', (2001) 16 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 813 (Rai 2001), her n9 (` ... these classifications are quite fluid. Thus, for example, research 
identifying a gene linked to a disease might be quite 'upstream' if the commercial goal is a drug 
therapy. By contrast, if the commercial goal is a diagnostic test, research identifying the gene might be 
relatively ' downstream'. ') 
Henry Ergas, 'Treatment of Unilateral Refusals to License and Compulsory Licensing in Australia' 
(Paper Presented to the Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Hearings on Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Washington, 22 May 2002), 
7. 
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It will assess the development of intellectual property protection within the context of 
biomedical research, and consider how intellectual property protection within the 
context of this industry affects the flow of innovation and development. It will go on 
to look at the issues of dominance and competition. There have been a number of 
government surveys in Australia and internationally which have considered the 
development of the medical biotechnology industry. ° Until recently, there has been 
no attempt to gather empirical evidence on the impact of patents within the industry 
on innovation. A number of recent international studies have begun to investigate 
issues associated with patent exploitation.° They have focused primarily on factors 
conducive to innovation, but have not to date gone on to consider the relevance of 
competition law within the framework of this broader debate. 
Because of the international nature of this issue, there is extensive reference to 
overseas literature during the course of this thesis. The context of this thesis is not 
restricted to Australia, but is intended to be applicable within the wider international 
context. Nevertheless, an important component of the thesis is the presentation of the 
results of an empirical study co-conducted by the author that investigates patenting 
and licensing practices within the Australian medical biotechnology industry. 14 The 
focus of the empirical evidence reported is on innovation within the Australian 
medical biotechnology industry. A central objective is to examine issues relating to 
refusals to license patents from the national perspective, and provide sufficient 
analysis of these issues to usefully inform policy debate in the area. 
Accordingly, the thesis focuses on regulatory policy from the Australian perspective, 
and appropriate regulatory mechanisms to evaluate the legality of refusals to license 
medical , biotechnology patents. As a consequence, the thesis brings together 
international references, but makes specific reference to the Australian context. This 
is important, because the debate is international, but the discussion is in the context of 
evidence gathered in respect of the Australian industry. 
12 See, eg, The Virtous Cycle-Working Together for Health and Medical Research, Health and Medical 
Strategic Review, (1999); Biotechnology Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Australian 
Biotechnology: A National Strategy, (2000). 
13 See, eg, John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen 'Effects of Research Tool Patenting and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation' in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds.), Patents in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy (2003) 287; Joseph Straus, Henrik Holzapfel and Matthias Lindenmeir, 
Empirical Survey on Genetic Invention and Patent Law, unpublished report (2002 ) (copy on file with 
author); Intellectual Property Institute, Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current 
UK Law and Practice (2004) (The UK Study). 
14 Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues 
Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 6. 
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ADVANCES IN GENETIC TECHNOLOGY AND THE MODERN 
MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
The medical biotechnology industry has a relatively recent history. The birth of 
modem biotechnological inquiry can be traced to the discovery in 1953 by James 
Watson and Francis Crick of the double helix!' This discovery led to better 
understanding of how human genes work. 
The most fundamental recent development, however, was undoubtedly the invention 
in 1973 of recombinant DNA technology by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer. The 
discovery, commercialisation and widespread dissemination of this invention has 
enabled the development of modern biotechnology, Representing the most 
fundamental technology in molecular biology, recombinant DNA technology was 
protected by one process patent for making molecular chimeras, and two product 
patents for proteins produced using recombinant DNA. 16 This technology has no 
alternatives and is essential to all research in molecular biology!' 
The discovery of recombinant DNA technology spawned the advent of the modern 
biotechnology industry. The Human Genome Project, (HGP) an attempt to map and • 
sequence the entire human genome, commenced in 1990. 18 The implications of doing 
so for the human race were very significant. Commentators foresaw the mapping and 
sequencing of the human genome as allowing unprecedented intervention into human 
drug development, therapeutics and diagnostics as scientists gleaned a better 
understanding of how the individual genetic type of individuals determined our 
predisposition to disease and ill-health. An international public sequencing 
consortium was established in 1996 for the purpose of completing the sequencing of 
the human genome. Driven by the promise of profits, a number of private companies 
joined the race to sequence the human genome in tandem with the public sequencing 
effort. 
15 J Watson and F Crick, 'A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid' (1953) 171 Nature 737. See also 
James D Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA 
(2001). 
16 Comprising United States Patent and Trademark Office ((JSPTO) Patent No US4 237 224 (granted 
in 1980) and Patent No US4 740 470 (granted in 1988) (now expired). This technology does not appear 
to have been patented in Australia. 
17 See further National Research Council, Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in 
Molecular Biology (Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1997) (the NRC Report), 40-42. 
18 For details of the HGP see the website of the United States National Human Genome Research 
Institute <http://www.genome.gov/10001772 > at 26 May 2005. 
See also the account in John Sulston and Georgina Ferry, The Common Thread: Science, Politics, 
Ethics and the Human Genome (2002). 
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The public sequencing consortium and Celera Genomics, one of the private 
companies involved in sequencing the human genome, announced in 2001 that a 
rough draft of the human genome had been completed ahead of schedule. Sequence 
information had been periodically released by the public sequencing consortium, and 
it followed by publishing a detailed description of the sequences once completed. 19 
Celera Genomics followed suit soon thereafter. 2° The sequence information attained 
by the private genomics companies differs from that released by the public 
sequencing consortium both in the sequencing methodologies employed, 21 and in the 
nature of the information provided. The private sequencing companies claim that 
value has been added to the sequence information provided by them in the form of 
annotations to the basic sequence information.22 Consequently, genomics companies 
have been careful to protect the release of this annotated information, and access to 
their databases is available through subscription only. 23 
A final draft of the HGP was completed in 2001, 24 and gaps in the draft sequence have 
now been largely eradicated. 25 This raises new possibilities for both public and 
privately-based researchers to explore disease potentiality and therapeutic 
intervention. Original estimates of the number of protein-coding human genes, put at 
between 100 000 and 200 000, have now been revised to between 20 000 and 25 000 
genes, 26 making human genetic conditions and disease far more complex than 
scientists originally envisaged. 27 Genomic research, in itself is therefore of limited 
19 (2001) 409 (6822) Nature (multiple articles). 
20 (2001) 291 Science (multiple articles). 
21 For example, Celera Genomics employed a 'shotgun' sequencing technique developed by Craig 
Venter, president of the company at the time the rough draft was completed; for analysis of this 
technique see, for example, Xinwei She, Zhaoshi Jiang, Royden A Clark, Ge Liu, Ze Cheng, Eray 
Tuzun, Deanna M Church, Granger Sutton, Aaron L Halpern & Evan E Eichler, 'Shotgun Sequence 
Assembly and Recent Segmental Duplications Within the Human Genome' Nature 431, 927-930 
(2004). 
22 See, eg, <http://www.celeradiscoverysystem.com/about/home.cfm > at 30 June 2005. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See 'International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium Describes Finished Human Genome 
Sequence', NIH News Release (20 October 2004) <http://www.genome.gov/12513430 > at 26 May 
2005. 
25 International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, 'Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the 
Human Genome' 431Nature (2004): 931-945. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Not only are many genetic conditions likely to be multi-factorial, but more than one gene may be 
implicated in a particular genetic condition or disease. Further, 'differential splicing' may mean that 
particular genes code for numerous proteins, and that intricate links exist between genes and proteins; 
see, eg, T A Brown, Genomes (2001) 1.3 at 
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bvicgi?rid=genomes.box.5293 > at 19 August 2005. 
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value to consumers as such, and it is the subsequent or follow-on research which may 
yield valuable answers to questions about human hea1th. 28 Nevertheless, without this 
basic genomic research the more downstream development would not be possible. A 
thriving biotechnology industry has evolved across the spectrum from research to 
product development, an industry which for some time now has been undergoing 
massive growth. 29 This is illustrative of the breadth of research possibilities, and of the 
hope that investors place in the success of the industry built around post-genomics 
research. The next phase of medical biotechnology research is the application of 
genomics to pharmaceutical, diagnostic and therapeutic research, and the broad scope 
of research opportunities in this area has driven industry development. 
Broadly speaking, there are four main research areas into which biotechnology 
research falls: 30 
• structural genomics and proteomics; 
• functional genomics and transcriptomics; 
• targeted drug discovery and pharmacogenomics; and 
• enabling technologies. 
Private companies are active in all of these areas of biotechnology research, while 
research institutionsm have primarily been involved in research that can be 
characterised as more upstream. This has generally involved structural genomics and 
proteomics, and the development of enabling technologies. The province of 
pharmaceutical companies has traditionally been drug discovery, although even 
pharmaceutical companies are increasingly venturing more into upstream research to 
28 See, eg, David R Bentley, `Genomes for Medicine' Nature 429, 440-445 (2004); John Bell, 
'Predicting Disease Using Genomics' Nature 429, (2004): 453; William E Evans & Mary V Relling, 
'Moving Towards Individualized Medicine with Pharmacogenomics' Nature 429, (2004): 464; Robert 
L Strausberg, Andrew J G Simpson, Lloyd J Old & Gregory J Riggins, `Oncogenomics and the 
Development of New Cancer Therapies' Nature 429, (2004): 469-471; Stephen P A Fodor, 'Packaging 
the Genome to Accelerate Biotechnology' in Bay Area Science and Innovation Consortium, 
Biotechnology: Essays from its Heartland (2004) 42. 
29 See, eg, Panos Kanavos, 'Determinants of Market Structure in the International Biopharmaceutical 
Industry' in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Aspects of 
Biotechnologies Related to Human Health: Part II: Biotechnology, Medical Innovation and the 
Economy: The Key Relationships (1998), 44-53. 
30 A Julian, Genomics Primer' BioSpace.com 20 July 2000 
<www.biospace.com/articles/genomics.primer.print.cfm> at 30 June 2005. 
31 Research institutions are defined for the purposes of this thesis as including universities, government 
research laboratories, public and private research institutes and hospitals. 
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maintain financial viability. 32 As a result, the traditional line between upstream and 
downstream, or basic and applied research is blurring and the crossover between 
public and private arenas of research is becoming more pronounced. 
AIM s 
As foreshadowed, the primary aim of this thesis is to examine the treatment of 
unilateral refusals to license medical biotechnology patents under Australian 
competition law by exploring the manner in which this issue is likely to be resolved 
on the basis of current interpretations of relevant provisions. 33 Increased levels of 
concentration within the medical biotechnology industry may lead to competition 
concerns. The structure of biomedical research and the medical biotechnology 
industry tends to lend itself to the possibility of contractual breakdowns when 
arrangements for the transfer of technology are being negotiated. The argument on 
which this thesis rests is that competition law should be available as a mechanism to 
address refusals to license patents, and that there is considerable doubt as to whether 
this is the case. 
In order to achieve this primary aim, there are four subsidiary aims. The first is to 
explore whether the potential for research holdup due to refusals to license patents 
exists in biomedical research in Australia. The second is to examine empirical 
evidence gathered in respect of refusals to license in the context of the Australian 
medical biotechnology industry. The third is to establish a flexible framework for the 
application of competition law to refusals to license patents. The fourth is to critically 
analyse the likely application of s 46 of the TPA to refusals to license medical 
biotechnology patents, and then consider whether this application is likely to accord 
with the framework. The basis of this analysis is to enable consideration of whether 
the framework provides a justifiable foundation for dealing with unilateral refusals to 
license patents, and accordingly whether the legislative requirements delineated in 46 
adequately address this issue. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The aims of this thesis are first pursued by examining the specific characteristics of 
biomedical research. The purpose for undertaking this analysis is to demonstrate that 
32 See, eg, details on Glaxo SmithKline's research program, 
<http://www.science.gsk.com/research/index.htm > at 19 July 2005. 
33 	. Different forms of refusals to license are explained below, 3.6. This thesis will use the term 'refusals 
to license' to refer to unilateral refusals to license patents, except where otherwise stated. 
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the preconditions for restrictions on access exist in biomedical research. This analysis 
forms the basis for analysis of the results of an empirical study co-conducted by the 
author. A detailed methodology in respect of this empirical study is contained in 
Appendix 1 to this thesis.' 
Chapter 1 examines the structure of the medical biotechnology industry. This 
structure has evolved to enable industry participants to take advantage of the many 
research and development opportunities available in biomedical research, and is 
typified by small, niche companies involved in specific areas of research within the 
product pipeline. Commercialisation of these research results through patent 
protection has become standard practice. Consideration of the structure of the industry 
is important within the context of the intellectual property/competition law debate, 
because it can have implications for levels of innovation within the market. Structure 
is a primary determinant of market conduct. Correspondingly, the regulation of the 
conduct of markets through competition law impacts on performance within markets. 
Accordingly, concentration levels within markets and the ability with which 
companies within those markets are able to compete will be an important variable in 
regulatory policy making. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis focuses on statutory patent law requirements with specific 
application to biomedical research. It considers the scope of medical biotechnology 
patents in light of these requirements, and goes on to discuss exploitation of those 
patents. A large number of patents are being granted and many of these patents are 
broad in scope. This increases the possibility that they will be used anti-competitively. 
Chapter 2 therefore sets up the bounds of patentability and points out the freedom a 
patent holder has to deal with a granted patent. 
Chapter 3 examines one of the primary methods of exploiting a patent, that of 
licensing. The necessity for licensing arises from the cumulative structure of 
biomedical research, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, has led to the evolution of 
various 'niche' companies to take advantage of the many research and development 
opportunities that exist on the path to biomedical product development. Patenting of 
research results at all stages of this research and development continuum means that 
licensing is an increasingly important method of transferring technology and enabling 
follow-on research and development. Bargaining breakdowns therefore have the 
potential to hinder innovation. Competition law is one of several methods of 
34 This methodology was published as part of the Nicol and Nielsen study, above n14. The portions of 
the study methodology extracted and reproduced in Appendix 1 to this thesis were written solely by the 
author. 
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regulating licensing breakdowns in certain circumstances, and in particular of 
compelling licensing where a licence is refused. This chapter therefore examines 
whether the structure of research and technology transfer patterns within the industry 
are conducive to bargaining breakdown and sets up the basis for a fundamental debate 
on the divide between intellectual property and competition law in biomedical 
research. As this chapter will demonstrate, it is the structure of research within this 
industry that makes it an example of an industry that is particularly vulnerable to 
contractual breakdowns, rendering consideration of it in terms of the intellectual 
property/competition law interface particularly valuable. 
The discussion in the first three chapters is built on in Chapter 4 by considering 
empirical evidence of refusals to license patents within medical biotechnology. This 
discussion takes place in the context of data on the Australian industry, and reference 
is made to studies in other jurisdictions for comparative purposes. The data will 
demonstrate that results from Australian and comparator jurisdictions are closely 
aligned. The fundamental question considered in this chapter is whether the medical 
biotechnology industry in Australia is experiencing problems due to refusals to 
license technology required to conduct research, or whether the market is finding 
solutions in instances where this does or would occur. The data enables consideration 
of the difficult issue of whether competition law is necessarily to regulate the 
exploitation of biomedical patents, and compel licensing where licences to patents 
necessary for follow-on innovation are refused. 
Chapter 5 provides an assessment of the manner in which refusals to license patents 
are treated under Australian competition law, and competition law within the US and 
EU. It then considers how Australian competition law should regulate refusals to 
license. This analysis is initially general in that the theoretical issue of the intellectual 
property/competition law interface is discussed, and the specific issue of refusals to 
license is then considered. The chapter concludes by proposing the establishment of a 
framework for dealing with refusals to license, and adherence to this framework in 
circumstances where legal consideration of the implications of a refusal to license is 
required. As this chapter will outline, s 46 of the TPA will be the primary provision 
considered under Australian competition law in an instance where a patent licence is 
refused. The remainder of the thesis will provide detailed consideration of whether the 
framework outlined in this chapter is likely to be adequately adhered to under 
jurisprudential principles established in relation to s 46. 
Chapter 6 considers in some detail the elements of s 46 and the manner in which the 
application of these elements has been interpreted as a result of recent Australian 
High Court decisions. It will be argued that two of the elements of s 46 have been 
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interpreted in a potentially restrictive fashion, and that as a result contraventions of 
the provision will be extremely rare. Despite a considerable body of recent case law 
dealing with s 46, however, interpretation of the provision remains subject to some 
degree of uncertainty. Moreover, Australian case law dealing specifically with 
refusals to license patents is lacking, and these factors render it difficult to evaluate 
precisely how this issue is likely to be resolved under s 46. 
An evaluation of US and EU case law dealing with that topic therefore forms the basis 
for Chapter 7 in that a consideration of this case law may provide some assistance by 
determining whether a refusal to license a patent is likely to be treated in accordance 
with the framework presented in Chapter 5, within those jurisdictions. There is no 
case law dealing specifically with refusals to license in the context of biotechnology 
patents, but the discussion in this chapter goes on to consider whether the principles 
enunciated as a result of existing case law are generalisable, and consequently 
applicable to refusals to license medical biotechnology patents. 
Chapter 8 then analyses in some detail how the elements of s 46, as currently 
interpreted, would likely apply to refusals to license medical biotechnology patents, 
drawing on the discussion in Chapter 6, and the principles discussed in Chapter 7 
where appropriate. To conclude the chapter, an assessment of the likely adherence of 
such application to the framework identified in Chapter 5 is made. 
In the concluding chapter some policy implications of the discussion that takes place 
in the preceding chapters are stated. The general conclusion drawn is that there is no 
evidence that indicates that it would be appropriate for refusals to license patents to be 
exempt from s 46 of the TPA. Instead, it is entirely appropriate that analysis of refusal 
to license cases be subject to the competition law provisions and proceed on a case-
by-case basis. In most cases where this occurs, competition law, via s 46, will deal 
adequately with the issue of refusals to license patents in medical biotechnology. This 
is because a vast majority of refusals to license are not, and should not be found to be, 
anti-competitive. 
Moreover, empirical evidence in respect of the medical biotechnology industry, an 
industry particularly prone to bargaining breakdowns, has exhibited limited evidence 
of problems arising due to refusals to license patents. Despite this evidence, however, 
there is still significant potential for refusals to license patents to impact negatively on 
innovation in an industry such as medical biotechnology. In a small number of cases a 
refusal to license a patent will have the potential to be anti-competitive and recourse 
to competition law should be possible. It is unlikely, however, that such a 
contravention would be found on current interpretations of the section. Accordingly, 
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this chapter makes some conclusions and recommendations in relation to s 46 and 
future directions for empirical research in the area. 
SCOPE 
In addressing the aims of this thesis, certain boundaries have been adhered to. First, 
there is some comparative material presented in this thesis, but this thesis does not 
attempt a comprehensive comparative study. Instead, United States and European 
Union jurisprudence are considered because these bodies of law are likely to be taken 
into account in the event that the issue arises for consideration by Australian courts. 
Each of these jurisdictions has a substantial body of relevant case law. These 
jurisdictions also constitute major biotechnology markets for Australian researchers!' 
Secondly, the thesis deals with only one form of intellectual property, that being 
patents. The issues that arise in this thesis may be generalisable in some respects to 
other forms of intellectual property that may be applicable to biotechnology, in 
particular, to copyright, plant breeders rights, and trade secrecy2 6 The thesis makes no 
attempt to discuss these other forms of intellectual property in any detail, except to the 
extent that they are relevant to issues relating to patents and competition law. In 
particular, there is some discussion of copyright in the case law that is the focus of 
Chapter 7, including some evaluation of the import of case law concerning refusals to 
license copyrighted material, to refusals to license patents. However, except to 
highlight the likely impact of this body of law on refusals to license patents, there is 
no detailed analysis of issues relating to copyright or other forms of intellectual 
property. 
Finally, there is no attempt to undertake a detailed historical analysis of competition 
law in Australia and its application to intellectual property dealings. Instead, the thesis 
aims to examine a practical issue on the basis of the law as currently drafted. 
35 Note that the issue has also been considered in New Zealand in the context of s 36 of the Commerce 
Act 1986 (NZ) (the Commerce Act). Section 36 is drafted in similar terms to s 46. The Commerce Act 
also contains some exemptions for intellectual property dealings. Space constraints do not permit a 
detailed discussion of the implications of these provisions for the purpose of the issues discussed in this 
thesis. In addition, there is no relevant case law dealing with refusals to license under the Commerce 
Act. For a discussion on refusals to license intellectual property in the context of s 36 of the Commerce 
Act, see, eg, Abraham I van Melle, 'Refusals to License Intellectual Property Rights: The Impact of 
RTE v EC Commission (Magill) on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law' (1997) 25 
Australian Business Law Review 4. 
36 See above n1. 
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TERMINOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Although competition law is a generic international term, in other jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis, the corresponding term used for regulation of competition 
issues is antitrust, and the terms are to some degree used interchangeably. It is 
acknowledged that there are important differences between the terms, and these can 
be attributed mainly to jurisdictional diversity in competition regimes?' However, the 
term antitrust is used as a synonym for the term competition law in this thesis. 
There is also some reference during the course of the thesis to patent 'monopolies'. 
'Monopoly' in this sense is simply intended to convey that a patent grants the right to 
exclude others. Usage of this phrase in commonplace and its use in this thesis is not 
intended to suggest that a patent automatically grants an economic monopoly. On the 
contrary, in a majority of cases a patent will not give rise to an economic monopoly, 
and so will not give rise to competition law issues. 
The focus of this thesis is on patent protection, but some general references to 
'intellectual property' are made throughout the course of the thesis. In particular, 
Chapter 5 contains some general discussion on the interaction between intellectual 
property and competition law, and references in this chapter to intellectual property 
are, for the most part, general references. Further, given that Chapter 7 contains 
discussion of some specific case law dealing with refusals to license copyrighted 
material, and as such, distinction is made in this chapter between particular forms of 
intellectual property. 38 
37 Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n2, vol II, ch 45, especially [45.3b]. 
38 Some material presented in this thesis has been published previously, either in its current form, or as 
a previous version. See Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, 'The Australian Medical Biotechnology 
Industry and Access to Intellectual Property: Issues for Patent Law Development' (2001) 23 Sydney 
Law Review 347; Jane Nielsen 'Biotechnology Patent Licensing Agreements and Anti-Competitive 
Conduct' in Centre for Law and Genetics (ed) Regulating the New Frontiers: Legal Issues in 
Biotechnology, Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 4 (2001) 35; Jane Nielsen and 
Dianne Nicol, 'Pharmaceuticals and Patents: The Conundrum of Access and Incentive' (2002) 13 
Australian Intellectual Property Review 21; Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical 
Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law 
and Genetics Occasional Paper No 6; Jane Nielsen, 'Reach-Through Rights in Biomedical Patent 
Licensing: A Comparative Analysis of their Anti-Competitive Reach' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 
169; Jane Nielsen and Dianne Nicol, 'Gene Patenting and Human Health: The ALRC's Report on 
Genes and Ingenuity' (2005) 20(10) Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Law Bulletin 153; 
Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen 'Australian Medical Biotechnology: 
Navigating a Complex Patent Landscape' (2005) European Intellectual Property Review 
(forthcoming). 
All of the material extracted from these papers and presented in this thesis is solely the work of the 
author. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Industries vary in the speed and cost of research and development ..., in the ease with 
which inventions can be imitated by others, in the need for cumulative or 
interoperative innovation rather than stand alone development, and in the extent to 
which patents cover entire products or merely components of products.' 
This comment was made in the context of the technology-specific application of 
patent law to various areas of technological innovation. 2 The purpose of patent 
protection is the production of innovative benefits. Parallel issues exist, however, in 
respect of the application of competition law to transactions involving inventions 
protected by patents. Determining the bounds of privileges granted by patents 
inevitably involves complex considerations. Disparities between industries serve to 
intensify these difficulties, because the extent to which patent holders may exercise 
their right to exclude may vary depending on the particular form of invention 
protected by patent and the impact that invention is likely to have on future research. 
Australia is typical of many developed nations in that the Australian government is 
endeavouring to promote the medical biotechnology industry and substantial public 
funding has backed this support for the industry. While the devotion of public funding 
is commendable, no effort has yet been made to determine the market structure most 
conducive to innovation, and the level of regulation desirable in respect of 
competition law. Patent protection invariably results in technological concentration, 
and it is possible that increased levels of concentration may have an adverse effect on 
innovations. This chapter will ultimately consider evidence on the benefits of 
concentrated as opposed to competitive market structures. 
In order to discuss the broader issue of the interaction of intellectual property and 
competition law within the Australian medical biotechnology industry, it is important 
to first map a number of factors relevant to research and development within that 
industry. The first is the structure of the industry, together with the associated issue of 
the effects of patenting within the industry, both internationally and in Australia. The 
second is the patentability and exploitation of biomedical inventions within that 
broader context. The third stage of this mapping process is to consider the incremental 
or cumulative pattern of research evident within the medical biotechnology industry 
1 Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, 'Policy Levers in Patent Law' (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 
1575, 1577. 
2 Ibid. 
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and its implications for future generations of research and development.' This chapter 
undertakes the first of these tasks, while Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the second and 
third respectively. Chapter 4 then considers whether there is empirical evidence to 
support any theoretical contention that refusals to license are hindering downstream 
research. 
This chapter will consider the emphasis that has been placed on the development of a 
sustainable biotechnology industry in Australia at government level, and some trends 
impacting on modem biomedical research and the push to commercialise the products 
of that research. A number of government-sponsored reports that have examined the 
evolution of the industry will be referred to, as these reports assist in drawing a 
picture of the focus on development of this industry in Australia. It will then consider 
the structure of the medical biotechnology industry, both internationally and in 
Australia, and illustrate patenting trends within the industry. The aim of this chapter is 
to provide some background into the evolution of the industry, and a brief explanation 
of how research patterns within the industry have impacted on the structure of the 
industry.4 The chapter will conclude by discussing studies that have sought to identify 
the relevance of market structure to innovation, and considering the desirability of 
concentration through patent protection in the context of biomedical research. This 
will lead into the deliberation in later chapters, of the role of competition law in 
curbing the monopolistic practices of biomedical patent holders to promote 
innovation. 
1.2 BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA 
Basic biomedical research has traditionally been undertaken primarily by the public 
sector. This seems certain to change forever as industry acts to capitalise on huge 
profits perceived to be available from post-genomic biotechnology research and 
product development.' Public sector research institutions are increasingly involved in 
applied research. Conversely, private companies are engaging in what would 
traditionally be defined as basic research. There is no doubt, however, that companies 
3 Cumulative research was defined in the Introduction to this thesis at n5. The nature of 'cumulative' 
research will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
4 Although this thesis refers generally to 'companies', a number of studies referred to in this chapter 
make reference to 'firms'. This terminology will therefore be utilised from time to time in this and 
subsequent chapters, although it is recognised that this term is wider than 'companies'. Accordingly, it 
is not intended that 'firm' be used as a synonym for 'company'. It is recognised that this term 
encompasses company structures. 
5 See further below, 1.4. 
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within the biotechnology industry remain heavily dependent on research institutions 
for the provision of a significant amount of basic research output. 
Australian health and medical research has a rich and proud history. This has been 
recognised in numerous federal government reports, which have examined the 
sustainability of research momentum and the ability of the Australian industry to 
capitalise on this research. 6 In a major review of the operation of the healthcare and 
medical sector in Australia, the Federal Government's The Virtuous Cycle-Working 
Together for Health and Medical Research: Health and Medical Research Strategic 
Review, (the Wills Review) the importance of the biotechnology industry was 
recognised, and it was predicted to be ' ... the next revolution beyond the information 
revolution' . 7 
It also stressed the importance of Australia's participation in this revolution, 
recognising that '...biotechnology has potential applications not only in the 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease, but also in the environmental, 
agricultural, and manufacturing sectors: 8 Australia's increasing $1 billion trade 
deficit in pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and other health and medical industries 
was also a major impetus for the push for the development of Australia's medical 
research base by the Wills Review. 9 It was considered that the opportunities available 
to the Australian pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries to develop and export 
intellectual property could assist in reducing this deficit. th Elsewhere, the Federal 
Government has stated its vision for biotechnology as: 
Consistent with safeguarding human health and ensuring human health and ensuring 
environment protection, that Australia capture the benefits of technology for the 
Australian community, industry and the environment!' 
6 See Commonwealth of Australia, The Virtous Cycle-Working Together for Health and Medical 
Research, Health and Medical Strategic Review, (1999); Biotechnology Australia, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Australian Biotechnology: A National Strategy, (2000) (the National Strategy); 
Biotechnology Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Developing Australia's Biotechnology Future: 
Discussion Paper (1999) (Developing Australia's Biotechnology Future); Commonwealth of Australia, 
Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System Redesigned: Final Report (1999). See also Commonwealth 
of Australia, Backing Australia's Ability: An Innovation Action Plan for the Future (2001). 
7 Wills Review, above n6, 25. 
8 Ibid, 25. 
9 Ibid. 126-7. 
Ibid. 
11 The National Strategy, above n6 at 7. 
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From a consumer perspective, biotechnology offers major benefits in terms of 
development of new and improved drugs, therapies and methods of diagnosis, and 
opportunities for containing health-care costs. From an industry perspective, many 
domestic and export market opportunities for small and medium-sized, as well as 
large companies exist. Biotechnology also offers opportunities for environmental 
management. 12 
The Wills Review recognised that Australia has the undisputed capacity to succeed in 
biotechnological development based largely on its fundamental research base. ° 
Australia's health and medical research output per capita exceeds the level that would 
be expected given Australia's population size, and citation levels exceed the world 
average in the area of public health and clinical research. 14 The Wills Review did, 
however, warn against complacency, and indicated that the industry's momentum was 
threatened by a number of factors including most notably: 
• declining public and industry financial support for the industry; 
• fragmented state-based support networks for the industry; and 
• inadequate grants systems. 
The Wills Review called for action to address these factors and highlighted strategies 
available to a number of stakeholders: the research sector, the industry (or private 
company) sector, and govemment. 15 At the same time, the Wills Review highlighted 
the need for action on the part of stakeholders to be mutually reinforcing. In 
particular, it envisaged a role for industry that streamlined technology transfer and 
new business formation practices, and importantly, stimulated the flow of medium to 
long-term venture capital." 
Both state and federal governments in Australia have been strongly supportive of the 
emergent biotechnology industry in recent years, principally in terms of assistance in 
providing capital and infrastructure. The findings of the Wills Review prompted the 
12 See generally The National Strategy, above n6; Developing Australia's Biotechnology Future, above 
n6, i; Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Third Meeting Background Paper, Innovation in Medical Biotechnology (1999) (Innovation in Medical 
Biotechnology) 
<http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/science_innovation/publications_resources/profilesimedical_biotech.h  
tm> at 30 May 2005. 
13 Wills Review, above n6, 25. 
14 /b.. , la 21-22. 
15 Ibid, 3-6. 
16 lb . . 9 la 6-10 
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allocation by the Federal Government in its 1999 Budget of additional funds to 
support biotechnology research in Australia, including: 
• an increase of AU$614 million to the National Health and Medical Research 
Council over six years; 
• AU$20 million each towards the establishment of research 'centres of 
excellence', the establishment of a National Institute of Clinical Studies, and 
capital works for independent health and medical research institutes!' 
Additional allocations of funds to biotechnology research have since been made, 
including funding of AU$46.5 million by Biotechnology Australia and the Australian 
Research Council to assist in the establishment of the Australian Stem Cell Centre. 18 
State governments have also actively promoted their respective industries with 
significant funding commitments. The Victorian Government, for example, released a 
Biotechnology Strategic Plan in 2000, which involved commissioning the 
Biotechnology and Bioscience-Based Industry Report in October 2000. 19 Recognising 
Victoria's significant biotechnology research base, The Strategic Plan also 
incorporated funding to establish biotechnology precincts around Victoria's existing 
research centres. 2° The Queensland Government has implemented a Queensland 
Biotechnology Strategic Plan, 21 which includes a number of funding initiatives aimed 
primarily at promoting innovative projects and funding start-up companies. 22 The 
New South Wales Government also released the NSW Biotechnology Strategy 2001 
BioFirst, which has a strong focus on funding and commercialisation assistance. 23 
17 Reported in Innovation in Medical Biotechnology, above n12, 3. 
18 Formerly the National Stem Cell Centre. For details on the Australian Stem Cell Centre see 
<http://www.nscc.edu.au/ascc_home.html> at 28 July 2005. 
19 BioAccent, Victorian Biotechnology and Bioscience-Based Industry Report (2000). 
2.0 For details see <http:www.bio21.org/> at 24 August 2005. 
21 Queensland Government, Queensland Biotechnology Strategic Plan 2005-2015: Biotechnology — 
Setting New Horizons (2005). 
22 For details on initiatives of the Queensland Government, see (2005) 
<http://www.sdi.q1d.gov.au/dsdweb/v3/guis/templates/content/gui_cue_menu.cfm?id=129 > at 28 July 
2005. 
23 For details see <http://www.business.nsw.gov.au/key.asp?cid=249 > at 28 July 2005. 
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1.3 THE TRANSLATION OF RESEARCH INTO PRODUCTS: THE 
PROCESS OF COMMERCIALISATION 
Focus on Australia's strong research base has meant increased emphasis on 
investment in research. The reports discussed above emphasised that promotion of 
basic scientific excellence in the health and medical area is a priority, but they did not 
consider the protection of that scientific knowledge in any detail. A focus on 
capturing and capitalising on the fruits of research has only recently received 
extensive attention. 
Australia has a number of strengths in medical biotechnology, including world class 
expertise in research, geographical advantages in terms of expanding regional 
markets, appropriate structures to promote close cooperation between the public and 
private sectors and an internationally recognised clinical trial system. 24 Despite this, 
development and commercialisation of scientific discovery has been generally weak. 25 
One factor behind this is inadequate management and understanding of intellectual 
property. 26 Intellectual property protection is crucial to both the research and company 
sectors, and provides companies with a means to recoup research and development 
expenditure. In many cases, research is the primary activity of a research institution or 
company, and intellectual property protection provides a research institution or 
company with an important (and perhaps their main) business asset. 
Increased awareness of intellectual property is evident within the Australian medical 
biotechnology industry, and has been expressly promoted by the Federal 
Government. 27 Commercialisation, where appropriate, has been actively encouraged 
and promoted, particularly in relation to research institutions. For example, the 
purpose of recently released National Principles of Intellectual Property Management 
of Publicly Funded Research was stated to be as follows: 
the purpose of developing the National Principles of [Intellectual Property] 
Management for Publicly Funded Research is to assist researchers, research 
24 
 
Wills Review, above n6, 12; Developing Australia's Biotechnology Future, above n6, 24. 
25  National Strategy, above n6, 11, 19-20; Wills Review, above n6, 12. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Biotechnology Australia and Spruson and Ferguson, Biotechnology Intellectual Property 
Manual, (2001); Australian Research Council, The Australian Tertiary Institutions Commercial 
Companies Association, The Australian Vice Chancellors' Committee, The Department of Education, 
Training and Youth Affairs, The Department of Industry, Science and Resources, IP Australia and The 
National Health and Medical Research Council, National Principles of Intellectual Property 
Management for Publicly Funded Research, 2001, (National Principles of Intellectual Property 
Management) < http://www.arc.gov.au/pdf/01_01.pdf> at 18 May 2004. 
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managers and their research institutions, in ensuring that they have access to best 
practices for the identification, protection and management of [intellectual property], 
and therefore, to maximise the national benefits and returns from public investment 
in research. 28 
A number of initiatives by the Federal Government to encourage commercialisation 
of research by the company sector have also been implemented. These include: 
• the Biotechnology Innovation Fund making available grants to assist 
companies in early stage commercialisation; 29 
• the Innovation Investment Fund providing venture capital to early-stage 
technology companies;3° 
• the R&D Start Program providing support by way of grants to companies; 31 
and 
• R&D Tax Concessions available for eligible R&D expenditure. 32 
If Australian research institutions and companies are unable to capitalise on their 
research output, Australia will lose the benefits of the research. The potential for 
benefits to flow offshore would result in real harm to the Australian industry, as well 
as the economy and ultimately consumers. It is this threat that has led the Federal 
Government to promote privatisation of the products of research. 
1.4 THE INCREASING PRIVATISATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
Medical biotechnology in Australia is moving into a newly industrialised phase. This 
process of industrialisation, is not unique to Australia, but is a global phenomenon 
that is having three interrelated effects: 
• increasingly, collaborative relationships between the public and private sectors 
are being formed; 
28 National Principles of Intellectual Property Management, above n27, 2. 
29 AusIndustry, Fact Sheet: Biotechnology Innovation Fund, 
<http://www.ausindustry.gov.au/content/content.cfm?ObjectID=01A28E134-A066-4D7E-
99AAA16094536488&L2Parent=0786C9BE-08B7-4973-  
93429A645AEEC8E4&L3Parent=FD34329B-F6F6-4C98-B963D0A59C20A603> at 18 May 2004. 
30 Industry Research and Development Board, AusIndustry, Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002), 36-39. 
31 Ibid, 43-48. 
32 Ibid, 51-58. 
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• universities and research institutions are increasingly seeking to patent their 
research results;" and 
• the traditional line between basic and applied science is being blurred. 
1.4.1 COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
The Wills Review highlighted the importance of company involvement in fostering 
the development of a sustainable health and medical industry, and the relationship 
between the research and company sectors is clearly an important indicator of the 
success of the industry. Collaborative relationships between the public and private 
sectors are crucial for development of research capabilities. A study commissioned by 
the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) found that 91 per cent of citations 
contained in Australian-invented patents, whether those patents were publicly or 
privately owned, were to public sector science!" This study found that public science 
is clearly a crucial resource for Australian research institutions and companies. 35 
Importantly, the effect of these relationships is a marked increase in the tendency to 
seek patent protection of research results. This tendency has now extended to the 
public sector. 
1.4.2 UNIVERSITY AND RESEARCH INSTITUTION PATENTING OF RESEARCH 
RESULTS 
Concomitant with the growth of these collaborative relationships, research institutions 
are being encouraged to commercialise their research results. The Federal 
Government has clearly demonstrated a pro-commercialisation policy in respect of 
publicly funded research. 36 In order to assist research institutions in commercialisation 
33 On university patenting of research results, particularly in relation to biomedicine see, for example, 
David C Mowery, Richard R Nelson, Bhaven N Sampat and Arvids A Ziedonis, 'The Growth of 
Patenting and Licensing by US Universities: an Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980', (2001) 1(30) Research Policy 99, 104, 110-116. 
34 CHI Research Inc, Inventing Our Future: The Link Between Australian Patenting and Basic Science 
(2000) (CHI Report) at 59. 
35 Ibid, 59-62. 
36 This trend is even more pronounced in the US where the patenting of university and other federally 
funded research is encouraged by statute, particularly the Bayh-Dole Act 35 USC §§200-211 (1980). 
On thse increased rate of patent filings in the US from publicly funded institutions, see Rebecca 
Henderson, Adam B Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg, 'Universities as a Source of Commercial 
Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting 1965-1988, (1998) 80 Review of Economics 
& Statistics 119. Patenting in the area of biomedicine has dominated; Mowery and Others 2001, above 
n33, 104, 110-116. Note, however, that US universities continue to patent far less than their industry 
counterparts despite generating more genetic discoveries; Michelle R Henry, Mildred K Cho, Meredith 
A Weaver and Jon F Merz, 'DNA Patenting and Licensing' 297 Science 1279 (2002). 
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activities, the National Principles of Intellectual Property Management lay down a 
number of principles intended to streamline and facilitate the process of 
commercialisation of publicly funded research." The National Principles of 
Intellectual Property Management state that research institutions will have procedures 
that provide support to publicly funded researchers to assist them in recognising when 
their discoveries may have potential commercial value." They also call for research 
institutions to implement a review process to identify intellectual property that can be 
protected and/or exploited." 
Ownership of intellectual property in the course of publicly funded research raises 
certain issues that may impede the process of protection and exploitation of 
intellectual property.4° Ownership of intellectual property is generally governed by 
common law, the fundamental position being that employers will have a right of 
ownership over any intellectual property generated by employees during the course of 
their employment!' In particular instances this position may be modified through 
provisions in an employment contract to vest ownership rights in employees. 
Particular issues arise in research institutions in relation to students conducting 
research, as students are not covered under the common law principle. The National 
Principles of Intellectual Property Management state that research institutions 
receiving public funding should have clear policies and agreements in place regarding 
ownership of intellectual property generated during the course of a student's study, 
research and training. 42 
The National Principles of Intellectual Property Management require public funding 
bodies to have clear policies on whether they will claim any ownership and/or 
associated rights for intellectual property generated from research supported by 
37  National Principles of Intellectual Property Managemen4 above n27. As to the adequacy of the 
National Principles of Intellectual Property Management, see, Andrew F Christie, Stuart D'Aloisio, 
Katerina L Gaita, Melanie J Howlett and Elizabeth M Webster, Commonwealth of Australia, Analysis 
of the Legal Framework for Patent Ownership in Publicly Funded Institutions (2003) (Christie and 
Others, Patent Ownership in Publicly Funded Institutions), 78-89. See also David Nyskohus, Ee-Ling 
Then, Paul Nicoll, Commonwealth of Australia, Intellectual Property Policies and Practices in 
Commonwealth Agencies, (2004). 
38 	. National Principles of Intellectual Property Management, above n27, Principle 1. 
39 Ibid. 
ao See generally Christie and Others Patent Ownership in Publicly Funded Institutions, above n37, 
Chapter 1. 
41 See especially, Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah (1938) 55 RPC 237; Victoria University of 
Technology v Wilson and Others [2004] VSC 33. 
42 National Principles of Intellectual Property Management, above n27, Principle 4. 
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them." It is probably the case that public funding institutions would ordinarily have 
rights of ownership of intellectual property generated by research institutions as a 
result of funding provided by them. However, the main national funding bodies, the 
ARC and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) have 
indicated that it will not be their policy to claim such rights." 
Finally, the National Principles of Intellectual Property Management state that 
research institutions and individual researchers are expected to consider the most 
appropriate way of exploiting intellectual property once protected, with each case to 
be considered on an individual basis." 
Subsequent to the release of the National Principles of Intellectual Property 
Management, the NHIMRC issued a set of interim guidelines on intellectual property 
management during the course of research funded by it (the Interim Guidelines)." The 
Interim Guidelines emphasise the importance of a focus by funding recipients on 
intellectual property management for its processes of grant, report and review." The 
Interim Guidelines make specific reference to patents, and the importance of patent 
protection in particular areas of medical research including blockbuster drugs and 
developments, and biotechnological research tools ' ... such as antibodies, probes, cell 
lines etc'." 
With regard to patent activity, Commonwealth agencies and publicly funded research 
institutions performed soundly in the period 1995-2000 in a diverse range of 
technology areas, but particularly in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
• categones49  Research institutions and other publicly funded bodies are actively 
involved in patenting the results of their publicly funded research. 5° 
43 Ibid, Principle 1. 
44 Ibid, 5. 
45 ibid. 
46 National Health and Medical Research Council, Interim Guidelines: Intellectual Property 
Management for Publicly Funded Research (2001) (Interim Guidelines). 
47 mid, 3. 
48 	. Ibtd, 2. The definition of 'research tools' in biomedical research has been contentious. Biotechnology 
research tools are the technological developments and products that enable subsequent lines of 
biotechnology research to be pursued. The term 'research tool' can be defined either narrowly or 
broadly, and varying interpretations of the term have been made. This issue is examined in more detail 
in Chapter 4 in the context of the empirical evidence. In this thesis, a broad definition of the term will 
be employed, so that any research input would be classed as a 'research tool'; see further, 4.3.1. 
49 CHI Report, above n34, 36-7, Table 4 and Table 5. See further below, 1.7. 
50 	. Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues 
Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 6, (Nicol and 
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1.43 A NEW RESEARCH LANDSCAPE: THE MERGING OF BASIC AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE51 
The line between basic, or fundamental research, and applied research (or what may 
loosely be termed downstream research) has blurred. Research institutions 
increasingly seek to undertake more applied, later-stage research. Increasingly, 
patents are being sought by both public and private institutions to protect their 
research results.52 There has also been a preponderance of commercial biotechnology 
company start-ups in market niches between fundamental academic research and end 
product development. These firms are heavily reliant on licensing income from 
patents that are useful as inputs into subsequent research that may ultimately lead to 
product development.' 
There has been considerable commentary on the decreasing divide between publicly 
funded research and privately funded research as companies move to fill the gap 
brought about by funding shortfalls in research activity and commercialisation.54 To 
this end, there has been a marked increase in the amount of basic biotechnological 
science generated by private funding. Research has demonstrated the increasing 
convergence between commercial enterprises and publicly funded institutions 
highlights the important role of private fimding. 55 In Australia, private companies are 
sponsoring an increasing amount of basic research, 56 although at present a majority of 
research performed by research institutions in Australia is still publicly funded." 
Nielsen Study) 125-6; Australian Law Reform Commission, Parliament of Australia, Genes and 
Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, Report No 99 (2004) (ALRC Report), 348-358. 
51 The term 'basic' research has been generally defined as research directed toward expanding human 
knowledge. The term 'applied' research has been generally defined as research directed toward solving 
practical problems; see Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research' (1987) 97 Yale Law Journal 177, her nl. 
52 See Walter W Powell and Jason Owen-Smith, 'Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property 
in the Life Sciences' (1998) 17(2) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 253-277. 
53 This issue will be considered further below, 1.6. 
54 See, eg, Rebecca S Eisenberg and Richard D Nelson, 'Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful 
Tension?' Academic Medicine 77 (2002): 1392. 
55 David Blumenthal, Nancyanne Causino, Eric Campbell and Karen Seashore Louis, 'Relationships 
Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences — An Industry Survey', (1996) New 
England Journal of Medicine 368. This study found that over 90 percent of life science companies in 
the United States are engaged in collaborations of some kind with academic institutions, with two 
thirds of surveyed companies expecting their support of life science research to increase; at 369-370. 
See also Walter W Powell, Kenneth W Koput and Laurel Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational 
Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology' (1996) 41 
Administrative Science Quarterly 116-145. 
56 See Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n50, 94-99. 
57 ALRC Report, above n50, 276-278. 
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The new research landscape is one in which open science plays a diminished role. 58 
The HGP culminated in a race by the public sequencing effort against the efforts of 
private companies. Post-genomic research continues in the same vein. Against this 
competitive backdrop, both research institutions and private companies alike are 
seeking patents over a broad spectrum of research results. Considerable commentary 
has been devoted to the effects of the increasing privatisation of basic research amid 
concern that this privatisation has the effect of eroding the norms or values considered 
to have been traditionally embraced by the scientific community in the pursuit of 
openness.59 
Medical biotechnology research is populated by scientists who are concerned with 
both the pursuit of fundamental knowledge and the solution of practical problems. 6° 
This represents a departure from the traditional distinction between standard analyses 
that place basic and applied science at opposite ends of a linear spectrum. 61 The 
challenge is to ' ... devise arrangements that preserve the great advantages of an open 
system for basic science while still preserving profit incentives for the creation of 
valuable new products.' 62 
At certain points in the duration of the HGP, the private sector has played some part 
in promoting open science, with, for example, Merck's sponsorship of a public cDNA 
sequencing effort with results to be placed in a publicly available database,63 and the 
formation of the SNPs Consortium by pharmaceutical companies in conjunction with 
the Wellcome Trust Foundation for the purpose of identifying and disclosing SNPs in 
the public domain.64 These incentives are aimed at promoting the accessibility of 
upstream technologies, but support the commercialisation through patenting of 
58 See Robert K Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in Robert K Merton (ed), The Sociology 
of Science: Theoretical & Empirical Investigation (1973) 267. See also, eg, Warren Hagstrom, The 
Scientific Community (1965). 
59 See, for example, Eisenberg and Nelson, above n54; Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Intellectual Property at 
the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale cDNA Sequencing' (1996) 3 University of Chicago 
Law School Roundtable 557; Rebecca S Eisenberg and Robert P Merges, 'Opinion Letter as to the 
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences' 
(1995) 23 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 1. 
60 Donald Stokes coined the term 'Pasteur's Quadrant' to describe research that combines the pursuit of 
basic knowledge and the quest for technological innovation; see Donald E Stokes, Pasteur's Quadrant: 
Basic Science and Technological Innovation (1997). This concept is discussed in Eisenberg and 
Nelson, above n54. 
61 Eisenberg and Nelson, above n54, 1393. 
62 Ibid, 1394. 
63 See Eliot Marshall, 'A Showdown Over Gene Fragments' 266 Science (1994): 208, 210. 
64 See Francis S Collins, Mark S Guyer and Aravinda Chalcravarti, 'Variations on a Theme: 
Cataloguing Human DNA Sequence Variation' Science 278 (1997): 1580. 
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downstream products resulting from research using these technologies. ° Private 
incentives may be as effective as public incentives in achieving an appropriate 
balance between intellectual property and the public domain. ° 
The strict dichotomy between basic and applied research is clearly unsustainable in 
any industry such as biotechnology where the two converge. However, the difficulty 
of pinpointing exactly where in the research spectrum privatisation may have a 
chilling effect on innovation results in many policy challenges.° Patenting allows the 
recovery of research and development expenditure, and product development. It has 
the potential to strengthen the development of the medical biotechnology industry, 
because it facilitates the process of commercialisation. Collaborative arrangements 
between the public and private sectors may also be beneficial where they assist the 
development and transfer of technology. 
1.4.4 SUMMARY 
An important aspect of the medical biotechnology industry is the tendency of both 
research institutions and private companies to patent research results. This trend has 
been driven in part by government initiatives to promote commercialisation, and in 
part by the requirements of capital markets. The nature of biomedical research and the 
push to commercialise research have impacted on the structure of the industry. At the 
same time, the structure of the industry will have a consequent impact on the transfer 
of patented technology. This has resulting implications for competition law, as it 
raises questions as to whether competition law has a role to play in regulating dealings 
in intellectual property. 
65 The emergence of private incentives to promote access to research results and materials has led some 
commentators to urge that consideration be given to achieving this balance by using legal change to 
reinforce efficient research norms that emerge within the research and commercial communities; See 
Arti K Rai, 'Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science' 
(1999) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 77. 
66 A number of government incentives aimed at reinforcing scientific openness in biomedicine have 
met with limited success. See, eg, National Institutes of Health, Basic Guidelines for the Transfer of 
Research Tools To and From Recipients of NIH Funds in National Institutes of Health, Report of the 
National Institutes of Health Working Group on Research Tools (1998), Appendix A. See also 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Draft Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Genetic Inventions, (1 February 2005) <http://www.oecd.org/document > at 22 June 2005. See further 
below, 4.2.2.2. 
67 . Eisenberg and Nelson, above n54. 
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1.5 INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Assessing the structure of an industry assists in considering the effects of patent 
protection on innovation within that industry. This section will consider the structure 
of the biomedical industry, both internationally and in Australia. A consideration of 
industry structure is important in four related but distinct contexts: 
• the Australian Government has demonstrated a clear imperative in terms of 
advancing the Australian biomedical industry. Regulation of the operation of 
the industry may be important to the development and sustainability of a 
viable and vibrant industry. 68 
• the size and types of companies and institutions operating in the industry drive 
the levels of patent contracting activity engaged in by both Australian and 
overseas market participants; 
• the cumulative structure of the industry has implications for follow-on 
research; 69 
• market structure as an aspect of the study of industrial economics is important 
in analysing the behaviour of market participants. 7° The structure of a 
particular industry is one of the main determinants of competition within a 
market; and 
Important issues arise in respect of the impact of levels of competition in a market on 
levels of innovation. It is therefore necessary to consider whether the industry is one 
that can be characterised as diffused, with each sector of the industry operating 
individually, or whether it is relatively concentrated. This section will demonstrate 
that the private sector of both the global and Australian biotechnology industries were 
originally characterised primarily by a large number of small entities. Although small 
companies and research institutions still dominate the market, there has been a 
68 Industrial economics is a useful tool for the formulation of policy toward the regulation of the 
conduct of participants within industries. For a discussion on the competing schools of economic 
thought that have formed the basis for (inter alia) competition policy, see Stephen G Corones, 
Competition Law in Australia (2004), 20-35. The main schools of thought are the mainstream school 
and the Chicago school, although recently there has been a shift from these fairly simplistic models to 
more complex models; see below, 1.8. 
69 This issue will be the subject of Chapter 3. 
70 Industrial economics examines the behaviour of companies within an industry in respect of matters 
such as pricing decisions, and the number and size of companies within an industry; see, for example, 
Frederic M Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (1990), 2 
('we seek to ascertain how market processes direct the activities of producers in meeting consumer 
demands, how those processes can break down, and how they adjust, or can be adjusted, to make 
performance conform more closely to some ideal standard'). 
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sustained period of increased concentration resulting in increasing numbers of large, 
vertically integrated organisations. 
1.5.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
Since the commencement of the Human Genome Project (HGP), the biotechnology 
industry has very broadly encompassed the following companies and institutions: 
• pharmaceutical companies (focusing largely on targeted drug discovery); 
• core biotechnology companies; 
• genomic companies; and 
• research institutions. 
Regional sectors of the international industry are primarily comprised of core 
biotechnology companies, n which are mainly small or medium sized enterprises. A 
small number of large core biotechnology companies are active in the industry, as 
well as most of the multinational pharmaceutical companies. Although genomic 
companies are classified as core biotechnology companies, the focus of their business 
has traditionally differed to that of other core biotechnology companies in that their 
emphasis is on sequencing and their products are research tools. In addition, research 
institutions are important in the process of performing basic research and producing 
research tools, and providing enabling technology to core biotechnology companies. 
The high costs of research and development are forcing many small companies to 
concentrate available resources into more narrowly defined research areas identified 
because of their potential for real therapeutic advantage and shorter development 
times. Reliance on the success of one product puts companies in jeopardy if the 
product fails. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult to accurately 
characterise individual companies by their research interests because of a growing 
trend for them to expand into other categories. The sequencing companies, for 
example, who could be traditionally described as genomics companies, are now 
engaged in more downstream research, primarily drug discovery. Incyte now 
describes itself as a drug discovery company, with three significant internal research 
71 Core biotechnology companies are companies whose business is entirely or substantially 
biotechnology related: See Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report (1999) (Ernst & Young, 
Australian Biotechnology Report), 5; Wills Review above n6 at 131. The definition of 'core' 
biotechnology includes all biotechnology-related applications including agricultural and industrial, 
therefore figures reported in the following sections on numbers of biotechnology companies encompass 
applications other than human health. 
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programs underway: 2 Celera is involved in drug discovery and the development of 
therapeutics and diagnostic tests.' Thus, while the research taxonomy described 
above provides a useful means of identifying the principal activities of research 
institutions and companies, they will often fall into more than one category. 
1.5.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRY 
The industry in the United States is well established. It comprises small recently 
established core biotechnology companies, and more established larger companies 
that have made biotechnology part of their portfolio: 4 By 2005 the number of core 
biotechnology companies in the US was estimated to have increased to 1 473 
companies:5 Research and funding institutions are an important component of the 
United States industry:6 
The structure of the dominant United States industry has provided a model for the 
industry in other regions, including the European industry:' Initially, core 
72 'Company Profile for Incyte Corporation' Press Release, 7 November 2003 
<http://investor.incyte.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=69764&p=IROL-NewsText&t=Regular&id=467793& > 
at 1 June 2005. Incyte is also involved in extensive licensing of its patents and in collaborative 
arrangements. 
73 See generally Celera's website <http://www.celera.com/> at 2 June 2005. 
Human Genome Sciences, another company initially involved in sequencing, now states that its goal is 
to '...build a global biopharmaceutical company that discovers, develops, manufactures and markets 
gene-based protein and antibody drugs to treat and cure diseases.'; <http://www.hgsi.com > at 6 June 
2005. 
74 A survey of the United States biotechnology industry conducted by the United States Department of 
Commerce indicated that 72 per cent of respondents reported their primary activity as being human 
health applications; United States Department of Commerce, A Survey of the Use of Biotechnology in 
US Industry (2003) 24-27. 
75 	. Biotechnology Industry Association, Biotechnology Industry Statistics 
<http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp> at 1 June 2005. The number of publicly held 
companies was reported to be 314. 
76 See, eg, Joseph Cortright and Heike Mayer, Signs of Life: The Growth of Biotechnology Centers in 
the US (2002). 
77 Note that while this discussion is confined to the structure of the industry in the US, the EU and 
Australia, the structural trends discussed are also driving the development of the industry in other 
countries such as Canada. The Canadian industry has seen a recent increase in the level of investment 
in biotechnology, with the result that the industry is rapidly expanding. See generally Ernst & Young, 
Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2005 (2005) (Ernst & Young, Global Biotechnology 
Report). In contrast, the industry in Japan differs markedly from these other industry sectors. Small, 
core biotechnology companies have not traditionally existed in Japan. Rather, the pharmaceutical and 
health care related companies, and food corporations have tended to diversify into biotechnology; 
Panos Kanavos, 'Determinants of Market Structure in the International Biopharmaceutical Industry' in 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Aspects of Biotechnologies 
Related to Human Health: Part II: Biotechnology, Medical Innovation and the Economy: The Key 
Relationships (1998), 53. A government drive to promote biotechnology start-ups could see the 
Japanese industry take on a structure more akin to that in other countries, Ernst & Young, Global 
Biotechnology Report, 78-79. 
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biotechnology companies were a United States phenomenon, but the number in other 
countries is increasing. In Europe the number the number of companies during 2004- 
2005 has been reported at 1815. 78 The European industry has recently achieved a scale 
comparable to the industry in the United States. However, raising capital presents 
challenges, and a good deal of European investment in biotechnology is generated 
from the US. 79 Germany boasts the largest number of biotechnology companies with 
346 companies, while the United Kingdom (UK) industry reportedly comprises 311 
companies. 80 
1.53 TRENDS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRY 
The structure of the biotechnology industry is not static. The industry in the United 
States, and to an increasing extent the European Union, is characterised by an 
increasing number of strategic alliances and mergers. Licensing agreements form the 
most common type of alliance, 81 although other forms include joint ventures, and 
research alliances. 
Companies and institutions within the industry are involved in alliance and merger 
activity for a number of reasons. By far the most compelling reason is the high cost of 
research and development together with the increased marketing power of the allied 
or merged entity. 82 The industry as a whole is highly research oriented. Financing is 
difficult for most start-up biotechnology companies, and the high costs of research 
and development force many companies to either enter into strategic alliances with, or 
be acquired by, larger biotechnology companies or pharmaceutical companies. 83 In 
addition, the high technical and commercial risks of product development mean that 
companies need to share risk and have significant product pipelines. These 
agreements result in the sharing of intellectual property over genomic information and 
bioinformatics tools in return for funds for research and development. Indeed, access 
78 Ernst & Young, Global Biotechnology Report, above n77, 44. The number of publicly held 
companies was reported to be 98. 
79 Ibid, 47-55. 
80 - . 
Ibia 46. 
81 See, eg, John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen 'Effects of Research Tool Patenting and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation' in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds.), Patents in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy (2003), 322-324; Intellectual Property Institute, UK Department of Trade 
and Industry, Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law and Practice 
(2004) 69; ICanavos, above n77, 51. 
82 See Ernst & Young, Integration: Ernst & Young's Eighth Annual European Life Sciences Report 
(2001) (Ernst & Young, Integration), 32. 
83 See Ernst & Young, Global Biotechnology Report, above n77, 47-55. 
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to intellectual property may be a major factor influencing a company's decision to 
enter into an alliance. 
It would appear in the United States at least, that the nature of these strategic alliances 
is changing. As company executives become more aware of the value of their 
products, they are tending to develop products to a later stage before entering into 
alliances, and in some cases are insisting on retaining greater rights to royalties in 
licence agreements. 84 Technology access agreements have also assumed more 
importance, with many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies showing an 
increased tendency toward obtaining non-exclusive licences to enabling technology. 85 
Multinational pharmaceutical companies are buying up the patents of core 
biotechnology companies, or entering into agreements allowing them access to the 
patents of smaller companies. 86 The primary reasons for this trend are considered to be 
a desire by pharmaceutical companies to increase their product pipelines given that 
many lucrative, or 'blockbuster' drug patents are about to expire, and the need to 
maintain revenue growth rates. 87 In line with this trend, a large proportion of the drug 
targets of many major pharmaceutical firms now come from genomic databases. 88 
The resultant industry structure is characterised by an increasing number of large 
entities with a portfolio of extensive patents comprising broad, overlapping patents. 
These may be consolidated entities, or vertically integrated groups of companies and 
institutions. 
1.6 THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY 
This section profiles the Australian medical biotechnology industry, highlighting the 
significant levels of alliance activity being engaged in. While the industry has become 
84  lbid, 31-32. 
85 See, eg, Ernst & Young, Convergence: Ernst & Young's Biotechnology Industry Report: Millenium 
Edition (2000) (Ernst & Young, Convergence). 48. An example is provided in the Report: Abgenix has 
licensed its technology for generating antibody product candidates to numerous biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies, notably Human Genome Sciences. Abgenix retained the right to use the 
technology, and at the same time has licensed the right to use technology from Human Genome 
Sciences. 
86 See, eg, Ernst & Young, Global Biotechnology Report, above n77, 12. 
87 id See also Ernst & Young, Integration, above n82, 34 for reasons why pharmaceutical firms seek 
to acquire top tier biotechnology firms. 
88 See, eg, the research profile of Merck, <http://www.merck.com/mrl/research/biology.html > at 28 
July 2005. 
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more established, there is still significant reliance on collaborations with international 
and Australian companies in all sectors of the Australian industry. 
1.6.1 THE SIZE AND COMPOSMON OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY 
The Australian industry is a small player in the international medical biotechnology 
industry. Nevertheless, it is evident that the industry is in a growth phase given recent 
increases in Australia in the number of core biotechnology companies. In 1999 the 
number of core biotechnology companies was estimated to be 20 listed companies and 
100 private unlisted companies. 89 The number was recently estimated to have 
increased to more than 400. 9° 
Most companies are of a relatively small size. There is also some representation by 
multinational pharmaceutical companies in Australia, such as Glaxo SmithKline, FH 
Faulding & Co, Novartis and Bristol Myers Squibb. Approximately 50 per cent of 
biotechnology companies in Australia are involved in biotechnology applications 
relating to human health. 91 Medical biotechnology companies in Australia are active 
in a range of research applications, with a majority of companies researching in 
human therapeutics and diagnostics, and a number of companies involved in drug 
development.92 Few companies work purely in genomics and proteomics, although 
research institutions predominate in this area.93 Some enabling technology is provided 
by a small number of biotechnology companies and research institutions. 
A number of Australian states and territories have strong research bases. Government 
sponsored investment has promoted collaboration between the university research 
bases and infrastructure, and companies with the ability to commercialise products. 
The importance of the private sector as an investor in publicly researched innovation 
is well recognised. 94 Often, biotechnology products are commercialised through 
technology transfer companies associated with the various universities and research 
89 Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report, above n71, 10. 
90 Invest Australia/Biotechnology Australia, Australian Biotechnology: Number One in the Asia Pacific 
for Biotechnology Investment (2005) 
<http://investaustralia.hyperlink.net.au/meclia/IS_BIOTECH_Eng,lish.pdf > at 24 August 2005. 
91 Kelvin Hopper and Lyndal Thorbum, 2002 Bioindustly Review: Australia and New Zealand (2002), 
29. 
92 Ibid, 3. 
93 Ibid. 
94 See, eg, Commonwealth of Australia, Ernst & Young and Freehills, Australian Biotechnology Report 
(2001) (Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report 2001), 60-65. The importance of the research 
system to the sustainability of biotechnology firms is also stressed: See CHI Report, above n34, 62. 
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institutions, or through spin-off companies established for the purpose of 
commercialising research generated by research institutions." 
A number of Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) are also involved in 
biotechnology research and the commercialisation of biotechnology products. These 
Centres compete by application for Commonwealth funding for a limited period, and 
may be self-sustaining after the completion of the funding period. CRCs comprise 
university researchers, government research institutes and private sector businesses. 
Available figures indicate that approximately one third of the 71 CRCs have 
significant biotechnology programs, with approximately ten of those involved in 
medical science and technology. 96 
The Australian biotechnology industry suffers from a shortage of venture capital, a 
problem which is certainly not specific to this industry." There is also a limit to the 
extent of public investment available in Australia, a related issue being the level of 
investor confidence in biotechnology. This may also prove to be a barrier to 
commercialisation in the absence of alliance activity between firms in the life science 
sector in Australia. It has been stressed that the key to overcoming this lies in merger 
and joint venture activity amongst Australian life science or biotechnology 
companies, and perhaps more importantly, in foreign investment in Australian 
biotechnology companies." 
1.6.2 INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIAN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
Many major international companies, particularly US and European companies are 
active in Australia, through ownership of Australian companies, research 
collaborations with Australian companies, or licensing agreements. Even so, there is 
some concern that many Australian biotechnology companies suffer from a lack of 
international exposure." The importance of investment by the international 
95 Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report 2001, above n94, 48-50. 
• 96 Department of Education, Science and Training, Commonwealth of Australia, CRC Directory 2004 
(2004); Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report, above n71, 53. 
97 	. Wtlls Review, above n6, 152; Developing Australia's Biotechnology Future, above n6, 28; Ernst & 
Young, Australian Biotechnology Report, above n71, 41. Note that levels of research and development 
expenditure by Australian companies are relatively low; see Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology 
Report 2001, above n94, 22-24. 
98 Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report, above n71, 21; Wills Review, above n6, 193. 
" Ernst & Young, Hay Group & Strategic Industry Research Foundation, Benchmarking Study of R&D 
Costs in Selected Segments of the Australian Biotechnology Industry: Final Report (Canberra: AGPS, 
2001); Wills Review, above n6, 193; Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report, above n71, 35. 
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pharmaceutical sector in particular, has been stressed.m° There is a clear trend toward 
international business alliances outnumbering local alliances. m 
The difficulty this presents from a national perspective is that the benefits from 
Australia's research base could flow offshore. This will often be compounded by 
Australian researchers being forced to negotiate agreements with powerful 
multinational companies that have superior resources and bargaining power. 
Nevertheless, establishing markets for their intellectual property is crucial for 
Australian researchers and companies. Licensing represents a popular option among 
biomedical patent holders for realising value from their patents, in that it allows patent 
holders to retain ultimate control of the patent, and in many cases realise value on an 
ongoing basis. Depending on the terms on which licence arrangements are entered 
into, rights to future inventions and intellectual property may be assured. 
After conducting a study of the industry in Australia in 2002, Hopper and Thorburn 
noted that the growth of the industry in Australia has slowed somewhat. 102 They did, 
however, report a marked increase in companies that could be categorised as 
upstream, and that engage in the business of supplying more downstream users with, 
for example, gene sequence data. 103 This apparent shift in focus by the Australian 
industry may have the effect of bolstering the upstream segment of the industry, and 
this will necessarily entail an increasing reliance on patent protection in this industry 
sector. Participants in the Australian industry will need to ensure: 
• that they obtain adequate intellectual property protection, particularly in the 
world's major markets; 104 and 
• that they make efforts to ensure that their intellectual property is marketable 
and adequately exploited. 
Companies face a number of hurdles in doing so. 105 However, a related threat may 
stem from the enforcement of patents by other industry participants to block research. 
Difficulties may be encountered by researchers, both public and private, in entering 
into contractual arrangements for the exchange of intellectual property. 
100 	. Wills Review, above n6, 157. 
101 Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report 2001, above n94, 47. 
102 Hopper and Thorbum, above n91. 
103 lb . ., la 11. 
164 Ibid, 30; Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report 2001, above n94, 49. 
105 These include financing innovation, obtaining expertise in management, regulatory constraints and 
policies, marketing products and penetrating international markets. 
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1.7 LEVELS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTING 
Obtaining accurate figures on levels of biotechnology patenting internationally or in 
Australia is difficult. This is due to differences in definitions of 'biotechnology' and 
'gene' patents" across jurisdictions, and the fact that limited information is available 
on patent applications and granted patents." Globally, there is little doubt that levels 
of biotechnology patenting have increased dramatically. The US biotechnology 
industry association BIO reported an increase in issued biotechnology patents in the 
US from 2,160 in 1989 to 7,763 in 2003." From 1998, over 7000 biotechnology 
patents have been issued per year." The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have reported similar growth in patenting activity; the number 
of biotechnology patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) has risen at 
risen at a rate of four percentage points above total EPO patents.' ° Over 6000 
biotechnology patents were granted by the EPO in 2000, compared to just under 2000 
patents in 1991. 111  
Many companies and research institutions have filed applications for human gene 
patents, with many of the companies initially involved in sequencing reporting that a 
very significant proportion of these applications have resulted in patent grants. Incyte 
has reported that it believes it has the 'largest compilation of information regarding 
full-length genes and the proteins they encode and also the largest commercial 
portfolio of issued US patents covering such genes and proteins.' 12 It is difficult to 
obtain precise comparable figures on the number of gene patents actually granted by 
106 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has defined patented 
genetic inventions as inventions whose claims include nucleotide (DNA or RNA) sequences. 
Biotechnology patents encompass gene patents and are a broader category; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies, (2002) (the OECD Report), 33. 
107 See also ALRC Report, above n50, 407. 
108 . Biotechnology Industry Association, Biotechnology Industry Facts 
<http .//www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp> at 30 May 2005. 
109 ibid. 
110 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Compendium of Patent Statistics, 
Internal Working Document (2004), 29. 
112 'Company Profile for Incyte Corporation' Press Release, 7 November 2003 
<http://investor.incyte.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=69764&p.IROL-NewsText&t.Regular&id=467793& > 
at 1 June 2005. Incyte is also involved in extensive licensing of its patents and in collaborative 
arrangements. 
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various national patent offices, but there is no doubt that there has been a steep rise in 
genetic patent applications.'" 
There is evidence of extensive patenting activity within the Australian biomedical 
industry, and the number of patents granted in the biotechnology category has steadily 
increased. In 1997, around 461 patents were granted in this category, and by 1998 this 
number had risen to 784. The number of patents granted per year peaked in 2001 at 
869, before dropping slightly during 2002 and 2003 to around 765 patents per 
annum. 114 
A vast majority of patents granted in the biotechnology category in Australia, have 
been granted to non-Australians. While around ten percent of patents granted each 
year originate in Australia, only two percent of patent applications filed in the 
biotechnology category up until 1998, originated in Australia. The number of 
biotechnology patents filed by Australians did increase in real terms from 26 in 1988 
to 46 in 1998, but it is likely that the number of biotechnology patents granted to 
Australians remains modest in comparison to non-Australian inventors. m While the 
number of patents granted in the biotechnology category have certainly increased 
since this period, it seems fair to assume that a significant number of patents are still 
granted to non-Australians.'" 
The CHI Report indicates that the number of Australian invented patents filed in the 
US closely matches the number of Australian invented patents filed in Australia. 117 
During the five-year period 1994-1998 there was a 249 per cent increase in Australian 
invented biotechnology patents from the previous five-year period, further supporting 
the conclusion that Australian biotechnology is in a growth phase.'" Nevertheless, US 
113 OECD Report, above n106, 34-38. 
114 IP Australia, Top 10 Technologies of Granted Standard Patents 92-03 
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/statistics/Standard%20Grants%20by%20Tech%2092-03.xls > at 
30 June 2005. Note that the number of pharmaceutical patents granted per year has increased 
dramatically, from around 630 patents per annum in 1997, to around 1200 patent per year from 1999 
onwards. 
115 Note that the biotechnology category includes both medical and agricultural biotechnology. It also 
includes gene patents. The author thanks Jodi Lawler and Rod Crawford from IF Australia for 
providing this data. 
116 Some of this data was also reported in Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, 'The Australian Medical 
Biotechnology Industry and Access to Intellectual Property: Issues for Patent Law Development' 
(2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 347, 360-362. 
117 CHI Report, above n34, 29. 
118 /bid, 32. 
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inventors continue to file the vast majority of biotechnology patents in the US. 119 The 
number of Australian co-invented patents generally is increasing, and a large number 
of co-invented patents are US-Australian collaborations. 12° 
The Report concluded that the performance of Australian inventors in the 
biotechnology category was stronger than the performance of Australian inventors 
generall y. 121 Despite this, biotechnology patent activity relative to gross domestic 
product remains average' 22 and the number of biotechnology patents filed and held by 
Australian inventors remains low in relative terms. 123 
1.8 THE RELEVANCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
In a comprehensive analysis on the structure of the international biopharmaceutical 
industry, Panos Kanavos identified a number of determinants of market structure 
specific to the biopharmaceutical industry. 124 Kanavos also examined the trends 
apparent in the biopharmaceutical industry and examined how these trends impact on 
market structure. 123 The biopharmaceutical industry is uniquely structured, and levels 
of concentration are low overall, but higher at sub-therapeutic or product levels. 126 
This is due primarily to the nature of the technology and the fragmentation of the 
pharmaceutical market into a large number of therapeutic categories.'" 
The biopharmaceutical industry is particularly research-intensive and is characterised 
by long product development lead times and relatively limited product pipelines. As 
119 Over the five-year period 1994-1998, US inventors filed 6 847 biotechnology patents and 10 218 
pharmaceutical patents; see ibid Table 6a, 71. 
120 Nearly half of all Australian co-invented patents are US-Australian collaborations. This figure has 
increased from five per cent in the first half of this decade to over 15 per cent in the last five years: 
Ibid, 26. 
121  Ibid, 26-29. In terms of general patenting activity, Australian invented patents in the US represent 
approximately 0.5 per cent of patents filed; at 26-29. 
122 Ibid, 28. 
123 	. . 	. See ibid. Fig 7. 
124 Kanavos, above n77, 41-129. 
125 Kanavos adopts a generally mainstream approach, but uses a theoretical framework that examines 
factors affecting structure, conduct and performance in an interrelated way. He states that this approach 
has been the approach of recent theoretical frameworks that have moved away from early mainstream 
empirical literature; Ibid, 44. 
126 Ibid, 105. 
127 "b . ., ict 105. 
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such, the interplay of a number of traditional barriers to entry unique to 
pharmaceuticals, impact on the structure of the industry:' 28 
• the high research and development costs associated with the research intensive 
nature of the industry; 
• the ability of companies to penetrate foreign markets; 
• concentration levels within the industry and the impact of competition policy 
on these concentration levels; 129 
• the ability to adequately market products; 
• price competition, which is generally low at sub-therapeutic level, and price 
differentiation which is high; and 
• the ability of companies to integrate. 
In addition, a number of exogenous factors related to the regulatory framework and 
investment and funding opportunities available to biopharmaceutical companies will 
play a part in the overall structure of the industry. 130 In particular, degrees of 
investment, and research and development support will impact on the relative size and 
success of the industry. 131  The ease with which intellectual property protection can be 
obtained is also an important factor. 132 
A number of these factors are also relevant to the structure of that portion of the 
medical biotechnology industry involved in the development of therapeutics and 
diagnostic tests and treatments. Clearly, certain factors are specific to the 
biopharmaceutical industry's involvement in drug development, and these relate 
generally to the regulatory framework within which biopharmaceutical companies 
must work, and the long lead-time for drug development. Despite these differences, 
however, the structure of that portion of the industry involved in therapeutic and 
diagnostic applications bears some similarities to the biopharmaceutical sector, 
highlighting the importance of the remaining indicators of market structure 
highlighted by Kanavos. 
128 Ibid, 53-66. 
129 This factor will be discussed in more detail below, 1.8.2. 
130 Kanavos, above n77, 67-99. 
131 Ibid, 67-87, 94-99. 
132 Ibid, 87-93. 
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Consideration of factors contributing to market structure is important from a 
competition law perspective, because market structure will have a bearing on the 
conduct of participants within a particular industry. Traditional competition law 
analysis has incorporated the structure-conduct-performance approach, which posits 
the examination of market power as a product of market structure, in assessing the 
conduct of a participant within a market.'" Performance, in turn, is the result of the 
structure-conduct relationship within a particular industry.'m 
Over time, this approach has been viewed as being overly simplistic. In Australia, a 
modified structure-conduct-performance approach is utilised by the courts, but it 
would appear that strategic considerations are becoming a more pronounced 
consideration. 135 This echoes to some degree, the current position in the US. US 
antitrust policy from the 1980s was dominated by 'Chicago School' economics, 136 
which advocates minimal regulation as a means to achieving allocative efficiency.'" 
Antitrust policy in the US has now entered a 'post-Chicago' phase, which is reflected 
in greater scepticism of 'strategic anti-competitive behaviour by dominant firms 
138 
Strategic considerations are likely to be taken into account by courts, (both in 
Australia and internationally) in determining the effect of conduct on dynamic 
efficiencies. Australian courts will continue to apply a structure-conduct-performance 
approach, 139 but strategic factors may now be an integral part of analysis of market 
133 This approach is based on the work of a number of Harvard economics and antitrust scholars, see, 
eg, Joseph Bain, Industrial Organisation, (1959); Scherer and Ross, above n70; Phillip Areeda and 
Donald F Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Applications (1978); Carl 
Kaysen and Donald F Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959). 
134 On determinants of market structure according to the Harvard or mainstream tradition, see Scherer 
and Ross, above n70, ch 4. 
135 See, eg, Rhonda Smith and David K Round, 'Section 46: A Strategic Analysis of Boral' (2002) 30 
Australian Business Law Review 202. 
136 This school of economic thought evolved from the work of a number of scholars associated with the 
University of Chicago; see, eg, George Stigler, The Organisation of Industry (1968); Harold Demsetz, 
Economic, Legal and Political Dimensions of Competition (1982); Robert H Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (1978); Justice Frank H Easterbrook, 'Ignorance and Antitrust' in 
Thomas M Jorde and David J Teece (eds) Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness (1992) 119 
137 See, eg, Easterbrook, above n136, 119; Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review 
and Critique' (2001) Columbia Business Law Review 257. As such, Chicago economists would be 
unlikely to support the regulation of unilateral actions; Corones, above n68, 23. 
138 Hovenkamp, above n137, 267. There remain, however, a number of important differences between 
the enforcement of competition law or antitrust in the US and Australia. For an explanation of antitrust 
regulatory policy, see generally Corones, above n68, ch 1. 
139 The application of this approach in relation to s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which 
prohibits the misuse of market power, will be considered in Chapter 6. 
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power and its effect on performance. This is particularly the case in relation to 
barriers to entry. 14° 
1.8.1 BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
Barriers to entry have been recognised as being the most important determinant of 
market structure when examining whether a market is competitive. 141 The ability of 
companies to enter an industry is important as a means of promoting competition and 
improving the allocation of economic resources. Barriers to entry are perceived as 
being anti-competitive in that they result in fewer entries and allow incumbents to 
enjoy above average profitability. 142 The study of entry and entry barriers is thus 
important in determining why the structure of any particular industry has taken on a 
particular form and in analysing the extent of market power possessed by an 
incumbent. 
Varying attempts have been made to define this term, and different approaches 
circumscribe different guidelines for what might constitute a barrier to entry. 143 
Historically, the debate centred around the views of Joseph Bain i44 who adopted a 
liberal definition of barriers to entry, and George Stigler, 145 a scholar of the Chicago 
School tradition which has traditionally taken a narrower approach. Subsequent work 
has built on and modified this earlier work, and the extensive economic literature on 
140 Corones, above n68, 32. 
141 See the definition of competition enunciated in Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd 
and Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169 at 188-89, and the elements of market structure which 
need to be examined in order to determine whether a market is competitive. This definition has been 
extensively quoted and is regarded as being the seminal definition of competition in Australian 
competition law. This matter will be analysed more extensively below, 6.3.3. 
142 See George Yip, Barriers to Entry: A Corporate-Strategy Perspective (1982), 7. 
143 As Hay points out, there is a substantive difference between the ... definition of a barrier to entry, 
and the elements that may constitute a barrier to entry.'; George A Hay, Boral — Free at Last (2003) 10 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 323, 330. It has also been suggested that the central issue 
accounting for these divergences in opinion is whether ' ... the definition and identification of barriers 
to entry must completely block entry, or whether it is sufficient if it only delays entry for some 
(socially acceptable) time; Antra Hood, 'Barriers and Impediments to Entry in Australian Health Care 
Markets After Stirling Harbour, Boral and Melway' (2002) 20 Australian Business Law Review 6, 15. 
See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, who suggest that it will be sufficient if entry is deterred for a 
'sufficiently long time'; Phillip E Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and their Application (2002) (Areeda and Hovenkamp), vol 2A, [420c]. 
144 Joseph Bain, Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing 
Industries (1965), 12-13. Bain contends that barriers to entry may arise from product differentiation, 
absolute cost advantages and economies of scale. 
145 George Stigler, The Organisation of Industry (1968), 67-68. Stiglerian barriers comprise costs that 
market incumbents do not have to bear, and exclude economies of scale. 
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barriers to entry attests to the complexity of deftnition and characterisation in this 
field of study. 146 
While there is some dispute amongst economics scholars over the appropriate 
definition of barriers to entry, for the purposes of competition law, it is generally 
accepted that the notion of barriers to entry as articulated by Joseph Bain will usually 
be most appropriate. 147 This is essentially because the focus of competition law is on 
whether entry is likely to occur and therefore limit potentially anti-competitive 
practices. Those practices will be evaluated according to existing market power, 
regardless of how that market power came about.'" Thus, an expansive definition of 
barriers to entry will be applied in determining issues of market power, so that a 
barrier to entry will generally be defined as any factor that permits firms already in 
the market persistently [to] raise their prices above a competitive level without 
attracting new firms to enter the industry. '149 
This is certainly the approach that has been adopted by Australian courts, 15° so that 
any restraint on entry will be taken into account in assessing market power. 151 
Essentially, any limitation on entry or factor that tends to raise the costs of new 
entrants relative to that of incumbents is capable of constituting a barrier to entry. u2 
Under this definition, a number of factors may constitute structural barriers to entry, 
including patents.'" It is well recognised that effective patent protection is important 
to this industry, primarily because biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies need 
146 A useful summary of some of the main studies in this area is contained in Hood, above n143, 9-15. 
For a more detailed exposition see Paul Geroski, Richard J Gilbert and Alexis Jacquemin, Barriers to 
Entry and Strategic Competition (1990) 68-85. 
147 Areeda and Hovenkamp, above n143, vol 2A, [420c]; Corones, above n68, 98-104. 
148 Areeda and Hovenkamp, above n143, vol 2A, [420c]. 
149 Bain' above n144, 5. See also ibid. vol 2A, [420a]. 
150 For example, in Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (2000) ATPR 41-752, a 
broad definition of barriers to entry in line with the definition of Bain was preferred. The result is that 
impediments to entry will need to be considered in analysing market structure; Hood, above n143, 21. 
See also Corones, above n68, 98-104. 
151 See also Hood, above n143, 16-21. Exactly what might constitute a barrier to entry will vary from 
case to case; at 16-21. 
152 For example, one of the main barriers to entry facing biotechnology companies in Australia and in 
other sectors of the international industry is the prohibitive cost of research and development and the 
related barriers of financing and levels of investment; see, eg, Ernst & Young, Australian 
Biotechnology Report, above n71, 44-45. In addition, many companies encounter problems 
subsequently when further funding is required, and this has resulted in the trend of affiances and 
mergers described above. 
153 See, eg, Scherer and Ross, above n70, 360. Australian courts have recognised that a patent may 
constitute a barrier to entry; see, eg, Queensland Wire, 189-190 (Mason CJ and Wilson J). 
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to recoup substantial research and development expenditure. 154 Kanavos points out 
that the effectiveness of the patent systems of various countries has had an important 
effect on the development of the biopharmaceutical industry in those countries. 155 
At the same time, the industry is increasingly characterised by defensive patenting, 
and vertically integrated organisations that have as a primary goal the consolidation of 
patents. 156 In certain circumstances, incumbents may erect entry barriers through 
strategic responses to actual or potential entry. 157 Strategic behaviour by incumbent 
firms can potentially deter entry either by threatening to reduce post entry prices that 
potential entrants can expect to receive or by taking actions that raise new entrants' 
costs. 158 Given the trend of the international industry toward alliances and sharing of 
patents, the strategic use of patents within the industry could impact on market 
structure and the market power of incumbents. 159 
1.8.2 CONCENTRATION VERSUS COMPETITION 
Undoubtedly, innovation is important to consumers and to the growth of a strong 
economy. 160 The facilitation of innovation enhances social welfare, and the process of 
innovation may entail some sacrifice in static efficiency at the expense of dynamic 
efficiency. 161 Various studies, both theoretical and empirical, have been conducted 
with a view to establishing the industry structure that provides the best environment in 
which to facilitate innovation. Empirical examinations have been conducted under a 
range of conditions and with a variety of industry structures in mind. 
Both patents and competition can facilitate innovation. 162 Justifications for patents will 
be discussed in Chapter 2, but proponents of patents consider they promote dynamic 
154 See below, 2.2.2.1, 2.2.2.5. 
155 Kanavos, above n77, 87-93. 
156 See further, below 2.5.4, 4.4.4. 
157 See Scherer and Ross, above n70, especially 391-396. 
158 Ibid. 
159 This issue will be examined in detail in the context of s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in 
Chapter 6. 
160 For a useful summary of the fundamental characteristics of innovation and the innovative process 
see Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, The Economics of Innovation: A Survey, July 
2002 (ABA Survey) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/0207salabasrvy.pdf > at 29 April 2004, at 4-8. 
161 Static efficiency constitutes short-term efficiency and relates to the optimal allocation of resources 
using existing technologies to produce existing products. In contrast, dynamic efficiency is the optimal 
allocation of resources in a world where it is possible to also produce new products and processes; ibid, 
their n3. 
162 Merges argues that shifts in organisational structure resulting in changes in firm-level distribution of 
research and development activity, is resulting in more integration between firms and less 
concentration of intellectual property within single firms. Specifically, research and development 
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efficiency by encouraging the process of research and development, and serve the 
goals of: 
• protecting against free-riders and so inducing innovation; 
• encouraging disclosure of inventions; and 
• facilitating commercialisation of inventions. 163 
By their nature, patents restrict competition in markets through the concentration of 
property privileges in an individual. While this may be necessary in order to advance 
the goals of the patent system, it may also entail considerable cost, particularly where 
a patent gives a patent holder a degree of market power. 164 Specifically, patents may 
hinder the process of competition by: 165 
• raising price levels above competitive levels; 
• reducing output of a product or technology below competitive levels; 
• restricting entry into a market through enforcement of patents; or 
• restricting access to products or technologies necessary for follow-on 
innovation. 166 
While it is inevitable that some degree of price and quantity distortion will result from 
the grant of patents, in some circumstances the effects mentioned above may be cause 
for concern. It is not clear, however, that competition necessarily has a more positive 
effect on innovation than concentration through the grant of patents. Competition may 
force market participants to innovate due to the threat of entry, and a multiplicity of 
efforts are being increasingly dispersed across industries, and decreasingly carried out by single large 
firms so that patents are controlled by many rather than a few. As a result of this 'outsourcing' or 
'strategic partnering', the days of the 'killer patent portfolio' are over, and intellectual property is 
playing an important part in this shift; see Robert P Merges, 'Antitrust Review of Patent Acquisitions: 
Property Rights, Firm Boundaries, and Organisation' in Robert D Anderson and Nancy T Gallini (eds) 
Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge Based Economy (1998) 116. 
163 Below, 2.2. See also Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) (Federal Trade Commission Report), Chapter 2, 3-7. 
164 It is generally accepted that it is a fallacy to view patents as universally conferring market power. 
While there will be instances in which patents do confer market power, in a majority of cases they will 
not; see, eg, Edmund W Kitch Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1727, 1729-38. See also below, 6.3.3, 8.2.2. 
165 See generally Federal Trade Commission Report, above n163, Chapter 2, 7-8; Louis ICaplow, The 
Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 1813, 1821-23 (discussing 
the fact that questions of patent-antitrust policy must involve a detailed analysis of reward versus 
monopoly loss). 
166 Below, Chapter 3, especially 3.9.1. 
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research efforts may lead to results that could not have been foreseen at the outset. 167 
Innovators may take different approaches to reach the same goal which in themselves 
could have social value.' 
It is also true, however, that despite the positive effects it may have in relation to 
innovation, competition may also injure innovation in some instances by: 169 
• restricting the ability of inventors to appropriate value from their inventions; 
Or 
• encouraging 'patent races' or duplication of research efforts. r° 
The question, therefore, is whether concentration or competition serves as a superior 
inducement to innovate. 171 A great deal of conflicting economic literature exists on 
innovation and market structure, and whether concentration or competition is more 
conducive to innovation. This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
overview of this literature, but merely aims to highlight the primary arguments 
presented by both monopoly theorists and advocates of competitive markets. 
1.8.2.1 SCHUMPETARIAN HYPOTHESES 
Monopoly theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter are Proponents of concentration as a 
method of promoting innovation."2 Schumpeter's hypothesis, in denouncing perfect 
competition as a model of ideal efficiency, is that large, monopolistic entities drive 
innovation and are likely to be motivated to innovate further by the threat of new 
participants entering the market with improved technology. 173 There have been two 
interpretations of this argument: 
• larger entities are likely to innovate more profusely than smaller entities; and 
167 Robert P Merges and Richard R Nelson, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope', (1990) 90 
Columbia Law Review 839, 873-4. 
168 Arti K Rai, 'Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of 
Patents and Antitrust', (2001) 16 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 813 (Rai 2001), 825. 
169 See Federal Trade Commission report, above n163, Chapter 2, 16-17. 
170 Patent races can also be a positive in terms of the diverse innovation they may give rise to. See also 
below, 1.8.2.2. 
171 	. It Is also important to remember that the rate of innovation in an industry will invariably influence 
market structure; Scherer and Ross, above n70, 630. 
172 See Joseph M Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). 
173 Ibid, 81-106. 
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• there is likely to be a greater level of innovation by entities in concentrated 
markets.'" 
Subsequent empirical studies have sought to test these two streams of Schumpeter's 
hypotheses, and the results of these studies are briefly outlined below.' m Although 
equivocal and conflicting, the studies conducted in this area offer some empirical 
guidance on the types of market features most likely to be conducive to innovation. 
(i) 	The Relationship of Firm Size to Innovation 
Theoretically, large firms may have greater capacity to innovate due to economies of 
scale, more diversified research and development activities that allow them to spread 
risk across projects, better access to financing, a greater ability to penetrate markets 
and stronger incentives to develop process improvements. 176 Conversely, small firms 
may be less risk averse than their larger counterparts. m 
Although there would appear to be a positive correlation between firm size and levels 
of research and development, recent studies have demonstrated that research and 
development levels do not rise more than proportionately with firm size. Early studies 
generally found firm size and research and development levels to be more than 
proportionate.m However, later studies (which, unlike the earlier studies, attempted to 
control for the effects of extraneous industry characteristics) contradicted these 
findings, and suggested that research and development levels rise 'monotonically' to a 
point with firm size and then rise only proportionately. 179 
Size of business units would appear to be more closely related to research and 
development levels than corporate size generally. 180 Recent studies have tempered 
174 ABA Survey, above n160, 28-30. 
175 For useful summaries see Scherer and Ross, above n70, 613-660; Ibid, 30-35. The ABA Survey also 
contains an annotated selected bibliography detailing a number of important studies in the area; ibid, 
50). The discussion that follows utilises the discussion format in the ABA Survey, as well as the study 
trends reported in that survey. 
176 Scherer and Ross, above n70, 652. 
177 Ibid, 652-653. 
178 An exposition of these earlier surveys can be found in William L Baldwin and John T Scott (1987) 
Market Structure and Technological Change (1987) 64-113. 
179 See, eg, Wesley M Cohen, 'Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity in P Stoneman (ed), 
Handbook of the Economics of Innovations and Technological Change (1995) 188 -264 especially 195 - 
196. The results of these studies led to a generally held belief that large firm size was detrimental to 
research and development activity; see Wesley M Cohen and Steven Klepper 'A Reprise of Size and R 
& D' (1996) 106 The Economic Journal 925, 930. 
180  Ibid, 936-946. Research and development into process innovations is likely to benefit more from 
firm size than research and development into product innovations; Wesley M Cohen and Steven 
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these findings, and suggest that it might be possible to conclude that larger firm size 
does in fact contribute to increased research and development, primarily because large 
firms have a greater capacity to realise sales revenues which allows them to fund 
research and development. 181 
(ii) 	The Relationship Between Market Structure and Innovation 
Theoretical analyses have predicted that rivalry is apt to stimulate research and 
development spending, although at some point increased concentration is likely to be 
detrimental to innovation because market participants are likely to appropriate returns 
as profit rather than committing them to funding further research and development. 182 
High levels of concentration are more likely to spur spending on research and 
development where technological advances occur ' ... quickly and unexpectedly ... ' 
rather than slowly and unexpectedly.'" 
Empirical studies have yielded contradictory results. A number of studies have 
supported the existence of a non-linear inverted-U relationship between concentration 
levels and innovation. 184 Thus, technological vigour may increase to a point with 
concentration, but this is likely to be at fairly low levels! 85 However, later studies 
suggest that inter-industry differences may impact on whether the inverted-U 
relationship holds within the context of a particular industry. 186 The matter is also 
complicated by the fact that in some industries, the level of innovation (and 
technological opportunity available) may itself influence entry levels into markets. 187 
Klepper, 'Firm Size and the Nature of Innovation Within Industries: The Case of Process and Product 
R&D' (1996) 78 Review of Economics and Statistics 232, 241. 
181 'bid, 198-210. 
182 Scherer and Ross, above n70, 646. 
183 'bid, 646. 
184 See, eg, Frederic M Scherer, 'Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers' 
(1967) 57 American Economic Review 524. See also the discussion in Richard C Levin, Wesley M 
Cohen and David C Mowery, 'R&D Appropriability, Opportunity and Market Structure: New 
Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses (1985) 75 American Economic Review 20. 
185 See, eg, Frederic M Scherer, Innovation and Growth: Schumpetarian Perspectives (1984), 247, 
suggesting that 'technological vigor' will not be enhanced by a concentration of greater than four firms. 
186 See, eg, Levin, Cohen and Mowery, above n184. See also Scherer and Ross, above n70, 646; Dennis 
W Carlton and Robert H Gertner, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behaviour (Working 
Paper No 8976, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002) 14. Scherer and Ross caution that 
despite the uncertainty surrounding the empirical evidence on the existence of an inverted-U 
relationship, the underlying theory supports its existence and thus it should not be dismissed too 
rapidly; at 647. 
187 See especially Paul A Geroski, 'Innovation, Technological Opportunity and Market Structure' 
(1990) 42 Oxford Economic Papers 586, especially 597; Paul A Geroski, 'Entry and the Rate of 
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In others, innovation levels and market structure may be simultaneously determined 
by other factors.'88 
(iii) The Availability of Technological Opportunities 
As discussed, recent research indicates that inter-firm factors other than firm size 
would appear to play a significant role in innovation levels. 189 In addition, industry 
characteristics other than market structure may influence innovation within an 
industry. 190 Indeed, recent research suggests that these factors may in fact be more 
fundamental in determining innovative activity and performance than market structure 
and firm size. 19 ' The ability to patent has been shown to have some correlation with 
levels of innovation, although the studies discussed in this section have indicated that 
the value and effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries. 192 Studies 
examining the ability to appropriate research and development do not offer any 
definitive conclusions about the relevance of this factor to levels of innovation. 193 
The richness of technological opportunities available to industry participants is one 
factor that may operate to simultaneously determine both research and development 
and concentration levels within an industry. 194 It may explain differences in innovation 
levels more effectively than factors such as concentration. 195 Again, limited data is 
available in relation to the effects of this factor on innovative activity, but it has been 
postulated that in industries characterised by high levels of technological opportunity, 
concentrated markets may produce more innovative activity. 196 Generally speaking, 
Innovation' (1991) 1 Economic Innovation and New Technology 203; Paul A Geroski, Market 
Dynamics and Entry (1991). Breadth in innovative opportunities will invariably attract new entrants, 
provided entry is possible. In this case, market structure may become a product of technological 
progress, and determining which is causative becomes difficult. 
188 See, eg, Levin, Cohen and Mowery, above n184. 
189 Above, 1.8.2.1. 
190 See, eg, Cohen, above n179, 210-231. These factors have been classified as product market demand, 
technological opportunity, and appropriability conditions; at 210-211. A recent Australian study found 
that, consistent with overseas studies, 'factors common to all industries, such as the extent of learning, 
knowledge spillovers, appropriability and managerial style are more important than industry specific 
forces'; Elizabeth Webster, Forces Shaping Firms' Decisions to Innovate: Evidence from Large 
Australian Organisations (Working Paper No 03/03, Intellectual Property Research Institute of 
Australia, 2003) 17. 
191 Cohen, above n179, 183. 
192 See below n208 and accompanying text. See also the discussion in Cohen, above n179, 226-231. 
193 Cohen, above n179, 230-231, 232-233. 
194 See especially ibid, 214-226; Scherer and Ross, above n70, 646-651. 
195 Scherer and Ross, above n70, 648; Geroski, 'Innovation, Technological Opportunity and Market 
Structure' above n187, 599-600. 
196 Scherer and Ross, above n70, 647. 
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participants in concentrated markets will usually have more incentive to commit 
profits to innovate further (rather than retaining profits as rent) when considerable 
technological opportunity exists and there is a risk that competing products will be 
developed. A recent study, however, suggests that high concentration levels may have 
a negative impact on innovation, even when the richness of technological opportunity 
is taken into account. 197 While these conclusions are based on descriptive observations 
and some empirical data, this data goes some way in attempting to explain the 
relevance of the role of technological opportunity conditions on innovation and 
performance. 198 Nevertheless, it remains unclear what the impact of technological 
opportunities and market structure on innovative activity are likely to be within the 
context of particular industries. 
1.8.2.2 COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 
In contrast with monopoly theorists, competition proponents argue that incentives to 
invest are greater under competitive conditions than under monopolistic conditions.'" 
While competitive firms are likely to innovate to protect their market position or to 
realise supra-normal profits, monopolists are unlikely to develop new technology that 
supersedes, or impinges on the market for, their product. 
An early advocate of competition, Arrow argued that competitive conditions would 
provide a more effective incentive to develop new products than monopolistic 
conditions, although the incentive to invest would still be less than is socially 
desirable." Using various models, economists have established that firms may well 
undertake more research and development under competitive conditions, but too 
much rivalry is liable to reduce the rents available to market participants and so act as 
a disincentive to innovate. 201 The following assumptions would also appear to have 
some bearing on the degree to which competitive conditions influence innovative 
behaviour: 202 
197 Geroski, 'Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure', above n187. 
198 Cohen, above n179, 232-233. 
199 Kenneth J Arrow, 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention' in The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (eds) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic 
and Social Factors (1962) 609. 
" Ibid, 619-622. 
201 Scherer and Ross, above n70, 636-637. Rents are likely to be reduced because firms expect (or 
perceive) that they will receive a smaller share of the profits available to the market. In addition, 
competitive conditions will cause prices to drop, thus reducing the overall profitability of the market. 
202 A considerable number of studies have been conducted in relation to the effects of competition on 
innovation. The ABA Survey contains an excellent discussion of a number of the important studies in 
50 
Chapter 1 
• the scale or intensity of competition in the market; 
• the nature of innovation within the industry; m 
• the standing and characteristics of particular firms, varying from entrenched 
incumbents to potential entrants; and 
• the likely outcome of patent races. 204 
In the end, the answer is probably that the ideal level of competition within a market 
will vary. It is well established that perfect competition is not a model of dynamic 
efficiency. 205 However some degree of competition is probably needed to maximize 
technical potential in an industry: 
What is needed for rapid technical progress is a subtle blend of competition and 
monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the former than the latter, and with the 
role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological opportunities 
exist." 
1.83 CONCENTRATION LEVELS WITHIN THE MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY 
It is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions about the optimal level of 
concentration in a particular industry, and it is likely that a consideration of this issue 
needs to be industry-specific. 207 This aligns with analyses of patents as an incentive 
for innovation, which will depend largely on the particular industry being 
examined.208 
the area; see ABA Survey, above n160, 22-28. The factors listed have been distilled from this 
discussion, and are not intended to be exhaustive. 
203 Innovation may be marginal or fundamental, or it may be uncertain (stochastic) as opposed to 
predictable (deterministic); see ibid, 25 and their n61. The state of competition may also influence 
whether innovation occurs in respect of product or process innovations. On process patents, see further 
below, 2.4.1.1. 
204 Patent races may commence on an equal footing, or may be asymmetrical. Patent races may give 
rise to a number of costs and benefits. Some benefits may be available to one competitor and not 
others; see further ibid, 25-26. 
205 See generally Schumpeter, above n172, especially 106. See also Scherer and Ross, above n70, 660. 
206 Scherer and Ross, above n70, 660. 
207 See, for example, Levin, Cohen and Mowery, above n184; Carlton and Gertner, above n186. 
208  Rai, above n168, 828-839; Wesley M Cohen, Richard R Nelson and John P Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), 
(Working Paper No 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000); Richard C Levin, Alvin K 
Klevorick, Richard R Nelson and Sidney G Winter, 'Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development' (1987) 3 Brookings Papers on Economics Activity 783. 
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Intellectual property protection is an undeniably crucial business asset of most 
medical biotechnology industry participants. In many cases, genetic materials and 
technologies claimed in patents will be difficult to substitute. Discussion in this 
chapter has shown that while many biomedical companies are small enterprises with a 
limited product portfolio, increasing levels of licensing and alliance activity are 
resulting in amplified levels of vertical integration. The net effect of these levels of 
consolidation of patents is fewer, larger entities controlling specific areas of research 
through the management and enforcement of suites of patents. 
It is also the case that a considerable number of patent holders in the industry are 
small and medium-sized, and hold relatively few patents. It is in the interests of these 
patent holders to assert and protect their intellectual property positions, given that this 
intellectual property is their primary asset. In addition, defensive or strategic209 
patenting strategies are resulting in single organisations and oligopolies m being in a 
position to control research efforts in a particular area. The question is whether 
increased levels of concentration are likely to have any impact on innovation, and 
whether this impact is likely to be positive or negative. 
Trends toward concentration within specific industries are not uncommon. 
Technological opportunity within a market tends to lend itself to high levels of 
concentration. 211 In some industries, the inherent nature of the research environment 
may be conducive to concentration, but it may also suffer as a result of concentration. 
Particularly where research within an industry is cumulatively structured, 
concentration in more upstream segments of the industry may impact on downstream 
research and product development where access to upstream technology is required to 
enable downstream research to proceed. The strategic use of technology protected by 
patents will have a resultant effect on market structure and the conduct of participants 
within that market. 
209 Strategic patenting strategies involve patenting broadly in an area (through either single broad 
patents or a suite of patents) and are employed essentially to allow industry participants to retain 
freedom to operate in an area of research. Defensive patenting strategies may be the result of similar 
motivations to strategic patenting strategies, but may also be employed to build up a proprietary 
position in an area and exclude others from innovating in that area. 
210 See John H Barton, 'Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios' 
(2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 851. 
211 Scherer, above n185, 247. 
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1.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered both global and Australian medical biotechnology 
activity, both in terms of market structure and patenting activity. The industry has 
arisen as a result of a first world push to develop the technology and the industry, and 
Australia is part of this push. This represents a different period to those previously 
witnessed in that government is sustaining a push to develop the industry. An 
increasingly important characteristic of the industry is its private character as 
evidenced by the increasing number of private companies involved within the 
industry. There has also been increased public and private funding of university 
research. A result of this factor is that both private companies and research institutions 
are asserting an escalating number of patents over inventions. The intellectual 
property focus is one of the central features of this industry, and large amounts of 
attention are being devoted to levels of commercialisation and privatisation of 
research results within the industry. In respect of this industry, the nature of 
intellectual property is undergoing a real renaissance. 
This chapter has considered the structure of the medical biotechnology market both 
internationally and in Australia, and how the factors affecting market structure are 
relevant in the broader focus of impetus for technological innovation. The central 
question arising from this chapter is whether the ideal market structure for this 
industry is represented within a concentrated or competitive market structure. These 
two pillars form the core of the thesis and underline the fundamental debate about the 
balance between intellectual property and competition law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Having considered in some detail in Chapter 1 the medical biotechnology industry 
and the theme of concentration versus competition, it is now important to map out the 
centrality of the patent system to the medical biotechnology industry. Undertaking 
this step of the mapping process is a prerequisite to considering how the industry 
might operate in a competitive market situation. Having examined the public/private 
divide, the relevance of intellectual property to the industry and levels of patenting, 
this chapter will now investigate the key area of patent law. 
This chapter seeks to outline standards of patentability in respect of medical 
biotechnology in order to consider in general terms the breadth of patents that have 
already been granted, and that are likely to be granted in future. The extent to which 
competition law should impinge on patents will vary depending on whether patent 
breadth is perceived to be problematic. A premise behind discussion in this chapter is 
that while patent law defines certain property rights, competition law may have a role 
to play in regulating the use of those rights. The way in which patent law 
circumscribes rights will partially determine the extent to which regulation through 
competition law should take place. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a 
number of issues associated with patent use or exploitation, because it is the manner 
in which patents are utilised that lie at the heart of the intellectual 
property/competition law intersection. 
This chapter will consider the patent system in Australia with particular reference to 
medical biotechnology. The chapter will begin by outlining the justifications for the 
patent system, and considering how these justifications fit within medical 
biotechnology research. It will then consider Australia's international patent law 
obligations and the requirements for patentability in Australia. Specific reference to 
biotechnology inventions will be made throughout the course of this discussion. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss exploitation and infringement, and begin to consider 
the manner in which patents may be used. 
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2.2 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PATENT SYSTEM' 
Intellectual property bears a number of similarities to tangible property. As such, the 
economic benefits and costs inherent in tangible property are relevant to any 
discussion of the patent system and whether or not its existence or extension is 
warranted. 2 Intellectual property does, however, possess important characteristics that 
distinguish it from tangible property, and therefore analyses of the economic benefits 
of property protection cannot be unreservedly applied to intellectual property. 3 The 
peculiar characteristics of intellectual property must be recognised in discussing 
issues relating to the grant and scope of intellectual property. 4 Therefore, a number of 
justifications for the patent system have evolved. 
This section briefly considers the traditional justifications for the patent system, and 
how these justifications inform policy debate. Rationales for the imposition or 
retention of a patent system can be generally grouped into two categories: natural 
rights theories, and economic theories. 
2.2.1 NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 
Natural rights theories focus on the inherent rights of inventors to reap the benefits of 
their mental labours through patent protection. 5 Thus, a patent is a reward for an 
inventor's contribution to the inventive process. 6 The natural rights thesis has, 
1 This thesis concentrates on patented inventions in the area of medical biotechnology, and a 
consideration of alternative forms of incentives for innovation is outside its scope. For a discussion of 
these issues see Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer, 'Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best 
Incentive System?' in Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern, (eds), Innovation Policy and the 
Economy, Vol 2, (2000) 51. 
2 See William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 
(2003) 11. Essentially, a cost-benefit analysis of the grant of property privileges involves weighing up 
the static and dynamic benefits of property ownership against transaction costs inherent in transferring 
privileges, the rent seeking behaviour of property owners, and the costs of protection of property 
privileges. 
3 Ibid, 36. 
4 These are, primarily, its non-excludable nature and ease of appropriability, and its non-rivalrous 
nature; see Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review 
of Intellectual Property Legislation Under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2002) 
(IYCRC Report), 210. Indeed, the economic and social costs of property ownership are exacerbated in 
the case of intellectual property protection; ibid, 12-21. For further discussion on the concept of 
rivalrous as opposed to non-rivalrous technologies, see below, 3.2. 
5 These theories are based largely on the work of John Locke, a seventeenth century philosopher. For a 
summary see, eg, Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, 'The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth 
Century' (1950) 10(1) Journal of Economic History 1 at 11-21; Robert P Merges, Peter S Menell and 
Mark A Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (2nd ed, 2000), 2-12. 
6 Machlup and Penrose, above n5, 11-21. 
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however, been less popular as a justification for the patent system than so-called 
public-interest rationales, or economic justifications. 
2.2.2 ECONOMIC THEORIES 
A consideration of the economic context in which patents operate is important not 
only in explaining why a patent system is in place, but also in assisting policy makers 
in debating and determining the appropriate parameters of patent law.' In 1953, Fritz 
Machlup undertook a review of economic analyses of the patent system. These 
analyses were generally pessimistic, questioning the need for a state-granted 
monopoly as an incentive for innovation. He concluded that despite the current patent 
system having some negative economic consequences, there was no alternative model 
to replace it, and that it had some positive aspects. 8 The patent system has been 
described as ' ... a crude and imperfect instrument...' in its role of incentive provision. 9 
The economic theories can be broadly categorised as follows: 10 
• invention-inducement theory; 
• disclosure theory; 
• development and commercialisation theory; and 
• prospect development theory. 
As Mazzoleni and Nelson point out, these theories are not mutually exclusive, and 
different versions of the various theories are at odds!' A number of the theories are 
grounded in property rights theory, while others are premised on economic theory. 
The various theories differ in the fundamental assumptions they make about the 
conditions for invention, development and commercialisation. The invention 
inducement theory is the most forceful theory that has evolved to justify the existence 
of the patent system, and it has underpinned much of the empirical work seeking to 
7 See, eg, Mark A Lemley, 'Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle' (2004) 54 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review 691. 
8 Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System (1958). 
9 Frederic M Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (3'1 ed 
(1990) 624. 
Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard R Nelson, 'Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of 
Patents' (1998) 32(4) Journal of Economic Issues 1031 (Mazzoleni and Nelson). The following 
discussion is based on the analysis by Mazzoleni and Nelson of the various economic theories of the 
costs and benefits of patents; See also Kenneth W Dam, 'The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law', 
(1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247. 
11 Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1033. 
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ascertain the effectiveness of patents. This theory appears to be particularly relevant 
to biomedical research. 
The other justifications for the patent system focus on dissemination rather than 
encouragement of innovation, and have been referred to by one scholar as ex-post 
justifications for patent protection. 12 The issue of dissemination of invention and the 
role of competition law in this regard becomes the focus of this thesis in later 
chapters. A number of these other theories would appear to be equally relevant to the 
nature of biomedical research, as discussed in Chapter 1. In particular, the prospect 
theory cannot be discounted. The prospect theory has, as its exegesis the development 
and commercialisation theory. The invention-inducement theory represents a largely 
internal incentive for the generation of patents, while the prospect theory is arguably 
more external and focuses on the market for patented products and processes. The 
ability to efficiently transfer patented technology forms the core of this thesis. 
2.2.2.1 INVENTION-INDUCEMENT THEORY 
The main justification for the patent system is the argument that patents are necessary 
to induce irmovation. 13 Implicit in invention-inducement theories, are the assumptions 
that patent protection is necessary to motivate innovation, and that stronger patent 
protection will increase the amount of invention. 14 Because they allow the exclusion 
of imitators, patents provide the incentive to engage in the innovative process. Earlier 
versions of the theory proceeded on fairly simplistic assumptions; 15 for example, that 
inventors simultaneously worked in diverse and non-competing areas, 16 and that the 
social value of most inventions lies in their final-use value!' In some research areas, 
particularly high-technology areas such as biotechnology, the situation is clearly more 
12 Mark A Lemley, 'Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property' (2004) 71 
University of Chicago Law Review 129. 
13 There is little guidance as to how much innovation is optimal, but it has been suggested that there is 
unlikely to be too much innovation from an economic welfare perspective; Federal Trade Commission, 
To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) 
(Federal Trade Commission Report), ch 2, their n30. See also Thomas M Jorde and David J Teece, 
Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation 
and Commercialise Technology, (1993) 60 Antitrust Law Journal 579, 584. 
Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1034-1035. 
15 Ibid, 1035-1036. 
16 See, eg, Kenneth J Arrow 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention' in 
Richard R Nelson (ed), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (1962); 609; William D Nordhaus, 
Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change (1969). 
17 See, eg, Nordhaus, above n16; F Michael Scherer, `Nordhaus's Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A 
Geometric Reinterpretation' (1972) 62 American Economic Review 422; Paul Klemperer, 'How Broad 
Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?' (1990) 21 RAND Journal of Economics 113. 
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complicated, and versions of the theory have developed to attempt to take this into 
account.° 
Whether patents actually encourage innovation is a difficult question in relation to 
which there is some limited empirical evidence. The importance of patents in this 
regard is often emphasised in respect of the biotechnology industry, and particularly 
the pharmaceutical industry. Two major studies have investigated the extent to which 
patent protection, as opposed to other methods of preventing imitation, is perceived as 
necessary to capture the benefits of technological innovations. ° Alternatives to using 
patents to protect innovation include secrecy, lead time, moving quickly down the 
learning curve, and complementary sales and service to customers. In surveying large 
samples of R&D laboratory managers from industrial companies, both of these studies 
found that patents ranked as the second least effective means of capturing the benefits 
of product innovation. 20 Both of the studies found that patent protection was, however, 
more important to pharmaceutical companies, with pharmaceutical companies in one 
study ranking it the most important means of protecting innovation, 21 and 
pharmaceutical companies in the other study ranking it second. 22 
These results suggested that patent protection is of limited value to many 
manufacturing companies, but undoubtedly important to the pharmaceutical industry. 
Scherer suggests three probable reasons for this: 23 
• in pharmaceutical patent claims, products are defined especially precisely; 24 
• the high costs of clinical trials; and 
18 See generally Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1036-1038, where variations of the theory are 
discussed. 
19 Richard Levin, Alvin Klevorick, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity: Microeconomics (1987); Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson and John Walsh, 'Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)', 
(Working Paper No 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000). See also Edwin Mansfield, 
'Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study' (1986) 32(2) Management Science 173 where patents 
found to be of limited value in most industries, except pharmaceuticals and chemicals, although this did 
not affect levels of patenting. Inventors went on to patent in most instances despite a perception that 
patents were unimportant. 
20 Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, above n19; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, above n19. Levin and 
Others also found that for new processes, patents were considered to be the least effective method 
behind secrecy. 
21 Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, above n19. 
22 Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, above n19. 
23 Frederic M Scherer, 'The Economics of Human Gene Patents' 77 Academic Medicine (2002): 1348, 
1351-2. 
24 The same argument applies to organic and agricultural chemicals; ibid, 1351-2. 
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• the low investment required to imitate through generic substitutes. 
Indeed, data shows that pharmaceutical companies in Australia devote between $200 
million and $450 million annually to research and development, with a large 
proportion of this amount being expended on clinical trials. 28 Currently, the cost of 
bringing a new drug to market is estimated to be in the vicinity of AU$900 million. 
The case in relation to biotechnology innovation is not so clear-cut. There is some 
evidence to suggest that extremely high research and development in high-technology 
industries such as biotechnology make patent protection crucial, particularly in order 
to raise venture capital!' Patent protection may also assist in facilitating access to 
capital through alliance activity, 28 although there may of course be many reasons for 
companies seeking to enter into collaborative arrangements. 29 
Other commentators have questioned the necessity of granting patents to protect 
publicly-funded research, which comprises a significant proportion of basic 
biomedical research. Given that this research would receive funding in any event, it 
may be that patents are unnecessary to promote biomedical innovation! ° A 
considerable amount of biotechnology research in Australia is still publicly funded. 
The amount of privately funded research is increasing, but it may be that patents are 
important to the research community even where that research is publicly funded. 
Many research institutions reliant on public funding have a clear imperative to attract 
investment through technology transfer, and in this respect, the ability to patent 
inventions is an important incentive to undertake research!' 
25 Department of Industry Tourism and Resources, Commonwealth of Australia, Pharmaceuticals 
Industry Profile <http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrintemet/cmscontent.cfm?object11)=8B4157CO-
00F3-47EE-B3C3994EECB2A4CB> at 18 May 2004. 
26 Ibid. Lawson asserts that there is no solid Australian data to support contentions by the 
pharmaceutical industry that it faces extremely high research and development costs; Charles Lawson, 
'Some Economic Questions for Biotechnology Patenting in Australia' (2000) 41 IF Forum 10. 
27 Scherer, above n23, 1353; David H Hsu and Tim Bernstein, 'Managing the University Technology 
Licensing Process: Findings from Case Studies', (1997) 9 Journal of the Association of University 
Technology Managers 1. Cf Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, above n19, whose results suggested that 
smaller companies are less likely to rely on patent protection than larger companies, perhaps because of 
the costs associated with defending patents. 
28 See Johua Gans, David H Hsu and Scott Stern, When Does Start-up Innovation Spur the Gale of 
Creative Destruction?, (Working Paper, Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia 2002). 
29 See generally Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical 
Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional 
Paper No 6, 94-123. 
30 See, eg, Arti K Rai and Rebecca S Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
(2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 289, 300-302. 
31 See Nicol and Nielsen, above n29, 126 
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Related issues arise in relation to patenting of more upstream inventions, such as 
human gene sequences. Scherer questions whether patents are a necessary incentive to 
innovate in the area of human genomics, and considers how gene sequence patents 
affect investment in more downstream therapeutic entities. 32 Scherer concludes that 
policy that supports withholding rights for gene sequences would be likely to delay, 
but not completely inhibit seminal invention at a more downstream level given the 
competitive environment in which innovation in this field is proceeding. 33 Scherer's 
analysis is confined to gene sequences, and it would appear that in the United States 
(US) at least, patenting of human DNA sequences affects only a small fraction of all 
research and development activity in the area of biology.' Thus, it may be that 
outside this limited area, patenting becomes more important in terms of the 
recoupment of research and development costs. 
2.2.2.2 DISCLOSURE THEORY 
This theory rests on the assumption that invention will not take place without the 
inducement of a patent. It is predicated on the ground that patents perform an 
important public interest function, of promoting disclosure of inventions, and without 
the patent system, there would be little incentive to disclose an invention!' As 
Mazzoleni and Nelson point out, the antithesis of the invention-inducement theory is 
the disclosure theory. 36 Unlike secrecy patents may encourage contracting and thus 
increased dissemination of inventions. 37 
2.2.23 DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALISATION THEORY 
Based on the assumption that many inventions will require extra development before 
they are ready for use, the development and commercialisation theory posits that 
many inventions will not result directly in a marketable product. 38 Instead, this theory 
32 Scherer, above n23. In Chapter One, the merging of basic and applied science was discussed; see 
above, 1.4.3. The issue of patents as an incentive to innovate may be similar in respect of both basic, 
upstream inventions, and more downstream, practical inventions. 
Ibid. 1359-1361,1363-1364. 
34 Ibid, 1356-9. 
35 As Mazzoleni and Nelson suggest, this may particularly be the case with process patents, given the 
findings by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter that secrecy is a more preferred method of protecting 
innovation than patents, Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1039. 
36 Ibid, 1038-1039. 
37 Ibid, 1039. 
38 Note that implicit in this theory is the view that many steps may be required before a 'consumer 
product' is available. This theory is based on the assumption that a patented invention will lead to one, 
ultimate commercial product; see Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1042. Chapter 3 deals with the 
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asserts that without proprietary rights, owners of upstream inventions would find it 
difficult to market their products to more downstream developers. 39 Patents may 
prompt an inventor to seek out opportunities to have inventions developed and 
commercialised, and may reduce the need for vertical integration within companies. 
In other words, it may enable specialisation within companies or institutions because 
it enables them to contract out various functions on the road to product development. 
2.2.2.4 PROSPECT DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
Following on from the development and commercialisation theory, Edmund Kitch 
presented a new theory of the patent system that attempted to realign the law of 
patents with the theory of property rights.° The focus of property rights theory within 
the context of intellectual property is the ability of owners of intellectual property to 
license, thus ensuring optimally efficient use of their intellectual property. ° The 
distinguishing feature of Kitch's work is that previous theory had focused on 
intellectual property as an incentive-by-reward system. The fundamental premise of 
Kitch's theory is that the prospect of coordinating future research paths, rather than 
the initial reward generated by the grant of intellectual property, will provide an 
incentive for innovation.° Further the ability to coordinate research will reduce 
duplication of research efforts and eliminate patent races. ° The theory also assumes 
that many inventions will be applicable to a range of follow-on uses." In short, the 
prospect theory advocates broad, upstream patents with few limitations on their use. 
The prospect theory assumes that coordinating future research will be possible, and 
that the transaction costs of doing so will be low. As Burk and Lemley point out, one 
of the economic bases of the prospect theory, is the Coasean Theorem ° which 
embodies the notions of perfect information, rationality on the part of the parties to a 
issue of cumulative innovation and its impact on contracting within the biotechnology industry. For a 
more detailed discussion of the process of contracting within the biomedical industry see below, 
3.3.4.5. 
39 See, eg, ibid, 1040-1941. 
4° Edmund Kitch 'The Nature and Functions of the Patent System, (1977) 20 Journal of Law and 
Economics 265, 265. 
41 Ibid, 265, 275-79; Robert P Merges, 'Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property' (1994) 94 
Columbia Law Review 2655, 2661. 
42 Kitch, above n40, 267-271. 
43 'bid, 278. 
44 Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1042. 
45 Ronald H Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. On the 
issue of transaction costs in licensing see also below, 3.3.3. 
62 
Chapter 2 
licence deal, and costless licensing. The other economic foundation of the prospect 
theory is the tragedy of the commons, or the risk that a particular resource will be 
overused in the absence of a broad patent that allows the coordination of research. ° 
2.2.2.5 SUMMARY 
The adoption of a particular justification for patents will have resulting implications 
for competition policy. ° For example, reliance on the prospect theory as a basis for 
granting broad patent protection to upstream innovators will reduce the importance of 
competition regulation of those rights, because the theory is based on allowing an 
initial innovator to license freely. Conversely, if the grant of patents is predicated on 
the invention-inducement theory, there is likely to be more concern to limit the scope 
of those rights to what is necessary to induce innovation and prevent free-riding, thus 
broadening the role of competition law. 
In reality, however, there is no one-size-fits-all theory. Of the theories discussed 
above, the invention-inducement theory is probably the 'standard justification' for 
intellectual property protection.° The invention-inducement theory alone is unlikely 
to provide a concrete foundation for complex questions relating to patent standards 
and the interplay of patent law and competition law. Indeed, other theories are 
arguably more likely to be suited to industries such as biomedicine that are based on a 
rapid flow of scientific information and techniques. 5° The development and 
commercialisation and prospect theories, for example, may be particularly relevant to 
industries where bargaining for the transfer of patents is necessary. 51 The prospect 
theory also appears to be suited to industries characterised by long product-
development cycles where a long period precedes the practical application of an initial 
invention.52 The result is that there is, as yet, extremely limited empirical evidence 
46 Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, 'Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle' (2004) 54 Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 691, 723. The notion of 'commons' and 'anti-commons' property is dealt with 
further below, 3.4.2. 
47 ibid. 
48 And of course for patent policy. 
49 Lemley, above n12, 129. 
50 Mazzoleni and Nelson, above n10, 1044-1048. 
51  Ibid, 1041, 1043. The development and commercialisation theory may be particularly relevant in 
relation to the commercialisation of university inventions, where patents are unlikely to be required to 
induce invention, but will facilitate the transfer and subsequent development of university inventions at 
1041. 
52 Ibid, 1044. 
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with which to analyse the suitability of patent protection in a particular industry, or 
the respective roles that patent law and competition law should play. 
It is submitted that the incentive-inducement justification provides a strong argument 
for patent protection on biomedical inventions. 53 In biomedical research patents are 
becoming key to attracting investment, and without the promise of a patent, certain 
research and development would not be undertaken. The automation of processes 
necessary for upstream biomedical innovation has, however, simplified the generation 
of a number of upstream products in biomedical research. 54 This throws into question 
the necessity for patent protection as an incentive to invest in research and 
development in respect of certain technologies." 
A number of the ex post justifications seem particularly suited to the structure of the 
research environment in biotechnology. In particular, the prospect theory would 
appear to be especially applicable." The cumulative nature of innovation means that 
the broad dissemination of inventions is more likely to lead to rapid advancement in 
technology. 57 It may be that neither the invention-inducement theory nor the ex post 
theories provide a complete justification for biotechnology patents, but in 
combination they help to explain why a patent grant may be warranted in respect of 
particular biotechnology products and technologies. Thus, it is submitted that the 
following contention by Lemley with respect to the prospect theory has resonance in 
relation to upstream biotechnology patents: 
[P]rospect theory is most useful when conceived as a part of, rather than in 
opposition to, the classical public goods story. Prospect theory is needed when 
control over subsequent development is a necessary part of the incentive to produce 
the pioneering invention in the first place, as is arguably true with pharmaceuticals. 58 
53 Cf Lawson, who argues that there is no systematic economic data to indicate that this is the case; 
Lawson, above n26. 
54 The generation of gene sequence data is an obvious example. This represents a limited portion of 
upstream biomedical research, and other upstream technologies may require considerably more 
research and development expenditure. 
55 See Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, 'Policy Levers in Patent Law' (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 
1575, 1583. 
56 Burk and Lemley have argued that the prospect theory is particularly suited to pharmaceutical 
invention; see, eg, ibid, 1600. 
57  This assumes that inventions will be broadly disseminated or at least disseminated to those with the 
best means to further develop the invention. This assumption may not always be valid. See below, 
3.3.2, 3.3.3. 
58 Lemley, above n12, 141 (references omitted). 
64 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 will consider these issues further in analysing the private ordering of 
incentives in a cumulative industry such as biotechnology, and it will be argued that 
initial innovators cannot always be relied upon to effectively disseminate their 
inventions and thus ensure that necessary follow-on research is pursued." There may 
be difficulties in conducting bargaining in order to enable follow-on research to 
proceed. Accordingly, it will be argued that the prospect theory has limitations that 
render its utility questionable. Further, in considering the application of competition 
law to intellectual property, Chapter 5 will draw on this discussion in examining the 
bounds of competition law regulation of intellectual property. 
2.3 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN RELATION To PATENT 
LAW 
Increasing levels of globalisation have resulted in the internationalisation of 
intellectual property law. The boundaries of intellectual property law and protection 
are generally national. However, because of the increasingly international nature of 
intellectual property, an initial step in any examination of national patent law is to 
consider the international context. 
Australia has certain obligations in relation to providing intellectual property 
protection not only for Australians, but also for foreigners wishing to obtain 
protection in Australia. In return, Australians can obtain intellectual property 
protection in a number of other countries. The international intellectual property 
system has operated on a reciprocal basis since its inception. The provision of 
intellectual property protection through a robust intellectual property system is 
considered to contribute to economic growth and consumer welfare. Intellectual 
property protection is perceived to be important in terms of promoting innovation, and 
enhancing dissemination of inventions. As such, efforts at international harmonisation 
have been premised largely on invention-inducement theory. Successive federal 
governments in Australia have certainly stressed this benefit of facilitating 
commercialisation. As such, Australia is a signatory to a number of international 
conventions dealing with intellectual property protection. The major conventions are: 
• the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (the Paris 
Convention); 60 
59 See below Chapter 3, especially 3.3.4.5. 
60 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property [1972] ATS 12 (entered into force 20 
March 1883). 
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• the Patent Cooperation Treaty (the PCT); 61 and 
• the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 
TR1PS).62 
• the Patent Law Treaty 2000.63 
2.3.1 THE PARIS CONVENTION 
The Paris Convention was the first multilateral convention governing the grant of 
industrial property rights." It introduced a number of important concepts, most 
notably, the principle of national treatment, which prevents discrimination against 
non-nationals from other signatory countries applying for intellectual property 
protection.° Although it did not lay down uniform standards of protection for member 
states, the Paris Convention did provide that an application for protection in one 
member state should not prejudice an application in other member states, that is, it 
provided that the priority date of the first application should count as the priority date 
of subsequent applications.° Membership of the Paris Convention currently stands at 
164 member countries, 67 and the convention has been subject to revision on a number 
of occasions. 68 Australia is a signatory to the Paris Convention. 
2.3.2 THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY 
Australia became a signatory to the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1970. 69 The Treaty 
allows an applicant to file a single international patent application for protection, and 
61 Patent Cooperation Treaty [1980] ATS 6 (entered into force 24 January 1978). 
62 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994). 
63 Patent Law Treaty opened for signature June 1 2000, WIPO Database of Intellectual Property 
Legislative Texts (entered into force 28 April 2005). 
64 'Industrial' property rights as defined under the Treaty has a broad meaning and includes patents. 
The term 'industrial property' is derived from the French term `propriete industrielle', with the term 
Industrielle' encompassing all aspects of human labour; see the discussion in Jill McKeough, Kathy 
Bowrey and Philip Griffith, Intellectual Property: Commentary and Materials, (r1 ed 2002) 3. 
65 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property [1972] ATS 12 (entered into force 20 
March 1883) art 2. 
66 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property [1972] ATS 12 (entered into force 20 
March 1883) art 4. 
67 For details see <http://www.wipo.org/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-paris.pdf> at 16 February 2004. 
68 The text of, and details of revisions to, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
[1972] ATS 12 (entered into force 20 March 1883) are available at 
<http://www.wipo.org/c1ea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm > at 1 July 2005. 
69 Details of member states are available at <http://www.wipo.org/treaties/en/documents/word/m -
pct.doc> at 16 February 2004. 
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designate member states in which protection is sought. Applications are sent to 
national offices for examination and grant of patents. 
2.3.3 THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
Pressure by developed countries to standardise international intellectual property 
standards led to the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by World Trade Organisation members (VVTO) 
in 1994. TRIPS is an annex to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, and comprises part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It 
prescribes the minimum standard of intellectual property protection that must be 
adhered to by WTO members." The aims of TRIPS are stated in Article 7 to be the 
promotion of innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology through 
intellectual property protection and enforcement. Fundamental principles behind 
TRIPS are the enhancement of free trade through adequate intellectual property 
protection, and ensuring that intellectual property enforcement measures do not 
restrain the international transfer of technology.n Australia's intellectual property 
regime was compliant with many of the TRIPS requirements, and relatively few 
measures were taken to ensure that Australia was in line with TRIPS standards. These 
changes were implemented as a result of the Patents (World Trade Organisation) Act 
1994 (Cth).72 
2.3.4 THE PATENT LAW TREATY 2000 
In addition, the Patent Law Treaty 2000 aims to harmonise administrative procedures 
such as filing patent applications. The Treaty was adopted on 1 June 2000 and has 54 
signatories." In addition, a number of countries have bilateral or regional• 
arrangements. In particular, the European Patent Convention, which includes non-
European states in it membership, is concerned with the granting of European patents. 
70 Membership of the WTO currently stands at 148 countries (16 February 2005). See 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif  e/org6_e.htm> at 1 July 2005. 
71 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994), art 8. 
72 Patents (World Trade Organisation) Act 1994 (Cth) (1994). 
73 For details see <http://www.wipo.org/treaties/en/documents/pdf/u-page34.pdf> at 16 February 2004. 
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2.4 PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence as to whether patents in biomedical 
research are justified, this chapter will demonstrate that many biomedical inventions 
meet the requirements for patentability laid out in international and Australian patent 
law. In Australia, patentability is assessed pursuant to the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the 
Patents Act 1990), and patent applications are examined for validity by the Australian 
Patents Office, a division of IP Australia. An inventor may choose to file a provisional 
application, or a complete application. A provisional application allows an applicant 
to file an application with a provisional specification:4 and gives the applicant 
additional time in which to finalise the specification. A complete application with 
complete specification must be filed within 12 months of filing a provisional 
application, but the priority date of the patent application will be the date of filing the 
provisional application: 5 Securing a priority date is crucial in Australia and Europe 
where the first to file rule applies. In the US this may not be the case because the first 
to invent rule applies:6 Accordingly, the US legislatioe makes provision for 
interference proceedings which are designed to allow the determination of a priority 
date under the first to invent rule:8 
TRIPS sets out the fundamental requirements for patentability of an invention, with 
Article 27 stating that patents shall be available for inventions in all fields of 
technology provided that they satisfy the requirements of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial applicability. These requirements must be applied without discrimination as 
to the place of invention, the field of technology, or the place of production: 9 Article 
29 of TRIPS further provides that the best method of performing the invention must 
be fully described in the patent document. In Australia, these requirements translate 
74 Where the applicant must describe the invention in general terms only. 
75 The priority date of a claim is defined as the date of filing of the specification, or where the Patents 
Regulations provide for a different date, the date determined under the regulations; Patents Act 1990 
(Oh), s 43(2). 
76 A first to invent rule means that an inventor who is the first to invent may still be accorded priority 
despite not being the first party to file a patent application. The rule has been criticised because of the 
difficulty of determining the first to invent. For criticism of the first to invent rule and recommendation 
that the US conform to a first to file rule, see Stephen A Merrill, Richard C Levin and Mark B Myers 
(eds)A Patent System for the 21' Century (2004), 124-127. 
77 Patent Act 35 USC (1952). 
78 Patent Act 35 USC §135 (1952). 
79 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994), art 27. 
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into the invention requirements contained in s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990, and the 
specification requirements contained in s 40. These requirements are based 
significantly on the requirements for patentability contained in the Patents Act 1952 
(Cth) (the Patents Act 1952), the predecessor to the 1990 legislation. A good deal of 
case law relevant to the interpretation of sections 18(1) and 40 was decided in the 
context of corresponding provisions of the Patents Act 1952. 
Section 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 sets out the requirements for patentability as 
follows: 
Section 18 Patentable inventions 
Patentable inventions for the purposes of a standard patent: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2),80 an invention is a patentable invention for the purposes 
of a standard patent if the invention, so far as claimed in any claim: 
(a) is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies; and 
(b) when compared with the prior art base as it existed before the priority date of that 
claim: 
(i) is novel; and 
(ii) involves an inventive step; and 
(c) is useful; and 
(d) was not secretly used in the patent area before the priority date of that claim by, or 
on behalf of, or with the authority of, the patentee or nominated person or the 
patentee's or nominated person's predecessor in title to the invention. 
Thus, the requirements for the grant of a standard patent are that: 81 
• there must be an invention which is a manner of manufacture; 
80 Subsection (2) provides that human beings, and the biological processes for their generation, are not 
patentable inventions; see further below, 2.4.1.2(11). 
81 The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) also makes provision for the grant of an 'innovation patent', the 
requirements for the grant being contained in s18(1A). The only point of difference is that an invention 
must involve an 'innovative step' rather than an 'inventive step'. As such, a lower level of 
inventiveness is required for an innovation patent, and the term of an innovation patent is 
correspondingly shorter at eight years; s 68. General references to patents during the course of this 
chapter will include reference to standard patents and innovation patents. 
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which 
• is novel; 
• involves an inventive step; 
• is useful; and 
• has not been secretly used. 
Not all of these requirements are considered during the process of examination of a 
patent. Manner of manufacture, novelty and inventive step must all be assessed as part 
of the examination procedure. 82 They are also available as grounds for opposition to a 
patent." Usefulness and secret use are not part of the examination procedure, and are 
not available as grounds for opposition. 84 Instead, they are, (along with the other three 
requirements of manner of manufacture, novelty and inventive step), available as 
grounds for revocation proceedings." Revocation proceedings are usually instituted in 
response to infringement proceedings. 86 The Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) recently recommended amendment to the Patents Act 1990 so that all of the 
requirements for patentability be assessed on the balance of probabilities!' At present, 
only novelty and inventive step are assessed on the balance of probabilities during 
examination," with the remaining requirements being assessed on the basis that the 
applicant is given the 'benefit of the doubt'. 89 
82 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 45(1)(b) and s 45(1)(c). 
83 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 59. Section 59 provides any party with the opportunity to oppose the grant 
of a standard patent within three months of acceptance by the Patent Office of a patent application. A 
patent will be granted or sealed at the expiry of this three-month period. 
84 Note that the ALRC has recommended that utility be included as a ground for examination and 
opposition; discussed below, see below, 2.4.4. 
85 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 138. Section 138 provides that any person may apply at any time after the 
grant of a patent, for an order that the patent be revoked. 
88 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 121. Chapter 11 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) makes provision for the 
institution of infringement proceedings in certain circumstances, and specifies the procedure for those 
proceedings; see in particular ss 117, 120. 
87 Australian Law Reform Commission, Parliament of Australia, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting 
and Human Health, Report No 99 (2004) (ALRC Report), Recommendation 8-3. The ALRC received a 
reference to consider issues associated with the patenting of genes and genetic technologies. See 
further, below, 4.2.2.4. 
88 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 49(1)(a). Prior to the changes introduced by virtue of the Patents 
Amendment Act 2001 (Cth), a patent examiner was required to give a patent applicant the benefit of 
doubt if they had reservations about novelty and inventive step. The Patents Amendment Act 2001 
(Cth) tightened up a number of aspects of novelty and inventive step. 
89 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 49(1)(b). 
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2.4.1 THE INVENTION REQUIREMENT: MANNER OF MANUFACTURE 
2.4.1.1 THE MANNER OF MANUFACTURE TEST 
According to the definition of 'invention' contained in Sch 1 of the Patents Act 1990: 
invention means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and 
grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and includes an 
alleged invention. 
As is evident from s18(1) and the definition of invention contained in Sch 1, the 
English Statute of Monopolies 1623, the precursor to all English and Australian patent 
legislation, retains an important role in laying down the threshold requirements for 
patentability. The retention of the language of manner of manufacture is an attempt to 
avoid circumscribing in detail the circumstances in which an alleged invention will be 
patentable. 
The central debate in relation to the inventiveness (incorporating the manner of 
manufacture) requirement in s18(1), has been whether or not an invention results in a 
'vendible matter' 9° or 'vendible product'. 91 The leading case is National Research 
Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (NRDC). 92 In considering the 
manner of manufacture test, the court in NRDC said that it is a mistake to adhere to 
the literal meaning of the word 'manufacture'. Rather 'Nile right question is ' ... is this 
a proper subject matter of letters patent according to the principles which have been 
developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?" 93 
In laying down this requirement, the court was endeavouring to set out an ambit 
within which an alleged invention must fall, rather than delineating precisely the 
circumstances in which an invention will be considered to be a manner of 
manufacture. Further, the court commented that a process, in order to fall within the 
limits of patentability within s6 of the Statute of Monopolies, must offer a material 
advantage in the sense that the process belongs to the useful arts as distinct from the 
fine arts, and must convey some value in the field of economic endeavour. 94 Thus, if a 
process produces an ... artificially created state of affairs ... ' which has some 
Boulton v Bull (1795) 126 ER 651, 661 (Heath J). 
91 GEC's Application (1942) 60 RPC 1, 4 (Morton J). 
n National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
93 Ibid, 269. 
94 Ibid, 275. 
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economic utility then the threshold test for patentability will be satisfied." This may 
include the application of newly determined properties of a previously known 
substance, to a new use." In contrast, 'a claim for the use of a known material in the 
manufacture of known articles for the purpose of which its known properties make 
that material suitable'," or an application claiming simply a 'new use of a particular 
known product', will fail to meet the invention threshold. 98 
The principle from NRDC is important in the context of biological inventions because 
many of these inventions involve the application of a new product to a previously 
unknown use. It thus paved the way for process patents" in the biotechnology field, 
which comprise a significant proportion of patents in this area. m° The test enunciated 
in NRDC would not be difficult to overcome for a large range of biotechnological and 
genetic inventions, including cell lines, hybridomas, viruses, genetic vectors and 
expression systems, mutations or genetic engineering, DNA, RNA and genes, mutant 
and synthetic genes and proteins expressed by a gene. 8n 
The ALRC considered the manner of manufacture test, and commented that there 
were difficulties with its composition and implementation. Nevertheless, they 
declined to make specific recommendations that a new threshold test for patentability 
replace the manner of manufacture test in respect of genetic materials. 182 This was 
primarily because to do so would constitute a departure from international standards, 
and because of the preponderance of naturally occurring organisms (including genetic 
sequences) that have already been considered to satisfy the existing threshold of 
95 Note that the claim in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents 
(1959) 102 CLR 252 involved not only a process claim, but it also involved a claim for agricultural and 
horticultural processes, which had traditionally not been patentable. 
96  Thud, 268. In contrast, 'a claim for the use of a known material in the manufacture of known articles 
for the purpose of which its known properties make that material suitable', or an application claiming a 
'new use of a particular known product', will fail to meet the invention threshold. 
97 Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232, 251. 
98  NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Ply Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655, 659. 
99 
 
While a product patent covers all uses of a patented product, a process patent claims rights to all uses 
of a patented technology. These are the broadest forms of protection available for biomedical products 
and technologies, because they give protection for all uses whether or not those uses are known at the 
time of patenting. Product by process claims protect one particular product produced using a particular 
process. Use claims cover specific claimed uses; see Dianne Nicol, 'On the Legality of Gene Patents' 
submitted to Melbourne University Law Review. 
See IP Australia, Australian Patents for: Microorganisms; Cell Lines; Hybridomas; Related 
Biological Materials and their Use; & Genetically Manipulated Organisms, 1, (IF Australia 
Guidelines) <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patents/specific/biotech.pdf > at 6 June 2005. 
101 See ibid. 
102 ALRC Report, above n83. 
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patentability. 103 Instead, they recommended that the general operation of the manner 
of manufacture test be independently reviewed, with focus on the 'generally 
inconvenient' requiremeneN 
Although NRDC and subsequent case law broadened the extent of patentable subject 
matter, there are a number of statutory exclusions from patenting. These can be 
classified as: 
• Allowable exclusions under TRIPS. 
• Exclusions under the Australian Patents Act 1990; 
• Exclusions under the Statute of Monopolies 1623; and 
A number of case law exceptions have also developed for material considered to be 
unpatentable pursuant to the NRDC test. The statutory exclusions will be examined 
prior to the relevant case law exclusions. 
2.4.1.2 STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTING 
Relevant TRIPS exclusions will be considered first, followed by specific exclusions 
provided for under the Patents Act 1990. Finally, exclusions under the Statute of 
Monopolies will be briefly considered. 
TRIPS Exclusions 
Adoption of the exclusions contained within TRIPS is not obligatory, 105 but they set 
the limits for WTO countries on allowable exclusions by providing the basis for 
statutory exclusions from patentability and justifying case law exceptions. 
Public Policy 
TRIPS contains limited provision to exclude classes of inventions from patentability 
on the grounds of public policy. Article 27(2) provides: 
103 - . ma 130. See also the other reasons listed at 130-131. 
104 
105 Article 27(2)(a) of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into 
force 15 April 1994) permits diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans 
and animals to be excluded from patentability. Australia has not adopted this exclusion. In relation to 
methods of medical treatment, see below 2.4.1.1(c)(ii) and see the Australia — United States Free Trade 
Agreement, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.9.2.b, which also permits exclusion on this ground. 
'bid, Recommendation 6-2, 
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Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention 
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely 
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
Although not directly incorporated into Australian law, 106 the exception is provided 
for in Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention and corresponding member 
state legislation. Article 53(a) has been interpreted as having the purpose of ensuring 
that inventions that are regarded as outrageous are not patented, and therefore the 
provision will be invoked only in rare and extreme circumstances. m As such, it is 
difficult to conceive of many circumstances in which the exception will apply. Article 
6.2 of the European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions 
provides a number of specific examples of inventions that will not be patentable: 1°8 
• processes for cloning human beings; 
• processes for modifying the germ line gene therapy of humans; 
• use of human embryos for commercial or industrial purposes; and 
• processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals where there is no 
substantial medical benefit to humans, as well as animals resulting from such 
processes. 
Outside these exceptions, it is likely that the scope of the exception is limited, and this 
is evidenced by the reluctance of courts to take on public policy considerations in 
determining patentability. m9 
106 Note, however, the general inconvenience exception, discussed below, which would arguably allow 
reference to notions of public policy; below, 2.4.1.2(iii). 
Ica Howard FloreylRelaxin [1995] EPOR 541. The court referred to European Patent Office Guidelines, 
which state: 
The purpose of this is to exclude from protection inventions likely to induce riot or public 
disorder, or to lead to criminal or other generally offensive behaviour ... A fair test to apply is to 
consider whether it is probable that the public in general would regard the invention as so 
abhorrent that the grant of patents would be inconceivable. 
108  EC Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art 6. 
1°9 See, eg, Myers Squibb v F H Faulding & Co (2000) 46 IPR 553. 
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Exclusion of Plants and Animals 
Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS allows member states to exclude from patentability, plants 
and animals and the biological processes for their generation (excluding 
microbiological processes) provided separate plant protection under plant varieties 
legislation exists. The Patents Act 1990 contains such exclusion for innovation 
patents, but not standard patents, 11° and the Plant Breeders Rights Act 1994 (Cth) 
allows registration where new plant varieties are propagated using selective breeding 
techniques. 
(ii) Australian Patents Act 1990 Exclusions 
Human Beings and the Biological Processes for Their Generation 
Section 18(2) of the Patents Act 1990 provides that human beings and the biological 
processes for their generation are not patentable subject matter. Although there has 
been no dispute that human beings should not be patentable, in the scope of the second 
part of the exception is unclear and remains untested. The effect of the exclusion is 
probably limited in practice, and although far from certain, it may operate to prevent 
patenting of the cloning of human embryos. It is also not clear, for example, whether 
human organs derived from the use of stem cell technology would be patentable. n2 
This exclusion is limited to patenting of higher life forms (that is, humans), with IF 
Australia confirming that many lower life forms constitute patentable subject 
matter.'" 
110 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 18 (1A), (3) and (4). In respect of standard patents, Australia has agreed 
under the Australia — United States Free Trade Agreement not to exclude plants and animals, from 
patentability; see Australia — United States Free Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.9.2 and 
17.9.3. 
111  This has been reinforced by the Australian Patent Office. See IP Australia Guidelines, above n100, 
1. 
112 See Matthew Rimmer, 'The Attack of the Clones: Patent Law and Stem Cell Research' (2003) 10 
Journal of Law and Medicine 488; ALRC Report, above n87, 168, Chapter 15. 
113 See IP Australia Guidelines, above n100. Note that a number of transgenic, non-human animals 
developed using gene technology have been held to constitute patentable subject matter, the most 
famous example being the Oncomouse (US Patent 4 736 866). This patent is discussed below, 
Appendix 2. See also ICarinne Ludlow, 'Genetically Modified Organisms and Their Products as 
Patentable Subject Matter in Australia' [1999] European Intellectual Property Review 298. 
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Discretionary Refusal to Accept Applications 
Section 50 of the Patents Act 1990 provides the Commissioner for Patents with the 
discretionary right to refuse to accept patent applications where: 
• the use of the invention would be contrary to law; 114 
• a claim for a substance or process producing a substance involves mere 
admixtures of known ingredients; and 
• a claim includes the name of a person as the name, or part of the name, of the 
invention. 
Patentability of Genes and Gene Sequences 
Despite two unsuccessful attempts to exclude genes and gene sequences from the 
bounds of patent law, 115 genes and gene sequences remain patentable provided they 
are isolated from their naturally occurring environment and characterised: 16 Naturally 
occurring genes and gene sequences will not be patentable because they fail the test of 
novelty."" 
(iii) Statute of Monopolies Exceptions 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies also precluded the grant of letters patents 
where the subject matter of the application was: 
• contrary to law; 
• mischievous to the state by raising prices or harming trade; or 
• generally inconvenient 
Since it is understood that the 'manner of manufacture' within s 18(1) of the Patents 
Act 1990 incorporates s6 of the Statute of Monopolies, these exceptions are 
incorporated into s 18(1). Arguably, however, the discretion available to the 
114 	. 	. 
Ills is usually taken to mean the sole use of the invention is contrary to criminal law or other 
statutory provision or rule under the common law. 
115 The history surrounding these proposed exclusions is discussed in detail in Dianne Nicol, Patenting 
of Human Genetic Material in Australia (Masters Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1997)182-183. 
116 See IP Australia Guidelines, above n100. This position has been supported by the ALRC; ALRC 
Report, Recommendation 7-1 (191). On the European position see, for example, Joseph Straus, 'An 
Updating Concerning the Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Including the Scope of Patents for 
Genes — An Academic Point of View' (2003) Paper presented at the Conference of Patent Judges, 
Special Edition. 
117 See below, 2.4.2. 
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Commissioner and contained in s 50(1)(a) supersedes the 'contrary to law' provision 
of s6 of the Statute of Monopolies. n8 
The generally inconvenient clause is sometimes referred to as the 'public policy' 
exception. u9 It has been used in some circumstances by the Australian judiciary, to 
deny patentability perhaps most notably by Heerey J (at first instance) in Bristol-
Myers Squibb v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (Bristol-Myers). 120 Heerey J rejected the grant 
of a patent over a method of administering a known anti-cancer agent on the grounds 
that it would cause general inconvenience by restricting the choice of doctors in 
selecting most effective methods of treatment. Heerey J's decision was overturned on 
appeal. The appeal judges found that methods of medical treatment should be 
patentable, but on grounds other than general inconvenience. 121 On appeal, the 
majority rejected the general inconvenience ground as a basis for rejecting a claim for 
a method of medical treatment, although Sheppard J was prepared to rely on this 
ground in rejecting the patent claim.' 22 
Although it is arguable that the generally inconvenient clause embraces wider notions 
of public policy, u3 the judiciary have been reluctant to impose public policy 
considerations on decision-making without clear statutory authority.' m The legislature 
has similarly failed to expressly incorporate public policy considerations in relation to 
the question of patentability. So, for example, ethical concerns about patenting 
genetically modified plant and animal organisms have not, to date, been addressed by 
the judiciary in the context of the general inconvenience exception. The ALRC 
considered it arguable that the generally inconvenient clause included in the 'manner 
of manufacture' test provides some basis for consideration of social and ethical 
considerations, but declined to recommend any further exemption from patenting on 
118 William Van Caenagem, Intellectual Property, (2001) 137. 
119 See Miranda Forsyth, 'Biotechnology, Patents and Public Policy: A Proposal for Reform in 
Australia' (2000) 11(4) Australian Intellectual Property Journal 202. 
12° Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 467. 
121 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 46 IPR 553; discussed below, 2.4.1.3. 
See also Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611 per Barwick CJ; Rescare Ltd v 
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119. 
122 See Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
123 Peter Drahos, 'Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality' (1999) 21 European Intellectual 
Property Review 441, 441. 
124 See, for example, Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1, 45. 
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ethical grounds despite doubt as to the applicability of the generally inconvenient 
clause.' 
2.4.13 CASE LAW EXCLUSIONS 
Mere Discoveries/Products of Nature 
While patents are available for inventions, they are not available for mere discoveries 
or products of nature because they do not conform to the requirements of the manner 
of manufacture test. The High Court in NRDC noted the difficulty of distinguishing 
between discoveries and inventions: 
The truth is that the distinction between discovery and invention is not precise 
enough to be other than misleading in this area of discussion. There may indeed be a 
discovery without invention — either because the discovery is some piece of abstract 
information without any suggestion of a practical application of it to a useful end, or 
because its application lies outside the realm of "manufacture." 126 
As noted in the Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedure Volume 
2: National, 127 discoveries having no way of carrying into effect, ideas, scientific 
theories, schemes and plans have generally not been considered to be per se 
patentable, and the critical question is whether the claimed invention relates to 
patentable or non-patentable subject matter. 128 In determining patentability, the APO 
Manual 2002 states that [t]his question can be answered by deciding whether the 
claimed invention lies in the intellectual or academic realm, or whether it lies in the 
technical or practical realm. Technical or practical matter is patentable.' 129 
In relation to biotechnological inventions, the question arises as to what will make 
micro-organisms and other life forms patentable. Traditionally, these biotechnological 
products and processes have been considered to be naturally occurring substances and 
125 ALRC Report, above n87, Recommendation 7-1. See also 188-190. Instead, the ALRC considered 
that social and ethical concerns can be more adequately addressed through regulation of research 
activities, and regulation of the exploitation of patented inventions; 188-190. 
126 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 264. 
127 Australian Patent Office, Manual of Practice and Procedure — Volume 2: National, (2002) (APO 
Manual 2002). Note that the APO Manual merely sets out current examination practice as enunciated 
by the courts, and is not in itself definitive on patentability. 
128 Ibid, [8.2.5.1]. 
129 'bid, [8.2.5.1]. 
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laws of nature, and therefore not patentable. 13° In line with the judgment of the High 
Court in NRDC, the Australian Patent Office directs examiners that ' ... a biological 
entity may be patentable if the technical intervention of man (ie manufacture) has 
resulted in an artificial state of affairs which does not occur in nature.' 31 
This reflects the position as laid down in the seminal US decision of Diamond v 
Chakrabarty, 132 in which the US Supreme Court upheld a claim for a patent for a 
genetically modified microorganism effective in the breakdown of crude oil spills. 
The essential position is that biotechnological inventions will not be patentable unless 
they have been artificially isolated and can no longer be said to be naturally occurring. 
Despite little case law in the area, it is well-accepted practice in Australia that 
organisms and microorganisms (including higher organisms such as genetically 
engineered plants and animals), elements of organisms (such as genes, gene 
sequences and proteins), and processes for their isolation and reproduction, are 
patentable and will not constitute discoveries.'" Claims falling into these categories 
will, of course, be subject to all of the requirements of patentability, and the complex 
issues surrounding the patentability of organisms and their components have been 
recognised and documented in Australia.' 34 
Methods of Medical Treatment 
While Article 27(2) of TRIPS allows member states to expressly exclude methods of 
treating the human body from patentability, in Australia there is no statutory 
exclusion. Until recently, uncertainty surrounded the patentability of methods of 
treatment of the human body, with a number of judgments casting doubt on whether 
or not such processes should be patentable. For example, the High Court in NRDC 
tentatively doubted the patentability of methods of medical treatment, and Justice 
Barwick in Joos v Commissioner of Patents135 allowed a patent for a substance to 
improve the keratinous strength of hair and nails on the express basis that cosmetic 
130 For example, in Rank Hovis McDougall Ltd's Application (1976) 46 AL1F' 3915, a claim for a 
naturally occurring organism was rejected, although a claim for a process of isolating and manipulating 
the microorganism was accepted. 
131 M0 Manual 2002, above n127, [8.2.14.2]. 
132 	. Dtamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980). 
133 IF Australia Guidelines, above n100; APO Manual 2002, above n127, [8.2.5.3]. A similar position 
applies in Europe; see The European Biotechnology Directive, above n108, art 5.2. 
134 See, eg, Nicol and Nielsen, above n29, 22-34; ALRC Report, above n87, 128-132; Charles Lawson 
and Catherine Pickering, 'Patenting Genetic Materials — Failing to Reflect the Value of Variation in 
DNA, RNA and Amino Acids' (2000) 11 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 69. 
135 JOOS V Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
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treatment could be distinguished from medical treatment and could be classed as a 
field of economic endeavour. On the other hand, in Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v 
Rescare Ltd 136 the majority declined to make a distinction between cosmetic and 
curative procedures and considered methods of medical treatment to be a manner of 
manufacture."' 
A definitive finding on the matter was made by the Full Court of the Federal Court in 
Bristol-Myers,m with the court unanimously holding methods of medical treatment to 
be patentable. The court refused to ground their decision in public policy, with Black 
CJ and Lehane J basing their finding on two explicit grounds: 
• the insurmountable problem, from a public policy viewpoint, of allowing 
products for medical treatment to be patented, but denying patentability for 
methods of treatment; and 
• the limited extent to which the matter of patenting of methods of medical 
treatment was dealt with by Parliament when it enacted the Patents Act 1990, 
particularly given that standard Patent Office practice in Australia was to 
allow patents for methods of medical treatment.' 39 
Justice Finkelstein rejected the notions of public policy employed by the trial judge, 
Heerey J, and refused to disallow the patent on the grounds of general 
inconvenience. m The ALRC also rejected the inclusion of an exclusion from 
patentability for methods of medical treatment in Australia. 141 
2.4.2 THE NOVELTY REQUIREMENT 
Section 18(1)(b)(i) of the Patents Act 1990 requires that an invention be novel, or 
new, when compared with the prior art base as it existed before the priority date!'" 
The prior art base is defined in Schedule 1, and incorporates information available 
136 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 40 FCR 1. 
137 The comments made by Lockhart J and Wilcox J were obiter since the matter was decided on the 
grounds of fair basing; see below, 2.4.6.3. 
138 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 46 [PR 553. 
139 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 46 IPR 553, 556-559. 
14° Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 46 PR 553, 586-593. 
141 ALRC Report, above n87, Recommendation 7-1, 178, ch 21. 
142 In respect of innovation patents, the relevant corresponding provision is Patents Act 1990 (Cth), 
s18(1A)(b)(i). The priority date in relation to a patent application is the filing date of the patent 
specification, and will usually be the date of filing a complete patent application with accompanying 
specification. 
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anywhere in the world"' and contained in any publicly available document,'" 
available through doing an act, or contained in a patent specification. 
In addition, s 7(1) provides that novelty will be assessed against prior art information 
made publicly available, either in a single document or through a single act, in two or 
more related documents or through the doing of two or more related acts, or in a 
single specification. Prior art information is defined in Schedule 1 as information that 
is part of the prior art base. 
'Publicly available' in the context of novelty can mean made available to a very small 
number of people. Provided a document is available to the public, it will be publicly 
available, even if it is relatively obscure and not generally read by the public. 145 
Commercially dealing with a product or disseminating it for use without an insistence 
on confidentiality will usually be an act sufficient to destroy novelty.'" A 
combination of documents or acts can be taken together in considering whether a 
disclosure has been made, but they must be unequivocally related in some way.'47 It 
must be possible for a person skilled in the art to regard them as a single source of 
143 See the definitions of prior art base and patent area contained in Patents Act 1990 (Oh), Schedule 1. 
Note that the definition of prior art base was expanded to include acts anywhere in the world as a result 
of the Patents Amendment Act 2001(Cth), in force from 1 April 2002. Prior to the proclamation of this 
legislation, novelty was assessed against documents available anywhere in the world, but against 
domestic acts only. The move towards assessment of the prior art base against the worldwide art base, 
is indicative of the harmonisation of Australian patent law with the law in other jurisdictions. Cf the 
Patents Act 1952 (Oh) where assessment of the novelty of an invention took place against the domestic 
prior art base only. Hence, depending on the age of a particular patent, courts must be aware of each of 
the three tests for novelty. 
144 Document is defined in s25 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Oh), and includes information 
stored or recorded on a computer, or material that produces sound or images, as well as paper and other 
material containing writing. The Australian Patent Office Manual indicates that it also includes 
photographs; APO Manual of Practice and Procedure, vol 2, above n127. 
145 See, for example, Sunbeam Corp v Murphy Richards (Aust) Pty Ltd (1961) 180 CLR 98 per 
Windeyer J, 111-12. Although some limited public disclosure may be permissible; see Patents Act 
1990 (Oh), s 24(1)(a), Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), reg 2.2, 2.3. 
146 Note however, that as of 1 April 2002, a grace period of 12 months prior to the filing of a complete 
application is available to protect inventors from accidental disclosure. Note also that s24 Patents Act 
1990 (Oh) and reg 2.2 of the Patents Regulations 1991 (Oh) provide inventors with a number of 
circumstances in which use of an invention will not be considered to be anticipation of a patent. Most 
notably, a period of experimental use is allowed. 
147 . Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd and Others v Martin Engineering Co and Another (1990) 161PR 545, 549 
(Lockhart J). This may be through cross-referencing within the documents. Note that a combination of 
documents and acts will not operate to destroy novelty. 
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information.'" Piecing together various unrelated documents or other disclosures, 
known as making a mosaic, is not permissible in terms of determining the prior art.'" 
Novelty is assessed on the balance of probabilities at the examination stage, and also 
in relation to opposition and revocation proceedings. 15° The question that will be 
asked in relation to novelty is whether the invention has been 'anticipated' by the 
prior art at the time of its priority date. If so, the patent application will fail for want 
of novelty. The traditional test for determining anticipation is the reverse infringement 
test. In Meyers Taylor Ply Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd, 151 Aickin J defined the reverse 
infringement test as follows: 
The basic test for anticipation or want of novelty is the same as that for infringement 
and generally one can properly ask oneself whether the alleged anticipation would, if 
the patent were valid, constitute an infringement. 152 
An alleged anticipation must contain all the relevant features, or essential integers, of 
the patent in question. The following test for anticipation was formulated by Lockhart 
J in Nicaro Holdings Ply Ltd and Others v Martin Engineering Co and Another: 1" 
If one skilled in the art is able to produce the product or process claimed in the 
patent through a process of trial and error by following the prior publication, 154 the 
patent will lack novelty. In this respect, all the essential integers of the patent are 
clearly mirrored in the prior publication. It may be the case that the patent has been 
anticipated even when it contains modifications to the prior art. If these modifications 
relate to inessential integers or mere mechanical equivalents that perform analogous 
purposes, novelty will be lacking. 155 In short, there must be a difference in respect of 
an essential integer for a patent applicant to succeed in establishing novelty. In that it 
enables the release of gene sequence information into the public domain for the first 
148 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 7(1)(b). 
149 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253, 293 
(Aickin J). 
150 Patents Act 1990 (Oh), s 49(1)(a). 
151 Meyers Taylor Ply Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 228. 
152 Meyers Taylor Ply Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 228, 235. 
153 Nicaro Holdings Ply Ltd and Others v Martin Engineering Co and Another (1990) 16 IPR 545. 
154 As opposed to experiments for the purpose of discovering something new; RD Werner & Co Inc v 
Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1989) 13 1PR 513. 
155 Sunbeam Corp v Murphy Richards (Aust) Ply Ltd (1961) 180 CLR 98 (Windeyer J); Nicaro 
Holdings Pty Ltd and Others v Martin Engineering Co and Another (1990) 16 IPR 545 (Lockhart J); 
RD Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Ply Ltd (1989) 13 1PR 513 (Lockhart J). 
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time, the isolation and characterisation of a gene or gene sequence will have the 
requisite novelty.' 56 
Similar issues arise in respect of 'combination patents' that: 
... combine a number of elements which interact with each other to produce a new 
result or product. Such a combination may be one constituted by integers each of 
which is old, or by integers some of which are new, the interaction being the essential 
requirement.'" 
Novelty resides, therefore, in a new combination of known integers. Because it is the 
interaction between known integers that is the crux of a combination patent, 158 the 
combination of integers must be disclosed in a particular piece of prior art, taken 
alone, in order for the patent to be anticipated!" In relation to inventions involving 
genetic technologies, novelty will be established if the invention is 'new in the sense 
of not being previously publicly available.' 160 
2.43 THE INVENTIVE STEP REQUIREMENT 
Section 18(1) (and its predecessor under the Patents Act 1952) treats novelty and 
inventive step as two distinct requirements for patentability. Because of the risk of 
confusion between the two concepts, courts have made it clear that novelty and 
inventive step are to be separately considered. Inventive step will also be assessed on 
the balance of probabilities during examination, opposition and revocation 
proceedings. 161 
Inventiveness, or inventive step, is required when compared with the prior art base. 162 
An invention that does not meet the requirements for inventiveness is 'obvious'. As 
stated in s 7(2) of the Patents Act 1990: 
... an invention is to be taken to involve an inventive step when compared with the 
prior art base unless the invention would have been obvious to a person skilled in the 
relevant art in the light of the common general knowledge as it existed in the patent 
156 Nicaro Holdings Ply Ltd and Others v Martin Engineering Co and Another (1990) 16 IPR 545, 549. 
157 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253, 266 
(Aickin J). 
158 Nicaro Holdings Ply Ltd and Others v Martin Engineering Co and Another (1990) 16 IPR 545, 553 
(Lockhart J). 
159 E Street Enterprises Inc v CPS Housewares Ply Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 465, 476 (Lockhart J). 
160 IP Australia Guidelines, above n100. 
161 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 49(1)(a) 
162 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1)(b)(ii). 
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area before the priority date of the relevant claim, whether that knowledge is 
considered separately or together with the information mentioned in subsection (3). 
The information subsection (3) refers to, is a single piece, or combination of two or 
more pieces, of prior art information. Prior art information and prior art base are 
defined in Schedule 1 and were discussed above in the context of novelty. 163 
Determining whether there has been an inventive step involves more complexity than 
the question of novelty. Referring to the test under the Patents Act 1952, Aickin J 
explained the procedure for determining inventiveness:' 
... the question of obviousness involves asking the question whether the invention 
would have been obvious to a non-inventive worker in the field, equipped with the 
common general knowledge in that particular field as at the priority date, without 
regard to documents in existence but not part of such common general knowledge. 
Despite the changes to the statutory test contained in ss 18(1) and 7(2) as a result of 
the Patents Amendment Act 2001 (Cth) the steps in the process of determining 
whether there is sufficient inventiveness remain relatively unchanged. These steps are 
to: 
• identify a hypothetical person skilled in the relevant art; 
• determine the common general knowledge of that person; and 
• assess whether, in light of that common general knowledge, the person skilled 
in the art would consider the invention to be obvious. 
2.4.3.1 THE PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART 
An objective assessment of inventive step is made by the court through the eyes of a 
normally skilled but unimaginative addressee in the relevant area of technology. 165 
The court may use expert evidence to assist it, but must still make an objective 
assessment. In some cases, the person skilled in the art may constitute a team of 
workers . 166 
163 Below, 2.4.2. 
164 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 262, 270. 
165 Speedy Gantry Hire Pty Ltd v Preston Erection Ply Ltd (1998) 40 IPR 543. 
166 General Tire & Rubber Co Ltd v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd [1972] RPC 457. 
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2.43.2 THE COMMON GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 
'Common general knowledge' differs from the term 'public knowledge' as used when 
determining novelty, and has a far more limited meaning. Aickin J in Minnesota 
Mining explained common general knowledge as follows: 167 
The notion of common general knowledge itself involves the use of that which is 
known or used by those in the relevant trade. It forms the background knowledge and 
experience which is available to all in the trade in considering the making of new 
products, the making of improvements in old. And it must be treated as being used by 
an individual as a general body of knowledge. 
The background knowledge extends beyond memorised material to include material 
known to exist by the skilled worker, and which he or she is able to access. In 
addition, as outlined above, s 7(3) of the Patents Act 1990 allows material to be added 
to the common general knowledge. 168 Thus, after determining what constitutes the 
common general knowledge, the court must consider whether any additional 
information needs to be added in line with s 7(3) and the definition of prior art base. 
This might include information a skilled worker could reasonably have been expected 
to search for. 169  The knowledge the court is required to attribute to the notional skilled 
worker is unlikely to include information contained in relatively obscure publications, 
unless the inventor could reasonably have been expected to ascertain those 
publications. 
The process of committing particular documents or acts to the common general 
knowledge may include combinations of pieces of information. 170 However, the 
relevant inquiry when examining inventiveness must be whether the invention itself is 
obvious, not whether a diligent searcher might be able to find and piece together the 
167 	. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253, 292. 
168 	. This requirement was not contained in the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), and was enacted as a result of a 
recommendation made by the Intellectual Property Advisory Committee (IPAC); Intellectual Property 
Advisory Committee, Parliament of Australia, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (1984) 
45. 
169 See Australian Industrial Property Organisation, Practice Note 1991 (No 10) Inventive Step. 
1" Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253, 293- 
294, ()Main J). 
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components of the invention from various sources. 171 Inventiveness may lie in piecing 
together a particular combination of pieces of information from various sources. 172 
Amendments to s 7(3) as a result of the Patents Amendment Act 2001 (Cth) mean that 
consideration may now be made of 'a combination of any 2 or more pieces of prior art 
information' that a skilled person could ' ... be reasonably expected to have 
ascertained, understood, [and] regarded as relevant...' •h73 
2.43.3 OBVIOUSNESS 
In considering inventive step, the court is determining, in effect, whether the prior art 
would have made the invention obvious to the hypothetical skilled worker in the field. 
In practice, a relatively small degree of inventiveness will suffice. Provided some 
small or simple inventive idea can be identified, inventive step will be established. 174 
The correct question for the court is: 'was the subject of the patent so obvious that it 
would at once occur to anyone acquainted with the subject, and desirous of 
accomplishing the end'. 175 Objective evidence of a course of research and 
development efforts directed toward satisfying a 'long-felt want' in a particular area 
of research may assist in establishing inventive step. 176 
Where the invention is made up from a combination of pieces of prior art, the proper 
question to ask is whether it would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art, 
to select from a very large range of publications the combination chosen by the 
inventor, and to select from those publications, the same combination of integers 
chosen by the inventor. 177 
While the level of inventiveness required to satisfy the inventive step requirement is 
relatively low, the changes to the prior art base arguably enable a more realistic 
171 This test was adopted in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 7(2) and 7(3) as a result of the Patents 
Amendment Act 2001 (Cth). 
172 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdoff (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253, 293- 
294 (Aicldn J). 
173 Note that the Patents Amendment Act 2001 (Oh) significantly increased the stringency of the 
inventive step test by allowing pieces of prior art to be combined, known as `mosaicimg'. This 
amendment was made as a result of recommendations made by the Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Commitee; see IPCRC Report, above n4, 154-156. 
174 Meyers Taylor Ply Ltd v Vicarr Industries Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 228, 249. 
175 Elconnex Ply Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 173. 
176 Elconnex Ply Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 173, 182 (Lockhart J); Wellcome 
Foundation v VI? Laboratories (Aust) Ply Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 262. 
177 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253, 293 
(Aickin J). 
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assessment of the prior art comprised in the common general knowledge. 178 With 
regard to gene patents, Australian Patent Office practice has been to grant patents on 
the basis that there is an element of inventiveness in isolating and purifying a 
particular gene or gene sequence despite the availability of automated sequencing 
procedures. This area is still, however, subject to some degree of uncertainty given 
inter-jurisdictional inconsistencies in the degree of inventiveness required, and a lack 
of specific judicial guidance in Australia. 
Some guidance may be available from the case of Aktiebola get Hassle v Alphapharm 
Pty Ltd,179 (Aktiebolaget Hassle) a case concerned with the patentability of a 
formulation containing the compound known as omeprazole. The compound itself had 
been the subject of a previously expired patent, and the patent that was the subject of 
litigation was challenged because it was alleged it had been arrived at by the exercise 
of scientific ingenuity and experimental research, and thus, it lacked inventiveness. 
The High Court, by majority, affirmed the approach of Aicldn J in Minnesota Mining, 
and concluded that the inventive step in this case arose from the process of 
experimenting with different combinations of integers until a successful formulation 
was arrived at. 18° The legislation181 did not direct an inquiry as to whether the course 
taken by the inventor was obvious, nor whether each of the integers in the 
combination was obvious. 182 
In this respect, the High Court aligned with US authority, and said the correct 
question in relation to obviousness is to ask whether the outcome or invention itself is 
obvious, not whether the method of obtaining it was obvious or worthwhile to try. 183 
Pursuant to this approach, gene sequences are likely to be patentable despite the 
arguably routine manner of generating gene sequence information. 
In Europe, the opposite position applies: an invention that is obvious to try will not 
involve a sufficiently inventive step. Consequently, certain modern methods of 
isolating gene sequences and identifying function (for example in silico techniques 
178 See, eg, Sam Ricketson and Megan Richardson, Intellectual Property: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, (1998) 664. 
179 Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Ply Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411 (Aktiebolaget Hassle). 
180 Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411, 436. The majority stated (at 436) 
that 'Nile tracing of a course of action which was complex and detailed, as well as laborious, with a 
good deal of trial and error, with dead ends and the retracing of steps is not the taking of routine steps 
to which the hypothetical formulator was taken as a matter of course.' 
181 The High Court was considering the relevant provision of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). 
182 Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411, 436-443. 
183 Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Ply Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411, 441-443. 
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which compare publicly available computer generated human DNA sequences to 
sequences from animal genomes with known function) would not to be patentable 
under European law. 184 Although this matter has yet to be judicially tested in any 
specific way in Australia, it is likely that a low level of inventiveness would be 
required in relation to patenting DNA sequences in line with Aktiebolaget Hassle. 185 
There has been some criticism of this test for inventiveness on the basis that it creates 
a per se rule for assessing obviousness, and ignores the presence or absence of 
technical obstacles to the invention.'" It does not allow the obviousness requirement 
to be tailored to a particular field of technical endeavour. 187 In Australia, the ALRC 
received a number of submissions that raised similar concerns, and that highlighted 
the low level of inventiveness likely to be required for assessing gene sequence patent 
applications.'" In focusing on the method of obtaining a particular gene sequence, 
some submissions raised the concern that IP Australia would be likely to grant patents 
for gene sequence information derived from automated sequencing techniques that are 
well known in the field. 
The ALRC acknowledged these submissions but considered that changes to the 
inventive step requirement were presently unnecessary.'" The ALRC's view was that 
the current test allows assessment on a case-by-case basis absent assumptions about 
the particular field of technology involved. Furthermore, they accepted that the 2001 
amendments that had the effect of increasing the information available to be assessed 
as part of the prior art information is likely to have the offsetting effect that the 
obviousness standard will be raised. 19° Finally, they allowed that IP Australia requires 
... more than the identification and isolation of a genetic sequence to grant a gene 
patent, in line with the current state of the art in the genetics field.' 19' Accordingly, 
they declined to make any recommendations that the standard for assessing 
obviousness be raised. 192 
184 See, eg, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, (2002) 
(Nuffield Discussion Paper), 29-30. 
185 See ALRC Report, above n87, 138-141. 
186 Merrill, Levin and Myers, above n76, 93-95. 
187 Ibid, 93. 
188 RC Report, above n87, 139-141. 
189 - . . 9 ma 141-142. 
190 Ibid, 141-142. See also, Centre for Law and Genetics, Submission to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission Public Inquiry, Gene Patenting and Human Health (2004). 
191 ALRC Report, above n87, 141. 
192 Ibid, 141-142. 
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2.4.4 THE USEFULNESS OR UTILITY REQUIREMENT 
The usefulness requirement is related to the disclosure requirements contained in s 40. 
This requirement does not stipulate that the invention be useful, or worthwhile in a 
social or commercial sense as such. Rather, it requires that the invention work as 
claimed if the specifications are adhered to. Gummow J in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty 
Ltd v Rescare Ltd193 compared the concept of usefulness with the requirement of 
sufficiency encapsulated by s 40: 
The distinction between insufficiency and ambiguity on the one hand, and inutility on 
the other is said to be that insufficiency occurs when the apparatus cannot be made, 
and inutility occurs when the apparatus can be made but, when made, does not work. 
However, as has been pointed out, the distinction is often less clear in practice ... 194 
Usefulness is not assessed at examination or re-examination, and is not available as a 
ground for opposition. It is available to applicants in revocation proceedings. 195 
In many other jurisdictions, commercial usefulness, or industrial applicability is a 
criterion of patentability. In the US, for example, one of the requirements for 
patentability is utility. Recently released guidelines on the utility requirement state 
that a patent application must demonstrate specific, substantial and credible utility of 
the claimed invention. 196 The European Biotechnology Directive also requires an 
applicant for a patent to satisfy a test of industrial applicability.'" The industrial 
applicability requirement has received significant attention in relation to patenting 
whole or partial gene sequences, 198 because it generally precludes a patent being 
granted for a gene sequence or partial sequence where the function of that particular 
sequence is unknown. The utility requirement has significantly increased the 
stringency of patent examination in the US, and aligns the US with the European 
Union (EU) on what is patentable subject matter.'" 
193 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119. 
194 Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119, 142 (Gummow J). 
195 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 138. 
196 	. Guidehnes for Examination of Patent Applications (2001) 66 Federal Regulations (US) 1092 (US 
Utility Guidelines). 'Credible' has been interpreted as meaning 'theoretically possible', even if not 
demonstrated in the claims. This interpretation has been criticised as setting the threshold for utility too 
low; see Nuffield Report, above ,178, 31. 
197 EC Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, (the European 
Biotechnology Directive), art 5. 
198 See, eg, Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n184, 31-34. 
199 	. Albeit through different grounds (utility as opposed to industrial applicability); see ibid, 31. 
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It was recommended in a recent review into intellectual property and competition 
laws in Australia, that the approach under the US Utility Guidelines be incorporated 
into the examination process under the Patents Act 1990.200 To some degree, the 
manner of manufacture test discussed above makes provision for an industrial 
applicability requirement in that the manner of manufacture test has been interpreted 
as requiring some economic utility. 201 The Intellectual Property and Competition 
Review Committee (the IPCRC) considered the coverage of utility in the Patents Act 
1990 to be adequate, although they recommended that utility (or industrial 
applicability) be considered during examination. 202 The Government announced that it 
would accept this recommendation, and direct that all aspects of specific, substantial 
and credible use be considered during the course of patent examination. 203 
In response to submissions that urged that a utility requirement be adopted as a 
requirement for patentability in Australia, 204 the ALRC recommended that 
'usefulness' be included as a requirement to be satisfied during examination?' The 
ALRC further recommended that 'usefulness' be interpreted to mean 'specific, 
substantial and credible' use, and that this requirement be assessed on the balance of 
probabilities. 206 Finally, the ALRC recommended that usefulness be specifically 
included as a ground for opposition, and that guidelines be prepared by IP Australia to 
assist examiners in applying the usefulness requirement. 2°7 
200 IPCRC Report, above n4, 16, 152-4. Specifically, the IPCRC recommended that the Patent Office 
ensure in its examination practice that the use described in the specification is specific, substantial and 
credible to a person skilled in the art. 
201 	. National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275. 
See also Australian Patent Office, Manual of Practice and Procedure, above n127, [8.4.1]-[8.4.2]. 
202 IPCRC Report, above n4, 16, 152-4. 
203 Commonwealth of Australia, Government Response to Intellectual Property and Competition 
Review Recommendations, Information Package (Government Response) 
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfsigeneral/response1PDF > at 31 May 2004. 
At the date of writing, the Government had not yet proceeded with this recommendation. 
204 Another ground on which the ALRC proposed amendment was that the Australia — United States 
Free Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1 may require that utility be a requirement for patentability. It may 
also require that the grounds listed as grounds for revocation in the Patents Act 1990 also be available 
as grounds on which a patent may be examined or opposed; see ALRC Report, above n87, 148-149; 
Australia and United States, Australia — United States Free Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.9.5, 
17.9.13. 
205 ALRC Report, above n87, Recommendation 6-3. See also the discussion at 142-159. Note that the 
ALRC did not consider that it was necessary to recommend that utility be included as a ground for 
opposition; at 156. 
206 'bid, 156. 
2°7 Ibid. 
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The result of the ALRC's recommendation, if accepted, would be that an applicant for 
a patent would be required to demonstrate specific function in relation to an invention. 
Given that there is some provision for such consideration in respect of the manner of 
manufacture test, the implications of this recommendation may be limited. In any 
case, as the ALRC pointed out, the primary area in which concern has arisen in 
respect of the utility requirement is gene sequence patents, and these concerns are, to 
a certain extent, redundant now that many gene sequences have been patented or 
released into the public domain. 208 
2.4.5 THE SECRET USE REQUIREMENT 
Despite provision being made in the Patents Act 1990 for experimental use or trial of 
an invention where necessary, secret use of the invention by the patentee before the 
priority date may be used as a basis for revocation of the patent. The basis of the 
secret use requirement is to prevent patent holders from extending their monopoly 
through exploiting the invention prior to the priority date. Section 9 of the Patents Act 
1990 identifies a number of uses of an invention, which will not constitute secret use, 
these being: 
• reasonable trial or experiment; 
• use occurring in the course of a confidential disclosure; 
• uses for purpose other than trade or commerce; or 
• use by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, a state or territory where disclosure 
to the Commonwealth, a state or territory has been made by the patentee. 
While secret use will generally be taken to mean commercial use, the threshold for 
commercial use is relatively low so that offering a patented invention for sale or 
licence under limited circumstances and conditions of confidentiality may be 
sufficient grounds for revocation. 209 
2.4.6 THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
A patent application must be accompanied by a specification which describes the 
invention claimed by an applicant for a patent. Specifications must conform to 
disclosure requirements prescribed by Section 40 of the Patents Act 1990: 
208 . Ibul, 158. 
209 But see Azuko Ply Ltd v Old Digger Pty Ltd (2001) 52 1PR 75. The court found, by majority, that 
manufacturing for subsequent sale after the priority date had a commercial aspect but did not amount to 
a use of the patented invention or de facto extension of the term of the patent; at 183. The fact that the 
goods were manufactured for the party testing the invention was a relevant factor. 
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40 (1) A provisional specification must describe the invention. 
(2) A complete specification must: 
(a) describe the invention fully, including the best method known to the applicant 
of performing the invention; and 
(b) where it relates to an application for a standard patent—end with a claim or 
claims defining the invention; and 
(c) where it relates to an application for an innovation patent—end with at least 
one and no more than 5 claims. 
(3) The claim or claims must be clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter 
described in the specification. 
(4) The claim or claims must relate to one invention only. 
Three requirements contained in s 40 require elucidation: 
• the requirement for full description. Claims that do not provide a full 
description are said to be insufficient; 
• the requirement for clear and succinct claims. Claims that are not clear and 
succinct are said to be ambiguous and lack clarity; and 
• the fair basing requirement, which requires correlation between the claims and 
the specification. 
The requirements of s 40 are considered on examination, 210 and are available as 
grounds for opposition211 and revocation. 212 Patents are often challenged on the basis 
of the matters specified in s 40, however the Commissioner of Patents may allow the 
specification to be amended so that deficiencies can be rectified. 
2.4.6.1 FULL DESCRIPTION AND BEST METHOD OF PERFORMANCE: 
INSUFFICIENCY 
The specification must provide a sufficient description of the invention to allow the 
invention to be carried out by a person familiar with the area of technology. If the 
written instructions are insufficient to allow a person versed in the relevant area to 
210 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 40. 
211 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 59(c). 
212 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 138(3)(f). 
92 
Chapter 2 
make the invention, the patent application will fail for insufficiency. m If someone 
skilled in the art can rectify any mistakes in the specification and supply any 
omissions without any inventive faculty, the description of the specification will be 
sufficient. 214 In the invention can be performed by a person skilled in the art without 
any new inventions or additions of their own or prolonged study of matters presenting 
difficulty, there will be sufficient disclosure.ns 
Note should also be made of sections 41 and 42 Patents Act 1990, which allow for the 
deposit of micro-organisms in place of a written description in a patent 
specification. 216 The sections were enacted due to the difficulty in providing an 
adequate description of micro-organisms or particular uses of them. In light of this, 
Australia became a signatory to the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition 
of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure 1977, in 
1987 (the Budapest Treaty). 217 The Budapest Treaty provides an international system 
for the deposit of micro-organisms by allowing the deposit of samples with 
recognised authorities. Sections 41 and 42 were enacted to give effect to the Budapest 
Treaty. 
2.4.6.2 AMBIGUITY AND LACK OF CLARITY 
Mere errors in grammatical construction will not be problematic, but 'vagueness of 
description, want of particularity and evident indistinctness of thought ... ' which are 
incapable of resolution by a skilled addressee will render claims ambiguous. 218 The 
terms in a claim will be interpreted pursuant to a ' ... practical commonsense 
approach ... ' ,219 and the body of the specification may be considered. 22° 
213 This i  differs from the utility requirement discussed above. A specification might enable a person 
familiar with the area of technology to carry out the invention, but if the invention does not work it will 
not have the requisite utility. 
214 No-Fume Ltd v Pitchford (1935) 52 RPC 231, 243. 
215 See, eg, No-Fume Ltd v Pitchford (1935) 52 RPC 231, Kimberley-Clark Australia Ply Ltd v Worrell 
(1961) 106 CLR 588. 
216  Previously s 40(3)-(7) of the Patents Act 1952 (Oh). 
217 Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure [1977] ATS 9. 
218 Kauzal v Lee (1937) 58 CLR 670, 685 (Dixon and McTieman JJ). 
219 Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Ply Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 173, 188. 
228 See, eg, Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security Systems (International) Ply Ltd (1988) 11 IPR 289. 
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2.4.6.3 FAIR BASING 
The claims within a specification must define the invention described in the body of 
the specification.' A patent applicant is limited, therefore, to what is specified within 
the claim, when subsequently exploiting the patent. In the words of Lockhart .1, 
Nile function of the claims is to defme clearly and precisely the monopoly 
claimed. Their primary object is to limit and not to extend the monopoly... '222 The 
claims must provide a 'workable standard suitable to the intended use.' 223 If a 
provisional application has been filed, the claims in the complete specification must 
be fairly based on the invention defined in the provisional specification or the earlier 
priority date will be lost. 224 
Genetics Institute v Kirin-Amgen Inc (No 3) (Kirin-Amgen) 225 is an important 
Australian authority which provides guidance in relation to the issue of breadth of 
claims in the field of biotechnology. Amgen's patent claimed the use of recombinant 
DNA techniques to produce commercial quantities of erythropoietin, a protein which 
is important in the regulation of the rate of red blood cell formation. The invention 
enabled the abundant production of erythropoietin, a rare protein in naturally 
occurring circumstances. The patent claimed the right to control erythropoietin 
production in human, monkey and other mammalian cells, which would include 
alternative methods of producing erythropoietin should they be discovered. The issue 
was whether the disclosure of the DNA coding sequence for erythropoietin provided a 
'principle capable of general application', in that Amgen had disclosed only the 
isolation from a cDNA library of the gene that encodes monkey erythropoietin. 
Genetics argued that the claims were too broad in that they claimed human 
erythropoietin cDNA which was not disclosed in the specification. Instead, the 
specification revealed that the gene that codes for human erythropoietin had been 
isolated from a genomic library. 
Because the specification disclosed the coding sequence for erythropoietin, Heerey J 
agreed that the patent disclosed a principle capable of general application and a 
beneficial property which was common to the class. In doing so, His Honour relied on 
221 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 40(2)(b). 
222 Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385, 391. 
223 Decor Corp Ply Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 1PR 385, 414 (Lockhart J) citing Aickin J in 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdoif (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253. 
224 See Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1; CCOM Pty Ltd v Jeijing Ply Ltd 
(1994) 28 IPR 481. 
225 Genetics Institute v Kirin-Amgen Inc (No 3) (1998) 156 ALR 30. The appellant will be referred to as 
Genetics, while the respondent will be referred to as Amgen. 
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the principle laid down in a recent decision of the House of Lords, Biogen Inc v 
Medeva plc (Biogen). 226 Heerey J did, however, distinguish that case. 227 In Biogen, 
Lord Hoffman, with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed, said that: 
If the invention discloses a principle capable of general application, the claims may 
be in correspondingly general terms. The patentee need not show that he has proved 
its application in every individual instance. 22s 
Lord Hoffman defined the critical issue in Biogen as follows: 
... It is not whether the claimed invention could deliver the goods, but whether the 
claims cover other ways in which they might be delivered: ways which owe nothing 
to the teaching of the patent or any principle which it disclosed ...The patent may 
claim results which it does not enable, such as making a wide class of products when 
it enables only one of those products and discloses no principle which would enable 
others to be made. Or it may claim every way of achieving a result when it enables 
only one of those products and it is possible to envisage other ways of achieving that 
result which make no use of the invention. 229 
Thus, applying these principles, Heerey J found that the sequence information 
provided in the Amgen patent provided other inventors with the opportunity to pursue 
other methods of obtaining the result claimed in the patent. Thus, Amgen was entitled 
to claim production of erythropoietin unlimited by species or structure." 
Kirin-Amgen suggests that gene patents may be interpreted broadly by the courts. 
Applicants will generally seek to claim all subsequent uses of the particular gene 
sequence claimed. In addition to the issues of novelty and inventive step, fair basing 
226 
 Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1. This case concerned a general principle for enabling 
plasmids to control the expression of polypeptides in bacteria, and claimed the principle in relation to 
any plasmid, bacterium or polypeptide. The crucial point of difference distinguishing Biogen's patent 
from the Amgen patent was that the coding sequence was not revealed in Biogen's patent. 
22' 7 Genetics Institute v Kirin-Amgen Inc (No 3) (1998) 156 ALR 30, 46. 
2 2 8 Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1, 48-49 (Hoffman J). 
• '29 
 Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1, 50 (Hoffman J). Note that a later decision of the House of 
Lords, Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v Hoescht Marion Roussel Limited and Others [2004] All ER (D) 
286, dealt with the same invention as the invention in issue in Kirin-Amgen. The House of Lords 
decided that what had been claimed by Kirin Amgen was not a principle of general application. The 
decision was based in part on Lord Hoffman's view in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 that the 
gene sequence claimed in Table VI in the patent specification was a discovery and not an invention. 
This marks a departure from established jurisprudence in relation to this issue in other jurisdictions. For 
discussion of the judgment see Luigi Palombi, 'The Impact of TRIPS on the Validity of the European 
Biotechnology Directive' (2005) 2(2) Journal of International Biotechnology Law 62. 
230 Genetics Institute v Kirin-Amgen Inc (No 3) (1998) 156 ALR 30, 46-48 (Heerey J). 
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may become an issue where the claims made in the application cannot be said to be 
fairly based on the descriptive information provided in the specification. Concern has 
arisen that claims to uses of gene sequences (including products deriving from those 
gene sequences) have been overly broad. Nevertheless, where coding sequences are 
disclosed, broad claims to general principles are likely to be upheld by the judiciary, 
and accordingly, are being granted by the Australian Patent Office.' Of importance 
here is the extent to which broad patent claims may enable a patent holder to control 
subsequent use of an invention. 
2.4.7 SUMMARY — STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY 
In medical biotechnology, there have been many instances where extremely broad 
patents have been granted on important inventions. This has led to calls for more 
stringent standards of patentability and examination. In some respects, amendments to 
the standards of patentability have alleviated concerns about the breadth of patents in 
this area. For example, the 2001 amendments to the Patents Act 1990 have had the 
effect of increasing the stringency of the inventive step requirement. Whether they go 
far enough is another matter, and concerns about the breadth of patent grants in the 
medical biotechnology area persist. 232 The current standards begin to provide some 
basis for circumscribing a role for competition law. Relatively broad patent claims 
may continue to be allowed and are likely to be upheld by the courts. The granting of 
broad rights may strengthen arguments that competition law should be available to 
regulate the use of patents. Further, the quantity of patents being granted in the 
biotechnology category is a basis for monitoring their use. 
231 In contrast, in the US, new written description and enablement guidelines provide more stringent 
rules in relation to the breadth of claims that may be made; Guidelines for Examination of Patent 
Applications (2001) 66 Federal Regulations (US) 1092; Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, (8th 
ed, Feb 2003 revision 2003); §2107, <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pacimpep/index.html> at 25 
August 2005 (US Examination Guidelines). 
US courts have also traditionally been less willing to uphold broad, upstream claims; see Regents of the 
University of California v Eli Lilly & Co (1997) 119 F3d 1159. 
232 It was these concerns that prompted the ALRC to seek a reference to inquire into the impact of 
patenting laws and practices in relation to genetic and related technologies; see ALRC Report, above 
n87, 11-12. 
96 
Chapter 2 
2.5 EXPLOITATION AND INFRINGEMENT 
A patent gives a patent holder the exclusive right to exploit an invention in Australia 
for a period of twenty years, and to authorise another party to exploit the invention. 233 
Exploit is defined in Schedule 1 to the Patents Act 1990 as follows: 
"exploit" in relation to an invention, includes: 
(a) where the invention is a product — make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the 
product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or 
keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or 
(b) where the invention is a method or process — use the method or process or do any 
act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use. 
Pursuant to s 13(2) of the Patents Act 1990, a patent holder may assign or licence a 
patent to another party to allow that party to exploit the patent. While an assignment 
essentially constitutes sale of a patented product or process, 234 a licence does not vest 
ownership in a licensee but allows the licensee to exploit the patent. This may be to 
the exclusion of all others (an exclusive licence), in conjunction with the patent holder 
(a sole licence), or in conjunction with a number of other licensees (a non-exclusive 
licence). Because licences are contractual arrangements, the terms on which licences 
are entered into are variable, and are subject to principles of freedom of contract. A 
licence may be granted to allow the licensee to conduct follow-on research. Follow-on 
research is research that uses the patented invention in some way in order to develop a 
new invention. 235 
The scope of a patented invention will, of course, be subject to what has been claimed 
in the specification. This highlights the importance of patent breadth and a focus on 
exactly what has been claimed. In the case of gene sequences, for example, because 
broad applications of the particular sequence might be claimed, any use of these 
inventions without the authority of the patent holder will constitute infringement. 236 
Pursuant to the Patents Act 1990, the circumstances in which a patent may be 
infringed are where: 
233 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 13(1). Note the provisions in relation to innovation patents, which are 
granted for a period of eight years; above, n81. 
234 An assignment must be in writing and signed by the parties to the assignment; Patents Act 1990 
(Cth), s 14(1). 
235 The concept of follow-on innovation will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
236 This will depend of course on whether the patent is valid. In particular, see the discussion above, 
2.4.6.3. 
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• a person exploits a patent without the authorisation of the patent holder; 
• a person authorises another person to exploit a patent without the authorisation 
of the patent holder; or 
• a patented product is supplied to another person and use of that product would 
constitute an infringement of the patent. 237 
Where a patentee or licensee brings infringement proceedings against an alleged 
infringer, a purposive approach will be adopted in comparing the combination of 
essential integers in the claims of the invention, and the infringing invention!' This 
section considers two issues central to patent exploitation: the research exemption and 
the compulsory licensing provisions contained in the Patents Act 1990. These issues 
are important in terms of the use that may be made of patents and access to patents for 
the purpose of conducting follow-on innovation. While a detailed analysis of them 
will not be provided, they require some consideration because they assist in 
demarcating the bounds of non-infringing use of a patent. Finally, this section will 
briefly consider some issues associated with the weight that should be placed on the 
validity of issued patents, and the importance to the medical biotechnology industry 
of strong, valid patents. 
2.5.1 THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
An exemption from infringement would provide a potential infringer with a basis for 
exploiting a patent without the permission of the patent holder. This may be 
particularly important where a patent is required for follow-on innovation. The 
bounds of such an exemption are important because research that is not covered by 
the exemption will continue to infringe. If a researcher is unable to obtain a license, 
they will not be entitled, in the absence of some alterative form of regulation, to 
conduct follow-on research. 
2.5.1.1 THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN PRACTICE 
The Patents Act 1990 makes no provision for a research exemption, and there has 
been no judicial pronouncement on the subject. 239 Any research with a commercial 
237 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 117. Infringement under s 117 is referred to as infringement by supply, or 
contributory infringement. 
238 See, for example, MJA Scientifics International v SC Johnson & Son (1999) 43 IPR 287. 
239 Although s 9 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) allows a patent applicant to undertake 'reasonable trial 
and experiment' prior to filing a patent application by excluding such trial and experiment from the 
definition of 'secret use'; Patents Act 1990 (Oh), ss 9(a), 18(1)(d). As such, a patent applicant is 
permitted to undertake experimental use of their invention. 
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purpose which relies on a patented product or process, would infringe that patent in 
the absence of a licence. What is not so clear is the extent to which non-profit 
research may infringe a patent. Instead, many users of patented products and 
technologies (particularly in the medical biotechnology industry) rely on a practice-
based research exemption,m although the scope of this exemption is subject to 
considerable uncertainty.241 
In reality, few patent holders in the medical biotechnology industry pursue academic 
researchers for infringement if their research is clearly non-profit. 242 A number of 
patent holders have shown an increased willingness in recent times to enforce their 
patents against academic researchers.243 The increasing tendency of academic 
researchers to pursue research with a commercial aim would take the conduct of this 
research outside the exemption. It is clear that the practice-based exemption would 
offer little assistance to any researcher conducting research with a hint of 
commerciality. 
2.5.1.2 THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
In the US, a case-based exemption exists. 244 The scope of the research exemption in 
the US is 'truly narrow', 245 although understanding of the true scope of the exemption 
within the research community has traditionally been limited. 246 The ambit of the 
exemption was recently explored by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) in Madey v Duke University (Madey v Duke), 247 where the CAFC stated that 
24° See Nicol and Nielsen, above n29, 218-222; ALRC Report, above n87, 326-327. 
241 Indeed, the basis of such an exemption is far from clear; see ALRC Report, above n87, 318-319. 
242 Nicol and Nielsen, above n29, 219-222. 
243 For example, Dr Mervyn Jacobson, the Chief Executive Officer of Genetic Technologies Limited 
(GIG) has suggested that GIG will take infringement proceedings against academic institutions for 
infringement of their junk DNA patents if necessary; see ABC Television, 'Patently a Problem' Four 
Corners, 11 August 2003 <http://www.abc.nelau/4comers/content/2003/transcripts/s922059.htm > at 
11 March 2004. 
244 The doctrine originated in 1813 as a result of the case of Whittemore v Cutter 29 F Cos 1120 1121 
[CCD Mass 1913] (No 17 600) per Story J. 
245 Roche Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co Inc 733 F 2d (1984). 
246 See generally Rebecca S Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1017 (1989). 
247 Madey v Duke University, 307 F 3d 1351, 1360-1 (Fed Cir, 2002). Note the issue of the use of 
patented drugs to conduct clinical trials in accordance with US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
regulations was recently considered by the US Supreme Court in Merck KGAA v Integra Lifesciences I 
Ltd 125 S Ct 1728 (2005). The case considered a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act 1984 35 U.S.C. 
§271(e)(1)), which provides an exemption for the use of patented compounds for the purpose of testing 
drugs pursuant to Federal Drug Administration legislation. In considering the breadth of the exemption, 
the Supreme Court said that '[t]here is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information 
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the experimental use rule would only support research conducted solely for the 
purpose of ... amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry .248 The Court made it clear that the profit or non-profit status of the user 
will not be determinative, and the test will be whether the act of alleged infringement 
is ' ... in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business... .249 The result of 
Madey v Duke is an exemption that will operate to protect non-profit research 
institutions in very narrow circumstances. Given that the business of research 
institutions is the conduct of research for scientific inquiry, any research other than 
'philosophical inquiry' will fail to attract the exemption. This broad definition of 
business interests means that most researchers conducting research at higher research 
institutions will not be able to utilise the exemption. 25° 
A less restrictive position exists in most EU countries, with researchers in the United 
Kingdom (UK), for example, being entitled to rely on a statutory defence. 251 This 
defence could be read as having two limbs, one that relates to private, non-
commercial use, and the other that relates to experimental use 'relating to the subject 
matter of a patented invention'. 252 This is the manner in which the defence has been 
interpreted, so that the two limbs are treated separately, 253 although the first limb has 
received little judicial consideration. 254 The second limb has been interpreted as being 
applicable to research that is potentially commercial, provided the research is 
from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed ... '; at 9. Despite a 
later comment that [b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the intent 
to develop a particular drug ... ' would not be covered by the exemption, the ruling has raised concerns 
about the extent to which patented upstream research tools are likely to be subject to the exemption; 
see, for example, Andrew Pollack, 'Justices Expand Rights to Experiment with Patented Drugs' The 
New York Times (14 June 2005). 
248 Madey v Duke University, 307 F 3d 1351, 1360-1 (Fed Cir, 2002), 1362. 
Madey v Duke University, 307 F 3d 1351, 1360-1 (Fed Cir, 2002), 1362. 
250 Tom Saunders 'Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the 
Experimental Use Doctrine' (2003) 113 Yale Law Journal 261 at 265. For criticism of the exemption 
see Merrill, Levin and Myers, A Patent System for the 21 st Century, above n76, 108-117; Katherine 
Strandburg, 'What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain' (2004) Wisconsin 
Law Review 81. 
251 Patents Act 1977 (UK), s 60(5). Section 60(5) provides that: 
An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an 
invention shall not do so if — 
(a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial; 
(b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention; 
252 Patents Act 1977 (UK), s 60(5). 
253 See, eg, Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Evans Medical Ltd [1989] 1 FSR 513. 
254 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Evans Medical Ltd [1989] 1 FSR 513, 517. 
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technical in nature. Thus, it will apply to in-house experiment for the purpose of 
improvement and modification. 255 
Generally, the position in most jurisdictions appears to be that a research exemption 
will apply where research with commercial possibilities is being conducted on an 
invention, rather than where research is being conducted that uses an invention. It has 
been suggested that restricting experimentation with an invention (for example to 
improve on the invention) while allowing experimentation on an invention is the 
appropriate parameter around which to define a research exemption, and that any such 
distinction should be applied in a flexible rather than formalistic manner!' 
2.5.1.3 DEFINING THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
The OECD has recently called for confirmation and clarification of the research 
exemption in OECD countries in response to concerns that access to basic inventions 
be ensured.257 As a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding the exemption in 
Australia, the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) recently received a 
reference to consider the desirability of a more clearly delineated experimental use 
exemption.258 The ALRC also considered this issue in the context of access to gene 
patents. 259 
The ALRC recommended that a statutory exemption should be enacted that aligns the 
Patents Act 1990 more closely with UK and EU law.26° Accordingly, the ALRC 
recommended the adoption of ... an exemption from patent infringement for acts 
done to study or experiment on the subject matter of a patented invention; for 
255 Monsanto Co v Stauffer Chemical Co [1985] RPC 515, especially 542. 
256 See Saunders, above n250, 267-8; Janice Mueller, 'No "Dilletante" Affair: Rethinking the 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools' (2001) 76 
Washington Law Review 1, especially 9, 54-66; Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, above 
n246, 1076-77. 
257 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Patents and Innovation: Trends 
and Policy Challenges (2004), 21, 23, 27. The OECD also recommended an international comparative 
study on the research exemption; at 27. 
258 See Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP), Patents and Experimental Use: Options 
Paper, Australian Government Printing Service (2004) (ACIP Options Paper). ACIP's final report is 
due to be presented to the Government in early October 2005, and publicly released in late October 
2005; Email from Sean Applegate to Jane Nielsen, 25 August 2005. 
259 See ALRC Report, above n87, Chapter 13. 
260 Ibid, 340. The ALRC rejected the restrictive position adopted in US case law. There is a degree of 
pessimism as to whether Congress would be likely to pass legislation providing for a more extensive 
research exemption under US law; Merrill, Levin and Myers, A Patent System for the 21 st Century, 
above n76, 115. 
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example, to investigate its properties or improve upon it.' 261 Importantly, the ALRC's 
exemption would continue to apply where research with a commercial purpose or 
objective is undertaken.262 Further, the ALRC recommended that the exemption 
should not ' ... derogate from any study or experimentation that may otherwise be 
permitted under the Patents Ace.263 There is some indication that ACIP will make a 
similar recommendation, the Options Paper released by ACIP stating that the options 
preferred by it were to: 
• make no change to the experimental use exemption; 
• modify the definition of exploitation to not include experimental use without 
further defining experimental use; 
• provide an exemption for fair experimentation with inclusive permitted uses; 
Or 
• provide an exemption for experimenting on the subject matter of the 
inventions, with inclusive permitted uses. 264 
The ALRC's recommendation, if accepted, provides a limited research exemption for 
research on a patented invention even when it is likely to lead to a commercial 
outcome. 265 In the case of genetic technologies, the ALRC gave some guidance as to 
what is likely to constitute an act 'done to study or experiment on the subject matter 
of the invention'. In the view of the ALRC, research that investigated the properties of 
a particular genetic technology or material would be exempt, such as research on a 
patented genetic sequence to investigate function or association with disease, or 
relationship with other genetic sequences! 66 Most research falling into this category 
would probably be conducted with a commercial endpoint in mind (even where it is 
conducted by public sector research institutions), and a licence to use the technology 
would be required at some point. 
Although the exemption would provide a researcher with protection from 
infringement liability during the early period of research, as soon as a commercial 
outcome appears likely a licence to use the protected technology would be necessary. 
261 ALRC Report, above n87, Recommendation 13-1, 341. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 ACIP Options Paper, above n258, 17. 
265 Though in the event that a commercial outcome is reached, a licence to use the patented product 
would be necessary. 
266 ALRC Report, above n87, 343-343. 
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The research exemption proposed will therefore only protect a researcher for a limited 
time, because at some point they will need to negotiate a licence to use the patented 
technology. The effect of the research exemption would in effect be to defer the 
necessity for negotiations. In this case, an exemption in line with that proposed by the 
ALRC would be of limited application, and is likely to be narrower than the current 
practice-based research exemption. It would not, for example, operate to cover the use 
of research tools for experimental purposes. 
It is submitted that a clearly defined exemption from infringement should be enacted. 
Such a research exemption is particularly necessary in an industry such as medical 
biotechnology where access to upstream research tools far removed from commercial 
product development, may be restricted.267 There are many intermediate steps between 
upstream invention and downstream development, and research during these 
intermediate stages may not be covered by the exemption proposed. Further, the 
exemption will have limitations, some of which may not be known nor tested. 268 It 
may not be clear precisely which uses are covered by the exemption, and which are 
not. 
Despite the benefits of more clearly circumscribing the circumstances in which 
researchers are infringing patents, doing so could have the effect of encouraging 
infringement litigation. Because patent holders will have a clear statutory basis on 
which to bring proceedings for infringement, the 'grey area' in which many 
researchers now operate could be lost. 
Even a broadly defined research exemption would have limitations. The research 
exemption will be of limited value if access to a patented product is refused, because 
it may be impossible to create the invention from the patent specification. Many 
biotechnology products are difficult to reverse engineer, and the patent holder may 
possess additional information without which the invention cannot be practised. For 
these reasons, it is submitted that while a broadly defined research exemption will 
assist researchers in determining whether research is likely to infringe a patent, a 
research exemption alone will not provide a solution where access to a patented 
biotechnology invention is required in order to conduct follow-on research. 
267 See also Merrill, Levin and Myers, A Patent System for the 21 g Century, above n76. 
'The ALRC pointed out, for example, that clinical trials conducted to satisfy regulatory requirements 
for new pharmaceuticals or genetic tests may fall outside the exemption; ALRC Report, above n87, 
343-344. 
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2.5.2 COMPULSORY LICENSING 
A compulsory licence is an order requiring the patentee to grant a licence to work an 
invention, in effect limiting the patentee's exclusive right to exploit the invention. The 
circumstances in which compulsory licences may be granted are limited, and the term 
for which they are effective depends on how long the reasons for their granting 
continue to exist. 
Article 31 of TRIPS implicitly allows compulsory licensing of patents. 269 The 
circumstances in which TRIPS allows the issue of compulsory licences are: 
• situations of national emergency or extreme urgency; 
• cases of non-public commercial use; 
• cases of anti-competitive practices; 
• dependent patent cases where the exercise of one patent will infringe another. 
The grounds referred to in Article 31 are not exhaustive, and WTO member states • 
may determine other relevant grounds. Generally, the grounds found in national 
legislation fall into the following categories: 270 
• refusal to deal; 
• non-working and inadequate supply; 
• public interest; 
• anti-competitive practices; 
• governmental use; 
• facilitation of the use of dependent patents; 
• specific compulsory licenses for patented medicines; and 
• licences of right, which allow importation by a licensee where the patentee 
imports a major portion of the product into the member state and carries out a 
minor production step in the member country. 
269  Article 31 also contains detailed conditions for the grant of compulsory licenses. Most importantly, 
in many cases a prior request for a license must have been made, and the licensee must provide 
adequate compensation to the patent holder. 
270 Carlos Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries, Working Paper 5, (1999), 10-21, 
<http://www.southcentre.org/publications/complicense/toc.html > at 19 April 2001. 
104 
Chapter 2 
Article 31 of TRIPS specifies that prior to the issue of a compulsory licence, a 
proposed user must have made attempts to obtain a licence on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions. These attempts must have been unsuccessful over a reasonable 
period of time. This requirement may be waived in circumstances of national 
emergency, other circumstances of extreme urgency, or public non-commercial use. 
The compulsory licensing provisions are being relied on by developing countries to 
manufacture drugs in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 271 While there is no doubt 
that this is an appropriate circumstance in which the compulsory licensing provisions 
should be utilised,272 the availability of compulsory licensing as a solution to general 
access issues (such as access to patents over genes required to develop diagnostic 
tests) is traditionally more contentious given the potential for reduction in incentives 
to innovate. 
2.5.2.1 COMPULSORY LICENCES — THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION 
The Patents Act 1990 allows for the issue of compulsory licences on the first three 
grounds.273 In the US, the primary ground on which compulsory licences are issued is 
to remedy anti-competitive conduct, 274 and many licences have been issued under anti-
trust decrees. 275 
Section 133 of the Patents Act 1990 provides for the issue of non-exclusive 
compulsory licenses for: 
• failure to work an invention where exploitation of the patent is necessary to 
satisfy the 'reasonable requirements of the public' (provided reasonable 
attempts have been made to obtain a license by the applicant and the patent 
holder has not provided a satisfactory explanation for failing to work the 
invention);276 and 
271 See generally Jane Nielsen and Dianne Nicol, 'Pharmaceuticals and Patents: The Conundrum of 
Access and Incentive' (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 21. 
272 Indeed, the TRIPS Council has gone further and authorised the supply of drugs to countries without 
sufficient capacity to manufacture the requisite drugs themselves; TRIPS Council (2003) 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
<http://www.wto.orgienglish/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htin > at 25 August 2005. 
273 These being refusal to supply, non-working, and inadequate supply, and public interest. 
274 F Michael Scherer, 'Comments', in Robert Anderson and Nancy Gallini, (eds), Competition Policy 
and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy (1998) 104-109, 106. 
275 ibid. 
276 Patents Act 1990 (Oh), ss133(2) and (3A). 
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• cases where an applicant seeks access to a dependent patent and also a patent 
that blocks exploitation of that patent. 277 The applicant will only be successful 
in obtaining a compulsory licence where the new invention involves an 
important technical advance of considerable economic importance on the other 
invention.278 This ground would not appear to be available to an owner of a 
dependent patent who would infringe another patent by working their 
invention. Instead, an owner of a dependent patent would have to rely on the 
'reasonable requirements of the public' ground. 
Section 135 defines what is meant by 'reasonable requirements of the public'. 
Essentially, where a new or existing trade or industry in Australia is unfairly 
prejudiced, or the demand in Australia for a patented product is not reasonably met, 
this will provide grounds for the grant of a compulsory licence. However, the 
compulsory licensing provisions under the Patents Act 1990 have rarely been utilised, 
and there is no judicial guidance on the circumstances in which a compulsory licence 
may be issued or what the 'reasonable requirements of the public' might be. 279 
Compulsory licensing provisions are used far more extensively in other 
jurisdictions.280 
The IPCRC accepted that a compulsory licensing system, by its very existence, may 
have the effect of influencing the terms on which licenses are negotiated. 281 Studies 
have shown that a compulsory licensing scheme, rather than inhibiting research and 
development, actually acts as a spur to innovation. 282 The threat of an application for a 
compulsory licence probably provides an impetus to patent holders to enter into 
licensing negotiations and ultimately into contractual arrangements. 283 Note, however, 
that given the under-utilisation of the Australian scheme, this aim may not be met. 
The inequality in bargaining power between many companies, particularly start-up 
277 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 133(2) and 133(3B)(a). 
278 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s133(3B). For further details on when a compulsory licence may be granted, 
and the conditions on which a grant is predicated, see ALRC Report, above n87, 617-621; Dianne 
Nicol and Jane Nielsen, 'The Australian Medical Biotechnology Industry and Access to Intellectual 
Property: Issues for Patent Law Development' (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review, 347, 370-71. 
279 The only reported case is Fastening Supplies Ply Ltd v Olin Mathieson Chemical Co (1969) 119 
CLR 572. 
280 See Correa, above n270. 
281 IPCRC Report, above n4, 162. Scherer, above n274, 106; Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n184, 
55. 
282 	. See, m particular Scherer, above n274, 106. 
283 See also Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n184, 55. Cf ALRC Report, above n87, 614. 
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companies, may mean that the threat of a compulsory licensing application is non-
existent. 
The lPCRC recommended changes to the compulsory licensing provisions within the 
Patents Act 1990 including the repeal of s 135, and the amendment of s 133(2). 284 The 
effect of this amendment would be to replace the 'reasonable requirements of the 
public' provision with a provision allowing for the grant of a compulsory licence 
where the public interest would be met by enhanced competition in the market. 285 The 
Report recommended that compulsory licensing orders be obtainable on application to 
the Australian Competition Tribunal with rights of appeal to the Full Federal Court. 286 
Presumably this would go some way towards expediting the application process. 
The Federal Government announced that it would accept these recommendations in 
part, accepting the IPCRC's recommendation to include a competition test as a 
ground for the issue of a compulsory licence, but declining to repeal s 135 and the 
broader grounds for issue of a compulsory licence contained in that provision. 287 The 
Federal Government also considered that applications for compulsory licences should 
continue to be considered by the Federal Court in the first instance. 288 As at the date of 
writing, the relevant provisions had not been amended. 
284 IPCRC Report, above n4, 162-163. The basis of the recommendation was a view that the provision 
as currently drafted is outmoded and fails to secure the goals of a compulsory licensing system. The 
terms of s133 were considered to be concerned with the promotion of domestic industry rather than 
'...securing the best use of resources and achieving high levels of productivity.' Further, it was 
considered that s133 is deficient in that it lacks an explicit competition test; at 162. 
285 The conditions specified by the IPCRC for the grant of a compulsory licence in these circumstances 
were: 
(a) access to the patented invention is required for competition in the (relevant) market; 
(b) there is a public interest in enhanced competition in that market; 
(c) reasonable requirements for such access have not been met; 
(d) the order will have the effect of allowing these reasonable requirements to be better met; and 
(e) the order will not compromise the legitimate interests of the patent owner, including that 
owner's right to share in the return society obtains from the owner's invention, and to benefit 
from any successive invention, made within the patent term, that relies on the patent. 
See ibid, 163. Without attempting to draft the conditions that would need to be met, the IPCRC 
stated that these conditions should be necessarily stringent, and that the expression, 'required for 
competition in the (relevant) market would 'amount to there being no other option for competition 
in that market, and that the enhancement of competition that would be secured by the grant would 
have to be material and substantial; at 163. 
2136  Ibid, 163. Currently applications for compulsory licences must be made to the Federal Court. 
287 Government Response, above n203. 
2E8 Ibid. 
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Enhanced access to the compulsory licensing provisions is highly desirable. It is 
particularly encouraging to note the focus on the importance of compulsory licensing 
to the competitive process. It is unclear as to the form the amendment would take, and 
how it would interact with the restrictive trade practices provisions in Part IV of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA), or whether the provision would only be 
invoked where there is a contravention of Part W. 229 Although the notion of 
compulsory 'licences as a remedy for anti-competitive conduct may provide the 
necessary impetus for increased utilisation of the remedy, there is no guarantee that 
this provision would increase the number of applications for compulsory licences 
given a number of factors that will remain unchanged: 
• the meaning of 'reasonable requirements of the public' will still be subject to 
uncertainty and (at present) devoid of judicial interpretation; 
• owners of dependent patents will continue to have to rely on the 'reasonable 
requirements of the public' proviso; and 
• the fact that application must be made to the Federal Court is likely to 
discourage a number of potential applicants due to the expense associated with 
any judicial process together with uncertainty as to the outcome. 
The ALRC also considered the compulsory licensing provisions, and recommended 
that the competition ground proposed by the IPCRC be inserted as an additional 
ground for the grant of a compulsory licence.290 The ALRC also recommended that 
the scope of the 'reasonable requirements of the public' test be darified. 291 
It is submitted that further amendment to the compulsory licensing provisions is 
warranted. Specifically, provision should be made for owners of dependent patents to 
apply for a compulsory licence to exploit an original invention on which the 
dependent patent relies. 292 The fact that provision is not made for the owner of a 
dependent patent to apply for a compulsory licence, when an inventor who does not 
own a patent may, gives rise to an anomaly. Uncertainty over the application of the 
'reasonable requirements of the public' test means that this ground is an inadequate 
289 It would appear from the recommendation made by the IFCRC that they intended the grounds set 
out in the recommendation to be decisive; IPCRC Report, above n4, 163. 
290 RC Report, above n87, Recommendation 27-1; 624-625. 
291 Ibid. 
292 In this case, a blocking patents situation may arise. For discussion of blocking patents and their legal 
definition, see below, 3.5; 4.4.1. 
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basis on which to ground an application where the owner of a dependent patent seeks 
access to an original patent.293 
It should be noted that the Australia - United States Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSTFA)294 apparently restricts the circumstances in which provision for 
compulsory licensing may be made. Under the AUSTFA, provision for compulsory 
licensing may be made: 
• to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be 
anti-competitive under the party's laws relating to prevention of anti-
competitive practices; or 
• in the case of public non-commercial use or national emergency or 
circumstances of extreme urgency, subject to specified circumstances. 295 
If these are the only circumstances which may be specified as grounds for compulsory 
licences, the existing grounds under the Patents Act 1990 fall outside their ambit. 
There has been no indication the Government intends amending the compulsory 
licensing provisions, although there can be no guarantee this will not occur in future. 
Given that the existing grounds for application for compulsory licence have been 
virtually unused and are of questionable value, this may not have a significant impact 
on the effect of the compulsory licensing provision. The AUSTFA still makes 
provision for application in the case of anti-competitive conduct, which is an 
important ground on which compulsory licence applications should be permitted. 296 It 
also, however, limits any expansion of the compulsory licensing provisions in future. 
2.5.2.2 SOME PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF COMPULSORY LICENCES 
Compulsory licenses appear to be an appropriate mechanism by which to solve some 
access problems, but in practical terms their utility must be questioned. The problem 
faced by any government bold enough to enforce the issue of compulsory licences is 
generally censure from major trading partners under pressure from powerful patent 
holders.297 In addition, for a compulsory licensing scheme to be effective, a licensee 
would need to be able to obtain compulsory licences in all those jurisdictions in which 
293 Cf ALRC Report, above n87, 627-628. 
294 Australia — United States Free Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1. 
295 Australia — United States Free Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.9.7. 
296 On the issue of compulsory licensing as a remedy under the TPA, see below, 6.6. 
297 The fact that compulsory licences are a 'contentious and politically sensitive' TRIPS issue was 
recognised by the Federal Government in their response to the IPCRC Report; see Government 
Response, above n203. 
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patents have been granted, principally in the US, the EU and Japan. At present there is 
no international consensus on the circumstances for the granting of compulsory 
licenses. Obtaining a compulsory license in Australia would not enable 
commercialisation on an international basis. 
2.5.3 CROWN USE 
Section 163(1) of the Patents Act 1990 permits the exploitation of a patented 
invention by the Commonwealth or a State, or by a person authorised by the 
Commonwealth or a State, without liability for infringement of that patent, provided 
that the exploitation is 'for the services of the Commonwealth or the State'. Detailed 
conditions govern use by the Crown pursuant to s 163(1). Relevantly, notification 
must be provided to the patent holder, 298 and adequate remuneration must be agreed 
upon. 299 The Crown use provisions provide a mechanism for access to patented 
inventions by Crown authorities." 
The ALRC considered that the Crown use provisions have the potential to be 
particularly useful when access to a patented genetic invention is required in the 
provision of public healthcare. Similarly, the ALRC stated that these provisions might 
be usefully invoked where access to a patented biotechnology product is required for 
public research purposes. 301 The ALRC recognised that the application of the 
provisions will be limited to bodies that fall within the definition contained within s 
163(1), and that there may be some uncertainty as to when exploitation is for the 
services of the Crown." Accordingly, they made a number of recommendations in 
relation to the Crown use provisions. 
The first was that the Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council should develop 
policies regarding the circumstances in which the Crown use provisions might be 
appropriately invoked." The ALRC also recommended that amendment be made to s 
167 (1) to clarify that 'for the services of the Commonwealth or of a State' include the 
298 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 164. 
299 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 165. 
300 Defined as the Commonwealth or a State, an authority of the Commonwealth or a State, or a person 
authorised in writing by the Commonwealth or a State; Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 162. 
301 ALRC Report, above n87, 601-602. 
302 
f
. ind, 601-608. For a discussion of case law relevant to when a body is likely to fall within the 
definition of the 'Commonwealth or a State', at 598-599; Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 
(ACIP), Review of Crown Use Provisions in Patents and Design Legislation, Discussion Paper, (2003) 
(ACIP Discussion Paper), 5-6. 
303 ALRC Report, above n87, Recommendation 26-1. 
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provision of healthcare services or products to members of the public. 304 The ALRC's 
fimal recommendation in relation to the Crown use provisions related to the 
remuneration payable to the patent holder in the event of Crown use or acquisition. 
Specifically, the ALRC recommended amendment to the Patents Act 1990 to provide 
that remuneration be paid by a public authority promptly, and be just and reasonable 
having regard to the economic value of the use. 305 
ACIP is also currently conducting a review into the Crown use provisions in 
intellectual property legislation. Although their Final Report has not been released, 
ACIP have indicated their preliminary views in a Discussion Paper released in 
December 2003.3°6 In particular, ACIP is considering whether restrictions on the use 
of the Crown use provisions might be appropriate in light of the detrimental effect that 
over-use of the provisions may have on incentives to innovate, especially in light of 
the commercial nature of many activities undertaken by Commonwealth and State 
authorities. 307 
The ALRC considered the Crown use provisions to be particularly appropriate for 
ensuring access by public sector organisations to patented genetic materials. 
Nevertheless, the provisions are limited to publicly funded bodies, and any privately 
funded body304 or company would fall outside their scope. In addition, the provisions 
are most likely to be useful where access is sought to downstream products, for 
example, drugs or diagnostic tests. Their application may be more problematic in the 
case of access to upstream research tools for research purposes, due to the original 
objectives behind the provisions, and a perception that the provisions should be 
invoked rarely, for example, in cases of public health emergency or other pressing 
public interest situations. 307 In addition, the AUSTFA does not permit the transfer of 
associated know-how related to a patented invention, so that exploitation of a patented 
invention may be difficult even in the event the Crown use provisions are utilised. 31° 
304 Ibid. Recommendation 26-2, 606-608. Such as the provision of genetic testing services. 
305 	. Ibid, Recommendation 26-3, 608. 
306 ACIP Discussion Paper, above n302. A report has been drafted and is likely to be forwarded to the 
relevant Minister during October 2005; email from Jeff Roberts to Jane Nielsen, 15 June 2005. 
Ibid, 5-9. 
308  This may include research institutions affiliated with public hospitals that nonetheless receive 
private funding. 
309 ACIP Discussion Paper, above n302, 8. 
310 Australia — United States Free Trade Agreement, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.9.7(b)(iii). 
307 
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2.5.4 PATENT VALIDITY 
A degree of criticism has been levelled at the Australian Patent Office on the basis 
that it lacks the resources and expertise to adequately examine the massive numbers 
of complex patent applications that have been filed in the area of medical 
biotechnology. 311 The problem is certainly not unique to Australia: similar problems 
exist in the US and Europe, with a huge preponderance of patent applications being 
filed in the biotechnology category over the last decade or so. 
Interestingly, a recent comparative study found few differences between the practices 
of patent offices in Australia, Japan, Europe and the US in relation to granting patents 
over expressed sequence tags (ESTs). 312 The OECD nevertheless recently affirmed the 
importance of high quality patents where those patents are important to innovation, 
and called for exploration of stricter examination as one means of discouraging low-
quality patent applications.m Low quality patents were defined as ' ... those that 
protect inventions of limited novelty, or that provide overly broad protection.' 314 The 
OECD considered that defensive patenting (patenting to avoid others patenting first) 
and strategic patenting (patenting to allow freedom to operate) in particular, 
contribute to problems associated with patent quality. 315 Allowing broad patents to 
issue may give patent holders unreasonably strong bargaining positions with 
downstream users of technology.316 
In response to general concerns about patent quality in Australia, the IPCRC recently 
recommended: 
• a more stringent 'balance of probabilities' test to replace the 'benefit of doubt' 
test during patent examination. 3" This recommendation has been 
311 Nicol and Nielsen, above n29, 81-2. 
312 Melanie J Howlett and Andrew F Christie, An Analysis of the Approaches of the Trilateral and 
Australian Patent Offices to Patenting Partial DNA Sequences (ESTS) (2003) IPRIA Working Paper 
09/03. 
313 OECD, Patents and Innovation, above n257, 28-29. 
314 OECD, Patents and Innovation, above n257, 18. 
315  Ibid, 9, 29. See John H Barton, 'Reforming the Patent System' 287 Science (2000): 1933 who 
argues that a general reduction in the number of granted patents would assist in solving the problem of 
defensive patent portfolios; at 1933. 
316 OECD, Patents and Innovation, above n257, 23; See also Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n184, 
58-59. Patent breadth is defined in OECD, Patents and Innovation as ' ...the extent of protection 
granted to patent holders against imitators and follow-on innovators.' This entitles patent holders to 
protection on their own inventions and also inventions that are deemed to be 'functionally equivalent' 
to their inventions, as well as follow-on inventions that rely on use of the patented technology; OECD, 
Patents and Innovation, above n257, 10. 
317 IPCRC Report, above n4, 18, 166-7. 
112 
Chapter 2 
implementedm with the result that granted patents are more likely to be valid; 
and 
• the devotion of additional resources to improving the quality of examination, 
focusing in particular on improved prior art searches. 319 
In response to concerns about the quality of examination of patents in respect of 
genetic technologies, the ALRC recommended the devotion of effort by IP Australia 
to ensure ongoing education and training,320 as well as the development of additional 
guidelines to assist examiners in applying the criteria for patentability to applications 
involving genetic materials and technologies. 321 The ALRC also recommended change 
to the standard of proof to be applied in assessing patent applications, in that a balance 
of probabilities test be applied in respect of all the requirements for patentability. 322 In 
making these recommendations, the ALRC considered that issued patents would be 
more likely to be valid. 
In addition, interested parties have the opportunity under the Patents Act 1990 to 
challenge patents, either in opposition or revocation proceedings. 323 Although 
opposition proceedings are used fairly infrequently, they have been utilised on a 
number of occasions to challenge biotechnology patents. 324 The 1PCRC was satisfied 
that the pre-grant opposition procedure is sufficiently transparent that its efficacy is 
ensured. 325 Revocation proceedings remain an important method of challenging the 
validity of patents, and can be brought at any time throughout the life of a patent. In 
318 As a result of the Patents Amendment Act 2001 (Cth). 
319 IPCRC Report, above n4, 18, 167-8. While the Federal Government accepted these 
recommendations in principle, it declined to enact specific legal changes. Instead, the Government 
considered that IP Australia's current initiatives to improve quality of examination and searching were 
sufficient; Government Response, above n203. 
320 ALRC Report, above n87, Recommendation 8-1, 199-206. 
321  Ibid, Recommendation 8-2, 206-210. The ALRC made no specific recommendations in relation to 
IP Australia's practices in searching the prior art, but supported the recommendations made in the 
IPCRC Report; at 211-212. 
322 	. Ibid, Recommendation 8-3, 212-217. At present, only novelty and inventive step are assessed on the 
balance of probabilities, with the other requirements for patentability being assessed on the basis that 
the applicant is given the 'benefit of doubt'. 
323 See above n83, n85. 
324 A number of these decisions are reviewed in Lawson and Pickering, above n134. 
325 The 1PCRC declined to give detailed consideration to the desirability of replacing pre-grant 
opposition with post-grant opposition. This was based partly on the views of the Advisory Council on 
Industrial Property (AC1P) in a recently conducted review, that industry groups were generally 
supportive of retaining a system of pre-grant opposition; Advisory Council on Industrial Property, 
Review of Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (1999). The 1PCRC also recommended that the 
pre-grant opposition procedure should continue to be the responsibility of IP Australia rather than an 
independent specialist body; see 1PCRC Report, above n4, 171-75. 
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considering the procedures for challenging the validity of gene patents under the 
Patents Act 1990, the ALRC considered that the mechanisms available were adequate 
and did not require change. 326 
One commentator has argued that expending additional resources during the process 
of examination is wasteful given the modest number of patents granted that should not 
be.327 Instead, Lemley argues against increased attention to validity and increased 
resources in the assessment of patent applications by the USPTO, primarily on the 
grounds that: 
• a massive increase in USPTO resources would be required to ensure validity 
of issued patents; 328 
• the number of patent holders who go on to license their patents would appear 
to be quite modest. 329 Most patent holders obtain patents for a host of reasons 
unrelated to licensing; 330 
• in high-technology and start-up industries, licensing has become a strategic 
exercise with many patent holders entering into tacit agreements not to sue 
rather than conforming to the typical model of licensing for royalties. Those 
patent holders who do choose to licence will frequently seek to maximize 
revenue by approaching a number of potential licensees who will challenge the 
patent if its validity is uncertain; 331 
• many patents are allowed to lapse prior to their expiry; 332 and 
326 ALRC Report, above n87, 227-228. 
327 Mark A Lemley, 'Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office' (2001) 95 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1495, 1497. 
328 Ibid, 1531. It has been estimated that approximately 74 per cent of patent applications in the United 
States result in granted patents, and that this figure is comparable to Europe and Japan; Robert A 
Clarke, 'US Continuity Law and its Impact on the Comparative Patenting Rates of the US, Japan and 
the European Patent Office (2003) 85 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 335. 
329 Lemley, Rational Ignorance, above n327, 1506-7. Lemley acknowledged that there is little empirical 
evidence on the numbers of patents that are licensed for revenue, or the number of licensees per patent, 
and concluded that establishing the social cost of patents is impossible without some idea of these 
figures; at 1507, 1531. 
330 Uncertainty about the future value of particular inventions, or the value of patents as financing tools 
may prompt a patent application. Patenting may also enhance a company's reputation as a market 
leader or constitute company policy. Patents may be sought simply for the sake of obtaining patent 
protection; 'bid, 1505-1506. 
331 Ibid, 1504-5. 
332 Ibid, 1503. 
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• few patents are ever litigated and those that are litigated are frequently subject 
to out-of-court settlement. 333 
Lemley argues that few patents are ever used in a manner that calls their validity into
question,334 and the objective number of patents of doubtful validity that are enforced 
is likely to be limited. Consequently, litigation is a more efficient way to examine 
validity than more comprehensive examination. 335 Lemley's views are not universally 
shared.336 Many in the biotechnology industry view patent validity to be paramount337 
and general recommendations for improved examination processes have been made. 338 
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) endorsed the strengthening of post-grant 
procedures to test validity, while at the same time recommending the implementation 
of some improved procedures throughout the examination process. 339 
In an industry such as the biotechnology industry in Australia, research institutions 
and small companies rely heavily on patent protection. Many Australian companies 
are shifting into small niche areas of research, and protection of their proprietary 
position is crucial. While these industry participants engage in defensive and strategic 
patenting strategies, at the same time they have fairly modest patent portfolios. TM0 In 
many cases, pateths are the lifeblood of these institutions and companies and 
represent their primary assets. At the same time, most smaller companies lack the 
resources to litigate competitors' patents, or even to adequately enforce their own 
patents. Detecting infringement is often difficult. 341 Because of the high costs 
333 'bid, 1501-1503. 
334 Ibid, 1510-11. Lemley estimates that as many as 95 per cent of issued patents will never be used, or 
will be used in circumstances where their validity is not called into question; at 1511. It should be 
queried whether the fact that patents are not exploited should provide a basis for arguing that the 
validity of patents should not be ensured. 
335 Ibid, 1531-2. 
336 See, eg, Arti K Rai, 'Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform' (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1035, 1081-1084. 
337 See also Biotechnology Industry Organisation, 'Patent Fee Bill Will Help Ensure Continued Biotech 
Innovation' Press Release, 3 April 2004 at <http://www.bio.org/news/ > at 15 June 2005. The 
Biotechnology Industry Organisation (BIO) showed support for the passage of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Fee Modernisation Act 2003 (HR 1561) on the grounds that the Bill would provide 
additional resources to the USPTO and allow them to issue quality, enforceable patents, which are 
crucial in ensuring investment for the biotechnology industry. 
338 See, for example, Merrill, Levin and Myers, A Patent System for the 2r Century, above n76, 103- 
108. See also Barton, above n315, 1934, 
339 Federal Trade Commission Report, above n13, Chapter 5, specifically 31-32. A similar 
recommendation was made in Merrill, Levin and Myers, A Patent System for the 21 g Century, above 
n76, 95-103. 
340.  Ncol and Nielsen, above n29, 76-81. 
341 Ibid, 215-216. 
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involved, commencing opposition or revocation proceedings is not an option for many 
industry participants, and the industry is correspondingly risk-averse. TM2 This 
reinforces that patent validity is an important issue for this industry, and that having 
some confidence in the validity of granted patents is paramount. It is submitted, 
therefore, that patent validity should be ensured to the highest possible degree, and 
that providing adequate resources to IP Australia is, in effect an alternative way of 
subsidising industry participants. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
In considering which of the theories discussed within the context of justifications for 
the patent system is most relevant to medical biotechnology, it is important to 
consider which theory gives the most cohesive explanation for the emergence of 
patents within biomedical research. The patent system is important to the 
development and sustainability of the industry, and to the central issue discussed in 
this thesis. While the incentive-inducement theory provides the primary basis on 
which patents in this industry can be defended, the other theories, particularly the 
prospect theory, remain significant and must be considered in light of the effects of 
broad initial patents on follow-on innovation. This has resulting implications for 
competition law. Because there is some degree of reliance on the invention-
inducement theory, a role for competition law must be considered. However, this role 
must be tempered because there is a need to encourage dissemination of inventions 
within this industry. 
There is no doubt that having a sound intellectual property system encourages 
international investment in domestic industry, and allows trade relationships to 
flourish. The rejection by Australia of a harmonised approach to intellectual property 
protection would mean a decline in investment in Australia. Australian inventors are 
able to make use of these relationships in conducting research and development 
activities, for example through importing technologies subject to patent protection for 
use in research, or through exporting for use or sale to other TRIPS compliant 
countries. The patent system is characterised by uniformity internationally. 
Nevertheless, the substantive law requirements for patentability differ markedly 
across jurisdictions, as do the procedures for obtaining patents. 
The reluctance of developed world patent holders to export their technologies to 
countries without TRIPS compliant patent legislation is illustrative of the effect a 
342 	. Ibid, 216-217. 
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reduction in patent protection would have on investment in domestic industry. At 
present, a considerable number of patents filed in Australia are foreign-owned, 
demonstrating that strong intellectual property protection not only boosts domestic 
productivity, but also encourages foreign investment activity. These attempts to 
harmonise intellectual property law have undoubtedly assisted inventors by 
streamlining the process of applying for patents across jurisdictions, and laying down 
minimum standards to which member states must adhere. They are also consistent 
with the Government's push to promote commercialisation through intellectual 
property protection. 
Despite extensive discussion of the requirements for patentability in Australia, the 
application of these standards remains uncertain, particularly in relation to developing 
technologies involving genetic and biomedical advances. It is likely to be some time 
before the criteria for patent grant become more certain, and the potential for broad 
claims exists. This highlights the necessity of examining other areas of law such as 
competition law to address the negative effects of broad patents on innovation. 
Ensuring that inventions can be commercialised may not in itself promote innovation, 
and patent holders may use patents in a way that precludes access. This chapter also 
considered issues associated with exploitation and infringement. The aim of this 
discussion was to highlight some measures that may be available to researchers 
wishing to avail themselves of biomedical technology necessary for research they are 
conducting. As has been illustrated, these measures are likely to provide limited 
assistance where access is refused. The research exemption and the compulsory 
licensing provisions are subject to uncertainty and lack uniformity. The application of 
competition law remains an important consideration for intermediate and downstream 
users of technology. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first two chapters have examined a number of factors relevant to biomedical 
research and the facilitation of innovation within that broader context. Chapter 1 
considered the promotion of medical biotechnology by the Australian government, 
and the structure of the medical biotechnology industry. Chapter 2 outlined the patent 
environment in which the industry operates, and the bases on which patents in 
medical biotechnology can be justified. Following on from the discussion in Chapters 
1 and 2, there is a need to delve into another aspect. The final feature of biomedical 
research as discussed in this chapter is its cumulative nature and the pattern of follow-
on innovation characteristic of this industry. 
'Cumulative' innovation refers to a pattern of research where technological 
developments build on the inventiveness of others. 1 Medical biotechnology provides a 
striking example of an industry characterised by cumulative research patterns, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 1.2 In many industries where research is cumulative, a 
considerable period of time exists between initial invention and a resulting product, 
and an initial inventor will not always have the capabilities to develop an invention 
past a particular point. Some degree of follow-on invention by other (often multiple) 
parties will be required before a 'product' in the sense of a product available to 
consumers, can be brought to market! Frequently, a downstream innovator will find it 
necessary to bargain to gain access to patents held by an upstream patent holder in 
order to conduct research or develop downstream products or technologies. 
Cumulative inventions may be `(i) improvements of previous products, (ii) cost 
reductions for producing earlier products, (iii) applications of earlier basic 
technologies, or (iv) enabling technologies such as research tools. ° Most commonly, 
a new invention will constitute a minor improvement over a previously patented 
invention, but it may also constitute a new application, or a separate and discrete 
invention.5 In biomedical research, there remains significant scope for the 
1 Cumulative innovation was defined in the Introduction to this thesis; see Introduction, n5. Synonyms 
used in this thesis to refer to this research structure include incremental or sequential innovation. 
2 See above, Chapter 1, especially 1.5. 
3 This factor partly drives the affiance and integration activity reported in Chapter 1; see above 1.5.3. 
4 Suzanne Scotchmer, Cumulative Innovation in Theory and Practice, (Working Paper 240, Goldman 
School of Public Policy, 1999) 1. 
In this and following chapters, reference will generally be made to improvements or follow-on 
inventions. This is intended to be a general reference to all those categories of inventions that constitute 
follow-on inventions. Where appropriate, the discussion will make specific references to 
improvements, new applications or discrete inventions, particularly in later chapters of this thesis. 
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development of new applications of upstream technologies, and enabling 
technologies. 
This chapter discusses the implications of a cumulative research structure and 
highlights the importance of contracting in order to enable follow-on research to 
proceed. Where bargains for the exchange of patents break down, there may be some 
consequent impact on follow-on research. It will be argued that providing incentives 
for initial or upstream research is an important consideration for the Australian 
medical biotechnology industry. Nevertheless, this should not preclude the availability 
of mechanisms to facilitate follow-on research. While the focus of the Australian 
industry is currently upstream research, this may not be the case indefinitely. This 
chapter will demonstrate that there is potential for access to technologies necessary to 
conduct follow-on research to be hindered. 
The question this thesis addresses is whether patent law is adequately dealing with 
this research pattern. If not, there is a need to look outside the realms of patent law at 
solutions offered by competition law. The basis for considering the operation of 
competition law in this context is that governments have demonstrated an imperative 
to facilitate wealth promotion within this industry. Implementing an appropriate level 
of competition law regulation is a necessary part of this process. 
3.2 THE ROLE OF CONTRACTING IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY 
While patent protection has been touted as being important to provide incentives for 
biomedical research, 6 contracting for the exchange of rights represents an important 
method of assisting in the efficient dispersion of patents.' Licensing allows the 
exploitation by licensees of patented technology in circumstances where the patent 
holder may not exploit the invention. Non-exclusive licensing will allow the 
exploitation of a patented invention by a number of licensees. 
The Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (IPCRC), who were 
recently charged with investigating the interaction between intellectual property and 
competition law under Australian law, identified a number of reasons why allowing 
6 See the discussion above, 2.2. 
7 Indeed, the 'ex post' justifications for that patent system considered in Chapter 2 are predicated on the 
assumption that licensing of inventions will take place where appropriate; see above, 2.2.2.2, 2.2.2.3 
and 2.2.2.4. The commercialisation and prospect theories, in particular, recognise the importance of 
fostering further innovation through the dissemination of inventions. 
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relatively unrestricted contracting in relation to intellectual property is important in 
any industry: 8 
• Initial inventors are often not best placed to exploit their inventions. 9 This is 
particularly relevant in a cumulative industry such as biomedicine; 
• In many cases, it is necessary to assemble and combine a considerable number 
of research inputs in order to produce one commercial product; 110 and 
• There may be considerable social cost if the ability of parties to contract freely 
is impeded; the non-rivalrous nature of many (but not all) intellectual property 
makes their wide dissemination desirable and social cost associated with 
inventing around potentially high." 
Licensing in particular, allows the generation of revenue for a patent holder, while 
allowing the exchange of rights for the development of the next generation of 
products. This is particularly important in an industry such as the biomedical industry 
where innovation occurs on a sequential or cumulative basis. Challenges exist in 
achieving a balance between allowing efficient and free licensing in relation to the 
development of particular products, and maintaining a competitive environment to 
enhance the innovative process at each generation of product development. 
3.3 THE CUMULATIVE INNOVATION LITERATURE 
Much scientific research, particularly in high technology industries, builds upon prior 
research. 12 In some cases, this prior knowledge makes follow-on research possible. In 
8 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2000) (IPCRC Report) 210-11. 
9 See also Robert P Merges and Richard R Nelson, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope' 
(1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 839, 843; John H Barton, 'Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in 
Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation', (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 449, 453-55. 
10 See also Edmund W Kitch, 'The Nature and Functions of the Patent System', (1977) 20 Journal of 
Law and Economics, 266; Merges and Nelson, above n9; Michael Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, 
'Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research' Science 280 (1998): 698, 
699. 
Non-rivalrous, or non rival-in-use technologies refer to those technologies or research tools, the use 
of which by one party will not normally reduce the profits of others from using it in that resulting 
products generally will not compete. Conversely, rivalrous or rival-in-use technologies will usually be 
used to develop products that will compete with one another. It may not be clear at the time that many 
biomedical patents are granted precisely what they are useful for, so it may be difficult to determine 
whether a particular technology is rivalrous or non-rivalrous. 
12 Note that the pattern of biomedical research has parallels in other high-technology industries. The 
computer software industry, for example, also involves heavy reliance on research tools to facilitate 
follow-on innovation. 
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other cases, follow-on research would simply be slowed or made more expensive if 
the researcher did not have the prior research to build on!' In each case, the social 
value of first generation inventions will include part of the social value of follow-on 
inventions. m This will comprise, respectively, the incremental social surplus provided 
by follow-on products, 15 the value of getting the invention sooner, or the cost 
reduction. 16 First generation inventors may require a portion of the social surplus of 
follow-on inventions as an incentive to invest in research and development of first-
generation products, as developing the first-generation product will often be socially 
worthwhile even if the cost of developing it exceeds its stand-alone value." 
The biotechnology industry relies heavily on the process of cumulative or sequential 
innovation. 18 Although pharmaceutical products fit more into a model of discrete 
invention, 19 Merges and Nelson treat biotechnology as a science-based technology,20 
given that the industry is: 
... built around two different sets of technologies: recombinant DNA and monoclonal 
antibodies. Both of these are based on prior, more general advances in molecular 
13 See Frederic M Scherer, 'The Economics of Human Gene Patents' Academic Medicine 77 (2002): 
1348, 1361-2; Suzanne Scotcluner 'Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law' (1991) 5 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 31. 
14 Scotchmer, above n13, 31. 
15 The social surplus is taken to mean profit available to firms, plus consumers' surplus; see ibid, 31; 
Jerry R Green and Suzanne Scotcluner 'On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation' (1995) 26 
The RAND Journal of Economics 20, 23. 
Scotchrner, above n13, 31. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Merges and Nelson, above n9. Merges and Nelson undertook a study of follow-on innovation in 
a number of industries. The industries examined by Merges and Nelson were grouped into four 
categories: the discrete invention model, cumulative technologies, chemical technologies and science-
based technologies. One or more of these models will be relevant to any one industry at a given time, 
but the mix will generally be industry-specific; at 880-884. While inventions in the categories of 
discrete invention, cumulative technologies and chemical industries may be driven by scientific 
development, some technologies fit into a separate category because their advance is driven primarily 
by "...recent developments in science ..."; at 883-4. 
19 Ibid, 880, 882-3. See also Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance 
of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) (Federal Trade Commission Report), ch 3, 23 
('Unlike the pharmaceuticals industry, in which major aspects of the innovation process are relatively 
discrete, biotechnology innovations typically form the basis of, or provide the tools for, independent 
follow-on R&D.). Note that as pharmaceutical companies rely more heavily on upstream 
biotechnology inventions, pharmaceutical research may fit more neatly into the same model as 
biotechnology. 
20 Merges and Nelson, above n9, 897, 902-904. 
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biology and both were initially discovered and employed by scientists concerned with 
pure research. 21 
Groundbreaking inventions in science-based industries usually tend to focus research 
efforts around the area of invention as new entrants see commercial possibilities.
Patent breadth is a fundamental issue as cumulative innovation becomes an important 
aspect of these industries. 23 The following factors are indicative of the importance of 
cumulative innovation in biomedical research: 
• the diverse range of actors within the industry; 
• the range of technologies impacting on the industry, including science-based 
and information-based technologies; and 
• the push to commercialise upstream developments as independently valuable 
products. 
The importance of basic discoveries to follow-on biomedical research has been 
demonstrated by a United States (US) study that asked researchers how reliant they 
were in developing products, on recent research (recent equating to a period within 
the last 15 years). 24 Of seven industry groups surveyed, researchers developing drugs 
and medical products indicated a strong reliance on recent academic research. 25 The 
ability to access prior research will often be an important determinant of whether 
follow-on research proceeds, and the rate at which it proceeds. The breadth of rights 
granted at the initial stages of the innovative process will impact on the amount of 
research conducted downstream. 
3.3.1 CUMULATIVE INNOVATION AND THE GRANT OF PATENTS 
A good deal of the cumulative innovation literature focuses on the breadth of patents 
that are granted at each stage of the innovation process. This literature forms a subset 
of the literature dealing generally with the optimal design of intellectual property. 26 
21 Thid, 905. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 904 -905. 
24 Edwin Mansfield, 'Academic Research Underlying Innovations: Sources, Characteristics, and 
Financing' (1995) 77 Review of Economics and Statistics, 55. 
25 Twenty seven percent of respondents researching in the area of pharmaceuticals reported a linkage 
between prior academic research and the development of a new product, with 17 percent reporting that 
they received "very substantial aid" from recent academic research. This figure was higher than the 
mean for all seven industries surveyed. 
26 There is extensive literature dealing with the question of optimal patent breadth, much of which 
considers the issue where only one innovator is involved; see, eg, Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, 
'Optimal Patent Length and Breadth' (1990) 21 The RAND Journal of Economics 106; Mark A 
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Clearly, the advance of science and technology is dependent on both initial and 
follow-on innovation. 27 Many commentators have sought to identify the appropriate 
parameters of patent protection at various stages of the innovation process. The 
breadth of patents granted at any particular stage is important, not only in determining 
the returns to be granted at various stages of the discovery pipeline, but also because it 
may impact on the ability of subsequent innovators to obtain access to upstream 
discoveries essential to their research. 28 In other words, patent protection ' ... sets 
bargaining positions for the ... licences that will form, and therefore determines the 
division of profit in these contracts.' 29 
Various options for intellectual property policy makers exist in decisions about the 
grant of intellectual property, and complex economic considerations are involved in 
this question.3° Much analysis, particularly economic, has been devoted to how 
intellectual property can be allocated to provide optimal incentives for both initial and 
follow-on inventions. The only way to encourage inventors to undertake every 
socially useful project would be to ensure they are able to collect all of the social 
value of a particular project as revenue. 31 This raises well-documented problems. 
First, providing strong patent protection leads to socially inefficient monopoly 
pricing. 32 Secondly, firms may over-invest if the patent is worth more than the cost of 
gaining the patent, leading to inefficiencies. Scotchmer points out, however, that it is 
impossible under certain assumptions to provide incentives under the patent system to 
both an initial inventor and sequential innovators. Because the social surplus from the 
first invention 'spills-over' into follow-on inventions, neither the initial inventor nor 
Lemley, 'An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term' (1994) 22 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 
369; Paul Klemperer, 'How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?' (1990) 21 The RAND 
Journal of Economics 113. Different considerations apply where innovation is cumulative. In addition, 
many of these analyses focus on the simple tradeoff between the perceived benefits (via inventive 
activity) and deadweight costs associated with extended patent life; see, eg, William D Nordhaus, 
Invention, Growth, and Economic Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change (1969). 
27 See generally Rebecca S Eisenberg 'Patents and the Progress of Science Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use' (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1017. 
28 See Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This 
Market Failing or Emerging?' in Rochelle C Dreyfiiss, Diane L Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), 
Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 
(2001) 223, 226; Scotchmer, above n13, 32. 
29 Scotchmer, above n13, 32. 
30 Scherer, above n13, 1361-1363. 
31 Scotchmer, above n13, 31. 
32 ibid. 
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sequential inventors will be able to individually recover the entire social surplus their 
inventions generate." 
3.3.2 PROVIDING INCENTIVES TO MAXIMISE UPSTREAM INNOVATION 
The challenge, then, lies in determining the appropriate division of social surplus 
between innovators operating at various stages of the cumulative innovation process. 
Some commentators would provide greater incentives to the initial innovator. For 
example, in developing his prospect theory, Edmund Kitch argued for greater 
incentives for the initial innovator due to the importance of this initial work in shaping 
and co-ordinating subsequent research. 34 Given the low commercial value of many 
initial inventions, Kitch argued that the prospect theory provides a better justification 
for the grant of a broad patent to an initial innovator than rewards-based theory." As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this theory has been an emerging and supportable theory, and 
seems to have application to an industry such as biotechnology. 36 
One of the most fundamental assumptions Kitch makes is that co-ordination of 
research efforts, even multiple research efforts, through licensing will be possible." 
Similarly, Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green argue for the provision of incentives 
for the initial innovator through the grant of broad patents," although unlike Kitch, 
their analysis is based on the invention-inducement theory." Green and Scotchmer 
33  Ibid, 31, 34. See also Green and Scotchmer, above n15. Cf Clarisa Long, 'Patents and Cumulative 
Innovation' (2000) 2 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 229. 237-245, who argues that 
the patent system should be sufficiently dynamic to ensure adequate reward to inventors at each stage 
of the innovation process. Although Long does not purport to investigate how such a system would 
work, she does advocate caution in optimising incentives for either basic researchers or follow-on 
researchers in an industry that she characterises as '...complex, non-linear, variable and uncertain.'; at 
246. 
34 	. ICitch, above n10. The prospect theory as a justification for the grant of patents is discussed in 
Chapter 2; see above, 2.2.2.4. A patent would also provide the patent holder with the opportunity to 
work on improvements and prevent rivals from duplicating these research and development efforts. 
35 	. Ibid, 124-271. Arguably, however, a rewards-based theory can support broad patent grants to initial 
inventors in that the social value of many initial inventions exceeds their commercial value; see, eg, 
Howard F Chang, 'Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation' (1995) 26 The RAND 
Journal of Economics 34, 48-49. See also Scotchmer, above n4, who states that; `Kitch does not 
distinguish whether the pioneer inventions are cheap or expensive, and he does not emphasise that 
"efficient" means efficient for the patentholder rather than for society. What is efficient for the 
patentholder might not be efficient for society'; 17 
36 Above, 2.2.2.5. 
37 Kitch, above n10, especially 276. 
38 See Suzanne Scotchmer, 'Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be 
Patentable?' (1996) 27 The RAND Journal of Economics 322; Green and Scotchmer, above n15; 
Scotchmer, above n13. 
39 See generally above, 2.2.2.1, 2.2.2.4. 
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argue that it is important to reward initial inventors where their inventions facilitate 
follow-on inventions, whether these follow-on inventions are improvements or 
competitors to the initial invention, or applications of the initial invention.° This is on 
the basis that surplus profits created by initial inventions can be redistributed to 
follow-on inventors through licensing arrangements. Specifically, granting broad 
patents to initial inventors (and denying them to follow-on inventors) maximises 
efficiencies provided ex ante agreements41 can be negotiated and concluded prior to 
investment in research and development by a follow-on inventor. 42 While ex-post 
licences are usually negotiated after costs have been sunk and patents issued, ex ante 
or prior agreements° are likely to be more efficient and increase profits for both firms 
through benefiting from economies of scale, sharing know-how or avoiding patent 
races. 44 Similarly, although they are guarded in their conclusions, Gallini and 
Scotchmer argue for broad initial patents where ex ante contracting is available." 
They do, however, acknowledge that what is crucial is the ability of firms under 
antitrust law to enter into private contractual arrangements." 
Initial and follow-on innovators will rarely have equal bargaining power. Because the 
breadth of the first invention will determine whether or not the second invention 
infringes, bargaining power often stems from the breadth of patents!' Another factor 
40 Green and Scotchmer, above n15, 20-33. 
41 Ex ante or prior agreements are essentially contracts entered into prior to the development of an 
invention. 
42 Green and Scotchmer, above n15, 21-22; Scotchmer, above n13, 35; Scotchmer, above n38, 323. 
Scotchmer notes that the ideal solution would be complete vertical integration prior to the first 
innovation, although this carries with it a number of difficulties concerning the identification and 
coordination of interested parties; Scotchmer, above n13, 35-36. 
43 Green and Scotchmer go on to consider how the issues of patent breadth, patent length and antitrust 
policy may be used to transfer profit from the second innovator to the first innovator; Green and 
Scotchmer, above n15, 25-30. A consideration of the competition law implications of ex ante 
agreements is outside the scope of this thesis, although the question is important in the context of the 
level of competition that is desirable in a particular market. For a discussion of United States antitrust 
treatment of research joint ventures that combine intellectual property, see, eg, Suzanne Scotchmer, 
'R&D Joint Ventures and Other Cooperative Arrangements' in Robert D Anderson and Nancy T 
Gallini (eds) Competition Policy and Intellectual property in the Knowledge Based Economy, (1998) 
203. See also Scotchmer, above n13, 35-37. 
44 Scotcluner, above n13, 35; Green and Scotchmer, above n15, 21-23, 31. Chang argues against 
allowing collusive ex ante agreements because doing so may create incentives for inefficient entry by 
imitators who manage to invent around the invention; see Chang, above n35, 49. 
45 Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer, 'Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive 
Mechanism?' in Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern (eds) Innovation Policy and the Economy, 
vol 2 (2002), 69. 
46 	. End, 69. That is, antitrust law should refrain from imposing undue restriction on collusive licensing. 
47 See Scotchmer, above n13, 32. 
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relevant to bargaining power will be the degree of inventiveness inherent in the 
follow-on invention. A premise of the work of Green and Scotchmer is that follow-on 
innovators generally have greater bargaining power than initial innovators because: 48 
• the follow-on product may not infringe. If this is the case, the follow-on 
innovator will compete with the initial inventor and the initial inventor will be 
unable to collect any royalties on the second product; 
• the follow-on product may infringe but its incremental benefits may greatly 
outweigh its costs, so that the follow-on innovator is likely to invest and 
negotiate an ex-post agreement; and 
• if the follow-on inventor has the sole ability to develop the second product, 
they may decide not to invest unless they are assured of a positive amount of 
incremental profit. 
A crucial factor to all of the analyses presented above is the ability of inventors to 
negotiate agreements, preferably ex ante. 49 Patent protection may be viewed as a 
conduit to the establishment of a bargaining position to enable the resolution of 
conflicts over patent infringement.50 In some industries,51 sequential processes of 
innovation are complex and licensees will subsequently become licensors of their own 
technology. In this respect, strengthening patent protection for a particular sequential 
innovator will impact of the ability of that innovator to license-on its technology. 52 
The importance of bargaining in facilitating follow-on innovation cannot be 
understated. 
3.3.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCCESSFUL BARGAINING IN RESTRUCTURING 
INNOVATION INCENTIVES 
If successfully negotiated ex ante agreements with appropriate follow-on inventors 
could be guaranteed," this would represent a strong ground for concentration of broad 
48 Green and Scotchmer, above n15, 23-25. See also ibid, 38. 
49 Although the focus of the prospect theory is not necessarily on ex ante licensing. This theory 
assumes that licensing ex post will be non-problematic. 
50 See generally Scotchmer, above n4. 
51 Biotechnology is a prime example of such an industry. 
52 See Scotchmer, above n4, 3. 
53 Note that an alternative response to an initial patent that blocks follow-on research is to invent 
around the initial patent. Empirical data on inventing around is considered below, 4.5.2. 
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patents in initial inventors. Whether ex ante or ex post agreements are being 
negotiated, there may be a number of impediments to successful bargaining: 54 
• in order to negotiate ex ante agreements, a patent holder will be required to 
identify and license improvers, a difficult task under the best of circumstances. 
Difficulties in predicting invention, particularly worthwhile invention, make 
searching for improvers a costly and time-consuming exercise; 
• improvers are less likely to present at the bargaining table ex ante if this would 
mean revealing information about an improvement; 55 
• transaction costs associated with licensing improvements will mean that in 
many cases licensing will not take place in an efficient manner. In the absence 
of transaction costs, parties are likely to bargain to a mutually agreeable 
position.56 Transaction costs may outweigh marginal cost, or may discourage 
improvers or potential improvers from seeking a licence, or even from the 
process of innovation. 57 Broadly defined, transaction costs of licensing 
intellectual property include the costs of searching for a licensee or licensor, 
negotiating a licence, monitoring performance, and enforcing the terms of the 
licence and protecting against infringement."; 
• difficulties in putting a future value on patents, and uncertainties about the 
value of future patents, are major factors standing in the way of viable 
bargains; 59 
• potential improvers may not have sufficient incentive to seek licences for 
improvements that have social value that exceeds their commercial value; 
54 See generally Mark A Lemley, 'The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law', 
(1997) 75 Texas Law Review 989, 1048-1067. 
55 Referred to as Arrow's information paradox; see Kenneth J Arrow, 'Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources for Invention' in The National Bureau of Economic Research (eds) The Rate 
and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (1962) 609, 614-5. Given that a 
seller of information is liable to withhold some information, a buyer will always purchase that 
information with incomplete information resulting in non-optimal allocation of the information; at 615. 
56 Known as the `Coase Theorem'; Ronald H Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 Journal of 
Law and Economics 1. An important contribution of the Coase Theorem is its recognition of the 
importance of transaction costs, and the fact that attention must be paid to them in initial allocations of 
rights; see Robert P Merges, 'Intellectual property and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents' (1994) 62 Tennessee Law Review 75, 82. 
57 See Lemley, above n54, 1053-1056. 
58 Clarisa Long 'Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter' (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 
823, 827-8. 
59 See Coase, above n56; ibid, 833-836. 
60 In other words, improvements that produce positive externalities'. 
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• strategic61 and non-economic considerations' may be infused into the 
bargaining process; and 
• patents over original inventions may give market power either due to the 
importance of the technology or the breadth of the patent, so that these original 
inventors have the power (and an economic incentive) to hold up innovation in 
improvements.63 
The debate over cumulative entitlements highlights the importance of private 
bargaining to shift surplus from one innovator to another in order to provide adequate 
incentives to a particular innovator. There are clearly risks in assuming that successful 
bargaining will take place. This reduces the bargaining power available to follow-on 
inventors. On the basis, largely, of this factor, a number of commentators have argued 
for stronger protection for follow-on inventors. 
Perhaps most notably, Merges and Nelson have argued that granting broader rights to 
follow-on innovators will provide a greater benefit to society by way of increased 
downstream innovation. 64 Merges and Nelson, like Kitch, view the important issue as 
strengthening the future development of technology rather than an individual 
invention.° However they disagree with Kitch that broad privileges granted to an 
initial patent holder are the best way to ensure this development. 66 In an examination 
of a number of industries, they were unable to find an instance where strong patent 
protection over an initial invention fostered effective development of follow-on R&D 
due to concerted coordination by the initial patent holder." Despite conceding that 
there may be some duplication of research efforts through patent races, 68 their view is 
61 See Merges, above n56, 82-82; Robert Cooter, 'Decentralised Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant' (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1643, 1676-77; Robert Cooter and Steven Marks, 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
A Testable Model of Strategic Behaviour' (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 225, 243. 
62 For example, irrational motivations with regard to licensing particular parties and not others; Lemley, 
above n54, 1059-61. 
63 By barring the development of improvements entirely, or charging prices considerably above 
marginal cost thus reducing incentives to improve; ibid, 1066-67. 
64 Robert P Merges and Richard R Nelson, 'Market Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of 
Patent Scope Decisions' in Thomas M Jorde and David J Teece, Antitrust, Innovation and 
Competitiveness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 185. 
65 See, eg, Merges and Nelson, above n9, 843. 
66 Ibid, 872-878. 
67 Ibid, 908-909. One of the important characteristics of the analysis undertaken by Merges and Nelson 
is their implicit assumption that invention differs between industries. Thus, the model utilised for a 
particular industry depends in part on the relationship between technical advances in the industry and 
the extent of licensing within the industry; at 843. 
68 Ibid. 877-884. 
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that favouring a competitive environment for improvements is a more effective 
mechanism for accelerating innovation than giving a patent holder the ability to 
develop a prospect.° 
Their concern is that the prospect of broad patents on fundamental inventions may 
hinder the technological advance of science-based industries,' ° although they do 
recognise that as these industries mature and settle into a pattern of cumulative 
innovation, issues relevant to patent scope tend to shift." It is certainly the case that 
the biotechnology industry has evolved to the point where a significant amount of 
innovation within the industry is incremental. Nevertheless, groundbreaking 
inventions continue to be patented and broad patents on pioneering inventions may 
continue to impact on subsequent innovators. 
3.3.4 PROVIDING ADEQUATE INCENTIVES IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 72 
The preceding sections have considered in general terms the debate over entitlements 
at various stages of the research continuum. The central justification for the patent 
system appears to be that it will incentivise research and development. The question is 
whether innovation will be best facilitated through the grant of broad patents to 
upstream innovators, or through ensuring that follow-on innovators are able to obtain 
access to patents necessary to conduct research. This section now makes specific 
reference to biomedical research, and attempts to demonstrate that given the patent 
landscape, the research environment and the industry structure evident in Australian 
biomedical research, it is vital that attention be given to ensuring that adequate 
incentives for follow-on research exist. This section therefore completes the 
theoretical construct to enable consideration of the application of competition law to 
biomedical patents in Australia. 
There may be particular reasons why broad rights on upstream inventions may benefit 
innovation in the medical biotechnology industry, particularly the biopharmaceutical 
industry." Firstly, there may be a need to protect upstream inventions that are 
Ibid, 843-4. 
7° Ibid, 905-907, 915. 
71 bid, 908. 
72 One option available under United States case-law to ameliorate the effects of broad patents is the 
application of the 'doctrine of equivalents' rule. The doctrine of equivalents allows a broad reading of 
initial patents when considering the claims of follow-on patents. Conversely, the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents allows a court to interpret an initial patent narrowly where a follow-on invention is a 
substantial advance in the state of the art; see, eg, ibid, 860-867; Merges, above n56, 76-78. 
73 See generally Arti K Rai, 'Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The 
Role of Patents and Antitrust' (2001) 16 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 813, 828-31. See also the 
discussion above, 2.2.2.1. 
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considerably removed from inventions with commercial prospects, from competition. 
Secondly, there are benefits (both perceivee and empirical' s) in allowing smaller, 
upstream patent holders to control bargaining during collaborative arrangements with 
downstream innovators. Finally, in theory, there is nothing to prohibit upstream patent 
holders from allowing multiple downstream innovators from pursuing multiple 
research paths:76 
The amount of upstream research conducted by the Australian medical biotechnology 
industry has risen steadily!' Many Australian research institutions and companies 
supply upstream technology to both Australian and overseas users of that 
technology." Extracting maximum value for that technology presents challenges," 
and this suggests that providing Australian inventors with bargaining power through 
broad initial patents is important. The industry has consistently highlighted the 
importance of intellectual property protection in recouping research and development 
expenditure on upstream research, and in attracting investment funding. 8° The 
government has highlighted the role that commercialisation plays in the development 
of a sustainable industry.81 
Nevertheless, follow-on innovators may have difficulty gaining access to necessary 
upstream technologies and products in certain circumstances. It is submitted that 
while providing incentives for upstream biomedical invention is important, there are 
grounds for concern that the current patent system provides excessive protection to 
74  Rai suggests that collaborative arrangements are more likely to flourish given that many upstream 
patents are concentrated in small biotechnology companies, primarily because potential downstream 
innovators are likely to be less risk-averse than they would be were the rights concentrated in large 
companies; ibid, 830. 
75 See, eg, Josh Lerner and Alexander Tsai, Do Equity Financing Cycles Matter? Evidence from 
Biotechnology Alliances National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No 7464, (2000) 20- 
21. 
76 The argument that multiple research paths are necessary to fully exploit the potential of a particular 
invention is one that may be particularly pertinent in the medical biotechnology area; See further 
below, 3.3.4.2. 
77 See above, 1.6.2. 
78 Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues 
Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 6, (Nicol and 
Nielsen Study), 110-114. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Parliament of Australia, Genes 
and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, Report No 99 (2004) (ALRC Report), 525-530. 
79  See Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n78, 111-114. See also the discussion above 1.6. 
80 See, eg, ibid, 76-80, 82-86. 
81 See above, 1.3. 
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upstream inventors at the expense of downstream innovation. 82 There are a number of 
reasons that taken together, suggest this might be the case, and these relate generally 
to: 
• the vast numbers of upstream medical biotechnology patents being granted; 83 
• the fact that many participants in the medical biotechnology industry are 
specialised and have limited research capabilities; 84 and 
• the fact that licences to conduct follow-on research will usually be conducted 
'ex post', and are therefore more prone to bargaining breakdown." 
A number of other factors may also contribute to the likelihood that access to licences 
may be refused. 86 
3.3.4.1 THE EXPLOSION IN UPSTREAM PATENTS 
As indicated in Chapter 1, there has been an explosion in biomedical patenting." This 
may be indicative that there is reason for concern in relation to the ability to conduct 
intermediate and downstream research and development. The generation of huge 
amounts of genomic information and proliferation of patents over this upstream 
information and the information-based tools used to generate it has resulted in 
challenges for how the intellectual property system can optimally reward inventors in 
the medical biotechnology industry. 88 Information technology-based research tools 
have been developed and become marketable." It has been suggested that this 
information explosion has led to a change in focus from information possession to 
information management, a shift that the traditional intellectual property system is ill-
equipped to handle. 9° Shifts in the markets for biomedical information and products 
also mean that the market cannot be characterised as a simple linear mode1. 91 
82 A number of commentators have argued, therefore, that it is important to maintain adequate 
incentives for follow-on innovators; see, eg, Scherer, above n13; Barton, above n9; Rai, above n73. See 
also Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, above n33, 238-246. 
83 Below, 3.3.4.1. 
84 Below, 3.3.4.2. 
85 Below, 3.3.4.3. 
86 Below, 3.3.4.4. 
87 Above, 1.7. 
88 See Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, above n33, 229, 233, 236-7. 
89 Ibid, 234-5. 
90 	. Ibid. 236-237. See also Rebecca Eisenberg, 'Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the 
Value of DNA Sequences' (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 783; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing 
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Relying on a simple linear model, Scherer provides a description of options available 
to offset the effects of resource allocation distortions that can arise from broad 
upstream patents. 92 Scherer's focus is on ensuring that follow-on invention is able to 
proceed. However, Scherer points out that this analysis may be too simplistic given 
that many patented technologies are frequently precursors to biopharmaceutical 
innovation.93 Thus, any one of these prior innovators can control whether subsequent 
innovation takes place by blocking that research. 
3.3.4.2 RESEARCH CAPABILITIES AND FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION 
A major justification cited in support of strengthening incentives for follow-on 
innovators is that it is desirable to have a variety of innovators pursuing follow-on 
innovation. 94 Participants operating in different industry sectors have different 
capabilities, and it has been suggested that the skills required for basic research giving 
rise to initial innovations often differ considerably to those required for follow-on 
activities and commercialisation.95 In addition, it is unlikely that an initial innovator 
will foresee all of the possible opportunities stemming from their invention. 96 Even if 
they do, they are unlikely to have the resources to develop all of these prospects 
themselves,97 or be able to adequately identify and coordinate the development of 
these prospects by follow-on inventors. 
Practices: Evidence and Policies, (Berlin: OECD, 2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf> at 18 November 2003 (the OECD Report), where 
concern is expressed that challenges at the interface of biotechnology and information technology are 
likely, because companies will be forced to use a variety of intellectual property which may give rise to 
new access issues; at 80. 
91 Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, above n33, 233-234. This is primarily because there is a 
need to access a diverse range of technologies in order to conduct research in a particular area. 
92 Scherer, above n13, 1361-1364. Including the narrow interpretation of existing and future genome 
claims (particularly the utility requirement), the application of the doctrine of equivalents and reverse 
doctrine of equivalents rules, the exclusion of research conducted solely for research purposes, and the 
reduction of the effects of multiple patents through the imposition of a system of mandatory arbitration 
for patent holders and follow-on inventors. 
93 Scherer, above n13, 1361-1364. 
94 See, especially, Scherer, above n13, 1362; Barton, above n9, 545-55; Rai, above n73, 823, 831. Of 
course, as Merges and Nelson have shown, this issue is not peculiar to the medical biotechnology 
industry, but is evident across a variety of industries; see Merges and Nelson, above n9. In particular, 
the structure of the medical biotechnology industry has parallels in the semiconductor industry. 
95 See Scherer, above n13, 1362. 
96 See, especially, Barton, above n9, 455. Gene sequence patents, for example, have a number of 
potential applications, these being: tools for diagnostic tests, research tools, gene therapy and the 
production of therapeutic proteins to be used as medicines; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics 
of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, (2002) (Nuffield Discussion Paper), 47-8. 
97 See Scherer, above n13, 1362. 
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The long process from research to development means that it is desirable to have 
many researchers pursuing research paths, because frequently an initial innovator will 
be unable to see the many research paths that could be undertaken in respect of one 
initial invention. Different approaches to solving a research problem may have social 
value that could not have been foreseen at the outset. 
33.43 EX ANTE' VERSUS 'Ex POST' CONTRACTING IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
Another important factor is that it may be difficult in biomedical research to conduct 
successful bargaining and thus ensure follow-on development. Ideally, ex ante 
bargaining would ensure that follow-on innovators are identified and coordinated. 98 
However, there are a number of reasons why licensing negotiations will frequently be 
conducted ex post in biomedical research: 
• researchers may continue to conduct non-infringing research despite the 
presence of a patent in an area. They may to prefer to defer licence 
negotiations until they have a commercial technology or product with which to 
• bargain, so that some of the uncertainty is removed from negotiations;" 
• uncertainty as to the value of a follow-on invention may be particularly high 
when the invention is only speculative. w° The rapid pace of invention in the 
medical biotechnology area is conducive to uncertainty in aspects of valuation. 
Similarly, the relative values of initial and follow-on inventions may be 
difficult to ascertain ex ante; 1°1 
• in any event, a follow-on inventor is unlikely to approach an initial patent 
holder to negotiate prior to investing sufficient resources toward understanding 
the implications of their invention. 102 In this case, they may be reluctant to risk 
misappropriation of their invention by the initial innovator; Hu 
• an improvement may be the result of an independent insight in which case the 
inventor may not be aware of existing patents in an area; 
98 k, the discussion above, 3.3.3. 
99 Note that the likelihood of this outcome may be bolstered by the ALRC's proposed research 
exemption. A researcher conducting research on an invention would be entitled under the exemption to 
conduct research without licence even where a commercial outcome is likely. The ability to do so may 
mean that some researchers postpone licensing negotiations until a commercial outcome is reached; see 
further above, 2.5.1.3. 
100 See Lemley, above n54, 1053. 
101 See also Scherer, above n13, 1362. 
102 Barton, above n9, 453. See also above n55. 
103 See Lemley, above n54, 1051. 
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• where there is risk that a follow-on inventor may become a competitor, 
socially beneficial licensing may be foregone in favour of private self-
interest. 104 This is less likely to be an issue where the initial invention 
constitutes a basic invention with little or no commercial application; and 
• attracting investment in research is not an easy process. In many cases follow-
on innovators will have insufficient resources to negotiate for an ex ante 
licence prior to the development and commercialisation of their follow-on 
product. 
It has been argued that if licensing negotiations are conducted ex post, or after the 
expenditure of research and development funds, there may be a serious risk of a 
bargaining holdup. 105 One basis for this argument is that because licensing 
negotiations are likely to take place ex-post, follow-on innovators must take the risk 
of unsuccessful negotiations into account in making investment decisions. This factor 
may cause them to exercise caution in investing in research. It is submitted that this 
argument strongly indicates that stronger support for follow-on innovators is 
necessary to ensure that follow-on research is able to proceed. 1°6 
Further, a patent holder may refuse to licence, or may choose to license on an 
exclusive basis.m In some cases, licensing negotiations may be governed by non-
economic or strategic motivations, with the result that a licence may be refused on 
irrational grounds. This may particularly be the case where a patent or suite of patents, 
give(s) a patent holder a significant amount of power in a market: w8 Ex post licensing 
has the potential to be more difficult where an initial patent is broad but encompasses 
a range of possible research applications. In this case, the patent holder may prefer an 
exclusive licensing arrangement, or vertical integration and retention of the 
technology. 
The ability to reach agreements (generally ex ante) is an undeniably important factor 
in arguments for concentration of research efforts through broad upstream patents. 
These arguments may stem from a belief that broad, initial patents stimulate 
104 See Federal Trade Commission Report, above n19, ch 2, 24, and the panellists cited therein. 
105 See Barton, above n9, 453. The issue of bargaining breakdowns in biomedical research is discussed 
further below, 3.4. 
106 See also Barton, above n9, 453. 
107 There might be a number of grounds on which a licence may be refused. In some cases, economic 
efficiency grounds may dictate a particular licensing outcome. These considerations are discussed 
further below, 8.3.3, 8.3.4. 
108 The concept of patents and market power will be discussed in detail in the context of s 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Oh), below, 8.2. 
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innovation, or from analysis in line with the prospect theory, that the prospect of 
coordinating future research justifies the grant of a broad patent. 109 However, it may 
be on this ground that these arguments are most vulnerable. Difficulties in negotiating 
ex post licences are likely to be exacerbated in medical biotechnology due to the 
many technologies frequently required to conduct follow-on research, and the 
potential for a vast number of these technologies to impact on many downstream 
research applications. 
3.3.4.4 OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS 
The factors discussed above provide compelling arguments for strengthening 
incentives for follow-on researchers in biomedical research. The long pre-commercial 
phase involved in most biomedical research also means that many follow-on products 
will constitute new applications rather than improvements that compete with the 
initial product. ith An inability on the part of follow-on researchers to conclude 
bargains with initial innovators may therefore result in products or technologies in 
new markets not being developed. This issue is developed further in Chapter 5 and 
succeeding chapters. In particular, it will be argued that refusals to license may 
become problematic where the development of new products in separate downstream 
markets is affected. 
John Barton advances a number of additional factors as supportive of greater rights 
for follow-on researchers:" 
• the issue of patents as an incentive for research, which Barton contends is 
ambiguous except perhaps in relation to the pharmaceutical industry; 112 
• the fact that much initial research is basic and often this has been (and is) 
benefited more through direct funding than by patent grant; 
109 It was argued in Chapter 2 that the incentive-inducement theory provides the strongest justification 
for patent protection in biomedical research; above, 2.2.3.5. However, the prospect theory may be 
useful where the ability to control subsequent development is an integral part of the incentive to 
innovate. Arguments in relation to negotiating licences are applicable regardless of whether one relies 
on the incentive-inducement theory, or the prospect theory. 
Rai, above n73, her n4 points out that the cumulative nature of biopharmaceutical research can be 
differentiated from cumulative innovation in other industries. In many industries, the second generation 
improvement competes in the same end product market as the first generation product. In contrast, 
most second generation improvements within the context of the biopharmaceutical industry occur in 
the pre-commercial stage prior to the development of a marketable product such as a drug. 
111 Barton, above n9, 453-454. 
112 In Chapter 2, some empirical evidence in relation to patenting as an incentive for research was 
discussed in the context of the innovation-inducement theory as a justification for patents. See above, 
2.2.2.1. 
136 
Chapter 3 
• the fact that there is a greater risk of anti-competitive behaviour with respect to 
initial patents. Broad patents may restrict follow-on research, and patents on 
research tools may prevent the development of subsequent (perhaps non-
infringing) therapeutic products; and 
• the fact that broad initial patents may mean that entry by later firms into the 
industry may be restricted or deterred as new generations of products are 
developed; 1" 
The first factor is certainly contentious, although there is some indication that patents 
have become an increasingly important tool for attracting investment in biomedical 
research. 114 In Australia, the limited capital capabilities of most medical biotechnology 
companies render them heavily dependent on patent protection. 115 
3.3.4.5 FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA 
Dependence on patent protection by Australian medical biotechnology companies 
means that adequate protection for initial inventors should be assured. It is submitted, 
therefore, that this consideration must always be borne in mind when contemplating 
policy development in this area. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the other factors 
discussed in the preceding section have no relevance in the Australian context. 
Although Australian research institutions and companies have been heavily involved 
in basic research to date, a majority of upstream biomedical patents in Australia are 
owned by non-Australians. 116 Therefore those Australian companies involved in 
intermediate and downstream research and development may have to negotiate access 
to patented technologies and materials necessary for follow-on research, with 
upstream inventors located offshore. In addition, many Australia researchers and 
companies that own upstream biomedical patents, license those patents on an 
exclusive basis.n7 If technologies are exclusively licensed, particularly to overseas 
113 A useful example to consider is that of cox-2 technology, discussed in Appendix 2. A broad patent 
over this technology may deter researchers in a variety of future research applications. See also John P 
Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen 'Effects of Research Tool Patenting and Licensing on 
Biomedical Innovation' in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds.), Patents in the Knowledge-
Based Economy (2003), 50, 28. 
114 See above, 2.2.2.1. 
115 See Biotechnology Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, ALRC Report, above n78, 440-441, 
Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n78, 81-92. 
116 See above, 1.7. 
117 Empirical evidence on the incidence of exclusive licensing of upstream biomedical technologies will 
be considered in further detail below, 4.4.3. 
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companies, this will invariably mean that access to those technologies by other 
follow-on inventors is restricted. This will have implications for Australian 
researchers conducting downstream research, because the technologies available for 
licence will be limited. 
Further, at some point, many upstream inventors will of necessity become follow-on 
inventors as opportunities for upstream research diminish. While there are plentiful 
research opportunities at present, research fields are becoming more cluttered as 
proprietary positions are sought and asserted. Genomics companies have diversified, 
and Australian inventors currently operating at the upstream end of the research 
spectrum may find that they need to adopt a similar course. Accordingly, mechanisms 
for gaining access to upstream inventions should be available in the event that 
recourse to them becomes necessary. The manner in which the industry is likely to 
evolve should be borne in mind when considering policy development. 
3.3.4.6 MECHANISMS FOR REGULATING FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
If it is necessary to ensure adequate incentives for follow-on innovators, and to 
maintain a competitive environment for follow-on inventions, it is necessary to 
consider how this might be done. In terms of regulation, four methods that have been 
alluded to are: 
• restricting the grant of patents or the scope of rights granted to initial 
inventors; 
• providing a statutory research exemption from infringement for research; 
• compelling licensing through a compulsory licensing scheme; or 
• utilising competition law to maintain a level of competitiveness in 
intermediate and downstream markets. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the first three options have been explored in Australia at 
some length, and it has been argued that there are problems relying on them to ensure 
that researchers have the ability to conduct intermediate and downstream research. 
This thesis will concentrate on the fourth option, and examine a specific circumstance 
in which competition law may operate to compel licensing and foster follow-on 
innovation. Specifically, it will consider the issue of refusals to license patents. 
Although competition law will not operate to prevent every negative impact on 
innovation, there may be circumstances in which competition law should intervene to 
prevent a patent holder refusing to license and so hindering follow-on innovation. An 
important consideration is to find ways to bolster rights for downstream innovators, 
without impinging on incentives for upstream innovation. 
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In some instances where follow-on innovators bargain with initial patent holders, 
bargaining breakdowns may occur because various factors make it difficult for the 
parties to reach agreement. In others, a party to the transaction may possess a greater 
degree of bargaining power than other parties. In this case, this party may be able to 
exert influence on the innovative process and in so doing have some effect on 
downstream levels of competitiveness. In some cases, the need to negotiate numerous 
licences may make it difficult for a follow-on innovator to gain access to the 
technologies necessary to conduct their research. The next section will consider the 
types of bargaining breakdowns that may be problematic in medical biotechnology 
research. 
3.4 CATEGORISING BARGAINING BREAKDOWNS 
The necessity to contract for the exchange of rights brings with it the risk that 
breakdowns will occur during the course of contractual bargaining. These breakdowns 
may result in a failure to access patents that would allow research to proceed. These 
issues may be particularly acute for the Australian medical biotechnology industry. As 
has been discussed, patents have value not only as a potential form of revenue, 118 but 
also to enable research to be conducted. 119 An inability to effectively license-out 
technology by Australian research institutions and companies will result in a failure 
by them to capitalise on the commercial value of their research. If, however, they are 
unable to effectively license-in technology, they may experience difficulty conducting 
further research which may have implications for product development. It is this 
second issue with which this thesis is concerned, although the two are heavily 
interrelated. 
The complex issues surrounding possible bargaining breakdowns in respect of 
intellectual property protected biotechnological inventions have only recently been 
recognised in Australia, although there has been some deliberation on these issues in 
overseas jurisdictions. Chapter 4 outlines the empirical studies that have been 
conducted in other jurisdictions. 120 A particular study that explored this issue in 
considerable depth is a study of the US biomedical industry by John Walsh, Ashish 
118 Licensing-out patented technology or products is one method of realising revenue on a patent. In 
this and subsequent chapters, references to `licensing-in' and licensing-out' will be made. Licensing-in 
refers to the situation where a party licenses a product or technology patented by another party for use 
in research and commercialisation activities. Licensing-out refers to the situation where a patentee 
provides another party with the right to exploit a patent in research and commercialisation activities. 
119 Through licensing-in technology necessary to conduct follow-on research. 
120 Below, 4.2.1. 
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Arora and Wesley Cohen. 121 Walsh, Arora and Cohen examined two forms of 
bargaining breakdown that have been identified as having the specific potential to 
arise in the medical biotechnology area: restrictions on access to single patented 
products or technologies, and anti-commons issues. The results of this study have 
been extensively relied upon. In Australia, the Nicol-Nielsen study has investigated 
these issues.' 22 The ALRC also gave consideration to possible policy responses to 
evidence of bargaining breakdowns. 123 This section considers the issue of bargaining 
breakdowns in biomedical research in the context of these two issues. 
3.4.1 RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS 
One of the two issues explored by Walsh, Arora and Cohen was whether the assertion 
of patents over foundational upstream discoveries is having the effect of undermining 
the advance of biomedical research. 124 A notable feature of biomedical research is that 
complex research paths are required to fully exploit the potential of broad upstream 
inventions. 125 Where access to a patent required for downstream research is restricted, 
there may be a detrimental effect on subsequent downstream development. Given that 
the essence of a patent right is the right to exclude others, there will invariably be 
some "routine under-use" in any well functioning patent system, and this may simply 
be a cost we pay for the operation of a patent system that otherwise benefits society. ' 
But where inventions over which access is restricted comprise foundational 
discoveries which themselves require further development in order to produce 
consumer products, there is may be some consequent effect on downstream 
development. One of the main justifications for the patent system is the invention-
inducement theory, and as has been discussed, patenting may well be important to 
stimulate upstream biomedical innovation. The assertion of patents and exclusionary 
licensing practices may nonetheless have a negative impact on downstream 
innovation. The move from public dissemination of research results which in 
121 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n113. See also John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen, 
'Working Through the Patent Problem', 299 Science (2003): 1021. 
122 Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n78, especially Results Chapters 4 and 5. Results of this study 
relevant to the issues in this thesis will be discussed below, 4.4. 
123 ALRC Report, above n78, especially chs 23-27. 
124 Walsh and Others, above n113, 296-297. 
125 Rai, above n73, 831. This makes the prospect theory of patents particularly applicable in the 
biotechnology area; see Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, 'Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle' 
(2004) 54 Case Western Reserve Law Review 691, 722-728. 
126 Heller and Eisenberg, above n10, 699; Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Patenting Research Tools and the 
Law' in National Research Council (NRC), Intellectual property and Research Tools in Molecular 
Biology (1997) 6, 9-10. 
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themselves constitute important research inputs, to more prolific patenting of research 
tools sets up the main precondition for the concern that intermediate and downstream 
research may be impeded. 127 
Two further preconditions may exacerbate the problem. First, broad interpretation of 
claims on upstream foundational discoveries may extend the reach of upstream 
patents and deter downstream innovators from researching in what they perceive to be 
a broad area of research. Secondly, reach-through claims to future inventions (for 
example, a right to a compound that acts on a patented target even though the 
compound itself is not described in the patent claims) could deter subsequent 
innovation. This will of course depend on how broadly the original patent claim is 
interpreted, and even if patent offices continue to interpret claims narrowly, courts are 
not precluded from construing them more broadly. 128 This uncertainty may act to 
inhibit research in an area where researchers are concerned about how a patent claim 
may be interpreted. 
Of the many examples of patented inventions that are likely to constitute important 
foundational discoveries, prominent examples include recombinant DNA technology, 
PCR and Taq polymerase, embryonic stem cells, and genes and proteins that may 
potentially be important in terms of therapeutic applications. 129 Walsh and Others 
suggest that there are two considerations when looking at this question: 1" 
• how key the invention or research tool is to subsequent innovation, and how 
broad a range of subsequent inventions might depend on the initial invention; 
and 
• is the invention rivalrous, or rival-in-use. 131 If one researcher uses such a tool, 
there will be less incentive for a competing researcher to use it because their 
profits will be eroded. On the other hand, some research tools are non- 
127 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n113, 296. The authors rely on their interview data to establish that 
there has been a surge in upstream patenting. Anecdotal data from company and academic scientists 
suggested there has been an increase in defensive patenting and in university patenting. 
128 See ibid, 296-297. 
129 See further Appendix 2. 
130 Walsh and Others, above n113, 332-334. 
131 See above n11. The example given by Walsh and Others is that of two compounds that block a 
receptor that is specific to a therapeutic approach to a disease. The discovery of one would decrease the 
profit of the other from use of its compound; ibid, 332. 
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rivalrous and can be used by a number of innovators with no erosion of their 
profits."' 
If an upstream invention is fundamental to primarily competing downstream research 
applications, Walsh and Others contend that access to it is more likely to be restricted 
in some way, often through exclusivity in licensing. Exclusive exploitation of an 
invention will entail some social cost because the party exploiting the invention will 
not have the means to pursue every application. 133 While this is certainly true, Walsh, 
and Others point out that there may also be some social cost where patented 
technologies are widely licensed to many users. In this case, it may be less likely that 
access will be restricted completely, but perhaps more likely that terms such as reach-
through rights to future inventions will be imposed. Their view is that it is nonetheless 
important in any case to consider the biological system being dealt with to determine 
whether there may be multiple ways of approaching a particular research issue. This 
will be one factor to consider in examining the impact of restricted access. In addition, 
the breadth with which patents are interpreted will determine the extent of research 
activities affected by those rights."4 
Promoting access to mitigate the social cost associated with restricted access to an 
invention must however be balanced against the risk that the incentive to develop the 
invention in the first place will be lessened. 135 This balance needs to be borne in mind 
whenever a consideration of these issues is undertaken. 
3.4.2 TRAGEDY OF THE ANTI-COMMONS 
An anti-commons may arise where no party has an effective privilege of use over all 
the rights necessary to conduct research to develop a resource. 136 Where this is the 
case, parties must reach agreements with the various owners of the rights to enable 
them to aggregate the rights they require access to. They may, however, have 
difficulty reaching agreement."' If there were no impediments to successful 
bargaining, rights would be traded and resources effectively utilised."' But where 
132 Walsh, Arora and Cohen give examples in biomedical research as PCR, microarrays and 
combinatorial libraries; ibid, 332. Another prominent example would be recombinant DNA technology. 
133 Ibid, 333-334. 
134 Ibid, 334-335. 
135 See ibid, 333-334. 
136 See Michael A Heller, 'The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets' (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621, 668-669. 
137 See ibid, 676-677. 
138 See Coase, above n56. 
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agreement with a number of rights holders is required, prohibitive transaction costs 
may lead parties to decide that exchanging rights is not worthwhile. 139 A socially 
optimal level of consumption of the resource may not be achieved, resulting in a 
'tragedy of the anti-commons' or under-use of the resource. 14° 
A complex patent landscape necessitates bargaining to allow the utilisation of 
patented products, methods and technologies at various stages of the research and 
development path. 141 For some time, there has been concern that this proliferation of 
intellectual property over research inputs may present a daunting obstacle to 
successful bargaining in biomedical research. 
The notion of an anti-commons in biomedical research was first advanced by Michael 
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg. They assert that there are two ways in which a 
government may inadvertently create an anti-commons problem: through the creation 
of numerous overlapping property rights over potential products or resources, or 
through the use of reach—through licence agreements leading to licence stacking. 142 In 
their view, the explosion of patent grants within the industry, and the increasing 
prevalence of restrictive licensing practices mean that an anti-commons is 
inevitable. 143 
Heller and Eisenberg consider that there are several reasons why it is unlikely that the 
biomedical industry will overcome an anticommons without legal intervention. First, 
transaction costs of bargains within this industry are particularly high. Secondly, 
different sectors of the industry may find reaching agreement difficult. Finally, 
upstream researchers may overvalue their patented inventions making the 
development of downstream products less worthwhile. Thus, the preconditions for an 
139 See Heller and Eisenberg, above n10; Heller, above n136; Eisenberg, above n28. The reasons for 
breakdown in negotiations within industries reliant on cumulative innovation will vary from industry to 
industry. For an empirical examination of this issue see Merges and Nelson, above n9, 843-844. 
140 Heller, above n136, 677. 
141 As has been discussed, the importance of bargaining for the transfer of rights is highlighted by much 
of the economic literature dealing with cumulative innovation and the optimal allocation of intellectual 
property, as recommendations on allocations are often predicated on the likelihood of successful 
bargaining taking place. 
142 Terms claiming reach-through rights in patent licence agreements give a patent holder rights to 
downstream uses of a licensed invention, and they may give rights to royalties over future inventions, 
rights to intellectual property over future inventions, or exclusive licences over future inventions; see 
Heller and Eisenberg, above n10, 699. For a consideration of the competition issues surrounding reach-
through terms in biomedical patent licensing agreements, see Jane Nielsen, 'Reach-Through Rights in 
Biomedical Patent Licensing: A Comparative Analysis of their Anti-Competitive Reach' (2004) 32 
Federal Law Review 169. 
143 Heller and Eisenberg, above n10, 699-700. 
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anti-commons in biomedicine exist, and it is unlikely that the market will right itself 
unassisted.'" Existing empirical evidence on the topic is divided. For example, Walsh 
and Others found little evidence of an anti-commons in biomedical research, but a 
report by an NIB Working Group suggests that increasing difficulties negotiating 
agreements over research tools is clear evidence that the conditions for an anti-
commons persist. 
3.4.3 STRATEGIC PATENTING STRATEGIES 
One matter worthy of comment is the tendency by companies in particular industries 
to amass large patent portfolios in the hope of dissuading competitors from entering or 
remaining in a market, or to bolster the company's bargaining position. 145 These 
offensive-patenting strategies might incorporate patents designed to bolster market 
power, and the patent holder may or may not intend using those patents.' 46 The effect 
may be single patent holders or oligopolists147 being in a position to preclude entry 
into particular markets in which they operate. They may increase the likelihood of 
bargaining breakdowns occurring as they increase the chance that licences will need 
to be obtained by industry participants in order for research to proceed. The 
biotechnology industry is one in which this patent landscape could conceivably 
emerge, as industry participants rush to secure patent protection and in so doing, fence 
in their intellectual property positions.'" 
144 	. Ibid, 700-701. See also Eisenberg, above n28, 231-248. In addition, Eisenberg contends that 
different agents within organisations have different agendas, for example, scientists and technology 
transfer personnel within universities are generally at odds in what they are aiming to achieve; at 239- 
242. 
145 See the discussion regarding 'mutual-assured-destruction' strategies in Federal Trade Commission 
Report, above n19, ch 2, 30-31. 
146  Ib . ch 2, 34-35. Indeed, patents may be obtained for the sole purpose of keeping rivals from 
entering the field rather than for the purposes of self-exploitation or licensing; at ch 2, 34. 
147 See John H Barton, 'Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios' 
(2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 851. Although a number of antitrust issues with regard to the 
behaviour of oligopolies emerge, it is only the issue of refusals to license by members of oligopoly 
groups with which this thesis is indirectly concerned. 
148 See the comments on the possible evolution of 'mutual-assured-destruction' strategies in relation to 
the biotechnology industry by John Barton in Transcript of Proceedings, Federal Trade Commission 
Hearings into Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy, (February 26 2002), [150]. Barton discusses the adoption of these strategies in relation to the 
semiconductor industry, and comments that a similar scenario could be envisaged for the financial 
services and biotechnology industries. 
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3.5 OVERCOMING BARGAINING BREAKDOWNS 
The literature suggests that there may be a number of methods employed to overcome 
bargaining breakdowns, whether these breakdowns constitute restricted access to a 
single patent, or anti-commons. 149 In some instances, industry participants may 
employ methods of overcoming bargaining breakdown. For example, licensing, where 
successful, is an important method of securing access to patented products and 
technologies. Some methods, such as strategic patenting through the accumulation of 
large patent portfolios, may assist particular industry participants in ensuring freedom 
to operate, but are likely to result in a more cluttered patent landscape and 
increasingly complex conditions under which licensing arrangements must be 
negotiated!" 
Where licences have not or cannot be negotiated, the research area may be one in 
which it is possible to invent around a particular patent or group of patents. Finally, 
collective rights organisations such as cross-licensing arrangements or patent pools 
may develop voluntarily in response to an anti-commons situation or where industry 
participants hold mutually blocking patents. 151 Other solutions such as patent 
clearinghouses and open source patents are also being discussed in the literature. m 
In other instances, government authorities may impose regulated solutions on an 
industry or sector of an industry. For example, in anticipation of an adverse effect on 
innovation, patent standards may be modified to make it more difficult to obtain a 
149 The discussion that follows does not comprehensively discuss all of the methods of overcoming 
bargaining breakdowns. For a more detailed discussion, see, eg, Federal Trade Commission Report, 
above n19, ch 2, especially 21-25, 30-32. 
150 Ibid, ch 2, 30-32. 
151 It should be pointed out that in the US, the term, "blocking patents" has a specific legal meaning. 
Blocking patents occur where one patent holder holds a broad patent over an invention (the dominant 
patent) and another patent holder holds a narrower patent over an improvement to that invention, or a 
new invention (the subservient patent); See Merges and Nelson, above n9, 860-861, and their n96, 
which discusses the intuition behind the grant of blocking patents. The holder of the subservient patent 
would require a licence from the holder of the dominant patent in order to practice their invention, and 
the holder of the dominant patent would be precluded from exploiting the improvement without a 
licence. In most cases, once an improvement is developed and commercialised, a licence from the 
holder of a pioneering patent that blocks the improver from practising the improvement, would be 
required. 
152 See, eg, Richard C Atkinson, Roger N Beachy, Gordon Conway, France A Cordova, Marye Anne 
Fox, Karen A Holbrook, Daniel F Klessig, Richard L McCormick, Peter M McPherson, Hunter R 
Rawlings, Rips Rapson, Larry N Vanderhoef, John D Wiley, Charles E Young, 'Public Sector 
Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management' 301 Science (2003): 174; Sara Boettinger and Dan L 
Burk, 'Open Source Patenting (2004) 1 Journal of International Biotechnology Law 221; Yochai 
Benlder 'Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents' 305 Science (2004): 1110. 
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patent. 153 Competition law is another method of overcoming bargaining breakdowns 
and aiding the process of dissemination. Similarly statutory patent pools may mandate 
the consolidation and dissemination of patents. Regulated solutions may assist where 
it is unlikely that bargaining breakdowns will be resolved by industry participants. 
For example, a number of commentators have been strong advocates of allowing 
industries to evolve to the point where private patent pooling arrangements are 
entered into, because they may be more tailored to particular industries and workable 
in practice than statutory schemes designed to deal with high transaction costs. 154 At 
the same time, other commentators have been pessimistic about the likelihood of 
emergence of collective rights organisations within the biotechnology industry. 155 
Particular methods of overcoming or mitigating bargaining breakdowns may be more 
likely to assist in the resolution of bargaining breakdowns in some industries than in 
others. This thesis considers the appropriateness of competition law in condemning 
refusals to license patents in the biomedical industry. 156 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that important policy questions arise in industries 
where there is a risk of patents hindering follow-on innovation. Maintaining an 
innovative environment and facilitating follow-on research are critical concerns. 
Patents granted too early in the research process, or patents that are too broad, may 
damage follow-on innovation and future competition. 157 The concentration of patents 
also enables a patent holder to exert a degree of control over future generations of 
invention. It is concluded, therefore, that in a cumulative industry such as medical 
biotechnology, adequate incentives for follow-on researchers should be ensured. 
153 On the difficulty in modifying patent law standards to ensure their industry specificity, see, eg, 
Michael A Carrier, 'Unravelling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox' (2002) 150 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 761. See however, Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, 'Policy Levers in Patent Law' (2003) 
89 Virginia Law Review 1575. 
154 See particularly Robert P Merges, 'Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual property and 
Collective Rights Organizations', (1996) 84 California Law Review 1293. See also United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology 
Patents? (2000), 8; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Genetic Inventions, 
Intellectual property and Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies (2002), 67. 
155 See, eg, Heller and Eisenberg, above n10; Arti K Rai, 'Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Norms of Science' (1999) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 77, 
especially 132-5; Scherer above n13, 1363. 
156 In this respect, the main issue for the purposes of the thesis is restrictions on access to single patents. 
An explanation of the anticommons issue was provided however, because access to a number of patents 
may be restricted, and this may render an anticommons situation likely. 
157 Barton, above n9, 455. 
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The first three chapters of this thesis have examined a number of issues relevant to the 
biomedical research environment. The cumulative nature of biomedical innovation, 
coupled with the structure of the industry and high levels of patenting within the 
industry, suggests that bargaining breakdown is prone to occur. The question that this 
thesis generally addresses is the role of competition law in regulating exclusionary 
licensing practices. This raises complex issues in relation to the interaction between 
intellectual property and competition law, and the point at which competition law 
should step in to control the use of intellectual property. Thus, the question entails 
consideration of the circumstances in which competition law should intervene to 
reduce levels of concentration in a particular market, and to remedy bargaining 
breakdown. The central issue is whether competition law is an appropriate mechanism 
to improve the bargaining position of follow-on innovators. 
This thesis proposes that competition law should be considered as a means of 
facilitating access to patents over other forms of regulation. Changes to patent 
standards will not affect the considerable number of medical biotechnology patents 
granted to date. Making provision for exclusion from infringement for research 
purposes under the Patents Act 1990 is also unlikely to significantly alter the amount 
of research that may be conducted on a patented invention. Similarly, the compulsory 
licensing provisions, despite providing the basis for a viable alternative to competition 
law, are relatively cumbersome and have not been tested. There are advantages to 
dealing with restrictive patent licensing under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
(TPA) given the established body of jurisprudence that has evolved under the TPA, 
and the ability of competition law to take account of dynamic efficiencies in focusing 
on dissemination. 
This thesis considers the most fundamental form of bargaining breakdown, that of 
refusals to license patents. It considers this issue in respect of medical biotechnology, 
an industry characterised by cumulative innovation. By refusing to license a patent, a 
patent holder can use that patent to preclude entry into either the market in which the 
patent holder is operating, or into more intermediate or downstream markets. Refusals 
to license intellectual property may take a number of forms in that they may be: 158 
• unilateral or individual; 
• concerted, in that they involve agreements by competitors designed to restrain 
trade; or 
158 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark A Lemley and Mark D Janis, IF And Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2002) vol I, 13-4. 
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• conditional whereby an intellectual property owner enters into an agreement 
with a licensee containing unilaterally imposed terms or conditions. 
It is important to distinguish between each form of refusal to license. While similar 
issues arise in relation to these three forms of refusal to license, competition law 
treatment of them differs considerably. Consideration of the issue in this thesis will be 
restricted to the first form of refusal to license, that of unilateral refusals to license. A 
unilateral refusal to license may also be constructive, that is, a license may be offered 
to a potential licensee, on terms that are so unreasonable that the offer to license 
amounts to a constructive refusal to license. 
Prior to considering the legal position surrounding refusals to license intellectual 
property, the following chapter will consider empirical evidence of exclusionary 
licensing practices within the biomedical industry, since this will be an important 
consideration in determining the role competition law should play in facilitating 
follow-on research. 
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Chapter 4 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the preceding chapters have indicated, there is significant theoretical evidence of 
the potential for restrictive licensing in the medical biotechnology industry. This 
potential arises from the structure of the industry, the vast number of biomedical 
inventions that are patented, and the cumulative nature of biomedical research. Patent 
protection is an important asset to participants in all sectors of the industry. While 
many industry participants emphasise the importance of patent protection as an 
inducement to innovation, there is no doubt that the dissemination of upstream 
biomedical inventions is crucial to follow-on innovation. Licensing is an important 
tool to enable the widespread distribution of inventions so that follow-on innovation is 
facilitated.' This is the case regardless of the basis on which the initial patent grant is 
justified. 2 
Until recently, however, there has been a lack of empirical work investigating whether 
this potential is eventuating in practice, and evidence cited in support of concerns 
about research hold-ups has centred mainly on anecdotal discussion. This chapter 
considers the major empirical studies that have been conducted in this area. These 
studies have not concentrated on patenting levels, but have focused on the effects of 
patent licensing within biomedical research. Data relevant to the incidence of 
breakdowns in licensing begins to allow an assessment of how patent law and 
competition law interact. 
It is argued within this chapter that there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to 
draw conclusive inference in relation to restrictive licensing practices within the 
industry, and that significantly more work in this area needs to be done. But the 
evidence does produce some indicative effects. There have been a number of studies 
conducted in the US and the EU! The Nicol and Nielsen study, in which the author 
was involved, was conducted with particular reference to Australia. 4 This study was 
1 For a discussion on licensing as a form of exploitation of a patent, see above 2.5. 
2 Whether the invention-inducement theory or prospect theory is advanced as a justification for the 
grant of an initial patent, in an industry where research is cumulative, licensing is an important manner 
in which follow-on innovation may be facilitated. As discussed above, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, there are a number 
of reasons in theory why initial innovators in biomedicine may not freely license their inventions. 
3 See below, 4.2. 
4 Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues 
Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 6, (Nicol and 
Nielsen Study) The Nicol and Nielsen Study considered medical biotechnology patenting and 
technology transfer practices within Australia. The study was undertaken jointly with Dr Dianne Nicol, 
and the resulting report was co-authored with Dr Nicol. The author and Dr Nicol contributed to all 
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the first comprehensive empirical work conducted in Australia examining issues 
associated with patent licensing. One of the issues investigated during the course of 
the study, was that of restricted access to patents necessary for biomedical research.' 
Particular challenges facing the Australian industry make these issues very relevant. 
To recap, these challenges relate to: 
• the need for Australian companies to seek foreign investment and enter into 
alliance activity with international companies; and 
• the fact that most Australian patents falling into the biotechnology category 
are owned by foreign companies, necessitating the need for Australian 
companies to negotiate access deals with these companies. 6 
The impact of gene patenting and licensing on the development of the Australian 
biotechnology industry has not yet been assessed, although there is now some 
recognition of the need for examination of these issues. The Nicol and Nielsen study 
was conducted with the distinct challenges facing the Australian industry in mind. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) also considered this issue, and 
recently released their Final Report which considered a range of important issues 
associated with gene patenting and licensing practices, including practices that may 
have some adverse effect on innovation within the industry.' Though the Nicol and 
Nielsen study was heavily cited by the ALRC, the ALRC Report resulted in limited 
recommendations. A central conclusion from the Nicol and Nielsen study was that 
although there was considerable potential for restrictive licensing within Australian 
biomedical research, there is limited evidence of these practices to date. 8 This is not to 
say they will not eventuate in time, but at present, research hold-ups appear to be 
minimal. 
aspects of the study equally. See also Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen 'Australian Medical 
Biotechnology: Navigating a Complex Patent Landscape' (2005) European Intellectual Property 
Review (forthcoming). 
5 Results Chapter 5 of the study considered evidence relevant to whether an anticomrnons has 
developed in respect of biomedical research in Australia; Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n4, Results 
Chapter 5. This thesis will not consider the issues relevant to anticommons, for example, mounting 
transaction costs and reach-through rights. 
6 See generally, 1.7. 
7 Australian Law Reform Commission, Parliament of Australia, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting 
and Human Health, Report No 99 (2004) (ALRC Report). 
8 A primary reason for undertaking the study was consideration of the issues raised in this thesis, 
although the study was very broad and encompassed a considerable number of other issues. 
151 
Chapter 4 
The data presented in this chapter will demonstrate that there is considerable evidence 
that Australian industry participants are managing to find solutions where access to 
patents necessary for research and development is refused, or where a researcher 
formed the view that a licence would be refused. In the few instances where licences 
are being refused, changes in research direction were reported to accommodate these. 
Nevertheless, the evidence does not account for instances where licences were not 
requested because it was perceived they would not be available, nor does it 
necessarily negate the potential for future research hold-ups due to refusals to license 
patents. 
4.2 RELEVANT STUDIES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A number of studies have been conducted in overseas jurisdictions in order to 
ascertain whether patents are having an adverse effect on levels of innovation within 
the medical biotechnology industry. 9 These studies will be considered in two 
categories, empirical studies, and those that have been primarily evidence-based and 
have been conducted on the basis of meetings or public hearings. 
4.2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
4.2.1.1 UNITED STATES STUDIES 
(1) 	The United States National Institutes of Health Working Group on Research 
Tools 
The United States National Institutes of Health established a Working Group on 
Research Tools to investigate access issues encountered by NTH funded investigators, 
and to investigate possible responses to any issues that arose. The inquiry was 
conducted through a series of interviews, and in 1998 the Working Group presented a 
Report detailing their findings and recommendations.° At the same time they released 
a set of guidelines for the transfer of research tools ll within NIH funded research, 
9 This section discusses a number of the main studies conducted in relation to this issue. It does not 
discuss all studies that may have been carried out, but concentrates on those that have received more 
attention in the literature. These studies have considered a broad range of issues. The studies will be 
generally outlined in this section, and references made, where relevant, to the results of these studies 
during the remainder of the chapter. 
10 National Institutes of Health, Report of the National Institutes of Health Working Group on Research 
Tools (1998), <http://www.nih.govinews/researchtools/index.htm> at 3 October 2002 (NIH Report). 
Note that the term 'research tool' is subject to varying interpretations, and different explanations of 
the term are discussed below, 4.3.1. 
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acceptance of which has been somewhat guarded.° The Working Group's inquiry had 
limited scope in that it was restricted to issues associated with access to research tools 
in transactions involving NTH grantees. At the same time, they recognised the issues 
they canvassed had broader application which were beyond the charge of the Working 
Group. The Working Group interviewed bench scientists, university technology 
transfer professionals, and personnel from private companies. 
(ii) John Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley Cohen 
John Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley Cohen were commissioned by the United 
States National Academies of Sciences to research licensing breakdowns within the 
medical biotechnology industry in the United States. ° Walsh, Arora and Cohen set 
out to investigate two related questions: first, whether there was any evidence of an 
anti-commons effect within the industry and on academic research, and secondly, 
whether there were any restrictions on access to patents over inventions or research 
tools that are foundational to future research. As Walsh, Arora and Cohen point out, 
these issues have occurred in a number of industries?' 
The methodology employed by Walsh, Arora and Cohen entailed interviewing 
respondents within various sectors of the industry. Seventy interviews were conducted 
with respondents from biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, universities, law 
firms, government and trade associations. ° Questions asked during interviews were 
aimed at exploring the issues outlined above. ° The questions also focused on how 
negotiations over intellectual property rights have changed over time, and strategies 
employed by researchers and companies to overcome any challenges brought about by 
intellectual property!' 
12 National Institutes of Health (NIH), Basic Guidelines for the Transfer of Research Tools To and 
From Recipients of NIH Funds, Appendix A, NIH Report, above n10 (NIH Guidelines). 
13 John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen 'Effects of Research Tool Patenting and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation' in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds.), Patents in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy (2003) 287 (Walsh Cohen and Arora); see also John P Walsh, Ashish 
Arora and Wesley M Cohen, 'Working Through the Patent Problem', 299 Science (2003): 1021. 
14 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 291-292. 
Ibid, 292-293. See their Table 1, 293 for a breakdown of respondents by organisation and 
occupation. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
153 
Chapter 4 
4.2.1.2 THE GERMAN STUDY 
On behalf of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright 
and Competition Law, and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 
Joseph Straus, Henrik Holzapfel and Matthias Lindenmeir conducted a similar study. 18 
The authors conducted approximately 25 interviews with a view to identifying trends 
and developments within the German biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. A 
broad range of issues were canvassed, including the nature of collaborations within 
the industry, the availability of licensing, the effect of patenting on publication, 
infringement of genetic inventions, the quality of patent documents and the necessity 
for special protection for particular genetic inventions. 19 
4.2.13 THE UNITED KINGDOM STUDY 
A study conducted by the Intellectual Property Institute (IN) on behalf of the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry was undertaken to consider the effect of the 
implementation of the EU Directive for the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions, on the UK bioscience sector. 2° Specifically, the study considered whether 
concerns about the effect of patents for genetic sequences, were founded. The main 
aims of the study were to gather empirical evidence on the effect of gene patents on 
access to genetic information, and the commercial exploitation of biotechnology. 21 
The study methodology involved statistical analysis of data on gene patents, 
interviews with all participants from all sectors of the industry, and an on-line survey 
of participants in the UK biotechnology sector. 22 An extensive report was released in 
May 2004. 
4.2.1.4 OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Another study investigating the differences in levels of DNA patenting and licensing 
within the various industry sectors has also been conducted, 23 while the effect of 
patents on the provision of clinical services was considered in a number of related 
18 Joseph Straus, Henrik Holzapfel and Matthias Lindenmeir, Empirical Survey on Genetic Invention 
and Patent Law, unpublished report (2002 ) (copy on file with author) (the German Study). 
19 A summary of the results is contained at I-II in The German Study, ibid. 
20 Intellectual Property Institute, Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK 
Law and Practice (2004) (The UK Study). 
21 mid, 5. 
22 For details of the study methodology see ibid, 19. 
23 	. Mtchelle R Henry, Mildred K Cho, Meredith A Weaver and Jon F Merz, 'DNA Patenting and 
Licensing' (2002) 297 Science 1279. 
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studies." Some empirical evidence has also been collected in other studies. For 
example, the authors of a study considering the effect of Canadian agricultural 
biotechnology patent policy on the enhancement of social welfare, conducted a survey 
of research institutions in Canada, the US and Australia. 25 
4.2.1.5 GENERAL FINDINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The empirical studies detailed have been generally positive about the operation of the 
biomedical industry given high levels of patent activity within the industry, with few 
adverse results on downstream commercialisation being reported. The authors of 
some reports have, however, warned that the potential for hold-ups in innovation due 
to restrictive licensing practices remains. 26 For example, in their study of the United 
States industry, Walsh, Arora and Cohen were cautiously optimistic about limitations 
on access. They warned that although research in broad therapeutic areas has not been 
blocked to date, this may be through a combination of luck and institutional response, 
and the potential to impede progress in a broad research area still exists. 27 To some 
extent, the same potential exists for the Australian industry. 
This concern extends to licensing of publicly funded research. 28 The provision of 
services in the diagnostics sector seems to be a matter for apprehension among 
industry participants, with Merz and Colleagues reporting widespread concern 
amongst their respondents that restrictive licensing practices with respect to patents 
covering genetic diseases were having a negative impact on the provision, quality and 
cost of genetic diagnostic services. 29 
24 Jon F Merz, Antigone G Kriss, Debra DG Leonard and Mildred K Cho, 'Diagnostic Testing Fails the 
Test' 415 Nature (2002): 577. See also Mildred K Cho and Jon F Merz, 'Letter to Nature' 390 Nature 
(1997): 221; Mildred K Cho, 'Impact of Patents on Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services' 
(2002) (Paper Presented at OECD Workshop on Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Licensing Practices Berlin, January 24, 2002). 
zs Dan Dierker and Peter Phillips, 'The Search For the Holy Grail? Maximising Social Welfare Under 
Canadian Biotechnology Patent Policy' (2003) 6 IP Strategy Today 45. 
26 For example, Walsh, Arora and Cohen found few adverse effects on downstream development, but 
stated that the potential for research to be impeded remains; Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 335. 
27 Ibid, 335. See also the German Study, above n18, 9-11. 
28 See especially Henry, Cho, Weaver and Merz, above n23, NIH Report above n10. 
29 Merz, Kriss, Leonard and Cho, above n24. A central conclusion of this study was that exclusive 
licensing had led to the monopolisation of clinical testing services. 
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4.2.2 OFFICIAL REPORTS 
4.2.2.1 UNITED KINGDOM 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics also released a discussion paper on the ethics of 
patenting DNA after extensively consulting core stakeholders within the United 
Kingdom industry!' This included an examination of issues concerned with restricted 
access to patents, including restrictions that prevent or hinder the development of new 
or improved medicines and treatments, and the obstruction of free exchange of 
materials and technologies due to the enforcement of patent rights. 
4.2.2.2 OECD 
Concern over the patenting of gene sequences and other products of biological 
systems prompted the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) to hold a workshop investigating the impact of patenting and licensing 
practices on access to genetic technologies, with over 100 invited speakers and 
participants reviewing empirical evidence on these issues?' Draft Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Genetic Inventions were recently released for comment22 The OECD has 
indicated an intention to present revised guidelines for endorsement to the OECD in 
late 2005/early 20062 3 
4.2.23 UNITED STATES 
(1) 	United States Federal Trade Commission 
The US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice held a set of hearings 
that aimed to investigate the complex issues surrounding intellectual property and 
competition 1aw. 34 The hearings involved over 300 expert participants and invited 
30 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, Discussion Paper 
(2002) (Nuffield Discussion Paper). 
31 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Genetic Inventions, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies, (2002) (the OECD 
Report). 
32 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Draft Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Genetic Inventions, (1 February 2005) <http://www.oecd.org/document> at 22 June 2005. 
33 See ibid. 
34 The first report from those hearings has been released; Federal Trade Commission, To Promote 
Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) (Federal Trade 
Commission Report). 
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public submissions. 35 As part of those hearings, a number of the issues surrounding 
access to intellectual property protected assets in general, and biotechnology patents 
in particular, came under scrutiny. These issues were considered in the context of 
competition law, and are given more detailed consideration throughout this thesis. 
The United States National Academies of Science 
The United States National Academies of Science held a workshop on intellectual 
property rights and the dissemination of research tools in molecular biology. The 
workshop heard from a variety of participants within the various sectors of the 
industry, and a summary of the workshop was subsequently collated and published. 36 
4.2.2.4 AUSTRALIA 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) received a reference in 2002 to 
investigate issues relevant to the patenting of genes, including the impact of gene 
patenting and licensing practices on research and commercialisation. The ALRC's 
Report, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, was released in 
June 2004." During the course of its inquiry, the ALRC received submissions and 
consulted widely with relevant stakeholders. It also considered empirical and 
evidence-based studies from Australia, and from other jurisdictions. References to the 
ALRC Report will be made throughout this chapter. 
4.2.2.5 COMPARISON OF FINDINGS 
As with the empirical studies, the official reports have highlighted the main concern 
in relation to patents on biomedical inventione as being access to diagnostic clinical 
testing.39 Moreover, some reports recognised that the potential for negative effects on 
research remains depending on the interpretation of patent claims and the manner in 
which patents over genetic technologies are exploited. ° 
35 See `FTC Issues Report on How to Promote Innovation Through Balancing Competition Law with 
Patent Law and Policy' Press Release (28 October 2003) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm > at 5 May 2004. 
36 National Research Council (NRC), Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular 
Biology (1997) (the NRC Report). 
37 ALRC Report, above n7. 
38 Note that a number of the empirical and evidence-based studies only considered issues relating to the 
patenting of genetic sequences; see The UK Study, above n20; Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n30; 
ibid. 
39 See OECD Report, above n31, 68-72; Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n30, 50-54. 
4° See especially OECD Report, above n31; Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n30. 
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4.3 RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS To RESEARCH TOOLS IN 
MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
The official reports and empirical studies discussed in the preceding section have 
generally found limited evidence of bargaining breakdown within the biomedical 
industry. In this respect, these studies are aligned with the Nicol and Nielsen study. A 
considerable number of patented upstream biotechnology inventions are requisite to 
follow-on research. In some instances, research tools will be critical to follow-on 
research. This section clarifies how biomedical research tools are defmed for the 
purposes of this thesis, before providing a guide as to how research tools or 
technologies are classified for the purposes of the empirical evidence presented in this 
chapter. 
4.3.1 'RESEARCH TOOLS' IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
There is no universally agreed definition of a 'research tool'. As indicated in Chapter 
1 of this thesis, in general terms biotechnology research tools are the technological 
developments and products that enable subsequent lines of biotechnology research to 
be pursued!' Defining the term beyond this is, however, difficult. A narrow definition 
of the term would limit research tools to those technologies that are traditionally 
understood to comprise methodologies employed in research laboratories for 
identifying potential drugs. 42 Notable examples are recombinant DNA technology, 
PCR taq polymerase, and genes and receptors. 
A broad definition would encompass virtually all upstream and intermediate 
technologies that primarily constitute inputs into further research and are not in 
themselves 'end products' in the sense of products that will be available to 
consumers.43 As well as the 'foundational' tools that would be encompassed in a 
narrow definition, examples of tools that would be included in a broad definition 
might include genomics databases, combinatorial libraries, clones and transgenic 
mice." As Eisenberg points out, one resolution of this divergence in definitions has 
41 See above 1.4.2. 
" See OECD Report, above n31, 50. 
43 Even so, a research tool may be classed as fairly downstream; an example given by Rai of a research 
tool that may be useful for downstream research, is a gene sequence used in testing for a particular 
genetic disease that does not open up other pathways of research. As Rai points out, this may not be 
clear at the outset. A patent holder may not be aware, for example, what disease pathways particular 
genes encoding receptors or enzymes code for. It is therefore difficult to envisage that a patent holder 
could investigate all possible disease pathways; Arti K Rai `Genome Patents: A Case Study in 
Patenting Research Tools' 77 Academic Medicine (2002): 1369, 1368-1372. 
44 Ibid. 
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been the adoption of differing definitions of research tools by various industry and 
public sector representatives, so that many participants make a concerted effort to 
avoid defining their institution's product as a 'research tool'. 45 
The definition adopted for the purposes of this thesis is a broad definition, so that any 
research input constitutes a research tool. This is the general definition employed in 
many of the studies that have been conducted in the area. 46 It is recognised, however, 
that many research institutions and companies have patents over many research tools 
that they would class as important products in themselves. 
43.2 CATEGORISING RESEARCH TOOLS 
Restricting access to a particular patented invention may result in follow-on 
innovation being slowed, delayed, or blocked entirely:" Technologies necessary for 
biomedical research fall into a number of different categories, and relevant factors to 
consider are the nature of the patented technology in question, and whether the person 
seeking access to the patented technology is in a competitive relationship with the 
patent holder. The categories into which research tools fall may be generally 
described as follows: 
1. technology that is being used by the patent holder and another researcher to 
conduct similar research, and one researcher subsequently finds the 
technology is already patented (for example, where a lead compound being 
used for development of the same drug by competing researchers is covered 
by patent); 
2. patented technology useful for a range of follow-on uses, the products of 
which may ultimately compete (for example where a lead compound is being 
used for research into two different drugs that may ultimately compete with 
one another); and 
3. patented technology that is useful for a range of non-competing, follow-on 
uses (PCR is a prime example). 
45 Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market 
Failing or Emerging?' in Rochelle C Dreyfuss, Diane L Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), Expanding 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (2001) 223, 228- 
229. 
46 See, eg, Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, especially 332-333; Nuffield, above n30, 47, NIH 
Report, above n10, 3-4. 
47 Discussed above 3.3. 
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Essentially, technologies that fall into categories two and three will be primarily non 
rivalrous, although clearly some technologies falling into category two will be 
riva1rous.48 The instances of restricted access, which are of primary concern, fall into 
categories two and three. It is in these instances that there may be significant social 
cost associated with restricting access. It is socially desirable, for example, that 
patented inventions that fit into category three be widely disseminated. In this way, 
broad innovation will be promoted and society will benefit through the introduction of 
a variety of new products. 
On the other hand, society accepts that there will be some reduction in competition 
associated with the patent system, 49 and is accordingly less concerned with restricted 
access to patented inventions that fall into category one. In order to encourage 
innovation, patents give an exclusive right to exploit an invention for a limited 
period.50 This necessarily entails some reduction in competition, but the benefit to 
consumers is likely to outweigh the cost of one competitor being unable to develop 
the invention. Although there may be a cost disadvantage where competing 
researchers are precluded from developing competing products, there is unlikely to be 
a reduction in products available to consumers. 
The second category is more problematic, and the desirability of promoting access 
becomes more equivocal. Broad access may be desirable because the potential of the 
invention is more likely to be maximised through having a variety of innovators 
exploiting the invention, particularly where it is unclear whether resulting products 
will compete. Walsh, Arora and Cohen cite the examples of Geron's exclusive licence 
for human embryonic stem cell technology and Myriad's diagnostic test licensing as 
having a dampening effect on research. 51 Clearly, the scope of the patent claims will 
become an important issue, because this will determine the breadth of follow-on 
research affected by the patent. 
as The ultimate question considered in this thesis is the role competition law should play in regulating 
refusals to license medical biotechnology patents. The reason for attempting to categorise technologies 
when considering issues of refusals to license, is to assist in determining whether the intervention of 
competition law is required in some instances but not others, for example, in respect of non-rivalrous 
technology but not rivalrous technology. 
49 This is a cost of the patent bargain; see above, 2.2. 
50 See section dealing with incentive-inducement theory, above, 2.2.2.1. 
51 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 333. Details of these patented technologies are provided in 
Appendix 2 of this thesis. 
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Although it is not always clear which category a particular patented invention is likely 
to fit into, this distinction has been borne in mind when considering whether the data 
obtained gives any insight into whether or not participants in the Australian 
biotechnology industry are having difficulties accessing patented upstream products 
or technologies that are required to enable them to conduct research. It is recognised, 
however, that some research tools are more fundamental to follow-on research than 
others. 
4.3.3 PATENTED RESEARCH TOOLS 
A number of the studies discussed in this chapter gave consideration to a number of 
foundational biomedical patents to which access has been restricted, in investigating 
the general effects of restrictive licensing. In the United States, for example, the 
preconditions for restricted access to patents certainly appear to exist, because a 
number of important, broad-ranging research tools are patented. 52 In some cases, these 
research tools can be used for a range of follow-on research activities. As a result of 
this, access to crucial patents may be blocked, and an array of follow-on research 
activities precluded at the expense of innovation. Many patented technologies that 
have been classed as 'foundational' to downstream research share common 
characteristics. The most notable characteristics are that: 
• in some cases (but not all), the patents in question resulted from publicly 
funded research, or the research of public research institutions;" 
• a number of the patents involved method claims as well as product claims; 
• in the case of a number of these patented technologies, the full value or 
potential of the patent was not known at the time that patent was lodged; 
• the patents are generally very broad and have the potential to impede research 
in the area or competing research to some degree; 
• the patents have often been exclusively licensed. 
A number of important research tools have been widely disseminated. The best 
example is probably recombinant DNA technology, patented by the Board of Trustees 
52 See John H Barton, 'Patent Scope in Biotechnology' (1995) 26 International Review of Industrial 
Property and Competition Law 605. See also Michael Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, 'Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research' 280 Science (1998): 698 (Heller and 
Eisenberg); Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13; See also Rai above n43. 
53 As indicated in Chapter 1, a trend in Australia and international jurisdictions is that many research 
tools that may previously have been freely disseminated are now being patented; see above, 1.4. 
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of Stanford University. 54 Recombinant DNA technology represents the cornerstone of 
modern molecular biology, and although very broad, the patents were widely licensed 
on a non-exclusive basis for low fees. 55 
Nevertheless, the manner in which many of these patented technologies have been 
exploited or enforced has been problematic. These examples provide some indication 
of the potential for research to be obstructed where patents are granted prior to the full 
scope of the claimed invention being known. Where these patents are not made 
available to other researchers, there may inevitably be some negative impact on 
innovation.56 A difficult policy issue is to determine how much distortion to allocative 
efficiency is acceptable, and whether there should be some restriction on the freedom 
of a patent holder to license an invention as it sees fit. 
An aspect of the Nicol and Nielsen study was to investigate the proprietary status of a 
number of these research tools in Australia. 57 This research revealed that a number of 
these fundamental patents have been patented overseas, but have not been patented in 
Australia.58 It is submitted a reasonable assumption that may be drawn from this is 
that this is also likely to be the case in respect of other patents over biomedical 
research tools or inputs. 
The fact that many of these technologies are not patented in Australia has implications 
for Australian researchers. The fact that many of these research tools are not patented 
54 Comprising United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent No US4 237 224 (granted in 
1980) and Patent No US4 740 470 (granted in 1988). This technology does not appear to have been 
patented in Australia. 
55 For further discussion see, eg, the NRC Report, above n36, 40-42. The patents have now expired. 
56 Note that where patented inventions are made available, but on restrictive terms, this may also 
impact negatively on innovation. Patent holders may impose restrictive terms in patent licences to 
protect their proprietary position. For example, an initial patent may not be worth much in itself, but it 
may yield a follow-on invention of considerable value. A patent holder may therefore impose a term 
claiming rights to future inventions in order to ensure they achieve an adequate return on their 
investment. Consideration of these issues is outside the scope of this thesis, but see, eg, Jane Nielsen, 
'Reach-Through Rights in Biomedical Patent Licensing: A Comparative Analysis of their Anti-
Competitive Reach' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 169. 
57 Undertaking a comprehensive search of Australian Patent Office's databases is a very costly and 
time-consuming process, and the on-line databases are difficult to navigate. Conducting searches of the 
on-line databases available yields results that are not guaranteed by Australian Patent Office to be 
accurate. On-line searching has been relied on in undertaking searches of the technologies discussed 
below given the inherent difficulties of conducting more thorough searches. It is therefore possible to 
state that no record would appear to exist in respect of a particular product or technology, but not 
possible to claim that these results are completely reliable. 
58 See Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n4, 41-49. A summary of a number of foundational patented 
technologies in provided in Appendix 2 of this thesis. This summary describes these technologies and 
their patent status in Australia. 
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in Australia is not entirely surprising given that Australia is not a large market in 
comparison with the major markets of the world." Many more patents in the 
biotechnology category are granted in the US and Europe than in Australia. Given the 
high cost of filing and maintaining patents, inventors are likely to patent and market 
inventions in a limited number of jurisdictions. 
433.1 USE OF U1VPATENTED FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH TOOLS IN AUSTRALIA 
There may be some implications of the fact that these technologies are not patented 
for Australian researchers. There is no doubt that a considerable number of these 
research tools are important to Australian researchers. Research tools that are not 
patented in Australia can be used for research and development in Australia without 
fear of liability for infringement. Whether any commercial products of research using 
these research tools can be exported into markets where they are patented depends on 
the jurisdiction in question. 
Governments in many major markets have prohibited such a practice. 6° For example, 
in the United States, the importation of intellectual property protected products, 
produced offshore without the consent of the owner of the technology is not allowed. 
However, the recent court decision of Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals61 cast 
some doubt of the ability of these provisions to protect patent holders where a drug is 
developed offshore using a patented method. This litigation involved the Method of 
Screening patents discussed above, and the relevant provision in US patent law 
prohibiting importation for the purpose of sale or use, of a product made by a process 
patented in the United States. 62 The matter was decided on appeal as follows: 
• the Housey patents are restricted to research methods and do not extend to 
manufacturing methods; 
59 See further ibid, 80-81. 
60 The essential issue here is the composition of provisions in national intellectual property legislation 
for parallel importation, which is the practice of importing products developed offshore (in a 
jurisdiction where the technology is not protected by patent) using the patented technology. While 
some jurisdictions allow parallel importation, most developed countries prohibit the practice. Detailed 
discussion of parallel importation is outside the scope of this thesis, but see further, Jane Nielsen and 
Dianne Nicol, 'Pharmaceuticals and Patents: The Conundrum of Access and Incentive' (2002) 13 
Australian Intellectual Property Review 21. 
61 Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001); Bayer AG v Housey 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc 228 F. Supp 2d 467 (D. Del 2002); Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals Inc 340 
F.3d 1367 App NO —2-1598 (Fed Cir 2003). 
62 Patent Act 35 USC § 271(g) (1952). 
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• the relevant provision applies only to patented manufacturing processes and 
not to research processes; and 
• the importation of products produced using those research methods in other 
jurisdictions will not constitute infringement of the United States patents. 
As a result, a drug developed in Australia using a research method patented in the US 
could be lawfully imported into the US and would not infringe the patent. This may, 
to some extent, place participants in the Australian industry at an advantage over 
participants in other jurisdictions. The precedent afforded by the Housey litigation is 
limited and applies only to patented research methods used to produce drugs. There 
are many situations involving the use of patented processes and products where it 
would not operate, for example, therapeutic applications developed using patented 
research methods. Further, protection would not extend to other major markets. In the 
European Union for example, it is unlikely that importation of products produced 
offshore using patented methods would be allowed.° 
Many Australian researchers and companies operate on a multinational basis, and the 
use of products or processes over which patents are held elsewhere may be viewed 
negatively. Many are involved in collaborative arrangements with foreign companies 
and researchers, and may , be reluctant to jeopardise these arrangements. Although 
Australian researchers and companies may make use of these foundational discoveries 
in their research without fear of infringement, any commercial benefits from doing so 
are likely to be limited. 
4.33.2 ENFORCEMENT OF PATENTED RESEARCH TOOLS 
A number of these foundational research tools are patented in Australia. There is no 
doubt that other important methods and technologies which will be required for 
biomedical research are also patented in Australia. The patent landscape is becoming 
increasingly complicated, and many upstream inventions have now been patented. In 
addition, it may be that research being conducted by the Australian industry will be 
seen as increasingly threatening as Australian companies and institutes gain an 
international presence. Although it would appear that patent rights have not been 
enforced as vigorously in Australia as they have in other jurisdictions, this is 
something that seems certain to change. Both overseas and Australian companies are 
starting to take a more aggressive approach to enforcement. A good example of this is 
63 For a more detailed discussion on applications of the principle of exhaustion of rights see Nielsen 
and Nicol, Pharmaceutical Patents and Developing Countries: The Conundrum of Access and 
Incentive' above n60, 35-36. 
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the stance taken by GTG in relation to their junk DNA patents. 64 GTG has also been 
exclusively licensed by Myriad Genetics to market and perform Myriad's patented 
testing procedures in Australia and New Zealand.° Of more direct concern for the 
purposes of this thesis are issues associated with an inability to gain access to 
upstream patents required in order to enable research to continue. 
The issue of restricted access to patents is therefore an important issue for the 
Australian industry. Even though a considerable amount of upstream research is 
conducted by the Australian industry, respondents in all of the sectors investigated in 
the Nicol and Nielsen study, frequently require access to upstream patents. Even 
upstream researchers may need to access patents over particular research tools that are 
crucial to their research, as few upstream researchers are in the position of having 
developed and patented every research tool they may need to conduct their research. 
4.4 REFUSALS TO LICENSE MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PATENTS IN AUSTRALIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE 
This section builds on the empirical studies discussed above by considering in some 
detail the Australian-based Nicol and Nielsen study. The primary issue addressed in 
this section is the occurrence of practices that act to limit access to medical 
biotechnology patents necessary to conduct research. 66 Specifically, it details evidence 
obtained in relation to refusals to license patents, and a number of associated issues. ° 
This discussion relies on the three categories of technology identified earlier in this 
chapter,68 and in doing so attempts to determine whether the technology in question is 
64 See the explanation of patents relating to Intron Sequence Analysis in Appendix 2. 
65 For details see <http://www.gtg.com.au/index_general.asp?menuid=080.030 > at 24 June 2005). 
66 Note that the evidence presented in this chapter is discrete from evidence relating to the 
anticommons issue. 
67 The data obtained during the course of the study was obtained through a series of three surveys, (sent 
to biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, research institutions and diagnostic institutions 
respectively) and around 40 semi-structured interviews of respondents from all industry sectors. A 
detailed study methodology is contained in Appendix 1. The study also covered data relevant to a 
number of restrictive licensing practices not considered for the purposes of this thesis, including costs 
and delays in patent licence negotiations, and restrictive terms and conditions contained in patent 
licences. See further Nicol and Nielsen Study, above n4, 156-168. 
68 As noted above, 4.3.2, the categories are: 
1. technology that is being used by the patent holder and another researcher to conduct similar 
research, and one researcher subsequently finds the technology is already patented (for example, 
where a lead compound being used for development of the same drug by competing researchers 
is covered by patent); 
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rivalrous or non-rivalrous. In this context, evidence relevant to the following are 
considered: 
• the existence of blocking patents in the industry; 
• whether licences are being refused; 
• the effect and frequency of exclusive licensing; and 
• failure to exploit patents. 
It should be noted that the ALRC in their recent inquiry into gene patenting in 
Australia, addressed many of these issues and gathered evidence through submissions, 
results obtained from its submissions and consultations are reported in its report Gene 
Patenting and Human Health, to be comparable to the results that are presented 
below. This chapter concludes by considering methods being utilised by industry 
participants to gain access to patents to which access is required. 
4.4.1 BLOCKING PATENTS 
As stated in Chapter 3, the blocking patents doctrine in the US has a specific legal 
meaning, and somewhat limited application.° During the course of this study, the 
term 'blocking patents' was used in a broader sense, as including any patents that 
blocked access to technology required for research. 7° In the company survey, 
respondents were asked whether their company had ever been required to change its 
research program because a patent blocked access to key research tools or materials. 
This question was intended to include situations where research to develop 
improvements was stymied in that it was perceived that a licence to a patent might not 
be granted. It essentially sought to determine whether any respondents had taken steps 
to avoid a blocking patent situation. 
4.4.1.1 EVIDENCE OF BLOCKING PATENTS 
Nine respondents to this question reported that they had changed their research 
program, (18 percent) and as would be expected, several of these respondents 
indicated that existing patents heavily influenced their research programs, with one 
2. patented technology useful for a range of follow-on uses, the products of which may 
ultimately compete (for example where a lead compound is being used for research into two 
different drugs that may ultimately compete with one another); and 
3. patented technology that is useful for a range of non-competing, follow-on uses. 
69 See above, 3.5. 
70 Note that this is also the definition of blocking patents employed by the ALRC in their report; see 
ALRC Report, above n7, 447, especially n42, and in the UK Study; see The UK Study, above n20, 15. 
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other commenting that only slight changes in the scope of their research were required 
to avoid infringing existing patents.71 One indicated that they left the field completely 
if they were unable to work with patent holders to enable them to access necessary 
patents. Another four respondents provided comments that indicated they had come 
across patents that would potentially impact on their research programs. The survey 
did not go on to ask how the companies' research programs had changed, however 
this issue was explored in more depth in the interviews. 
Of the 18 diagnostic institutions surveyed, only one reported access to patents•
necessary to conduct research being blocked (five percent). The patents in question 
were the BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents. Four of the 21 research institutions surveyed 
reported having to change their research program because a patent blocked access, (19 
percent) and their responses were qualified. It may be that this figure was fairly 
insignificant because research institutions are less concerned about proceeding 
without a licence given that they rely on the existence of a practice-based research 
exemption:2 It was not possible to discern from the survey results whether the 
research they were referring to was non-commercial in nature. 
A significant number of interview respondents considered blocking patents to be a 
real issue within the industry. Many respondents commented that they could not see 
the value of companies obtaining patents purely for blocking or defensive purposes: 3 
Having said this, 21 respondents to the company survey had applied for a patent for 
strategic reasons, that is, to allow them freedom to operate (43 percent). In most cases, 
that patent had been granted. It was not clear whether those particular patents were 
subsequently exploited or licensed-out, however many respondents who participated 
in interviews either had patents that they did not currently exploit, or knew of 
companies who held patents they did not currently exploit. In many cases, these 
patents were not licensed or otherwise transferred, although this may have been for a 
number of reasons. 74 In a number of instances respondents held patents they had not 
exploited but subsequently let them lapse, and routinely undertook audits of the 
patents on their books to enable them to identify these patents. 
71 Note that two of these responses were received from non-biomedical companies. Both of these 
respondents described their activities as falling into the category of plant/animal research. 
72 Although as discussed, the status of this exemption is unclear; see above, 2.5.1. 
73 On defensive and strategic patenting strategies, see, above, 3.4.3; Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges (2004) 
29. 
74 For example, the patents may have had limited commercial value, or may not have been marketable. 
There may be a number of difficulties associated with licensing or otherwise transferring technology 
out, and these may prevent licensing deals in some instances. 
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One patent attorney interviewed during the course of the study had encountered many 
instances of blocking patents in biotechnology due to the nature of the research 
process and the necessity for most follow-on researchers to use patented technology 
held by others. The solutions most commonly observed by this respondent were 
working carefully around the prior art or seeking a licence!' A significant number of 
respondents interviewed reported that they had avoided research in an area because 
they were aware that another company held a patent to which they required access, 
and they considered they would have difficulty gaining access to that patent. 76 In most 
cases, these respondents indicated that they were in a horizontal, competitive 
relationship with the patent holder. It was evident that a number of these were clear 
competing products cases as outlined in category one above. In some cases, however, 
it was less clear that this was the case and it was more likely that the patented 
technology fell into category two. Often the ultimate outcome of research was not 
known at the time that the research was undertaken. 
Some respondents engaged in academic research reported having difficulties gaining 
access to necessary patents. It would appear that patent holders are becoming 
increasingly wary of infringement by academic researchers as the line between 
academic research and commercialisation becomes increasingly blurred!' Again, it 
appeared in a number of cases that the technology in question fell into category two, 
although the data does not permit a strong view on this. This clearly poses a problem 
if a single patent has broad applicability, and restricting access has the potential to 
block off whole areas of research that cannot be foreseen at the time the research is 
conducted. The question here is whether these patented inventions to which access 
was blocked, comprise foundational discoveries that are key to broad areas of 
subsequent research. 
The result of these licensing practices is also, as one respondent pointed out, that the 
patent holder will lose ground by failing to allow anyone to work on their patents. 
There must be some social cost associated with this, as well as the strategic cost to the 
patent holder of falling behind. 
75 See also above 3.3.4.3. 
76 The UK Study found little evidence that gene sequence patents have created patent thickets, but 
found some difficulties in negotiating in-licences, particularly for research tools, did exist. These 
problems related primarily to negotiating terms in licence agreements; The UK Study, above n20, 69. 
The OECD reported that although a risk of patent thickets remains in biotechnology, this has not had a 
significant impact on innovation to date; OECD Report, above n31, 61-62. Patent thickets are most 
likely to give rise to an anticommons, but have the potential to deter research where access to single 
blocking patents is required. 
77 For discussion on the decreasing divide between basic and applied science, see above 1.4.3. 
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4.4.1.2 OVERCOMING BLOCKING PATEIVTS 
Of the interview respondents who commented that they had encountered difficulties 
of some kind with patents blocking research, many of them said they had overcome 
these difficulties by changing the direction of their research so as to avoid infringing 
the patent(s). In some cases, these patents were owned by competitors and the 
problematic patents were patents over technology that would compete with any 
technology derived from the research program if it continued (category one). In this 
situation, although it is to be expected that being granted access to a competing patent 
is unlikely, one research institution respondent pointed out that a licence deal might 
even be attractive to a competitor if you have a skill set that they want. 
Other respondents commented that they required licences to research inputs to enable 
them to proceed, and tended to avoid research areas (or subsequently change the 
direction of their research) unless they were relatively sure they could obtain a 
necessary licence. Successful licence agreements were often reached. In a 
considerable number of cases where a licence was required and the researcher 
approached the patent holder, respondents indicated that a successful licensing 
outcome was eventually negotiated. One licensing manager contended that 99.99 
percent of licensing deals within the industry run smoothly, and only about 0.01 
percent stand out as anomalies. His view was that research is blocked in very 
exceptional cases. 
However, other respondents reported that in many instances they did not even try to 
negotiate a licence if they were of the view that the relevant patent holder would be 
unlikely to enter into negotiations with them. In a majority of cases, the patented 
technologies fell into category one, although a number clearly fell into category two. 
Licensing was the main strategy by which access to patents could be negotiated. In the 
case of blocking patents, cross-licensing is a mechanism by which a blocking patents 
situation may be overcome. While only a small number of interview respondents had 
been involved in any cross-licensing activity, a significant number considered that 
cross-licences would become more common within the industry. 
Some respondents (particularly where the technology to which they required access 
fell into category one) reported that inventing around was a strategy they had 
employed to enable them freedom to operate, while others redirected their research 
efforts to avoid infringing relevant patents. 78 Respondents from the pharmaceutical 
78 By redirecting their research efforts, these respondents essentially altered their research programs to 
avoid infringing existing patents. 
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sector were generally of the view that it is not possible to obtain broad patents that 
block research in the pharmaceutical industry because of the ability of researchers to 
invent around. It was evident that these pharmaceutical patents represent a clear case 
of patents that fall into category one. 
Note also that the Australian Patents Act 1990 provides that a compulsory licence 
may be granted where an applicant seeks access to a patent and also a patent that 
blocks them from exploiting that patent, although as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
application of this provision is very limited and would not allow, for example, the 
holder of a subservient patent to obtain a compulsory licence to gain access to a 
dominant patent. 79 
4.4.2 REFUSALS To LICENCE 
Ernst & Young reported that 20 percent of the companies surveyed during their 1999 
survey had abandoned a project because they were unable to gain a licence.80 While it 
is not clear whether licences were actually requested and refused, this figure suggests 
that refusals to license may be a problem that is encountered frequently by Australian 
medical biotechnology companies. The results obtained in the Nicol and Nielsen 
study indicate, however, that refusals to license do not, as yet, appear to be a 
significant problem for the industry. 
4.4.2.1 THE SURVEY DATA 
Of the companies that responded to the company survey, six reported being refused a 
patent licence (12 percent). Two other respondents, although failing to indicate that 
they had encountered a refusal to license, would appear by implication to have done 
so.81 The question was intended to elicit responses as to unilateral refusals to license, 
although it would appear in one case at least that the refusal was predicated on 
unreasonable terms. Of the six companies who were refused a licence, none reported 
being in a vertical relationship with the patent holder, and three reported being in a 
79 See above, 2.5.2. The 'reasonable requirements of the public' test may address this issue, although it 
was submitted during the course of the discussion on compulsory licensing that uncertainty over the 
application of this provision makes its utility dubious. 
so Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report (1999) 35. 
81 Answers to later questions rested on the assumption that they had been refused a licence. Note that 
one of these respondents was engaged in plant/animal research rather than biomedical research, 
although the patent for which a licence was apparently refused was described as an active drug patent. 
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horizontal relationship. 82 Responses about the nature of the relationship between the 
parties were not received from the other three respondents. 
Reasons for the refusal were given by three respondents: two reported that exclusive 
licences were granted to another party, and the other stated that they were in 
competition with the patent holder." A majority of these companies were significant 
in terms of size as measured by number of employees and revenue, with most of the 
respondents reporting revenue in excess of AU$5 million. Three were internationally 
owned. All of the companies had a significant number of patents ranging from eight to 
"thousands". Respondents were also asked about the kind of patent for which a 
licence was refused. Four respondents provided this information, 84 with one answering 
research tool, two answering gene sequence, 85 and one answering active drug patent. 86 
It was surmised from the information concerning relationships with the patent holder 
or exclusive licensee, that the 'active drug patent' fell into category one, however this 
is not altogether clear from the limited data available. Given the types of patents to 
which access was refused, it would appear in the remaining three instances that the 
patented technology fell into either category two or three." 
Of the research institutions that responded to the survey, only two reported that they 
had been refused a licence (nine percent), and only one of those institutions had had to 
abandon a particular area of research because of the refusal. None of the diagnostic 
institutions surveyed had encountered a refusal to license, probably due to the low 
level of research and licensing-in being undertaken within the diagnostics sector. 
82 The respondent referred to above at n81 also reported being in a horizontal relationship with the 
patent holder. 
83 One other respondent who did not provide an affirmative answer to the refusal to license question, 
cited unreasonable terms as a reason for a refusal to license — it is not clear whether there was a refusal 
or not, but it seems in any event that it was not a unilateral refusal to license. 
84 One other respondent who had not answered yes to the refusal to licence question, answered this 
question and said the patented technology was enabling technology. They also said the patentee was in 
a horizontal relationship with them. 
85 One of these was also described as diagnostic. 
86 It was not possible to glean from the results whether the patents were being exploited in any event by 
either the patentee or another licensee. 
87 This would depend on what definition of 'research tool' had been employed by the respondent who 
provided this answer, and the particular gene sequences in question. It is not possible to state definitely 
whether these technologies were rivalrous or non-rivalrous. 
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4.4.2.2 THE INTERVIEW DATA 
This perception that unilateral refusals to license are not a pervasive issue within the 
industry was reinforced by the interview data. 88 Most of the company and research 
institution respondents had not encountered outright refusals to license, although one 
managing director whose companies were involved in downstream development 
activities, had been refused licences by US companies on a number of occasions. His 
companies had only negotiated licence deals with US companies. He commented that 
many small to medium sized US companies had refused to license patents on the 
grounds that they would rather not risk losing a potential market. On the other hand, 
larger companies were more willing to license on the grounds that they were unlikely 
to enter that particular research area. This respondent's companies had not been 
offered licences on restrictive terms, but had only encountered outright refusals to 
licence. In the case of this respondent, the technology over which licences had been 
requested clearly fell into category two, as the companies in which he was involved 
were engaged in the business of value-adding to upstream and intermediate 
technologies. 
This account appeared to be somewhat isolated. Another respondent engaged in 
downstream development activities reported that there had been an occasion where a 
research tool patent holder did not want to license them, but ultimately licensed their 
partner, effectively solving any problems created by the refusal. One university 
technology transfer officer stated that they had been refused licences but generally the 
problem was that terms were unacceptable. Some respondents complained that owners 
of research tool patents, while willing to license, unreasonably demanded reach-
through royalties. Another respondent from a large pharmaceutical company agreed 
that refusals to license do happen, but considered that most deals that don't work out 
are probably unsuccessful primarily due to the low probability of success rather than 
other aspects. 
One interpretation of this data is probably that refusals to license were not 
encountered because often it did not get to the stage that licences were requested. 
Many respondents acknowledged this. In this case, it could be argued that there may 
be instances where research areas are being avoided if there is a fear that a licence to a 
requisite research input is unlikely to be granted. 89 Many researchers and company 
Cf Ernst & Young, above n80, 35, where it is reported that 20% of their respondents reported 
abandoning a project due to an inability to obtain a licence. 
89  This may align the results of the study more closely with the figure obtained by Ernst & Young from 
their survey results; see above n88. 
172 
Chapter 4 
respondents stated that they avoided particular areas of research if competitors held 
patents, or if it looked as though obtaining a licence necessary to enable them to 
conduct research might prove to be too problematic. In some cases technology to 
which access was required clearly fell into category one, but in other cases it is likely 
that the patented invention fell into category two. For example, a respondent from a 
large pharmaceutical company stated that if it was clear the patent holder would not 
give a licence over a target, they tended not to pursue it. They had a large number of 
targets to choose from, so abandoning targets because they could not obtain the 
necessary licences to continue research was not hugely problematic. 
To summarise, in line with the survey results a few interview respondents expressed 
frustration at difficulties in licensing-in enabling technologies, but these were greatly 
outnumbered by the number of respondents who had not experienced any problems. 
An alternative reading of the data is that respondents had available to them many rich 
technological opportunities and were not concerned if they perceived that they would 
be unable to obtain licences on occasion. 
Patented research tools were also frequently used without licences, particularly by 
universities where it was unlikely or unclear whether or not a commercial product 
would result. It was conceded by a number of company respondents that it would be 
impossible to know what every lab or company was doing, so policing use of research 
tool patents is extremely difficult. A patent attorney interviewed agreed that research 
tool patents are very difficult to enforce, particularly at present when many research 
tool patents are owned by multinational companies. 
4.4.23 REASONS FOR REFUSALS To LICENSE 
Similarly, most respondents engaged in licensing-out their technology (including 
research tools) appeared to hold the view that it made good business sense to engage 
in fairly liberal licensing practices. This is not to say that exclusive licensing 
practices, or licensing-out on terms that may be problematic to one party, are not 
common within the industry. It seems clear that there are some parties with whom a 
patent holder would not contemplate a licence arrangement. Many respondents 
intimated this, and one respondent was more specific. Engaged in upstream research 
and development activities, this respondent gave three reasons why a requested 
licence might be refused: 
• where the licence grant would conflict with their own business development, 
or with a licence granted to another party, particularly an exclusive licence; 
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• where the potential licensee was problematic in terms of finances or reputation 
within the market place; and 
• where the intended application of the patented technology was unethical. 
The first ground was undoubtedly the most common ground on which a licence would 
be refused, and this is in line with the survey results. It is to be expected that when a 
patent holder has a product patent, they are likely to refuse to license their own 
competitors or license two parties in competition. Again, patented inventions falling 
into category one are unlikely to be widely disseminated, and this may entail some 
social cost. Consistent with the objectives of the patent system, some degree of 
exclusion is to be expected. 
In contrast, in situations where the products developed constitute broadly applicable 
foundational discoveries, failing to license broadly may have some consequent effect 
on downstream research. The same respondent also pointed out that in circumstances 
where " ... we may have given a licence for gene therapy to treat breast cancer, and 
someone else wants it for all cancers", a licence would also likely be refused. 
Although there could clearly be a conflict for an exclusive licensee in such a case, it 
would certainly be questionable whether a company engaged in researching gene 
therapy for breast cancer competed with a company engaged in researching gene 
therapy for all cancers. This is more likely to be an instance that fits into category two 
or three,9° and is more problematic in terms of restricted access. 91 It is difficult to say 
with any precision how frequently such a scenario might arise. 
A consideration then, that has major bearing on whether patent holders are willing to 
license others, is the technology in question. Whether the technology is core to the 
activities of the patent holder will be an important variable. Patent holders will be 
understandably reluctant to license inventions that fall into category one, and in some 
instances category two. It became evident during the course of interviews that patent 
holders are more likely to license non-core technologies, and this may result in patent 
holders being willing to license technology falling into categories one and two. Where 
they were not licensed, in many cases it would appear that the inventions were being 
90 Depending on likely research outcomes. 
91 Note that a patent holder may license to a number of licensees, permitting each to undertake different 
uses or exploit in different territories. In this sense, a licence will be exclusive in terms of a particular 
field of use or territory, but the arrangement might not be quite so restrictive as an exclusive licence 
that is not so confined 
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exploited in any event, although respondents did report inventions not being 
exploited.92 
Broadly applicable research tools (falling into category three) are more likely to be 
widely licensed because this is a method of maximising revenue on them. Permitting 
others to use some enabling technologies is unlikely to impact significantly on the 
competitive advantage a patent holder or licensee may have. During interviews, there 
were no reported instances of licences to technology falling into category three being 
refused. 
Submissions to the ALRC's inquiry into gene patenting indicated that refusals to 
license are not really problematic for the Australian industry. 93 Walsh, Arora and 
Cohen reached a similar conclusion in respect of the US industry: 94 in particular their 
respondents complained of restrictions on the use of targets. 95 In considering a number 
of examples, however, their conclusion was that it was only in a number of limited 
instances that access to a target was completely restricted or limited, and in most cases 
the target was being exploited by at least one party. It should be remembered, 
however, that there might be some social cost or impact on innovation, when few 
parties are working on solving one problem. 96 This is most likely to be an issue in 
respect of technology falling into categories two and three. 
4.4.3 EXCLUSIVITY 
4.4.3.1 THE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVITY ON RESEARCH 
It should again be emphasised that exclusivity is the cornerstone of the patent system. 
Exclusivity is part of the patent bargain, and the price society pays for the disclosure 
of invention. Without monopoly rights, the patent system would cease to function. 
The aim of this discussion, therefore, is to consider whether there are instances in 
which exclusive licensing practices are likely to hinder innovation in that use of an 
invention will be restricted. 97 An exclusive licensing arrangement means that other 
92 See below, 4.4.4. 
93 ALRC Report, above n7, 528. 
94 See also the German Study above n18, 7. 
95 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 310-14. 
96 See Robert P Merges and Richard R Nelson, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope' (1990) 
90 Columbia Law Review 839, who argue that innovation will be best served by a variety of innovators 
working on improvements, rather than relying on the patent holder to coordinate development of 
subsequent innovation through licensing. 
97 As Rai and Eisenberg have pointed out, '[e]xclusive licences on research tools with potentially broad 
applications threaten to throttle scientific progress by limiting the number of players in a developing 
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parties will be refused licences, and it is in this context that this data is presented. 98 It 
is unlikely that public benefit considerations play a major role in market dealings 
between a licensor and a licensee. Again, the category into which technology will fall 
will be important, in that ideally non-exclusive licensing of inventions falling into 
category three (and often category two) will take place. 
Data obtained revealed that while many patent holders initially aim to disseminate 
their technology widely, licensing decisions are often driven by revenue 
considerations. Respondents frequently expressed a desire to non-exclusively license 
their technologies where a number of licensees had been identified." But in many 
cases in order to extract the best bargain they were required to license on an exclusive 
basis. Pharmaceutical companies in particular, demand exclusivity, particularly in 
relation to drug targets. Where licensing decisions are dictated to some extent by the 
bargaining power of the respective parties, licences may be granted to fewer licensees 
than would be considered to be socially optimal. This is particularly the case where a 
potentially non-rivalrous invention may not be licensed to its full capacity, and other 
non-competing uses of an invention may be precluded. 
4.43.2 EXCLUSIVE LICENSING IN PRACTICE 
Exclusivity can take a number of forms including geographical exclusivity, 
exclusivity for a limited period, or field-specific exclusivity. Licensing on an 
exclusive basis is commonplace within the industry. Of the 22 respondents to the 
company survey who had requested licences, 16 of those respondents had entered into 
licences on an exclusive basis (73 percent of respondents who had licensed-in, 33 
percent of total respondents). th° Ten parties had licensed-in on a non-exclusive basis, 
and five reported having both kinds of agreements. Two parties failed to provide 
details of the kind of arrangements entered into. 
field.'; Arti K Rai and Rebecca S Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
(2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 289, 301. 
98 As such, the competition law implications of terms in contracts providing for exclusive licensing 
arrangements will not be considered in this thesis. 
99 This was the case in respect of technologies falling into all three categories, but particularly in 
respect of category two and three technologies. 
wo All but two provided details of the kinds of arrangements entered into. Ten parties had licensed-in 
on a non-exclusive basis (one of these was involved in plant/animal research), and five reported having 
both kinds of agreements (again, one of these was involved in plant/animal research). 
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Sixteen of the 22 respondents who had licensed-out patents provided details of the 
kinds of licensing-out agreements they had entered into. 101 Twelve respondents had 
entered into exclusive licensing-out arrangements (54 percent of respondents who had 
licensed-out, 24 percent of total respondents). Only six respondents had entered into 
non-exclusive arrangements, and four reported both exclusive and non-exclusive 
deals. 
Eight of the 12 research institution survey respondents who had requested licences 
had entered into non-exclusive licensing arrangements (67 percent of respondents 
who had licensed-in, 35 percent of total respondents), and three had entered into 
exclusive arrangements (25 percent of respondents who had licensed-in, 13 percent of 
total respondents). Thirteen research institutions had licensing-out arrangements, and 
11 of these provided details of the type of arrangement. Seven said they had entered 
into exclusive arrangements, (54 percent of respondents with licensing-out 
arrangements, 33 percent of total respondents) and four said they had entered into 
both exclusive and non-exclusive arrangements (36 percent of respondents with 
licensing-out arrangements, 19 percent of total respondents). None said they had only 
entered into non-exclusive arrangements. 
Of the three diagnostic facilities who had entered into licensing-in arrangements, one 
said they had entered into exclusive arrangements, and one non-exclusive. Only two 
respondents had licensing-out arrangements, and both of these were exclusive 
agreements. 
Exclusive licensing appears to comprise a significant portion of licensing 
arrangements within the industry. This was confirmed by the interview data, which 
highlighted the role of exclusivity in licence agreements. The interview data also 
confirmed that whether a licence agreement is exclusive or non-exclusive will depend 
largely on a number of factors including: 
• the nature of the invention being licensed; 
• the negotiating power of the respective parties and their position in the drug or 
therapy development pipeline; and 
• the nature and number of potential licensees. 
One party stated that their agreement had expired, two were in negotiations or planning to enter into 
an agreement, one party citedconfidentiality and two did not know or did not provide an answer. 
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4.4.33 THE NATURE OF THE INVENTION OR LICENSED PRODUCT 
Exclusive arrangements were viewed as appropriate where a licence was being sought 
with a particular commercial outcome or product in mind. Respondents also reported 
being reluctant to enter into non-exclusive arrangements where the price demanded 
was excessive. On the other hand, respondents were generally willing to expend 
significant amounts for exclusive licences. 
A patent holder may exclusively license the whole subject matter of an invention, or a 
particular component of an invention. It is important to recall that specific fields of an 
invention may be separately licensed on different bases. The nature of the invention or 
the licensed component will be an important variable in licensing negotiations, as it 
will determine to some extent whether an exclusive or non-exclusive licensing deal 
will be more lucrative. As explained by a respondent involved in a biotechnology 
commercialisation company: 
Whether to licence exclusively or non-exclusively depends on the project. For 
example, when working with animal models most licences will be non-exclusive, 
devices will be exclusive. The type of licence depends on the type of technology and 
what you want to licence; service, compound, device etc. Each has its own quirky 
nature. 102 
Gene targets may be licensed either exclusively or non-exclusively depending on how 
wide any potential applications of the gene are. A gene patent may have a number of 
applications and one particular application or function (such as a diagnostic or 
therapeutic application) may be exclusively licensed, and others non-exclusively 
licensed. That is, a licence over a gene patent may not be totally exclusive, but may be 
field specific. Such arrangements were reported to exist by a significant number of 
respondents from both research institutions and companies. 
A number of respondents confirmed that product based inventions (or components of 
inventions) are often exclusively licensed, while broadly applicable technology-based 
inventions are generally licensed on a non-exclusive basis. Platform technologies, 
assays, reagents such as monoclonal antibodies, and diagnostic tools for example, are 
generally licensed on a non-exclusive basis, while compounds and other drug targets, 
and particular applications of gene patents are often licensed exclusively. In short, 
102 Many of the foundational research tools discussed in Appendix 2 were exclusively licensed, which 
in many cases hindered the pace of research and development in a particular field. It is desirable that 
non-rivalrous technologies be non-exclusively licensed, as exclusive licensing of these technologies is 
likely to be detrimental to downstream product development. 
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technologies falling into category one are generally exclusively licensed, while 
broadly applicable technologies falling into category three are more likely to be non-
exclusively licensed. Category two is more problematic, and it would appear that 
technologies falling into this category were in some instances licensed on a fairly 
limited basis. This was due in part to the fact that products resulting from the licence 
deal might compete with products developed by the patent holder. The factors 
discussed below also played some part. 
Respondents also reported being more willing to exclusively license-out where the 
patented technology was not core to their activities. A number of respondents 
exclusively licensed-in technology in order to shore up their patent portfolios, 
recognising that they were far more likely to be granted an exclusive licence where 
the patent holder had no intention of using the patented technology. Under these 
circumstances, the generally held view was that although they may not want to use the 
technology, this was unlikely to be of concern to a patent holder who was unlikely to 
use the technology and realise any value on it themselves. It will be argued in later 
chapters that it may be appropriate to apply competition law where a patent holder 
refuses to license a patent and development of a product in a separate, downstream 
market is precluded. This data would tend to suggest that there is some evidence that 
patents are being exclusively licensed-in but not exploited, and this may have 
implications where access to that patent is sought to enable the conduct of research 
and development activities. 
4.4.3.4 THE NEGOTIATING POWER OF THE PARTIES AND THEIR POSITION IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE 
Many company respondents said that they insisted on exclusive licences from 
university or biotech start-ups, while some generally bargained for assignments, 
exclusive licences and non-exclusive licences in that order. Many respondents agreed 
that an assignment was optimal but frequently they were forced to settle on less than a 
full assignment of rights. Respondents from universities, for example, stated that in 
licensing-out their technology or products, a non-exclusive licence would in many 
circumstances be desirable. However, a large number of research opportunities are 
available for licence, and in order to achieve a satisfactory licensing outcome many 
respondents said they were forced to accept that their product would need to be 
licensed-out on an exclusive basis or not at al1. 1°3 Many respondents at various stages 
103 See also Henry, Cho, Weaver and Merz, above n23. This study found that in the US, non-profit 
organisations are far more likely to grant exclusive licences. Sixty-eight percent of licences granted by 
non-profit respondents were exclusive compared with 27 percent of licences granted by private firms. 
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in the development pipeline had licensing arrangements with large multinational 
firms, and agreed that there was often little choice but to license exclusively. 
In some instances, respondents said they were forced to non-exclusively license their 
patents where they were being infringed, or risk a challenge to the validity of their 
patents that they could ill afford to defend. 
4.4.3.5 POTENTIAL LICENSEES 
The licensing decisions of many companies are dictated to some extent by their 
identification of potential licensees. For example, if only one or two companies would 
potentially be interested in the intellectual property, they would realise more benefit 
by licensing-out on an exclusive basis. Where there are a number of researchers 
operating in an area, one respondent involved in upstream research and development 
activities stated that they tried to license non-exclusively to extract more value from 
the intellectual property. Indeed, where this was the case, an exclusive licence would 
not be desirable unless the potential licensee had a significant share of the relevant 
market. Thus, identification of the markets to be serviced is an important part of any 
licensing decision. 
Of course, the factor mentioned previously will come into play here; the ability of 
patent holders to enter into non-exclusive licensing-out arrangements where there are 
a number of licensees available, may be hindered to some extent by who the licensees 
are and what arrangements they are prepared to enter into. For example, though many 
respondents said they would probably license-out on a non-exclusive basis if they had 
a choice, they admitted their choice of licensing arrangement was dictated to some 
extent by the demands of licensees, who often insisted on exclusivity. 
An interesting comparison can be drawn with the device sector of the industry, with 
one respondent from a company engaged in developing devices explaining that they 
non-exclusively license to competitors on a regular basis, and in fact competitors are 
likely to be the only parties interested in licensing their technology. In many cases, 
these deals involve cross-licensing which seems to be common within device 
companies. 
The authors recognised there could be several reasons for this: the exclusive licensing mandate of the 
Bayh-Dole Act 35 USC §299 (1980); a desire by universities to reduce licensing expenses; a perception 
that universities are more likely than their industry counterparts to licence targets for drug discovery; 
and the fact that private companies may generate different types of invention to non-profit institutions. 
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At the downstream end of the research and development spectrum, respondents from 
pharmaceutical companies stated that they insisted on exclusive licences for 
compounds used as drug targets. Other respondents involved in downstream product 
development activities confirmed that they would only license-in products on an 
exclusive basis on the grounds that they could not afford to invest in research and 
development of a product under the threat of competition. Most licensees involved in 
licensing-in product based inventions from research institutions sought exclusive 
licences, and were reluctant to enter into agreements on any other basis. Price is 
obviously a consideration here, as products licensed on a non-exclusive basis will 
always be available at lower cost. 
With reference to research tool (involving non-rivalrous technology) patents, a 
number of respondents who could be characterised as operating at the downstream 
end of the development continuum, predictably expressed a desire for non-exclusive 
licences for all broadly applicable research tools. 104 The Cohen-Boyer patent for 
recombinant DNA technology was mentioned by a number of respondents as a kind of 
ideal to be sought after in relation to licensing research tool patents. Exclusive 
licensing of research targets was more likely to be tolerated. 105 Indeed, these 
inventions are more likely to fall within category one. 
By contrast, one respondent was involved in the bioinformatics sector. This 
respondent could think of only one or two examples of exclusive licensing deals 
involving software within the sector, and spoke of the sector maintaining an ethos of 
free, unrestricted access, and licensing occurring on a non-exclusive basis. 106 
4.4.4 FAILURE To EXPLOIT PATENTS 
Interview respondents were questioned about patents they held but did not exploit. As 
reported above, a number of respondents stated they could not see the sense in 
retaining patents but not exploiting them. At the same time, many respondents either 
held patents they did not exploit, knew of patents that were being held but not 
exploited, or speculated that this was certain to be the case. m Some respondents 
suggested that larger companies might employ the strategy of patenting in order to 
104 One respondent from a large pharmaceutical company stated that they would like to see guidelines 
for the licensing of research tools in line with the Guidelines released by the N1H. However, these 
guidelines have had a limited impact on the actual dissemination of patents over research tools; see 
above n12 and accompanying text. 
105 See also Henry, Cho, Weaver and Merz, above n23. 
106 Software is generally licensed for use as enabling technology. Note that proprietary databases have 
for the most part been licensed exclusively or semi-exclusively. 
107 In some cases these patents had been obtained by licensing-in. 
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exclude competitors from areas of research they considered they might enter at some 
stage. The position seems to be that many respondents we spoke to employ a 
defensive patenting strategy and in effect "fence in" their intellectual property 
position by obtaining families of patents. 108 One respondent commented on the degree 
of "over-patenting" evident at all levels of the industry. 
One survey question sought to ascertain the levels of strategic and defensive patenting 
taking place in the industry. Survey respondents were asked whether they had ever 
applied for a patent for strategic reasons. This may include patents applied for where 
there was no intention to exploit a patent. Twenty-one of the 49 company respondents 
said that they had (43 percent). This figure is not surprising given available data about 
the high levels of patenting within the industry: strategic patenting and licensing 
strategies are crucial in order to ensure freedom to operate. It is likely that at least 
some of these respondents obtained patents for defensive reasons in that they did not 
wish to exploit them. Strategic and defensive patenting would appear to be far more 
prevalent within the company sector than other sectors. Only five of the research 
institutions surveyed said that they had applied for a patent for strategic reasons (22 
percent), while one diagnostic facility answered this question in the affirmative (five 
percent). Given the high cost of obtaining patent protection and the limited resources 
of many research institutions and diagnostic facilities, these figures are not surprising. 
Most interview respondents engaged in patenting agreed that they patented very 
broadly. A number of respondents reported that their companies had patents (or 
licences) on their books that they did not exploit. Their research options were so rich 
that they had many patents they just didn't have the resources to exploit themselves. 
Gene validation targets, for example, are being generated at a rapid pace. In addition 
to this, some respondents reported that they had identified technology they did not 
wish to see exploited, and paid the patent holder to effectively sit the intellectual 
property on a shelf and not seek licensing opportunities. 
In some instances where patent holders did not exploit patents, they resolved this non-
exploitation by either letting the patents lapse or licensing them out. Often, however 
licensing opportunities were not sought, nor available. In the case of many academic 
institutions, potential licensees had so many research opportunities, that many patents 
were not taken up and exploited. Marketing technology and products to overseas 
companies is difficult. If a potential licensee approached the patent holder, often this 
led to some sort of negotiated arrangement. If not, often the patents stayed on the 
1°8 See Dierker and Phillips, above n25, 45-62. 
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books of the patent holder. It may be the case in this instance that these patents were 
not worth working in any case in the sense that a commercial outcome was unlikely. 
Alternatively, it is possible that they were potential investors were simply not aware 
of the patents, or that the patent holders did not actively seek licensing opportunities. 
One respondent considered that in many cases there is a lack of effort on the part of 
patent holders to license-out their technology. Alternatively, he suggested that 
research institutions in particular, file patent applications fairly indiscriminately due to 
pressure to generate income. A trade association representative, who criticised the 
tendency of research institutions to patent inventions without a commercial outcome 
in mind, shared this view. 
A number of respondents commented that they could not see the point of obtaining 
patents (or licences) and not exploiting them. Maintaining patents in this instance was 
a waste of valuable funds, and their view was that they could not afford licence fees 
unless they intended exploiting the licensed technology. The main value of a patent 
was, to many respondents, a licence agreement or preferably, a number of licence 
agreements. Nevertheless, there was some divergence of views in respect of non-
exploitation. 
Some respondents continued to maintain patents they did not wish to currently exploit 
if there was a possibility they may subsequently become useful. One respondent 
involved in a technology transfer company suggested that the impetus behind many 
patent applications is a view on the part of a particular party that a patent may become 
valuable. This is particularly the case in research institutions where research takes 
priority and commercialisation retains a less critical role. Because of this there are 
many instances where patents are obtained and not exploited. 
In some cases, licences may be obtained to products and technology but the licensee 
may refrain from exploiting the licences. One respondent from an upstream company 
stated that his company did not engage in much licensing-in. However, it would seek 
an exclusive licence where patents owned by other researchers and used for different 
purposes, created holes in their patent portfolio. This respondent indicated that 
licensing-in under these circumstances will usually be straightforward where the 
patent holder has no intention of exploiting the technology, or where the technology is 
not core to the organisation being approached. The patent may be a valuable and 
strategic addition to the licensee's patent portfolio, even if the licensee has no 
intention of exploiting the patent. Again, the implications of this practice may be that 
downstream research and development activities are precluded at the expense of one 
company's strategic proprietary position. 
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In summary, respondents who indicated that they had patents or licences they did not 
exploit, indicated that this was for two main reasons: 
• they considered the technology may become useful at a later stage; or 
• they wished to prevent someone else from exploiting the technology. 
Aside from these motivations, few respondents maintained patents over technology 
they had no intention of exploiting. In general, respondents did not express concern 
that their technology would become obsolete, although respondents from the device 
and bioinformatics sectors of the industry specifically viewed this as a problem. Thus, 
concern at technology losing its value was not generally referred to as a motivation to 
license-out. The short life span of technology in the device sector prompted vigilant 
management of companies' patent portfolios. In the bioinformatics sector, the rapid 
pace of technology made intellectual property protection of dubious value. 
Another university technology transfer officer had encountered negotiations for deals 
where the company was attempting to license to stop a product in the process of being 
developed by the university from being commercialised. Revocable licences are one 
way of safeguarding patents in which patent holders have a strong research interest by 
preventing licensees obtaining licences with no intention of exploiting them. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, another safeguard exists in that the Australian Patents Act 
1990 provides for the issue of compulsory licences for failure to exploit an invention. 
Specifically, an application for a compulsory licence can be made where the 
reasonable requirements of the public have not been satisfied, and the patent holder or 
their licensee has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to work the 
invention. 1® 
Nevertheless, it seems that there are still some patents that are not exploited, and it 
may be that patent holders and licensees have no choice but to pursue the most 
commercially promising lines of research. There may, however, be some social cost 
where patents that may not lead to a commercially valuable outcome but are 
nonetheless relevant to some socially valuable research, are not exploited. 
4.5 OVERCOMING ACCESS ISSUES 
There may be a number of options available to a researcher who finds that a particular 
research project is blocked by a patent held by another researcher.' 1° A number of 
109 Patents Act 1990 (Oh) s133(2). See also above, 2.5.2.1. 
no See above, 3.6. 
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these options have been alluded to during the course of this chapter. This section will 
briefly consider empirical evidence in relation to the efficacy of these options because 
this will be relevant to the role that competition law should be given. The options that 
will be discussed are: 
• licensing patents; 
• inventing around patents; 
• infringing patents and relying on a research exemption; and 
• challenging the validity of patents. 
4.5.1 THE EXTENT OF LICENSING ACTIVITY WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY 
Perhaps the most obvious way to deal with patents that have the potential to restrict or 
prevent research and development is to enter into a licence agreement or some other 
collaborative arrangement. Although there is significant licensing activity within the 
Australian industry, it may be that at the present time, licensing is less widespread 
than it is in other jurisdictions. Other studies have found that licensing activity within 
the industry is extremely libera1. 111 Walsh Arora and Cohen, in particular, said that 
their respondents indicated that it is typically not that difficult to contract. n2 Many 
broadly applicable foundational patents are licensed non-exclusively, and there is a 
trend toward realising value from patents by licensing widely. 113 Data obtained in the 
Nicol and Nielsen study indicated that approximately half of the respondents were 
involved in licensing activity; most respondents who own patents reported licensing 
them out, and many respondents reported being able to licence-in technology to which 
they required access. n4 Although actual comparative figures from studies in other 
jurisdictions are not available, these studies give the impression of prolific licensing 
activity. The youth of the Australian industry may account for licensing figures being 
slightly low relative to other jurisdictions. Interview respondents were adamant that 
the Australian market is very active in terms of licensing, and licensing is an 
111 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 322-3; The German Study, above n18, 6-7; The UK Study, 
above n20, 69. 
112 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 322. 
113 Ibid, 323. 
114 Survey results revealed that 12 research institution respondents (52 percent) and 22 company 
respondents (45 percent) had engaged in licensing-in activities. Just three diagnostics institutions (18 
percent 23 percent of diagnostic institutions conducting research) had licensed-in for research purposes. 
Most of the respondents who reported licensing-in activity had licensed in between one and four 
patents. Interview results were generally supportive of these figures. Note also that in their 1999 report, 
Ernst & Young found that half of the companies they surveyed were involved in licensing activity; 
Ernst & Young, above n80, 35. 
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important part of the business strategy of many intermediate Australian companies 
who seek to add value to technology they have licensed-in, before licensing it on. 
Licence agreements with international companies and institutions are very important 
to the Australian industry, and indeed to the international industry as a whole. 115 
Widespread collaborative activity was also reported, and this represented an important 
method of gaining access to technologies or products which were necessary to enable 
research to proceed. Respondents reported immense volumes of intellectual property 
deals per month within the global industry. However, licence deals are not always 
straightforward, and some difficulties in contracting effectively had been encountered 
by respondents to the study. 116 This may be a product of inequality in bargaining 
power and levels of experience between Australian researchers, and parties in 
jurisdictions where the industry is more established. 
The ALRC made a similar finding, and to address these issues, recommended a 
number of measures aimed at facilitating more streamlined licensing-out and 
licensing-in arrangements. 117 In particular, Recommendation 22-2 recommended the 
development of non-binding 'model agreements and interpretive guidelines' for 
licensing, while Recommendation 22-3 recommended the consideration of additional 
industry initiatives to assist licensing practices. The ALRC considered that model 
agreements and guidelines developed in other jurisdictions could provide assistance in 
their development in Australia. n8 
A number of well-known examples where licensing-in patents has been problematic 
are outlined in Appendix 2. Licensing-in is unlikely to assist where the patents to 
which a researcher or company requires access are held by a competing researcher, or 
where the technology or product falls into category two and products that will be 
produced are likely to ultimately compete. In other words, rivalrous technologies are 
less likely to be licensed than non-rivalrous technologies. 
115 A vast majority of licensing-in deals were with foreign research institutions and companies, with in 
excess of 60 percent of licensing-in deals involving United States patent holders. Around 30 percent of 
licensing-in arrangements involved Australian research institutions and companies, with the remainder 
comprising mainly European Union, Canadian, Israeli and New Zealand patent holders. See also 
Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen 'The Australian Medical Biotechnology Industry and Access to 
Intellectual Property: Issues for Patent Law Development' (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 347, 354-358. 
116 The ALRC made a similar finding, and to address these issues, recommended a number of measures 
aimed at facilitating more streamlined licensing-out and licensing-in arrangements; see ALRC Report, 
above n7, Recommendations 22-1, 22-2 and 22-3. 
117 ibid. 
118 The ALRC referred specifically to the NIFI Guidelines, above n12, and the OECD guidelines, above 
n32 (although the Draft Guidelines had not been issued at the time of the release of the ALRC Report); 
ALRC Report, above n7, 535-536. 
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4.5.2 INVENTING AROUND PATENTS 
In ensuring freedom to operate, many respondents confirmed the need to make an 
evaluation of patents they need to access, and patents they need to work around. One 
respondent interviewed who was involved in downstream development activities, 
stated that reasonably skilled people can successfully negotiate where impediments to 
research exist, or find ways around those impediments. Inventing around problematic 
patents was reported to be an important strategy employed by researchers in all 
sectors of the industry. 119 Walsh, Arora and Cohen suggested that the ability of 
researchers to invent around may prompt licensing on reasonable terms. 12° Several 
respondents disagreed that inventing around is a commonly employed tactic for 
avoiding infringement. One respondent whose company is involved in upstream 
research concerning specific mutations on particular genes stated that very specific 
knowledge about a patent would be required before it could successfully be invented 
around. Another whose company is involved in downstream research considered that 
inventing around may come perilously close to constituting infringement. This 
respondent did acknowledge considering relevant patents on a regular basis to ensure 
an awareness of the research activities of other researchers and companies in the area. 
Nevertheless, about two thirds of all respondents we interviewed who were engaged 
in research stated that they frequently invented around patents. One respondent 
estimated that researchers probably spend 50 percent of their time inventing around, 
while another considered that researchers in his company spend around 90 percent of 
their time working out how to get around patents held by competitors. It is clear that 
the ability of researchers to invent around will depend on the field of research 
involved, specifically: 
• how encumbered the area of research is; 
• the breadth of the relevant patent(s); and 
• the nature of the patented product or technology. 
119 Studies that have revealed patents to be of dubious value have indicated that the principal reason for 
the limited effectiveness of patents in some industries is the ability of competitors to invent around; see 
Wesley M Cohen, 'Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity' in P Stoneman (ed), Handbook of the 
Economics of Innovations and Technological Change (1995) 188, 228; Richard Levin, Alvin 
Klevorick, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 
Microeconomics (1987); Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson and John Walsh, 'Protecting Their Intellectual 
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)', (Working 
Paper No 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000). 
120 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 323-324. 
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4.5.2.1 LEVEL OF ENCUMBRANCE 
Some areas are more heavily patented than others are. One respondent commented 
that it may be getting harder to invent around within the biotechnology industry 
because of the increasing number of patents. It would appear that one of the most 
heavily encumbered areas is stem cell research, and yet respondents still reported 
working around those areas covered by competitor patents. 121 This is probably a factor 
that will become more relevant as the patent landscape within the industry becomes 
more cluttered. 
4.5.2.2 PATENT BREADTH 
Inventing around is less problematic in some areas than others because patents are 
narrower and thus more susceptible to inventing around. Patent requirements have 
become more stringent in the United States with the result that patents are narrower 
and therefore easier to invent around. 122 Some of the earlier patents were considered 
by respondents to be a real problem. One respondent pointed out that patent attorneys 
are trying to draft claims more broadly to prevent inventing around. Also, one 
respondent acknowledged that they tried to patent very broadly, filing as many patents 
as they could on a compound to prevent inventing around. This assisted them in 
avoiding a blocking patents situation by securing an area of research. 
4.5.2.3 THE TECHNOLOGY OR PRODUCT 
Inventing around may be more technically and economically feasible in some research 
areas than other. Inventing around may be particularly difficult in the case of a very 
broad initial patent, or for example, where a research area is very densely patented. 123 
It may also be difficult where the patented invention involves genetic material given 
that there will often be no alternative to the naturally-occurring sequence. 124 It may be 
that the evolving nature of technology in some research areas is conducive to 
inventing around. For example, one respondent from an upstream company 
considered that: 
Gene sequences are a special case. Most of the method patents have competing 
methods for almost anything: microarrays etc. There are half a dozen guys trying to 
121 See also the discussion on the WARF patents in Appendix 2. 
122 With the exception of device patents where it was considered by one respondent that the United 
States standard of examination was quite poor, and resultant patents were difficult to get around. 
123 See generally Federal Trade Commission Report, above n34, ch 2, 21-22. 
124 See, eg, Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n30, 50. Cf OECD Report, above n31, 22. 
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push the processes and if anyone tries to corner the market it will go somewhere else. 
It was thought that patenting genes, SNPs would corner the market. But now look at 
gene expression, messenger RNA expression, which are not captured by the patents, 
interference RNA, etc. these are all competing technologies. It is such a creative 
process, I have no concerns that anything could block for very long. In the end others 
will find ways around the things that people are trying to block. Next year is not even 
relevant. People do sometimes try to block but in every case they have failed. 
At the furthest downstream end of the drug development pipeline, a respondent from a 
small pharmaceutical company noted that they considered that there were few patents 
in the pharmaceutical industry that could not be invented around. As one respondent 
from an intermediate company noted, it is often possible to get around patents held by 
others by moving down the synthetic pathway, changing processes, or inventing 
around. Again, patent claims in some areas are necessarily narrower than in other 
areas. For example, narrow process patents may be easy to get around, while 
promoters are one kind of technology that some respondents considered to be 
impossible to invent around. 
Although inventing around may be possible, it is questionable whether it will result in 
all lost opportunities being recovered. Other studies have suggested that a single 
patent (or even group of patents) is unlikely to entirely inhibit research in a particular 
area. This is because, for example, a patent over a single protein is unlikely to prevent 
research into a particular disease given that many diseases are complex and there are 
often ' ... multiple approaches to the metabolic pathways.' 125 This is borne out by the 
interview data in the Australian study that makes it clear that few researchers or 
companies are forced to cease research entirely, although there may be some social 
cost associated with research being redirected to avoid infringement. This will depend 
again on the technology in question. 
There is likely to be little social cost in the simple case of a researcher inventing 
around to avoid infringing a competitor's patents. Indeed, society is more likely to 
benefit in such a scenario. There may however, be some social cost where, for 
example, a patent over technology that is useful for research into the development of 
different but competing products is enforced. In many instances the data did not allow 
this distinction to be made, although it appeared that some cases at least fell into the 
latter category. 
125 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 42. See also The UK Study, above n20, 69-70. 
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4.5.3 INFRINGEMENT AND RELIANCE ON A RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
It became apparent during the course of conducting interviews that a significant 
amount of patent infringement is engaged in by industry participants. Some of this 
infringement appeared to be unintentional, and occurred primarily due to impediments 
in searching the prior art. In other cases, respondents indicated that they would 
infringe patents they considered to be invalid. A number of respondents indicated that 
they might proceed with research despite the existence of a patent that may block that 
research, and await notification from the patent holder that they had infringed the 
patent. Upon receiving notification, these respondents indicated that they would 
attempt to negotiate a licence. In a significant number of cases, respondents who 
adopted the strategy of infringing patents were company respondents. These 
respondents indicated that infringement is often difficult to detect and this contributed 
in some way toward the practice of infringing patents. This is particularly the case in 
relation to broadly applicable research tool patents: tracking infringement by 
competitors is far more straightforward than following the activities of a multitude of 
users of non-rivalrous technology. 
These results accorded with results obtained by Walsh, Arora and Cohen, who 
concluded that infringement constitutes a practical 'working solution' in instances 
where access to a patent is in some way restricted. 126 It would appear, however, that 
infringement is not as pervasive a practice within the Australian industry as Walsh, 
Arora and Cohen found it to be within the US industry. This may in part be due to the 
fact that fewer fundamental research tools are protected by patent in Australia. The 
German Study concluded that some infringement in making and using research tools 
does occur, but this was primarily because few companies interviewed had reached 
the stage of commercialisation. 127 
Walsh, Arora and Cohen also found that infringement within the university 
environment is rife, and that infringement proceedings are unlikely to be instituted 
against research institutions. 128 They reported that not only do many research 
institutions rely on the research exemption, but few company respondents could see 
the value in pursuing university researchers due to the unfavourable publicity this 
would generate. 129 
126 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 324-328. See also The German Study, above n18, 10-11. 
127 The German Study, above n18, 10. 
128 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n13, 324-327. 
129 Thud, 325-327. See also The German Study, above n18, 11. 
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The results obtained in the Australian study support this to an extent, 13° but many 
research institution respondents indicted that they would be unlikely to adopt this 
approach because their government sponsors prefer to adopt a more risk-averse 
strategy to intellectual property management. Commercial outcomes of many projects 
conducted by research institutions in Australia tend to be managed by technology 
transfer companies or companies aligned with the research institution. Many of the 
intellectual property issues (including infringement issues) that arise as a result of a 
project becoming commercial in nature tend, therefore, to be managed by commercial 
sponsors. 
At the same time, the practice-based research exemption appears to remain an 
important vehicle within the research institution environment, with many research 
institution respondents reporting that they rely heavily on the exemption, and many 
patent holders acknowledging that they respect the existence of an exemption. The 
ALRC's proposed research exemption would not cover downstream, commercial uses 
of an invention, with the result that it would probably be relied upon to a lesser extent 
as a commercial outcome becomes likely. In any event, the commercial uses to which 
many upstream inventions using patented research tools are put would necessitate a 
license to use those patented technologies. 
4.5.4 CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF PATENTS 
The validity of patents may be challenged through either revocation proceedings or 
opposition proceedings, both available under the Patents Act 1990. 131 Revocation 
proceedings are pursued very infrequently, and few matters are actually litigated. 
Virtually every respondent who addressed the issue of revocation agreed that the main 
reason why challenges to validity were unlikely to be mounted was the considerable 
cost involved. As such, revocation proceedings are often not a viable option, 
particularly for research institutions and small companies. The threat of revocation 
may, however, be used as a bargaining tool in licence negotiations. 
130 See the discussion on the research exemption, above, 2.5.1. The ALRC received a number of 
submissions highlighting the importance of the research exemption to the research community and 
supporting the adoption of a new, explicit research exemption; see ALRC Report, above n7, 328-329. 
A number of submissions raised concerns that the exemption proposed by the ALRC would not 
adequately protect the research community; at 330-333. While many submissions received by ACIP 
considered an experimental use exemption to be an inherent aspect of the patent system, several 
submissions disagreed and considered there to be policy justification for such an exemption; Advisory 
Council on Intellectual Property, Patents and Experimental Use: Options Paper (2004); 25-26. 
131 See above at 2.4. 
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Opposition proceedings are instituted more frequently by Australian researchers and 
companies, although respondents were somewhat divided on the value of opposition 
proceedings. Some respondents considered opposition proceedings to be necessary 
whenever their proprietary position is threatened, and one respondent commented on 
their effectiveness in foreclosing progress in research by, particularly, research 
institutions and small companies. Others perceived little value in opposing patents, 
due to the cost involved and the risk that they could assist the patent holder in refining 
their claims. 
As a result, it would appear that a majority of researchers are unlikely to test the 
validity of patents that may threaten their research, although revocation and 
opposition remain an important tactical tool in licensing negotiations. This can be 
contrasted with the situation in the US: Walsh, Arora and Cohen found that 
challenging patents was a strategy engaged to deal with an anticommons or restricted 
access situation, although their respondents commented on the significant costs 
involved in taking this course. 132 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
The overseas studies considered in this chapter contained limited consideration of 
whether refusals to license, the primary issue considered in this thesis, were 
problematic in biomedical research. Nevertheless, they gave detailed consideration to 
whether or not restrictive licensing practices were being engaged in by patent holders. 
A number of the issues dealt with by these studies are relevant to refusals to license. 
This is because a number of restrictive licensing practices, for example, exclusive 
licensing and defensive patenting, may result in the non-availability of licences 
necessary to conduct downstream research. It is possible to say, therefore, that 
evidence from these studies is comparable to and consistent with data obtained in the 
Nicol and Nielsen study. 
At this stage, it is difficult to gauge the extent of restrictive licensing given the 
somewhat limited empirical evidence available, and further empirical work that delves 
further into these issues is required. There is certainly evidence of exclusionary 
practices within the Australian and international industries, but it must be remembered 
that the essence of a patent right is the right to exclude others. Given this, it is not 
surprising that few respondents complain of restrictions on free access to patented 
132 Walsh, Cohen and Arora, above n13, 324, 332. 
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technologies and products. This is despite the fact that there are a significant number 
of patents within the industry that block research to some extent. 
Data from the Nicol and Nielsen study is consistent with other international studies in 
demonstrating that there has been some limited evidence of refusals to license patents 
within the industry. The technology to which access is restricted needs to be 
considered. Few respondents complained about access to technology being restricted 
where that technology fell into category one. They accepted this as a necessary 
element of the patent system, and given (generally speaking) their support of the 
patent system, were content to bear this cost. 
It also became evident that a majority of technologies falling into category three have 
been widely disseminated, although it is possible to conclude tentatively from the 
evidence that there may be exceptions. This finding has been reported in all of the 
empirical studies discussed in this chapter. Category two technology presents more 
difficulties in that there may have been some instances where access was refused. The 
data does not divulge whether the technology was nonetheless being exploited, which 
would, to a degree, lessen the social cost that restricted access entails. 
However, it is probably fair to say that few respondents were concerned at the long-
term effects of restricted access, and in most cases research was able to proceed albeit 
in a modified fashion. In a number of instances respondents indicated that their 
research continued, but the modification of research meant that various lines of 
research which could have led to promising results were not pursued. 133 Of course, it 
is difficult to gauge the effects of exclusionary practices without knowing where 
particular lines of research are likely to lead. Further work in this area that examines 
the longer-term effects of exclusionary licensing practices such as refusals to license 
would be useful. Data that systematically tracks particular patented technologies in 
respect of which licences have been refused would assist in drawing firmer 
conclusions about the effects of these restrictive licensing practices on downstream 
innovation and competition within the industry. 
Access issues are alleviated to some extent by rapid technological advance within the 
industry which makes it more likely that alternatives to foundational inventions will 
be developed. Walsh, Arora and Cohen concluded that future problems resulting from 
exclusionary licensing practices in the United States could not be ruled out, and called 
133 As reported above, data obtained by Ernst & Young would seem to indicate that abandonment of 
promising research is relatively common within the Australian industry; see Ernst & Young, above 
n80, 35. 
193 
Chapter 4 
for continued vigilance to defend open science. lm Data from the Nicol and Nielsen 
study endorses this finding. 
Importantly, there is a significant upstream component to the Australian industry. 
Policy responses to restrictive licensing practices need to balance the benefits of 
improved access against possible reductions in incentives to upstream patent holders. 
Encouraging innovation remains a key concern, and the issue is how ensure that 
follow-on research proceeds without impacting on the ability of upstream or initial 
inventors to recoup their investment. The data also suggested that downstream users 
of technology may seek to license-in technology to assert a proprietary position. In 
this case, they may seek licences to patents they do not intend to ultimately exploit. 
Balancing the needs of downstream users who require access to technology against 
incentives to upstream users is a delicate exercise. The following chapter examines 
the interplay between intellectual property and competition law, and the role of 
competition law in promoting innovation. It then analyses the manner in which 
competition law should evaluate refusals to license intellectual property. 
134 Walsh, Cohen and Arora, above n13, 335. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Preceding chapters have established the structure of biomedical research and the 
medical biotechnology industry, discussing the extent of government support for the 
industry evident in Australia. Chapter 4, via the empirical work undertaken, 
considered whether there are problems being encountered within the industry in 
relation to refusals to license patents. It can now be said that although there is limited 
evidence of refusals to license patents, there is sufficient evidence of practices such as 
exclusive licensing and defensive patenting to permit a conclusion that the potential 
for refusals to license exists. Patent law is a dense, and sometimes difficult to navigate 
area of law. The patent system is unlikely to address the potential for restrictive 
licensing practices such as refusals to license. Consequently, there may be scope for 
these issues to be addressed through competition law. 
The complex interaction between intellectual property and competition law does, 
however, render this a difficult task. There is a need to preserve incentives to 
innovate, particularly in an industry such as medical biotechnology that is dependent 
on patent protection. The extent to which competition law should impinge on patent 
privileges raises seemingly intractable issues. It is an objective of this chapter to 
consider the role of each body of law in maximising incentives to innovate within the 
context of a cumulative, high technology industry such as medical biotechnology. 
This chapter attempts to provide a method of dealing with the particular issue of 
refusals to license, by applying reasoning from the broader context of the intellectual 
property/competition law interface. Although attempts to settle the conflict between 
intellectual property and competition law have been made, there is no universally 
agreed method of dealing with the interface. 
The chapter begins by discussing the regulation of competition in Australia, and how 
intellectual property transactions are dealt with under this legislative regime. Given 
the influence of competition regimes in other jurisdictions on the development of the 
Australian legislation and competition law jurisprudence, reference is made to the 
evolution of relevant competition law provisions in the United States and Europe. 
Following from this discussion, the chapter attempts to balance the theoretical 
underpinnings of these two areas of law and to reach some conclusion on whether 
there is an optimal manner in which competition law should be framed to deal with 
intellectual property transactions, specifically refusals to license patents. Finally, a 
framework for dealing with refusals to license patents is proposed to resolve this 
seeming impasse, although it will be concluded that the framework should be applied 
with a sufficient degree of flexibility to allow courts the freedom to impose 
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competition law restraints depending on the individual circumstances of a particular 
case. 
5.2 COMPETITION LAW TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN AUSTRALIA 
Competition law in Australia is regulated primarily by the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) (the TPA). This section briefly discusses provisions of the TPA relevant to the 
regulation of anti-competitive conduct contained in Part IV of that Act, before 
considering how intellectual property dealings are treated under the TPA. A limited 
exemption for some forms of dealings under intellectual property statutes is provided 
in s 51(3) of the TPA. This section analyses a number of reviews that have considered 
the desirability of maintaining this exemption, and considers whether refusals to 
license should receive special treatment under Part N. 
5.2.1 THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION IN AUSTRALIA THROUGH THE TRADE 
PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) 
Section 2 of the TPA states that 'The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of 
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for 
consumer protection.' 1 Clearly, it follows that one of the policy objectives behind the 
TPA is the enhancement of public welfare through the prohibition of anti-competitive 
conduct. Part IV of the TPA proscribes certain forms of conduct by companies based 
on an assessment of whether or not that conduct is anti-competitive and comprises the 
following provisions: 
• sections 45(2)(a)(ii) and 45(2)(b)00 2 which regulate collusive conduct 
between competitors (contracts, arrangements or understandings) that 
substantially lessens competition; 
• section 46 which prohibits a company with a substantial degree of market 
power from taking advantage of that market power by eliminating or 
substantially damaging a competitor, preventing the entry of potential 
competitors into a market, or deterring or preventing a party from engaging in 
competitive conduct; 
This provision was inserted into the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Oh) as a result of the Competition 
Policy Reform Act 1995 (Oh). 
2 These provisions will be referred to as 'section 45'. 
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• section 47 which regulates exclusive dealing; 3 where that exclusive dealing 
has the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition in a market; 4 
• section 48 which prohibits resale price maintenance, or the practice or 
specifying the minimum price at which goods must be resold; and 
• section 50, which prohibits mergers or acquisitions that would have the effect 
or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a substantial market 
for goods or services. 
Of these provisions, s 46 will be the only provision considered in detail in this thesis. 
A number of the Part IV provisions have the potential to interplay with intellectual 
property dealing where anti-competitive terms are imposed in licence agreements.' In 
that refusals to license intellectual property generally constitute unilateral conduct, 
this thesis will only consider the anti-competitive implications of refusals to license in 
the context of s 46. Refusals to license may have the potential to contravene s 45 
where exclusive licensing limits the use of particular intellectual property privileges 
by other parties. 6 However, s 46 will be the focus of analysis, and its elements will be 
considered in detail in Chapter 6. 
The following section considers s 51(3) of the TPA, which provides a limited 
exemption from a number of the Part IV provisions for certain conditions in licensing 
agreements. As will become apparent, s 51(3) does not exempt conduct that might 
breach s 46. Therefore, unilateral refusals to license patents will not fall within the 
exemption. Despite the fact that refusals to license are not exempted by s 51(3), the 
3 Exclusive dealing should not be confused with exclusive licensing. Exclusive dealing is the practice 
of supplying goods and services on certain conditions, for example, that goods will not be acquired 
from a competitor of the supplier. 
4 Note that the practice of third line forcing, which is the practice of supplying goods on the basis that 
goods be accepted from a third party, is illegal on a per se basis, although a proposed amendment to the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) will mean that third line forcing will be subject to a substantial 
lessening of competition test; see the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) (2005), Sch 
7, Pt 1. This amendment arose as a result of a recommendation of the Trade Practices Act Review 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Trade Practices Act Review (2003), 131. For general discussion 
on the recommendations of the Trade Practices Act Review Committee, see, for example, Lynden 
Griggs, 'Small Business and the Operation of the Trade Practices Act — Another Review, Another 
Election, and the Battle Lines Between Big and Small Business are Once Again Redrawn!' (2004) 11 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 348. 
5 See, for example, Trade Practices Commission, Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual 
Property, Background Paper (1991) (TPC Background Paper), 21-30. 
6 In any case, it may be that s 46 will catch exclusive licensing arrangements where they have the 
potential to be anti-competitive in that an exclusive licensing arrangement gives rise to combined 
market power. An amendment to s 46 has been proposed that will allow a court to take into account any 
market power a corporation possesses by virtue of contracts, arrangements or understandings with 
others; see further below, 6.3.5. 
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exemption will be considered in further detail for two reasons. First, consideration of 
exemption from Australian competition law for particular intellectual property 
transactions is an important factor in analysing the broader policy question of whether 
or not competition law should provide special treatment for intellectual property 
dealings.' Secondly, a recent review of the exemption recommended that s 51(3) be 
amended to encompass conditional refusals to license intellectual property, 8 and the 
implications of this recommendation are also relevant to the policy debate over 
intellectual property and competition law. 
5.2.2 THE APPLICATION OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT TO INTELLECIVAL 
PROPERTY9 
Having an intellectual property privilege will not necessarily protect the holder from 
the provisions dealing with anti-competitive conduct in Part IV of the TPA. It is 
specifically provided that the TPA applies generally to intellectual property 
transactions.° There is, however, a limited exemption to this blanket application of 
Part IV to intellectual property transactions contained in s 51(3) of the TPA!' 
5.2.2.1 SECTION 51(3) OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 
Section 51(3) relevantly provides that: 12 
(3) A contravention of a provision of this Part other than section 46, 46A or 48 shall 
not be taken to have been committed by reason of: 
7 For this reason, consideration will also be given to the general treatment of intellectual property 
dealings in other jurisdictions, notably the US and EU. 
8 See Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review of 
Intellectual Property Legislation Under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2002) 
(ITCRC Report). 
9 See generally Australian Law Reform Commission, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and 
Human Health, Report No 99, (2004), (ALRC Report), Geoff Adams and Dan McLennan, 'Intellectual 
Property Licensing and Part IV of the Trade Practices Act: Are the TPA 's Pro-Competitive Provisions 
Anti-IP Commercialisation?' (2002) 51 Intellectual Property Forum: Journal of the Intellectual 
Property Society of Australia and New Zealand 10, Richard Hoad, 'Compulsory Licensing of Patents: 
Balancing Innovation and Competition' (2003) 54 Intellectual Property Forum: Journal of the 
Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New Zealand 28; Charles Lawson, 'Patenting Genes and 
Gene Sequences and Competition: Patenting at the Expense of Competition' (2002) 30 Federal Law 
Review 97; Jason Fung, 'The Case of an Awkward Interface — Patents v Competition' (1998) 21(3) 
University of New Sounth Wales Law Journal 757; Warren Pengilley, 'Patents and Trade Practices — 
Competition Policies in Conflict?' (1977) 5 Australian Business Law Review 172. 
10 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 51(1)(i). 
The term 'exemption' will be used in the context of s 51(3), although the sub-section is cast in the 
form of an 'exception'. 
12 Section 51(3) also applies to registered designs, copyright and EL rights within the meaning of the 
Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Cth). 
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(a) 	The imposing of, or giving effect to, a condition of: 
(i) A licence granted by the proprietor, licensee or owner of a 
patent, ... or by a person who has applied for the registration of a 
patent ... ; or 
(ii) An assignment of a patent, ... or of a right to apply for a patent 
to the extent that the condition relates to: 
(iii) the invention to which the patent or application for a patent 
relates or articles made by the use of that invention; ... 
If a condition in a patent licence is not exempted by s 51(3), it does not necessarily 
follow that it is anti-competitive. It simply means that it will not automatically attract 
the exemption. Sections 46 and 48 are explicitly stated to fall outside the exemption. 
Unilateral refusals to license patents will be dealt with under s 46, thus refusals to 
license intellectual property will not fall within the exemption. It will become evident 
that misuse of market power (in its respective legislative embodiments)" is the main 
area in which recent overseas litigation focusing on the interaction between 
intellectual property and competition law has been concentrated. H 
Section 51(3) has rarely been relied on, and there has been debate over its relevance 
and how much certainty it provides to owners of intellectual property in conducting 
transactions for the exchange of rp rights. 15 It is not clear what conduct is exempted 
by s 51(3) in that the term 'relates to' is ambiguous. 16 In the only decision that dealt 
with how s 51(3) should be interpreted, Mason J stated that the exemption in s 51(3) 
will not apply where a condition in a licence seeks to obtain an advantage collateral to 
13 Two relevant international counterparts of s 46, these being section 2(a) of the Sherman Act 1890 and 
Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/65, will be discussed 
below 5.4. Relevant case law in relation to these provisions and refusals to license intellectual property 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
14  See Carolyn Oddie and Patrick Eyers, 'Erosion of Rights — or Redressing the Balance: Competition 
Challenges to Intellectual Property Rights' (2004) 12 Trade Practices Law Journal 6, 14. 
15 The provision has been subjected to a number of reviews. These reviews will be discussed in more 
detail below, 5.2.2.2, but see especially IPCRC Report, above n8, 202-216; National Competition 
Council, Parliament of Australia, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: 
Final Report (1999) (NCC Report) 149-246. 
16 See TPC Background Paper, above n5, 12-13. 
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the subject matter of the invention or in other words, to extend the scope of the 
intellectual property!' 
This decision has been used to support differing interpretations of s 51(3). 18 A broad 
interpretation of 'relates to' would exempt almost any condition. ° A narrow 
interpretation would require the condition to relate directly to the intellectual property 
in which case a vast majority of terms would fail to be exempted. 2° An intermediate 
view may see s 51(3) exempting conditions that increase the market power held by a 
holder of intellectual property beyond that granted!' In any case, s 51(3) provides 
little guidance as to the basis on which particular conditions are likely to fall within 
the exemption. 
The original objectives of s 51(3) are unclear, and it was concluded by the National 
Competition Council (NCC) in their inquiry into the exemption that s 51(3) was 
probably enacted to prevent a perceived clash between intellectual property law and 
competition law. 22 The NCC also considered that the section may assist in identifying 
whether licensing conditions that are likely to have the effect of subdividing 
intellectual property are anti-competitive, and may provide intellectual property 
owners with greater certainty in which to undertake licensing or assignment of 
intellectual property. 23 In the NCC's view, this greater certainty can help reduce the 
costs associated with compliance with competition laws and encourage more licensing 
activity. 24 
5.2.2.2 SECTION 5/ (3) REVIEWED 
In 1993, a report released by the Hilmer Committee of Inquiry (the Hilmer 
Committee) set out a number of recommendations aimed at facilitating an effective, 
uniform national competition policy. 25 In 1995, a National Competition Policy was 
implemented via the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA), which requires the 
17 Transfield v Arlo (1980) 30 ALR 201. The implications of this decision are discussed ibid, 12-13. 
18 See the discussion in IPCRC Report, above n8, 207. 
19 Ibid. 
2° Ibid. 
21 Ibid. This interpretation was also adopted by the TPC; see TPC Background Paper, above n5, 13. 
22 NCC Report, above n15, 160-164, 166. The NCC considered that this objective was no longer 
relevant because they concluded that there was no clash between these two bodies of law. 
23 NCC Report, above n15, especially 165-167. 
24 
 ibid. 
25 Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, Parliament of Australia, 
National Competition Policy (1993), xxi-xxxix (Hilmer Committee Report). 
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Commonwealth, States and Territories of Australia to implement competition policy 
taking into account matters such as the promotion of efficiency, competitiveness of 
Australian businesses and benefit to consumers. 26 An important component of the 
CPA was that governments in Australia review the anticompetitive effects of existing 
legislation, subject to the principle that: 
(a) the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; 
and 
(b) the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition. 27 
The Hilmer Committee identified s 51(3) as a provision that required independent 
review, stating that it saw force in arguments for reform of the exemption, and for 
matters that fell within its purview to be dealt with under the TPA's authorisation 
procedure. 28 This culminated in the recent reviews 29 of section 51(3) by the NCC in 
1999,30 and the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (IPCRC) in 
2002. 31 The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) also considered the 
application of s 51(3) to genetic technologies as part of its recent inquiry. 32 
26 Competition Principles Agreement, cl 1(3). The Competition Principles Agreement is contained in 
National Competition Council, Parliament of Australia, Compendium of National Competition Policy 
Agreements (1997), a series of agreements that combined, form the National Competition Policy. For 
more detailed discussion see Charles Lawson, 'Patent Privileges and the National Competition Council 
Policy — Patent Scope and Allocation?' (2005) 33 Australian Business Law Review 7. 
27 Competition Principles Agreement, above n26, cl 5(1). The Competition Principles Agreement also 
provided in cl 5(5) that proposals for new legislation be subject to the same principle. 
2s Hamer Committee Report, above n25, 150-151. Section 88 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Oh) 
provides that authorisation and notification may be granted by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) for conduct that would otherwise substantially lessen competition. 
The authorisation provisions do not apply to s 46, but authorisation given for conduct that would 
contravene s 46 in addition to a provision to which the authorisation provisions relate, will render that 
conduct lawful under s 46. For further discussion, see Stephen G Corones, Competition Law in 
Australia (3 rd ed, 2004), [3.70], [8.205]. A number of amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Oh) which would expedite the authorisation process were proposed by the Trade Practices Act 
Review Committee, and those amendments have been incorporated into the Trade Practices Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No 1) (2005). See Trade Practices Act Review Committee, above n4, 112-114; Trade 
Practices Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) (2005), above n4. 
29 For criticism of the manner in which reviews relating to patent privileges have been conducted under 
the Competition Principles Agreement, see Lawson, above n26. 
3o See NCC Report, above n15. 
31 See IPCRC Report, above n8. 
32 ALRC Report, above n9. Note also that the Trade Practices Act Review Committee also made 
mention of the exemption, but declined to make a detailed assessment of the provision on the grounds 
that the matter fell outside its terms of reference, and that a current Federal Court case was considering 
the matter; Trade Practices Act Review Committee, above n4, 86. 
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(i) 	The National Competition Council Report 
The NCC interpreted its task under its Terms of Reference to be ... whether, and if 
so, how, Part IV of the TPA should regulate licensing and assignment of intellectual 
property rights.' 33 The NCC expressed the view that intellectual property privileges 
and general property rights share similar attributes, 34 so that intellectual property 
rights are 'neither particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor 
particularly suspect under them'. 35 It considered that there was no inherent conflict , 
between intellectual property and competition laws. 36 
The NCC engaged in a process of weighing the costs and benefits of the exemption," 
and focused on the certainty that s 51(3) provides to parties engaged in licensing as 
the main justification for ultimately recommending the retention of s 51(3). 38 
However, the NCC recommended amendment to s 51(3) on the basis that the 
exemption as currently drafted did exempt some anti-competitive conduct. 
Consequently they recommended that the exemption be retained, but that s 51(3) be 
amended to remove horizontal dealings and price and quantity restrictions from its 
scope. 39 The recommendations resulting from the review remain under consideration 
by the Govemment,40 and the recommendations made by the NCC were required to be 
considered by the IPCRC in its subsequent review of s 51(3). 41 
33 NCC Report, above n15, 3. For criticism of the manner in which the NCC interpreted its Terms of 
Reference (and arguably limited the scope of its review), see Lawson, above n26, 12. 
34 NCC Report, above n15, 149. 
35 Ibid, 160. 
36  Ibid, 163. The NCC also recognised that there was no exemption such as that contained in s 51(3) in 
the legislation of overseas jurisdictions; ibid, 186-192. 
37 Ibid, 193-209, 221-231. 
38 Ibid, 220. Note that in its interim report, the NCC had recommended abolishing the provision entirely 
on a number of grounds, including uncertainty over the operation of the exemption, the lack of an 
exemption in other jurisdictions and the minor effect that repealing the exemption would be likely to 
have on investment in innovation; see National Competition Council, Parliament of Australia, Review 
of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Draft Report, (1998), 6, 96, 196-200. For 
further discussion, see Lawson, above n26, 13-14. 
39 NCC Report, above n15, 241-245. The NCC also recommended that the exemption be extended to 
include rights conferred under the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), and that the ACCC issue 
guidelines on the operation of s 51(3); see NC -C Report, above n15, 221-223. 
National Competition Council, National Competition Council Legislation Review Compendium (4 th 
ed, 2002), 31. 
41 The IPCRC was only required by its Terms of Reference to have regard to the conclusions and 
recommendations contained in the NCC Report; see IPCRC Report, above n8, 217. 
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(ii) 	The Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee Report 
The IPCRC stated that caution should be exercised in any change to the law that 
impacts on the ability of intellectual property holders to contract effectively, even 
where others are excluded from utilising the rights, because the ability to contract for 
the exchange of intellectual property assists in the efficient dispersion of intellectual 
property.42 It considered that repeal of the section would create uncertainty with 
possible negative impacts on licensing activity, and that in the event of repeal Part IV 
provisions may catch currently exempted and socially beneficial licence conditione 
Despite this, the IPCRC considered that it is important to ensure that holders of 
intellectual property do not go beyond the scope of market power conferred by that 
intellectual property." The IPCRC considered this concern to be particularly 
important in a jurisdiction such as Australia where intellectual property protection is 
relatively strong!' The Committee's view was that s 51(3) did not achieve an 
adequate balance. 
The IPCRC therefore recommended a number of changes to s 51(3) to improve its 
efficacy. They recommended repealing and replacing s 51(3) with an amended 
version of the sub-section with the main amendments being that: 46 
the new s 51(3) would apply to all of the Part IV provisions including s 46; 
• the 'imposing of conditions in a licence, or the inclusion of conditions in a 
contract, arrangement or understanding, should also clearly mean the refusal 
by the owner of an [intellectual property] right to enter into a licence, contract, 
arrangement or understanding.'; 47 
42 Ibid, 210-11. 
43 Ibid, 210-211. 
44 Ibid, 211. 
45 Mid, 211. 
46 Ibid, 213. The IPCRC recommended that s 51(3) be replaced with an amended sub-section that 
would ensure that: 
a contravention of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act, or of s 4D of that Act, shall not be taken to 
have been committed by reason of the imposing of conditions in a licence, or the inclusion of 
conditions in a contract, arrangement or understanding, that relate to the subject matter of that 
intellectual property statute, so long as those conditions do not result, or are not likely to result, in 
a substantial lessening of competition. 
Ibid, 215. The IPCRC also recommended the expansion of s 51(3) to apply to all intellectual property 
statutes; at 215. 
47 The purpose of this recommendation was to protect a licensor in the absence of a completed contract; 
ibid, 213. 
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• dealings falling within the exemption in s 51(3) would be subject to an effects-
based, or substantial lessening of competition test."8 
In addition, the IPCRC recommended that the body charged with monitoring anti-
competitive conduct, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC), issue guidelines to clarify when s 51(3) is likely to apply to particular terms 
and conditions. 
(iii) The Implications of the Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Committee Recommendations 
The lPCRC's approach generally represented an adoption of the 'scope of the grant' 
approach,49 which may in itself present difficulties in interpretation. 50 There is no 
doubt that difficulties inherent in s 51(3) would remain despite the IPCRC's proposed 
amendments. It is not clear how the test proposed by the lPCRC distinguishes 
between market power stemming directly from intellectual property, and market 
power that is beyond the scope of the right. 51 Moreover, while the 'substantial 
lessening of competition' test would conceivably be workable once augmented by 
guidelines, 52 the much-criticised 'relates-to' test would be retained along with 
uncertainty as to its interpretation. 53 It is submitted that the meaning of this phrase 
may, to some degree, be clarified as a result of the amendments to s 51(3). The phrase 
is likely to be given a wider interpretation given that terms that relate directly to the 
intellectual property statute would never involve a substantial lessening of 
competition. This tends to support the argument that a broader interpretation of 
'relates to' would be adopted. 
Equally, a broad interpretation would tend to exempt a large number of conditions 
from the operation of relevant Part IV provisions. This implication of adopting a very 
48 This requirement has been referred to as a 'substantial lessening of competition override'; Ian Eagles 
and Louise Longdin, 'Competition in Information and Computer Technology Markets: Intellectual 
Property Licensing and Section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974' (2003) 3 Queensland University 
Journal of Technology Law and Justice Journal 28, 33. 
49 This approach derives from the US 'inherency doctrine', and essentially it stipulates that intellectual 
property should be subject to competition law when its use goes beyond the scope of the right. See 
generally ibid, 32-36; Michael A Carrier, 'Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox' (2002) 150 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 761, 788-791. 
50 See Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 32-36. See also NCC Report, above n15, 190; Carrier, above 
n49, 788-791. 
51 See Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 34. 
52 Although Adams and McLennan argue that conditions in intellectual property licences are unlikely, 
for the most part, to substantially lessen competition; Adams and McLennan, above n9, 19-20. 
53 See Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 33-34. 
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wide view of s 51(3) may lead the judiciary to adopt a more cautious approach in 
interpreting s 51(3). In addition, an amended s 51(3) would still fail to provide any 
definitive guidance as to which particular conditions would be exempted by s 51(3), 
although guidelines would presumably offer some clarification depending on the form 
those guidelines took. 
In considering the exemption contained in s 51(3), the IPCRC pointed out that it were 
constrained by the current Part IV provisions, and that comment on these provisions 
was outside the scope of its reference. 54 Nonetheless, the Committee would appear to 
have had some difficulty with the structure of Part IV and the adverse effects that 
were likely to be experienced by intellectual property holders on the basis of this 
structure. They indicated that their recommendations were necessarily restricted by 
the content of Part IV, which they claimed was enacted during an era of greater 
economic regulation. 55 Had it not been so constrained, (or had the Part IV provisions 
been differently constituted) it is possible the IPCRC would have made a very 
different set of recommendations. Indeed, it has been speculated that the retention of a 
statutorily based exemption may have been unnecessary had the Committee been 
content with the make-up of Part IV. 56 
There is undoubtedly a challenge in achieving a balance between allowing the 
exercise of intellectual property and ensuring that holders of intellectual property are 
not able to use those rights anti-competitively. 57 The need to maximise business 
certainty identified by the IPCRC must be offset against competing concerns, such as 
the effects of licensing on dynamic efficiencies associated with licensing intellectual 
property.58 The recommendations of the IPCRC were an attempt to address these 
concerns in light of the constraints identified by the Committee. 59 
54 IPCRC, above n8, 210. For criticism of this interpretation by the IPCRC of their Terms of Reference, 
see Lawson, above n26, 17-19. 
55 IPCRC, above n8 210. See also Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 29, 46. For criticism see Lawson, 
above n26, 18-19. 
56 Eagles and Longdin, above n48 34-36. The exemption means that intellectual property rights in 
Australia are treated differently to other forms of property rights, a principle which is at odds with the 
position in other jurisdictions. Because the constitution of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Oh) and the tests contained within many of the Part IV provisions are problematic, (and this is attested 
to by the degree of review undertaken in respect of Part IV since the enactment of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Oh)), the Committee may have felt compelled to retain some degree of protection for 
intellectual property rights over and above that assigned to other property rights; at 34-36. 
57 IPCRC, above n8, 212. 
58 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1989) Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Rights, 15. 
59 Cf Lawson, above n26 18-19. 
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Nevertheless, the IPCRC's recommendation that conditional refusals to license be 
exempted by the s 51(3) exemption, may lead to unilateral refusals to license being 
structured so that they are covered by the exemption. In this sense, this 
recommendation amounts to a broadening of the exemption in relation to refusals to 
license. 
(iv) The Government Response to the Intellectual Property and Competition 
Review Committee Report 
As stated above, the Government is still considering its response to the NCC Report. 
It has, however, responded to the IPCRC Report and partly accepted the 
recommendations of the lPCRC. The Government Response indicates that the 
operation of s 51(3) will be expanded so that s 51(3) applies to all intellectual property 
statutes, but the remaining recommendations were accepted in limited form. 6° 
Specifically, it declined to expand the operation of s 51(3) to apply to all of the Part 
IV provisions, with the result that the exemption still will not apply to s 46. The 
Government did accept that the sub-section would apply to the per se provisions in 
Part IV, subject to a substantial lessening of competition test, 61 and that guidelines 
would be issued by the ACCC to assist in the operation of s 51(3). The Government 
indicated that these guidelines should: 62 
• outline when intellectual property licensing and assignment conditions might 
be exempted under s 51(3); 
• outline when intellectual property licensing and assignment conditions might 
breach Part IV of the TPA through application of a substantial lessening of 
competition test; and 
• indicate when conduct that is likely to breach Part IV of the TPA might be 
authorised. 
As Eagles and Longdin point out, the government have, in laying down these 
stipulations, presented the ACCC with three quite distinct tasks. 63 In formulating 
guidelines that fulfil these tasks, the ACCC has a number of methodologies at its 
disposal. Regardless of which methodology is employed, the ACCC will face a 
60 Commonwealth of Australia, Government Response to Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Recommendations, Information Package (Government Response) 
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/general/responsel.PDF > at 31 May 2004. 
61 Including the per se prohibitions contained in ss 45, 45A, 47 and 4D. 
62 Government Response, above n60. 
63 Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 37. 
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number of issues in formulating a coherent policy for intellectual property dealings, 
and addressing each of the tasks assigned to it by the Goverrunent m 
The Government's response has been criticised due to the fact that it watered down 
the recommendations of the IPCRC. 65 The operation of s 51(3) is unlikely to alter 
dramatically, 66 although it will be less effective than the exemption proposed by the 
IPCRC. 67 The 'relates to' test will be retained, and it is this test that is arguably the 
most problematic element of s 51(3). In addition, the continued exclusion of certain 
provisions, including s 46, from the operation of s 51(3) appears to be arbitrary. 
The Recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
Section 51(3) 
Despite receiving a number of submissions questioning the utility of these modified 
amendments, the ALRC declined to recommend specific amendment to s 51(3) in 
their report Genes and Ingenuity, but did support amendment in line with the 
Government response to the IPCRC Report.68 The ALRC was limited in respect of 
recommendations it could make, because its Terms of Reference were limited to 
issues associated with gene patenting. 69 Licensing is an important component of the 
medical biotechnology industry, and licensing arrangements involving gene patents 
are common. It is probably fair to say that little consideration is currently given to any 
protection provided under s 51(3) to parties to licensing arrangements. While an 
amended exemption in line with this recommendation is unlikely to provide any more 
certainty to patent holders than the section as currently drafted provides, the ALRC 
also made a further recommendation in relation to the issue of Guidelines which may 
provide significantly more clarity. 
64 These issues are discussed at length by Eagles and Longdin, ibid, 37-40. 
65 See ibid, 36-37. 
66 It has been suggested that the IPCRC has 'perhaps come closest ... ' to achieving a 'clear dividing 
line between proper and acceptable exercise of intellectual property rights on the on the hand, and 
improper and unacceptable exercise of intellectual property rights on the other ... ' Nevertheless, it may 
be that the exemption in s 51(3) has been retained because it has been 'seems to have been ineffectual 
and to have done no harm.'; Justice Kevin Lindgren, 'The Interface Between Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: Some Current Issues in Australia' (2005) 16 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 76, 93. 
67 Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 36-37. The ACCC has indicated its view that the proposed 
amendments will significantly broaden the applicability of Part IV to licensing terms and conditions; 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission to Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Intellectual Property Rights over Genetic Materials and Genetic and Related 
Technologies — Gene Patenting and Human Health Issues Paper (2003) 6, 8-9. 
68 ALRC Report, above n9, 576. 
Ibid, 7-8. 
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Recommendation 24-2 recommended that the ACCC issue guidelines to clarify the 
relationship between intellectual property and Part IV, addressing in particular: 
(a) when the licensing or assignment of intellectual property might be exempted 
under s 51(3) or might breach Part IV; and 
(b) when conduct that would otherwise breach Part IV might be authorised under 
Part VII of the Trade Practices Act.7° 
The ACCC had indicated to the ALRC in a submission responding to the that it 
intended issuing and implementing such guidelines subsequent to the amendment of s 
51(3). 71 While these recommendations were generally in line with the IPCRC's 
recommendations, the ALRC went further and recommended that 
The guidelines should extend to the exploitation of intellectual property rights in 
genetic materials and technologies, including patent pools and cross-licensing. 72 
At present, holders of patents in the area of genetic technologies have limited 
guidance available as to when conduct in which they engage is potentially anti-
competitive. Guidelines will therefore assist in elucidating when s 51(3) is likely to 
provide an exemption for patent holders from the reach of Part IV. They will 
hopefully also provide some guidance in relation to other issues identified by the 
ALRC, including the issue of refusals to license patents. 
At the date of writing, legislation to amend s 51(3) had not been introduced into 
Parliament, and the provision remains in its current form. The Government has 
foreshadowed amendments in line with its response to the TPCRC Report upon the 
availability of an appropriate legislative vehicle. 73 
Ibid, 576. 
71 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission to Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Intellectual Property Rights over Genetic Materials and Genetic and Related 
Technologies — Gene Patenting and Human Health: Discussion Paper DP 68, (2004), 3. 
72 ALRC Report, above n9 576. 
73 See Department of Treasury and Finance, Parliament of Australia, Commonwealth Regulatory Plan 
(2005) <http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/936/RTF/Toc107982889 > at 16 August 2005, 9. 
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The Australian Law Reform Commission's Recommendations on the Role of the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
The ALRC also highlighted its concern with the role of the ACCC in monitoring and 
enforcement. Despite acknowledging the difficulty of being cognisant of specific 
patent transactions,74 the ALRC, in Recommendation 24-3, recommended that: 
As the need arises, the ACCC should review the conduct of firms dealing with 
genetic materials and technologies protected by intellectual property rights, to 
determine whether their conduct is anti-competitive ... 75 
Recommendation 24-4 recommended that government health departments and other 
stakeholders avail themselves of complaint procedures available under the TPA to 
alert the ACCC to conduct that may breach Part IV and 'have an adverse impact on 
medical research or the cost-effective provision of healthcare'. 76 
The ALRC accepted the ACCC's submission that it is a complaints-driven regulator!' 
In the absence of specific complaints, it is difficult to see how this role envisaged for 
the ACCC will have practical utility. The commercial nature of most transactions 
involving patents makes regulation difficult. Nevertheless, advocating an 'oversight' 
role for the ACCC in intellectual property dealings may go some way toward 
eliminating potentially anti-competitive conduct. As the ACCC itself pointed out in its 
submission, whether or not this area becomes an enforcement priority depends on 
whether it perceives there to be public interest in increased investigation!' 
5.2.2.3 REFUSALS To LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Where a refusal to license is predicated on conditions that may be considered to be 
unreasonable, s 51(3) may operate. Of course, this all depends on how an amended s 
51(3) is interpreted, and the form taken by ACCC guidelines. Unilateral refusals to 
license patents will fall outside the ambit of s 51(3). They will continue to be subject 
to the tests contained within the misuse of market power provision, s 46, and the 
application of this provision to refusals to license patents will be considered in detail 
in subsequent chapters.79 
74 Ibid, 576-579. 
75 Ibid, 580. 
76 Thud, 580. 
77 Ibid, 578-579 (para 24.98). 
78 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n71, 4. 
79 See below, particularly Chapters 6 and 8. 
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5.3 THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) 8° was 
discussed in Chapter 2 in respect of requirements for intellectual property protection." 
Despite making extensive provision for uniformity in respect of intellectual property 
protection by WTO Members, TRIPS contains few provisions dealing with the 
interaction between intellectual property law and competition law. Article 8(2) 
contains the principle that member states may take appropriate measures, where 
needed, 'to *prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology'. Article 8(2) does not operate to impose an 
obligation on member states to counter the abuse of intellectual property, and provides 
no substantive legal clarity as to its application. 82 
In relation to contractual licences, article 40(1) provides: 
Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual 
property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may 
impede the transfer and dissemination of technology. 
Article 40(2) allows member states to make provision in national legislation 
specifying 'licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an 
abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the 
relevant market. ... ' Article 40(2) also allows member states to 'adopt appropriate 
measures to prevent or control such practices ... 
Article 40 contains scant guidance as to the identification or treatment of anti- 
competitive abuses of intellectual property through licensing practices or conditions." 
80 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994). 
81 See above, 2.2.3. 
82 See Andreas Heinemenn, `Antitust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPs Agreement of the 
World Trade Organization' in Friedrick-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker (eds) From GA T7' to TRIPs 
— The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1996) 239, 241-243. 
83 See Wolfgang Fikentscher, 'Historical Origins and Opportunities for Development of an 
International Competition Law in the TRIPs Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
Beyond' in Friedrick-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker (eds) From GAIT to TRIPs — The Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1996) 226, 234-238; ibid. 239. Article 40(2) 
does contain a limited number of examples of categories of licensing practices and conditions that may 
be anti-competitive, although it is clear that these examples are not exclusive. 
211 
Chapter 5 
Again, the adoption of measures provided for in Article 40 is optional!' Article 40 
does not apply to unilateral conduct that might constitute a misuse of market power, 
given that it occurs 'outside a licensing context ...'. 85 As a result, member states are 
afforded virtually unfettered discretion in regulating the intellectual 
property/competition law interface, which has resulted in a divergence of approaches 
to this important enforcement issue. 86 Issues relating to misuse of market power, in 
particular, are given very little consideration in TRIPS. 
As discussed above, Article 31 of TRIPs contains provisions allowing member states 
to provide for the issue of compulsory licences in appropriate circumstances, although 
the list of circumstances provided in TRIPs is not exhaustive. One of the grounds 
specified is anti-competitive practices, although again, no further guidance is given as 
to what may constitute an anti-competitive practice.87 Article 31 contains requirements 
that must be adhered to before a compulsory licence will be granted to an applicant. In 
summary, an applicant must have: 
• made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder to use the right on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions; 88 
84 Heinemenn, above n82, 245. 
85 See Pedro Roffe, 'Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licences Under the TRIPs 
Agreement' in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf (eds), Intellectual Property and International 
Trade: The TRIPs Agreement (1998) 261, 283. 
86 On the role of TRIPS in specifying international standards in respect of the intellectual 
property/competition law interface, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark A Lemley and Mark D 
Janis, IF and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2002), 
(Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis) vol II, ch 40. There have been a number of attempts by the United 
Nations, the OECD and the WTO to develop international standards in respect of this issue. A group of 
scholars also released a Draft International Antitrust Code (the Munich Code) contained as a 
supplement to 64 Antitrust & Trade Register (BNA) (1993). While this thesis will not undertake 
disussion of the development of international standards, Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis identify the 
importance of this issue, and comment on these attempts; at ch 40, Lemley and Janis acknowledge the 
difficulties that have been experienced in dealing with these issues on an international basis, and 
conclude that li]n view of the largely discouraging history of international antitrust legislation, it may 
be more realistic to look to the development of a body of national common law on intellectual 
property/antitrust that is gradually prodded towards harmonization by WTO-level decisions on 
competition aspects of the TRIPS agreement.'; at vol II, [40.40]. See also Eleanor M Fox, 'Toward 
World Antitrust and Market Access' (1997) 91 American University Journal of International Law and 
Policy 1; Eleanor M Fox, 'Trade, Competition and Intellectual Property — TRIPS and its International 
Counterparts' (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 481; Jerome H Reichman, 
'Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the 
WTO Agreement' (1995) 29 International Lawyer 345; Susan K Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South 
Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (1998). 
87 Heinemenn, above n82, 239, 244. 
a Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994) art 31(b). 
212 
Chapter 5 
• those efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time; 89 and 
• any use applied for must be authorised predominantly for the supply of the 
• domestic market in which the use has been authorised. 9° 
These conditions may be disregarded where a court or tribunal has made a 
determination that a practice or condition is anti-competitive. This indicates the 
importance of the protection of competition. 91 
Therefore, although TRIPS contains strict requirements for the provision of 
intellectual property protection, considerable discretion is left to Member States in 
regulating intellectual property through compulsory licensing, and particularly 
through competition law. The next section considers competition law treatment of 
intellectual property transactions in the US and EU. 
5.4 COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 
Whereas the TPA contains a statutory exemption from the operation of some 
competition law provisions for dealings in intellectual property, the US and European 
competition law regimes adopt quite different methods of indicating whether 
particular intellectual property dealings should be subject to the operation of their 
respective competition laws. The following sections will discuss basic principles of 
United States (US) and European Union (EU) competition law as applied to 
intellectual property transactions. They contain an examination of provisions relevant 
to refusals to license intellectual property, 92 in addition to more general discussion of 
the intellectual property/competition law interface in each of these jurisdictions. The 
purpose of this discussion is to allow some comparison of the manner in which the 
interface is regulated in each jurisdiction, as a conduit to examining how the issue of 
refusals to license should be treated in the Australian context. 93 
89 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994) art 31(b). 
9° Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [1995] ATS 12 (entered into force 15 April 
1994) art 31(f). 
91 Heinemann, above n82, 244. 
92 Although there are important differences between these terms and s 46, these provisions collectively 
will be referred to as 'misuse of market power provisions'. See further below, 7.1. 
93 As such, the following sections do not contain comprehensive treatment of relevant provisions of US 
and EU law. 
213 
Chapter 5 
5.4.1 THE UNITED STATES 
Several statutes regulate US antitrust 1aw,94 which is enforced by the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). Most relevant for the purposes of this thesis is the Sherman Act 1890 (the 
Sherman Act)," which prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint 
of trade." Section 2 of the Sherman Act is the US counterpart of s 46 and provides 
that: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony ... 
5.4.1.1 THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
The first element that must be proved in establishing a contravention of section 2 is 
that the defendant possesses monopoly power. 97 A rule of reason analysis is 
employed." In addressing the issue of monopoly power, markets are defined in terms 
of their product and geographic dimensions." Once monopoly power has been 
established, it must also be proved that the monopolist has engaged in an 
'exclusionary practice', examples of which have developed as a result of the case 
law.m In the case of leveraging monopoly power from one market to another, it has 
94 A discussion of these statutes is contained in Alan Gutterman, Innovation and Competition Policy 
(1997) 71-74. The most relevant for the purposes of this thesis is the Sherman Act 15 USC (1890). 
95 Sherman Act 15 USC (1890). 
96 Sherman Act 15 USC §§ 1-2 (1890). 
97 The amount of market power required to constitute monopoly power will vary, but will generally be 
measured using three methods: market share, profit margins and constraints on pricing. The choice of 
method will depend on the facts of a particular case. Various cases have provided guidelines on the 
degree of power required to establish monopoly power. See, for example, Keith N Hylton, Antitrust 
Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (2003) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
230-243. See also generally Phillip E Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and their Application (2" ed, 2002) (Areeda and Hovenkamp) chs 5 and 6. 
98 A rule of reason analysis allows a factual analysis in a particular case, and considers whether any 
justification for a restraint or anti-competitive practice exists; see National Society of Professional 
Engineers v US 435 US 679 (1978) 692. 
99 See the discussion in Areeda and Hovenkamp, above n97, vol 2A, [530-565]. 
too See ibid vol 3, [600-617]. 
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been argued that modern case law imports a requirement that there be a specific intent 
to monopolise. 10' 
It is well established that dealings in intellectual property are subject to the provisions 
of the antitrust statutes, including the provisions of the Sherman Act. ma The 
achievement of monopoly power solely as a result of an advantage such as a legal 
licence will usually provide a defence to the attainment of monopoly power, but not to 
unlawful exclusionary practices engaged in by the monopolise ° 
Although this provision is the US equivalent of s 46 of the TPA, clearly, there are 
some important differences between the two provisions. Most notably, s 2 requires 
monopolisation, whereas s 46 requires only that a corporation possess a substantial 
degree of market power. K4 
5.4.1.2 THE US GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
US regulators and courts have a long history of regulating the interface between 
intellectual property and competition law. l° Over the course of this regulation, the 
two bodies of law have 'traded ascendancy', w6 with intellectual property being 
subjected to tight scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies during the 1930s and 
1940s, and again during the 1970s. m Since the early 1980s, US antitrust regulators 
101 Hylton, above n97, especially 202-206 discussing relevant case law. Significant discussion could be 
devoted to the history of section 2 and its elements. Note that while it is not intended to discuss the 
elements of section 2 or this case law in detail, US cases dealing with refusals to license and 
consequent leveraging issues will be discussed below in Chapter 7. 
102 Early Supreme Court decisions include United States v Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co 226 
US 20 (1912) and Motion Pictures Patents Co v Universal Film Manufacturing Co 243 US 502 (1917). 
Note that these cases marked the advent of two legal constructs in relation to the intellectual 
property/antitrust interface. The first was a view that an intellectual property right confers a monopoly 
on the holder of that right, and the second was that intellectual property and antitrust occupied two 
separate spheres of law; see Willard K Tom and Joshua A Newberg, 'Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field' (1997) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 167, especially 
170-173. 
103 Areeda and Hovenkamp, above n97, vol 3, [617]. 
104 Although it might be argued that s 46 has been interpreted to require a degree of market power akin 
to monopoly power; see below, 6.3.5. 
105 See Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.14]. 
106 Ibid, [1-15]; Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) (Federal Trade Commission Report), Chapter 1, 14-15. 
107 FTC Report, above n106 Chapter 1, 15-18; Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.15 —
1.17]. 
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have adopted a more permissive approach toward patent law in line with the view that 
intellectual property and antitrust share a common goal." 
This changing view has been shaped by a number of factors,'® including the creation 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit im stronger standards of patentability, 111 
and changing views toward the validity and importance of intellectual property 
(particularly patent) protection. 112 Developments in economic thinking also influenced 
antitrust theory. rn The precedence of one particular body of law over the other has 
been shaped largely by political and economic factors. 114 
In the US, the treatment of terms and conditions in intellectual property licensing 
agreements is dealt with by Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
Rights (`The US Licensing Guidelines'), jointly produced in 1995 by the US 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (`The Agencies')."5 
108 See, eg, Tom and Newburg; above n102; James B Kobak Jr, 'Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic' (1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journal 341, 
345-346. On political influences on intellectual property policy, see, for example, Susan K Sell, Private 
Power, Public Law: The Globalisation of Intellectual Property Rights (2003); Peter Drahos, `BITs and 
BIPs — Bilateralism in Intellectual Property' (2001) 4 Journal of World Intellectual Property 791; Peter 
Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism (2002) especially ch 1. 
109 See, eg, Robert M Merges and John F Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials (3" ed, 
2002) 11; Kobak, above n108, 347-350. 
110 One result of the establishment of the CAFC has been an increase in findings of patent validity; see, 
for example, John R Allison and Mark A Lemley, 'Empirical Evidence on the Validity of litigated 
Patents' (1998) 26 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 185. 
See generally above, 2.4. 
112 Note that the development of the doctrine of patent misuse has occurred in tandem with these 
developments. It is not proposed that this doctrine be considered, although there is considerable overlap 
between this doctrine and certain antitrust principles. For further discussion on the role of this doctrine, 
see, eg, Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.3c]. 
113 Federal Trade Commission Report, above n106, Chapter 1, 22-23. More specifically, Chicago 
School thinking came to the fore during the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted in more lenient treatment 
of intellectual property, and a more laissez-faire view of regulation generally; Federal Trade 
Commission Report, above n106, Chapter 1, 22-23. 
114 Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.15-1.17]. 
115 US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property, (1995) (US licensing Guidelines) 
<http://www.usdoj.goviatripubliciguidelines/ipguide.htm > at 27 October 2003. 
The Guidelines state the regulatory policy of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, as is indicated by the following statement (see Guideline 1.0): 
These Guidelines state the antitrust enforcement policy of the US Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission (individually, "the Agency," and collectively, "the Agencies") with 
respect to the licensing of intellectual property protected by patent, copyright, and trade secret 
law, and of know-how. By stating their general policy, the Agencies hope to assist those who 
need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a practice as anticompetitive. However, 
these Guidelines cannot remove judgment and discretion in antitrust law enforcement. 
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Heightened interest by the antitrust authorities in relation to the intellectual 
property/antitrust intersection has led some to suggest that antitrust may experience a 
period of revival in relation to its regulation of intellectual property transactions. n6 
Concern about the vigour with which intellectual property is presently able to be 
asserted is typified by the following statement by former Federal Trade Commission 
Chairman, Robert Pitofsky: 
Traditionally, 'cases at the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust 
laws have been analyzed by examining the impact on economic incentives and 
balancing them against anticompetitive effects. ... An approach that starts from the 
point of view that a patent holder does not have to sell or license to anyone, and 
proceeds from that unchallenged assumption to the rule that it therefore can condition 
its sales or licenses in any way it sees fit ... would be an unwise and unfortunate 
departure from the traditional approach in this area. I question whether there is a 
reason to believe any such interpretation is necessary to encourage the innovation 
process.m 
The Guidelines are outcome directed in that they consider the impact of particular 
restrictions on economic efficiency and competition. n8 The Guidelines are based on 
three premises: 
• for the purpose of antitrust, intellectual property is comparable to any other 
form of property; 
• intellectual property is not presumed to create market power; and 
• intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors 
of production and is generally pro-competitive. n9 
In relation to the first premise, the Agencies apply antirust to intellectual property in 
the same way it applies to other forms of property, taking into account the particular 
Moreover, the standards set forth in these Guidelines must be applied in unforeseeable 
circumstances. Each case will be evaluated in light of its own facts, and these Guidelines will be 
applied reasonably and flexibly. 
116 See, eg, Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, [1.17]; remarks of FTC Commissioner Mary L 
Azcuenaga, 'The Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Adaptations, Aphorisms and 
Advancing the Debate' (1996) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenaga/alis.htm > at 16 December 
2004. 
117 Robert Pitofsky, 'Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property' (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 913, 923-924. 
118 See Eagles and Longdin, above n48, 38. 
119 US Licensing Guidelines, § 2.0. 
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characteristics of intellectual property. 12° The Guidelines recognise that while many 
licensing arrangements are welfare-enhancing and pro-competitive, antitrust concerns 
may still arise. To this end the Agencies will focus on the actual effects of an 
arrangement, not its formal terms.' Restrictions in licensing arrangements will 
usually be evaluated on a rule of reason analysis, in that any anti-competitive effects 
will be weighed against any pro-competitive effects that arise! 22 Restraints that are 
clearly anti-competitive will be per se unlawful,' and the Guidelines also allow an 
antitrust 'safety zone' to encourage licensing activity. The safety zone will apply 
where: 
• the restraint is not facially anti-competitive; and 
• the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty 
percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint.' 24 
If market share data is unavailable, the Agencies will assess whether or not there are 
four or more independently controlled technologies that are substitutable for the 
technologies controlled by the parties at comparable cost, or whether or not there are 
four or more independently controlled entities that have the capacity and incentive to 
engage in research and development activities that are a close substitute for those of 
the parties to the licensing agreement. 125 
120 In stating that intellectual property is comparable to any other form of property, the Guidelines 
provide the following qualification: 
The Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual 
property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible property. 
That is not to say that intellectual property is in all respects the same as any other form of 
property. Intellectual property has important characteristics, such as ease of misappropriation, 
that distinguish it from many other forms of property. There characteristics can be taken into 
account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require the application of 
fundamentally different principles; ibid, § 2.1 
A footnote to this guideline then provides that: 
As with other forms of property, the power to exclude others from the use of intellectual 
property may vary substantially, depending on the nature of the property and its status under 
federal or state law. The greater or lesser legal power of an owner to exclude others is also taken 
into account by standard antitrust analysis. 
121 . 	. 	. US Li.censing Guidelines, § 3.1. 
122 Ibid, §§ 3.4, 4.2. 
123 Ibid, § 3.4. 
124 Ibid, § 4.3. 
125 ibid. 
218 
Chapter 5 
Licensing is generally viewed as pro-competitive, and a licensor's freedom to deal 
with their intellectual property will generally only be fettered by the following 
limitations: 
• where restrictions in a licensing agreement relate to non-patented products or 
processes; or 
• where the restrictions harm competition between companies who may have 
been actual or likely potential competitors in the absence of an agreement. 126 
The Agencies may analyse the competition effects of agreements in respect of 
technology or innovation markets. A technology market consists of the intellectual 
property that is licensed or its close substitutes. 127 A technology market analysis will 
be used when rights to intellectual property are marketed separately from the products 
in which they are used. 128 An innovation market is a market in new or improved goods 
and services. An innovation market analysis may be used where a licensing 
arrangement may adversely affect competition to develop new or improved goods or 
processes, and the effects on innovation cannot be adequately addressed through the 
analysis of goods or technology markets. 129 
5.4.13 REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE US 
GUIDELINES 
Contentions that unreasonable terms contained in licence agreements are anti-
competitive will be dealt with under the principles just discussed. In respect of 
outright refusals to licences intellectual property, the Guidelines provide that a holder 
of intellectual property is under no general obligation as a result of attaining market 
power through intellectual property, to license the use of that intellectual property to 
others. 13° This principle does, however, contain the following proviso: 
As in other antitrust contexts, however, market power could be illegally acquired or 
maintained, or, even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the 
126 See ibid, §§ 3.1, 3.3, 4.1. In practice, this will not apply to companies in a horizontal competitive 
relationship. 
127 Ibid, § 3.2.2. A technology market analysis will be used when rights to intellectual property are 
marketed separately from the products in which they are used. 
128 Ibid. § 3.2.2. 
129 Ibid, § 3.2.3. Innovation market analysis may be used in conjunction with goods or technology 
market analysis. 
13° Ibid, § 2.2. 
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ability of an intellectual property owner to harm competition through unreasonable 
conduct in connection with such property. 131 
US courts both prior and subsequent to the development of the US Licensing 
Guidelines have consistently declined to recognise a general duty to license. 132 It has 
been contended, however, that the proviso cited above leaves courts with the 
possibility of invoking the essential facilities doctrine in relation to intellectual 
property. 133 US case law in relation to refusals to license intellectual property will be 
considered in Chapter 7. 
5.4.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The Treaty Establishing the European Community 134 contains provisions regulating 
anti-competitive conduct within the European Union (EU). 135 Article 81 136 prohibits 
practices, decisions or agreements 'which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the EU'. Article 82 137 prohibits the 
abuse of a position of dominant market power, and is the EU equivalent of s 46: 138 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
131 'bid, § 2.2. 
132 These cases are discussed below, 7.2.1.2. 
133 Kobak, above n108, 354. 
134 Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/65. 
135 For a useful discussion on the EC Institutions and the enforcement of competition law by the 
European Commission and Courts, see Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition 
Law and Practice (7th ed, 1997) 17-25. Note that competition law is primarily enforced by the 
European Commission, and appeals are heard by the Court of First Instance (CH), and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The European Court of Justice gives single judgments with no dissents, and 
may or may not follow the preliminary opinion given by one of the Advocate Generals of the Court. 
The Advocate Generals are appointed by Member States and provide an opinion on which the judges of 
the Court of Justice may rely. The fact that dissenting judgments and separate opinions are not allowed 
has been criticised; see, for example, at 19-20. 
136 Formerly Article 85. 
137 Formerly Article 86. In the following chapters, earlier cases that consider Article 86 instead of 
Article 82, will refer to Article 86. Thus, these references are intended to refer to the same provision. 
138 As to the aim of Article 82 in the protection of competition see Richard Whish, Competition Law 
(4th ed, 2001) 149-150; Sarah A Turnbull, 'Barriers to Entry, Article 86 EC and the Abuse of a 
Dominant Position: An Economic Critique of European Community Competition Law' (1996) 17(2) 
European Competition Law Review 96. 
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(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
The European Court of Justice has stated that there are a number of elements to be 
satisfied in proving a breach of Article 82: u9 
[F]or the prohibition under Article 86 [now Article 82] to apply, it is ... necessary 
that three elements shall be present together: the existence of a dominant position, the 
abuse of this position, and the possibility that trade between member-States may be 
affected thereby. 140 
5.4.2.1 THE ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 82 
Thus, although attaining a position of dominance is not in itself unlawful, a market 
participant with dominance must take care not to abuse that position. ul The first step 
in determining the issue of dominance is to define the relevant market, and the second 
is to consider whether or not the undertaking is dominant in that market. The 
European Commission and Courts approach the question of market definition by 
considering the relevant product market 142 and then the relevant geographic market. 143 
139 Note that the operation of Article 82 is in the process of being revised: see Phillip Lowe, Speech 
Delivered by Phillip Lowe at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Thritieth Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference, Washington, 23 October 2003 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_040_en.pdf > at 17 November 2004. 
See also Brian Sher, 'The Last of the Steam-Powered Trains: Modernising Article 82' (2004) 25(5) 
European Competition Law Review 243. 
140 Parke, Davis & Co v Proble, Centrafarm and Others (1968) CMLR 47, 59. 
141 See Steven D Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation of 
Innovation (1998), 147. 
142 A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their 
intended use'; Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Inc v European Commission 
[1973] CMLR 199, [32]. Both demand side and supply side substitutability are considered using a test 
similar to the SSNIP test, although demand side substitutability has been more rigorously considered; 
see Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community 
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The Commission is in the practice of defining markets somewhat narrowly with the 
result that very small undertakings may in fact be found to be dominane w . 
A dominant position is defined as 
[A] position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its 
customers and ultimately of its consumers." 5 
The test for dominance therefore requires consideration of whether effective 
competition is being prevented, (in line with the concept of market power advanced 
by economists) and Whether an undertaking is able to behave independently. 146 In 
practice, a finding on dominance will be made after consideration of a number of 
relevant factors that have evolved as a result of the case law. 147 
The concepts of abuse detailed in Article 82 are not exhaustive, and the provision has 
been interpreted to incorporate a wide range of conduct. 148 Article 82 has been 
interpreted by the ECJ to apply to anti-competitive conduct in addition to exploitative 
behaviour, or in other words, to conduct that damages the structure of markets in 
which a dominant firm has weakened competition. m9 The third element, that of an 
effect on trade, will be satisfied where certain conduct brings about an alteration in the 
structure of competition in the relevant market. 15° 
Competition Law, OJ C 372 on 9/12/1997; and see Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights, above n141, 151-153. 
143 See Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community 
Competition Law, above n142. See also the discussion in Korah, Introductory Guide, above n135, 79- 
88. 
144 See especially Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 157- 
160, Whish, above n138, 165-166. 
145 United Brands v Commission [1978] 1 CMLR 429, [65] (Judgment). 
146 See Whish, above n138, 152-153. 
147 See the discussions of these factors ibid 153-163; Korah, above n135, 89-92. 
148 See, eg, Whish, above n138, 176-184; Korah, above n135, 97-121. 
149 See especially Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3462, [70]. See also Anderman, EC Competition 
Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 181-182. 
150 Commercial Solvents v Commission Cases 6/73 and 7/73 [1974] 1 CMLR 309. 
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Dealings in intellectual property are subject to Article 82. 151 In addition to Article 82, 
the competition laws of individual Member States are set out in national competition 
legislation. 
5.4.2.2 EU COMPETITION LAW REGULATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DEALINGS 
Although the US has been described as the 'historically more activist antitrust side of 
the Atlantic ... ', 152 the interface between intellectual property and competition law 
was, until recently fairly tightly regulated in the EU. In some respects antitrust 
became less accommodating of intellectual property during the latter decades of the 
twentieth century. 153 Intellectual property has traditionally been dealt with nationally 
by member states, and intellectual property privileges came to be perceived as barriers 
to entry that had the potential to inhibit the development of a common market. 154 This 
led to somewhat cautious attitudes toward regulation of intellectual property dealings, 
which have recently, to some extent, been relaxed. 155 
The intellectual property/competition law interface in European law during this time 
was generally governed by the existence, exercise dichotomy, 56 whereby 
determinations by the European Court of Justice indicated that the court took the view 
that while the existence of intellectual property was a national matter, the exercise of 
that right could be examined by the European Court of Justice. The distinction arose 
from comments made by the European Court of Justice in Consten and Grundig v 
Commission, 157 although the dichotomy has proved unworkable' in more recent cases 
and to a large extent been dispensed with. 159 Instead, the European Commission and 
151 See generally Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 148- 
150. 
152 Kobak, above n108, 342. 
153 See generally Valentine Korah, 'The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The 
European Experience' (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 801; Kobak, above n108, 346-347. See also the 
discussion in Chapter 7 dealing with EU case law on refusals to license. 
154 Korah, above n135, 803. See also Valentine Korah, 'Patents and Antitrust' (1997) 4 Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 395, 400. 
155 Korah, above n135, 803-807. Although, as Korah points out, there were exceptions to this trend, in 
general intellectual property dealings were analysed ex post so that any efficiencies associated with 
investment in research and development were disregarded; at 803-804. 
156 See, eg, Korah, above n135, 217-218. 
157 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 345 (Cases 56/64 and 58/64). 
158 Indeed, the origins of the dichotomy in the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ 
C 325/65 have been questioned; see Thomas C Vinje, 'The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the 
ECP (1995) 17(6) European Intellectual Property Review 297, 299-301. 
158 See, eg, ibid, 299-301. 
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Courts have adopted a more 'circumstances-based approach to dealing with disputes 
concerning the exercise of intellectual property. 16° 
(i) Block Exemptions 
As discussed, provisions within The Treaty on European Union regulate anti-
competitive conduct within the European Union. 161 There are a number of Group 
Exemptions contained in regulations that exempt certain conduct from particular 
provisions, generally where the conduct is deemed to be in the public interest. These 
exemptions are in the nature of practice-oriented guidelines in that they specify 
whether or not particular conduct is likely to be permitted, or contravene competition 
law prohibitions. 
In order to qualify for the exemption, the conduct must satisfy the criteria under the 
regulations: if these criteria are satisfied the conduct is automatically exempted. Most 
relevant to date has been Regulation (EC) No 240/96 (31 January 1996) (no longer in 
force). 162 This exemption was aimed primarily at facilitating the dissemination of 
technology, and it operated on a narrow basis. In essence, the exemption only applied 
to exempt conduct where it was considered highly unlikely to be anti-competitive. 163 
The benefits of the exemption could be withdrawn where the effects of the exempted 
agreement were incompatible with Article 81(3) of the Treaty. 164 
(ii) The New EU Competition Regime 
As of 1 May 2004, the EU adopted a new competition law regime. The main aims of 
the reform of the competition system are generally to: 
• enhance enforcement activities; 
• increase certainty to businesses; 
• adopt greater reliance on economic analysis; 
• improve merger control; and 
160 Ibid, 301. 
161 See above, 5.4.2. 
162 Commission Regulation (EC) 240196 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain 
Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, [1996] OJ L 31/2 (Regulation 240196). Article 81(3) 
provided a limited exemption from the application of Article 81. Article 82 contains no corresponding 
exemption. 
163 See NCC Report, above n15, 189. 
164 Regulation 240196, above n140, Article 7. Although use of the withdrawal power has been very 
limited, the threat of its use has been utilised to induce parties to change their conduct; see Anderman, 
EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 85. 
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• undertake internal reforms to enhance adoption and implementation of the 
preceding measures!' 
The substantive prohibitions contained in Articles 81 and 82 will remain unchanged. 
Regulation 240/96 was due to expire in 2006, and in 2001 the Commission adopted a 
mid-term review report of this Regulation. 166 Submissions were invited in relation to 
the ITBE Mid-Term Report, and the operation of Regulation 240/96. This procedure 
was aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of Regulation 240/96 over the duration of 
its operation. The Report was critical of the way in which technology transfer 
agreements are evaluated under Regulation 240/96. In particular, it found that the 
Regulation focuses more on the form of the agreement than on the actual effects of the 
market. In addition to analysing the policy approach on which the Regulation is based, 
the Report found that: 167 
• the Regulation is too prescriptive which may discourage efficient transactions 
and hamper dissemination of new technologies; 
• the rules under the Regulation require simplification and clarification; 
• a number of restraints under the Regulation are presumed illegal or excluded 
from the operation of the Regulation without good economic justification; 
• by concentrating on the form of the agreement, the benefit of the block 
exemption is extended to a number of situations which should not always be 
exempted (the example of exclusive licensing is given); 
• the Regulation makes insufficient distinction between competitors and non-
competitors. 
165 See Mario Monti, 'EU Competition Policy After May 2004, Paper presented at the Fordham 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, (2003) 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/index_speeches_by_the_commissioner.html> at 31 
May 2004. 
166 Commission Evaluation Report on the Transfer of Technology Block Exemption Regulation No 
240196: Technology Transfer Agreements Under Article 81, COM (2001) 786, (Mid-Term Report). 
167 	. . See ib id.; See also Kirtilcumar Mehta and Luc Peeperkom, 'Licensing of Intellectual Property Under 
EU Competition Rules: The Review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation' 
Statement to the FTC1DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, Washington, (2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522mehtadoc.pdf > at 12 March 2004. 
See also Summary of Submissions on TTBE Review Report, Annex 1, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer/summary_of  comments.pdf> at 
20 January 2004. 
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The outcome of the review has been the drafting of a revised Regu1ation. 168 As of 1 
May 2004, Regulation 240/96 ceased to be operative, and the Commission of the 
European Communities adopted a new exemption for technology transfer 
agreements. 169 The Commission has also issued draft guidelines aimed at providing 
explanation and guidance as to the operation of the Revised TTBE, and the 
application of Article 81 to licensing agreements that fall outside the scope of the 
Revised TTBE. 17° Major changes to the current system are: m 
• the Revised TTBE treats agreements between competitors fundamentally 
differently from agreements between non-competitors; and 
• a less formalistic approach to determining the effects of technology licensing 
agreements. Treatment of licence agreements will depend largely on the 
market share of the parties. 172 Where market share falls below the requisite 
level, the parties to an agreement will be able to take advantage of a 'safe 
harbour'. A number of licensing restrictions are classified as `hardcore' 
restrictions and prohibited. Outside the safe harbour, the TTBE Guidelines 
employ a more economic analysis in explaining how Article 81 will apply in 
individual cases. 
168 See Commission Regulation (EC) 77212004 of 27 April 2004 on the Application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements [2004] OJ L 123/11 (Revised TTBE) and 
Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements 
[2004] OJ C 101/02 (Ii 	BE Guidelines). See also 'Commission Proposes New Safe Harbour for the 
Licensing of Patents and Know-How', EU Press Release, (2003) 
<http://www.juridicum.su.se/jurweb/utbildning/master/master_of  european_intellectual_property_law/ 
Commissionpressroom.pdf> at 31 May 2004. 
Article 249 (ex art 189) provides that the Revised TTBE 'shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States.' 
169 See Revised TTBE, above n168. 
170 TTBE Guidelines, above n168. 
171 See Revised TTBE and TTBE Guidelines, above n168; Monti, above n165, 4; Valentine Korah, 
'Draft Block Exemption for Technology Transfer' (2004) 25(5) European Competition Law Review 
247; David Hull and Amy Toro, 'Reform of the Technology Licensing Rules' (2004) The European 
Antitrust Review, 34; John Ratliff, Axel Gutermuth and Rajeshree Bhojnani, 'European Commission 
Proposes New Competition Rules for Technology Licensing', (2003) 
<http://www.wilmer.com/files/tbl_s29Publications/FileUpload5665/2904/News_215243279180219011  
515101300.pdf> at 31 May 2004. 
172  Parties who are competitors will not benefit from the block exemption if their combined market 
share exceeds 20 per cent. Parties who are not competitors will not benefit from the block exemption if 
their individual market share exceeds 30 per cent. Note that this analysis applies to product markets 
only, and special rules apply to technology markets. 
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5.4.2.3 REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Although there has been a good deal of focus on when particular conduct will be 
exempted from the scope of Article 81, there is no exemption in respect of conduct 
that may fall foul of Article 82. Instead, dealings that may be in breach of Article 82 
will simply be subject to the requirements of that provision, and evaluated according 
to whether or not the requirements of that provision are made out.'" Given this, 
unilateral refusals to license intellectual property will simply be dealt with under the 
case law principles formulated in respect of Article 82. This body of case law will be 
considered in Chapter 7, but the following comments are worth bearing in mind: 
• for holders of intellectual property, there is a real risk (as a result of a tendency 
toward narrow market definition by the Commission) that markets will be 
defined narrowly under Article 82 with the result that a finding of dominance 
or de facto monopoly becomes more likely; 174 
• an intellectual property holder may be accorded particular rights in one 
market, but those rights might not extend to other secondary markets; 175 and 
• because the issue of abuse is intricately linked to the question of dominance, a 
finding that a greater degree of dominance exists may have some impact on 
the standard of conduct required in assessing whether conduct is abusive. m 
5.4.3 SUMMARY 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that refusals to license intellectual property 
within each jurisdiction discussed are dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and are not 
subject to any exemption from competition law. Indeed, there is no legislatively-based 
exemption from competition law for intellectual property dealings in the US. 177 
173 See below 7.3. 
174 Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 159-160. 
175 Ibid, 187-188. 
176 /b . ., la 168-169. 
177 Interestingly, the NCC recognised that the lack of an exemption for licensing conditions in other 
jurisdictions did not appear to have harmed investment in research. The NCC also found that there 
were a number of other grounds on which retention of the exemption in s 51(3) was questionable, 
including uncertainty over the operation of s 51(3), the relatively minor consideration competition law 
would receive in decisions about investing in innovation, and the global nature of licensing which 
throws into question the need for favourable treatment in a particular jurisdiction; NCC Report, above 
n15, 196-200. The NCC failed to directly address these matters in recommending retention of the 
exemption. 
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Instead, the US Licensing Guidelines do no more than provide an indication of the 
enforcement policy of US regulators. rm 
The exemption contained in section 51(3) of the TPA fails to exempt refusals to 
license intellectual property. The IPCRC recommended specific amendment to s 51(3) 
to specifically incorporate conditional refusals to license intellectual property. It is 
submitted that this recommendation might be open to question on the grounds that 
there may be limited evidence to justify such an exemption. Depending on the 
particular view taken of the role of competition law in regulating intellectual property 
transactions, such expansion may not be desirable. Moreover, the fact that the issue is 
dealt with on an individual basis in other jurisdictions is highly relevant. It is aligned 
with the position taken in the Government Response, which was to continue to treat 
conditional refusals to license contrary to s 46 as falling outside the scope of the 
exemption. 
The next section considers the interaction between intellectual property and 
competition law, and argues that there is some doubt that an exemption from 
competition law for intellectual property transactions is warranted at all. For this 
reason, it is submitted that it is entirely appropriate that refusals to license are not 
exempted, and are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. It does, however, attempt to set 
out a general framework to guide regulation in this area, in line with the theoretical 
effect of refusals to license and the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4. 
5.5 THE INTERACTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION LAW 
5.5.1 RECONCILING AIMS 
As articulated in Chapter 2, one of the central justifications for patent law is the 
provision to inventors of a temporary, exclusive right to exploit an invention in order 
to encourage innovation. 179 Despite some disagreement over whether intellectual 
property laws (and in particular patent laws) are necessary to stimulate innovation, 180 
they have been accepted as an integral component of the legislative framework for the 
178 In contrast, both Australia and the EU exempt certain intellectual property dealings from breaching 
particular competition law provisions, although their operation and effect vary considerably. The 
Commission has also issued Guidelines indicating regulatory policy in implementing the Revised 
TTBE, and ACCC Guidelines in relation to s 51(3) would have a similar effect. 
179 See further above, Chapter 2.2. 
180 See the discussion above, 2.2.2.1. 
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promotion of innovation in all WTO countries. 181 Competition law, on the other hand, 
prohibits certain anti-competitive behaviour by corporations, and places limitations on 
the use of market power. 182 The effect that intellectual property may have on follow-
on innovation has already been discussed,'" and it is the potential for intellectual 
property to impact negatively on the innovative process that raises competition law 
issues. 
Intellectual property inevitably imposes allocative costs on the public through 
restricting competition in goods and services,'" and intellectual property laws can 
only be justified if the costs of limiting access to innovative ideas can be sufficiently 
offset by an appropriate level of innovation and dissemination. 185 Intellectual property 
laws clearly recognise the value of competition in that intellectual property protection 
is limited in scope, duration and effect,' 86 and applies to some subject matter but not 
others. At the same time, competition laws defer to intellectual property laws to some 
degree in allowing innovators a limited monopoly to exclusively exploit a privilege. 
Viewed simplistically, intellectual property law and competition law are in conflict.'" 
The dominant paradigm, both in Australia' s and internationally, 189 is that intellectual 
property law and competition law essentially share the same goal, and that is to 
181 TRIPs was very much a negotiated outcome between WTO member states, and some WTO 
countries agreed to adopt the standards imposed by TRIPs in exchange for other beneficial trade 
outcomes. In this respect, a number of concessions to particular countries were made, and this reflects 
that there are a number of TRIPs signatories, particularly developing countries, who may question 
whether strong intellectual property standards necessarily promote innovation; see generally Sell, 
Private Power, Public Law, above n108. 
182 See Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.5]. 
183 Above, 3.3. 
184 See Nancy T Gallini and Michael J Trebilcock, 'Intellectual Property Rights and Competition 
Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Economic and Legal Issues' in Robert D Anderson and 
Nancy T Gallini, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy (1998) 17, 17-18. 
185 	- See Hovenlcamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.9 — 1.13]. 
186 See Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.10]; Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 
17-18. 
187 The literature on this topic is extensive. For a brief overview of the issues associated with the patent 
law/competition interface, see, eg, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights (1998) background note. Many of the other 
references cited in this chapter also provide useful discussion. 
188 1PCRC Report, above n8, 209-214; NCC Report, above n15, 160-164. See also Philip Tucker, 
'Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights and Misuse of Market Power — Where is the Line in 
the Sand?' (1999) 10 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 78, 78-79; TPC Background Paper, 
above n5, 8-10, especially 9; Pengilley, above n9; 174-176. 
189 See, eg, the discussion in FTC Report, above n106 ,ch 1, 7-9; Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above 
n86, vol I, [1.9]-[1.13]; Gutterman, above n94, 11-12; Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 18; OECD, 
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benefit consumers by encouraging innovation and enhancing economic efficiency 
within markets. Intellectual property laws encourage innovation and the development 
of new products, and encourage competitors to compete with existing participants 
using more efficient means. Competition laws seek to impact on prices, output and 
market structure and in doing so, to promote rivalry and consequently innovation. 
Accordingly, both seek to maximise long-term dynamic efficiencies through the 
encouragement of innovation. 
5.5.2 DIVERGING APPROACHES TO COMPLEMENTARY AIMS 
This congruence between the two bodies of law is not, however, absolute, and there 
are instances where tension continues to exist between them. This tension stems in 
part from the manner in which intellectual property laws and competition laws set out 
to achieve their (albeit complementary) aims: 
An essential difference ... in the achievement of pro-competitive effects between 
competition law and intellectual property law lies in their temporal character: 
competition law strives to maintain a consistently competitive market whilst 
intellectual property law is content to allow mild distortions in market conditions to 
realise long term benefits. Thus, despite the common goal, intellectual property law's 
mode of achieving market efficiencies is antithetical to competition law's view of 
acceptable behaviour. 190 
Although intellectual property laws and competition law both have as their objective 
the promotion of innovation and long-term dynamic efficiencies, there may be cases 
in which it is not clear how innovation may best be served: through the provision of 
intellectual property, which inevitably leads to short-term market distortions, or 
through competition laws which monitor competition on a perpetual basis. 191 Finding 
the balance will invariably be problematic in some instances. 192 
In an economic sense, intellectual property restricts access by others in order to 
provide the holder of the legislated privilege with a social advantage (the right to 
Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights (1998), above n187, 7; Tom and Newberg, above 
n102; Carrier, above n49, 766. See also the US Licensing Guidelines, § 1.0. 
190 Tucker, above n188, 79. See also Federal Trade Commission Report, above n106, ch 1, 8-14; 
Maureen O'Rourke, 'Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract and 
Standardisation in the Computer Industry' (1998) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 1, 31. 
191 Tucker, above n188, 79-80. See also Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.3b]; 
Carrier, above n49, 766-771. 
192 See Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 5-7; OECD, 
above n187, 7. 
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exclude others). The difficult question for competition law is when the privilege 
restricts access more than necessary to secure that social advantage. 193 The broad issue 
addressed in this thesis is when competition law should be implemented to optimise 
follow-on innovation and to facilitate long-term dynamic efficiency, with specific 
reference to medical biotechnology. This may necessarily involve some trade-off in 
short and long-term efficiencies. 
5.53 FINDING THE BALANCE 
As indicated in previous sections of this chapter, to the extent that intellectual 
property laws and competition laws can be reconciled, competition laws in many 
jurisdictions defer to some degree to dealings in intellectual property. Competition 
law and policy in many jurisdictions, including Australia, contains some guidance as 
to the treatment to be afforded to intellectual property transactions. Policy in the area 
may be guided by different considerations in different jurisdictions, 194 and in relation 
to various issues and industries. 
5.53.1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICY DEBATE 
There are many difficulties inherent in enacting an optimal competition policy for 
dealing with issues arising in relation to intellectual property licensing. While a 
framework for competition policy in relation to intellectual property is desirable, 195 
determining the specifics of such a framework is fraught with difficulty. This 
difficulty stems from variance in views on the principles that should guide 
competition policy in respect of intellectual property. Gallini and Trebilcock point out 
that competition policy may have a number of effects on the social surplus amounting 
from innovation through the provision of: 
• ex ante incentives to innovate or undertake research and development; 
• ex post incentives to disseminate technologies and products; and 
• price competition in markets where the new technologies and products are 
utilised. 196 
193 See William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 
(2003) 374-375. 
194 Indeed, this may be the case in relation to competition policy generally, although the issues are 
somewhat amplified when the difficult case of intellectual property is raised. 
195 Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 22-27. See also Tom and Newberg, above n102; Louis Kaplow, 
'The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal' (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 1813. 
196 Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 21-22. 
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Gallini and Trebilcock suggest that the second and third effects should guide 
competition policy in relation to intellectual property. 197 Accordingly, they contend 
that the following principles should guide the application of competition law analysis 
to intellectual property law:' 
[Principle 1] There should not be a presumption that an intellectual property right 
creates market power.'" 
[Principle 2] Competition policy should acknowledge the basic rights granted under 
patent law. 
[Principle 3] A licensing restriction should be permitted if it is not anticompetitive 
relative to the outcome that would result if the licence were proscribed; otherwise, an 
evaluation of the potential efficiency effects of the restriction on the pricing and 
diffusion of the intellectual property should be made. 
These principles formed part of the executive summary of the OECD's Report on 
Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights." Although participants of 
the roundtable that led to the report gave unqualified support for the first 
principle, 201 the position was far more equivocal in relation to the second and 
third principles. 202 In particular, the second principle was considered by 
roundtable members to be 'most in need of elaboration and possible 
qualification: 2°3 This highlights the difficulty inherent in balancing the two 
bodies of law. Disagreement over this principle really underscores the debate as to 
which body of law should take precedence, and whether competition law should 
treat intellectual property as inherently different from other forms of property. It is 
submitted that while intellectual property does have unique characteristics that 
should be borne in mind in competition law analysis, this should not preclude 
197 Ibid, 22, 24-26. 
198 Ibid, 22. 
199 Many commentators assert that intellectual property will confer market power only in rare cases; 
see, for example, Edmund W Kitch, 'Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property' (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1727, 1729-1739; Landes and Posner, above 
n193, 374-375. While this is certainly true, in rare cases a patent may confer market power. An 
accumulation of intellectual property rights could also operate to confer market power. 
200 OECD, above n187, 8-9 
201 The issue of patents and market power will be discussed below, 8.2.2. 
202 OECD, above n187, 8-9. 
203 Ibid, 9. See also FTC Report, above n106, where it was concluded that while antitrust policy should 
take patent policy into account in promoting long-term consumer welfare, it is equally important that 
competition policy concerns be considered by those responsible for implementing patent law and 
policy; ch 6, especially 1-9. 
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competition law being applied in the same manner as it is to other forms of 
property. 204 
A closely related issue is whether competition law should be concerned with the 
existence of intellectual property, 205 or merely its exercise. It is probably fair to say 
that the currently populist view is that: 
antitrust will be concerned not with the legitimate exercise of an intellectual property 
right granted by the government, but with efforts to expand the scope of that right," 
either to new products, or temporally, or by conditioning access to the right on 
restrictions of competition. Efficient wealth maximization requires that a line be 
drawn between conduct that is permissible and that which is impermissible. 
The fundamental question is whether it is the task of intellectual property laws or 
competition laws to defme the boundaries or scope of the legislated privilege, and 
therefore the legitimate exercise of intellectual property. 
204 Competition regulators certainly do not agree with the second principle proposed by Gallini and 
Trebilcock. The US Antitrust Guidelines provide an obvious example; see above, n120. The position of 
the ACCC is also worth considering. Despite the exemption contained in s 51(3) of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Oh), the ACCC has consistently asserted that intellectual property should be treated in the 
same manner as other contracts, arrangements and understandings, subject to the authorisation and 
notification procedures; see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission to the 
Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, (1999), 16-17. See also Hilmer Committee 
Report, above n25, 150-151. 
205 Although there may be issues associated with the grant of a patent, these being (1) whether the 
patent is warranted, and (2) whether the patent (or whether a group of patents taken in combination) 
confers market power. The first issue is addressed by patent law, but the second is not. It has been 
recommended that the Patent Office be cognisant of the detrimental effects of granting patents that 
confer market power; FTC Report, above n106, ch 1, 9-12, 37-38. 
206 This approach essentially embodies the scope of grant doctrine. This doctrine has been criticised on 
the grounds that it defers overly to patent holders at the expense of competition law; see Carrier, above 
n49, 788-791. 
207 See Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n86, vol I, [1.3b]. See also Gutterman, above n94, 12, 
and note the following comment by Melamed and Stoeppelwerth, who explain that the notion of anti-
competitive conduct can be articulated as follows: 
M here appears to be an emerging consensus in both the economics literature and judicial decisions 
that anticompetitive conduct is conduct that serves no legitimate purpose, or is itself unprofitable, and 
is undertaken in order to exclude or weaken competitors in anticipation of increased market power and 
resulting supracompetitive recoupment. ... both the antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws 
distinguish between earning monopoly profits, which property owners are entitled to do, and sacrificing 
profits in order to create additional power; A Douglas Melamed and All M Stoeppelwerth, 'The CSU 
Case: Facts, Formalism and the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property' (2002) 10 George 
Mason Law Review 407, 418-419. 
In other words, conduct will be deemed exclusionary if it lacks a valid efficiency justification; at 12. 
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5.53.2 COMPETTTION TRFATMEIVT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
There are costs associated with exempting a greater range of conduct from the 
operation of competition laws: stronger incentives by way of intellectual property 
protection do not necessarily equate with social benefit." One outcome of stronger 
intellectual property protection is decreased price competition." Immunity from 
competition may also operate to reduce incentives to innovate where patent holders 
hold a position of dominance in a market. 21° At the same time, intellectual property 
can grant significant power to an innovator, and the boundaries of intellectual 
property can in some circumstances be more difficult to determine than those of 
tangible property. 211 These factors would tend to militate against overly broad 
deference to intellectual property laws by competition law. 212 
On the other hand, business certainty and dissemination are the primary benefits of a 
broad exemption.213 Allocative efficiency is likely to be increased as a result of 
confidence in the legality of intellectual property dealings. 214 Intellectual property 
possesses unique characteristics such as its significant social benefit and its ease of 
appropriability that tend to support stronger rights for intellectual property holders. 215 
The necessity to combine complementary assets offers further support. 216 
Some commentators have attempted to provide some method of measuring the benefit 
to the patentee with the loss to society of a particular licensing restriction. 217 These 
208 FTC Report, above n106, ch 1, 14. 
209 
/bid. 
210 See Tom and Newberg, above n102, 199-200. 
211 Richard J Gilbert and Willard K Tom, 'Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The 
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later' (2001) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 43, 83-86. 
212 James Langenfeld, 'Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Toward Strildng a Balance' (2001) 
Case Western Reserve Law Review 91, 94-97. 
213 See, eg, NCC Report, above n15, 193-199. 
214 Willard K Tom and Joshua K Newberg, 'US Enforcement Approaches to the Antitrust-Intellectual 
Property Interface' in Robert T Anderson and Nancy T Gallini (eds) Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy (1998), 343, 359. 
215 These arguments are summarised in Langen.field, above n212, 93-94. See also OECD, above n187, 
8. 
216 Langenfeld, above n212, 93; IPCRC Report, above n8, 210. 
217 See, especially, William Baxter, 'Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An 
Economic Analysis' (1966) 76 Yale Law Journal 267; Ward Bowman Jr, Patent and Antitrust Law: A 
Legal and Economic Appraisal (1973); Kaplow, above n195; Mark R Patterson, 'When is Property 
Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem?' (2000) 73 South California Law Review 1133; Carrier, above 
n49. ICaplow, for example, sought to develop a formula that 'examines the ratio between the reward the 
patentee receives when permitted to use a particular restrictive practice and the monopoly loss that 
results from such exploitation of the patent; Kaplow, above n195, 1816. 
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attempts are subject to some criticism in that the process of measurement presents 
difficulties. They also apply to licensing restrictions, and do not apply to refusals to 
license patents. This issue therefore continues to present challenges to policy makers. 
The bounds that competition law places on dealings in intellectual property are 
important not just because they determine the outcome of matters that may be 
litigated, but also because they influence the manner in which practitioners advise 
parties, and the manner in which parties behave in negotiations. 218 For example, a 
patent holder who knows there are likely to be very few circumstances in which a 
refusal to license that patent would be successfully litigated, will be more confident in 
refusing a licence and asserting that position. A party who is likely to be refused a 
licence is more likely to seek a licence and instigate legal proceedings if they are 
aware that the matter could be determined in their favour. 
It is submitted that competition law should play a role in monitoring the use of 
intellectual property, but that it should be employed carefully. 219 Policy design and 
implementation in this area should take account of the important role that intellectual 
property plays in stimulating innovation, and of the desirability of the dissemination 
of those rights. 220 In line with this, intellectual property laws should be capable of 
being amended to remedy perceived weaknesses in their operation; competition law 
should not step in to intervene on a frequent basis where these laws are viewed as 
deficient. 221 Arguments supporting this approach have been made in respect of the 
information goods market given that these markets are characterised by: 222 
• monopoly power in a fewer number of industry participants; 
• patterns of progressive concentration; and 
218 Steve Anderman, 'The Aftermath of Magill' in Eric Barendt, The Yearbook of Media and 
Entertainment Law (1996) vol 2, 235, 244 ('[C]ompetitors will be encouraged in their negotiations with 
rightholders, their complaints to the Commission, and possibly their litigation in Member State 
Courts'). See also the discussion in John Temple Lang, 'European Community Antitrust Law: 
Innovation Markets and High Technology Industries' (1997) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 
717, 812-816. 
219 See also Jill McKeough, 'Is Intellectual Property Different or are all Unhappy Monopolists 
Similar?' (2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 289. 
2213 See also, Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, above n141, 5-6. 
221 Alessandra Narciso, 1MS Health or the Question Whether Intellectual Property Still Deserves a 
Specific Approach in a Free Market Economy' (2003) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 445, 452. 
222 See generally ibid, 450-451; John H Barton, 'Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent 
Breadth and Sequential Innovation' (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 449; Carl Shapiro, Competition 
Policy in the Information Economy (1999), paper obtained from author's website 
<http://faculty.haas.berkeley.eduishapiro/comppolicy.pdf> at 15 November 2004, 4-6. 
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• oligopolistic markets with a shrinking number of significant competitors. 
Similar issues arise in respect of medical biotechnology, and these new market 
structures depart from conventional market structures for tangible goods. 223 Calls for 
changes to the copyright system have been made in circumstances where copyright is 
extending to information-based goods in order to clarify the extent of protection in 
this industry and reduce the number of instances where protection is broad and 
dubious. 224 Similar considerations have also driven recommendations for amendments 
to patent laws, particularly in relation to biotechnology patents. 
Viewed this way, competition law does have an important role to play in curbing the 
anticompetitive practices of patent holders. Many patents in medical biotechnology 
are strong, and there have been a number of changes to patent law standards in all 
jurisdictions to ensure that this is the case. Given this, there should be some 
mechanism to ensure that these strong rights are not exercised in an anti-competitive 
manner. This is particularly the case where those rights impose broad protection over 
a number of uses. In relation to high-technology industries such as medical 
biotechnology, the matter is perhaps succinctly put by one US commentator in 
discussing the difficulty in determining the appropriate limits antitrust should place on 
intellectual property: 
From an antitrust perspective, the dynamic quality of innovation and intellectual 
property, its capacity to change and revitalise industries, has its negative or dark side 
as well as it positive or bright side. The dark side is that control of the innovation 
process or its fruits — whether in the form of a computer operating system, a biotech 
tool, or anything else, could lead to control over vast areas of industrial or 
commercial endeavour. Though largely intangible, resources such as these can be 
seen as every bit as strategic as the [tangible assets] of the past with which antitrust 
and its essential facilities and monopolisation principles have always so uneasily 
struggled. 225 
Although it is arguable that competition law should intervene in intellectual property 
dealings only rarely, there are circumstances in which intervention may be desirable. 
Granting immunity to patent holders precludes this possibility. It is difficult to lay 
down definitive rules as to when competition law may usefully play a part, and it may 
223 See the discussion above, 1.5. 
224 Narciso, above n221. See generally Kobak, James Kobak Jr, 'Intellectual Property, Competition 
Law and Hidden Choices Between Original and Sequential Innovation' (1998) 3 Virginia Journal of 
Law and Technology, 6, particularly, 41-44. 
225 Kobak, above n108, 350-351. 
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be that a case-by-case assessment is the most appropriate method of proceeding. 
There are, however, some basic rules that may be put in place to deal with particular 
issues. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining the appropriate 
role for competition policy in promoting innovation, and to establishing some 
guidelines for treatment of refusals to license intellectual property. 
5.5.4 THE ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN FOSTERING INNOVATION 
In Chapter 1, some economic studies considering the impact of competitive as 
opposed to concentrated market structures in fostering innovation were considered. 226 
These studies have yielded contradictory results, and the most reasonable conclusion 
would appear to be that the optimal level of competition within a market would 
depend on the particular industry in question. Factors such as the manner in which 
innovation proceeds 227 and the degree of technological opportunity available in an 
industry will have a bearing on whether or not a competitive market structure is 
conducive to innovation in that industry. 'Competitive' in the economic sense, should 
be taken to mean the efficient exploitation of an economy's resources. It will not 
necessarily mean a greater number of participants competing in a particular economic 
market. 228 
There is an issue as to what role competition policy has in attempting to influence the 
rate of innovation within an industry by policing licensing arrangements. Should 
competition law be proactively involved in policing intellectual property dealings, and 
if so to what extent should it be involved? Would it be most beneficial if regulatory 
authorities employed an interventionist approach, or should competition law, in effect 
be a 'backstop' to curb only very extreme exercises of intellectual property at the 
instigation of competitors? 
The extent to which consideration of the research and development effects of 
licensing restrictions should be taken into account is problematic given the 
inconclusive nature of economic evidence examining the link between competition 
policy and innovation. 229 In light of this tenuous link, Gallini and Trebilcock propose a 
limited examination of the research and development effects of licensing restrictions 
226 Above, 1.8.2. 
227 See above, 1.8.2.2. 
228 See Landes and Posner, above n193. 379. 
229 Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 23-26. See also the discussion by Marina Lao, 'Unilateral 
Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal' (1999) 9 Cornell 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 193, 213-218. See further above, 1.8.2.2. 
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by competition authorities.23° The principles espoused by them in forming a 
framework for the treatment of intellectual property dealings by competition law 
reflect this, by concentrating on the pricing and diffusion aspects of a licensing 
restriction. Yet the evidence in respect of whether concentrated market structures are 
conducive to innovation is equally unsettled, and it is therefore unclear whether one 
body of law should take precedence over the other in encouraging innovation. For this 
reason, consideration of innovative effects may be entirely relevant to a competition 
analysis of a particular intellectual property licensing practice. 
Commentators generally advocate that consideration of research and development be 
given, in one of three ways: 231 
• competition policy should be coordinated with patent policy to provide 
adequate incentives for research; 
• restrictions that reduce innovation in future markets for products and processes 
should be prohibited by competition law; or 
• competition law should be concerned with the allocative effects of licensing 
on diffusion and pricing of technologies and products, not on encouraging 
research and development. 
While the first approach recommends that research and development considerations 
be explicitly taken into account by competition policy, the other approaches propose a 
more subtle consideration of the effect of a particular licence or licensing restriction 
on innovation. The views of various commentators reflect these varying policy 
choices. 232 Gallini and Trebilcock take the view that patent policy and competition 
policy have discrete roles to play. Not surprisingly, they advocate that on a general 
basis, the third approach be taken. The third approach is concerned with the allocative 
effects of a contract on diffusion and pricing: 
the task of patent policy is to define those rights which encourage innovation (in 
terms of duration and protection from imitation); the task of competition policy is to 
prevent the anticompetitive transfer and use of technology while respecting the basic 
exclusive rights as laid out by patent law. Indeed, this policy will affect the 
23° Gallini and Trebilcocic, above n184, 25-26. 
231 These approaches are summarised ibid, 24-25. 
232 An advocate of the first approach, for example, is Robert Merges; see Robert P Merges, 'Antitrust 
Review of Patent Acquisitions: Property Rights, Firm Boundaries, and Organisation' in Robert D 
Anderson and Nancy T Gallini (eds) Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy (1998) 111. 
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innovator's overall return, and therefore the incentive to innovate in the first place, 
but the decision to allow the licence will be based on the ex post incentive to license, 
not on the ex ante incentives to innovate.2" 
Gallini and Trebilcock acknowledge that all three approaches may be appropriate in 
different circumstances depending on the market involved and the technological 
conditions. The issue addressed in this thesis centers on determining how competition 
policy should provide for follow-on innovation. In this respect competition law is an 
important tool to facilitate dissemination of technology and regulate prices. Further, 
patent law has some mechanisms to counter excessive rights given to upstream 
innovators where those rights are overly broad. For example, patents may be 
challenged and overly broad patents are unlikely to withstand such challenge. 234 
However, this does not mean that competition law should not be cognisant of ensuring 
adequate provision of incentives for research and development. Competition law has 
long been considered to be an important tool in the promotion of innovation. 235 In 
Australia, it would appear the process of reform being implemented under the 
National Competition Policy demonstrates that competition law is being recognised as 
an increasingly important element of an innovative and dynamically efficient 
economy. 236 
It is submitted that competition policy has a direct role to play in maintaining a 
competitive environment for follow-on innovators in intermediate and downstream 
medical biotechnology markets. 237 At the same time, it must retain sufficient 
flexibility to account for the myriad markets and technologies to which it must be 
233 Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 25. 
234 Of course, of greater concern than broad single patents, may be accumulations of patents, the 
assertion of which may operate to foreclose research in a particular area. 
235 This is a commonly recognised goal of competition law. See, for example, FTC Report, above n106, 
ch 1; David M Hart 'Antitrust and Technological Innovation in the US: Ideas, Institutions, Decisions, 
and Impacts, 1890-2000' (2001) 30 Research Policy 923; Pitofsky, above n117. See generally Carrier 
above n49. 
236 See Competition Principles Agreement, above n26. The Productivity Commission recently 
conducted a review of the National Competition Policy. The Review identified 'support for 
technological innovation' as an important reform that had yet to be addressed; See Productivity 
Commission, Parliament of Australia, Review of National Policy Reforms, Inquiry Report No 33 (2005) 
368. The Review identified the need to 'continue to pursue reform opportunities across the economy 
', and stated that another important matter for policy attention was 'ensuring that there are cost-
effective mechanisms in place to address market failures in technological innovation, including 
appropriate intellectual property protection'; at 360, 369. See also Lawson, above n26. 
237 See also Federal Trade Commission Report, above n106, ch 2, 36, where it was concluded while 
patent policy and competition have important roles to play in promoting innovation, neither is solely 
capable of fostering innovation. Therefore, the two must work in tandem. 
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applied. Any competition law analysis in areas of high technology such as 
biotechnology (which is itself a diverse industry) must be capable of accommodating 
different considerations in respect of different segments of the industry. In light of 
this, a focus on the impact of particular licensing arrangements on innovation may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances. 
5.5.5 COMPETITION POLICY AND REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECI'UAL 
PROPERTY 
The right of a holder of intellectual property to refuse to license that right is one of the 
most problematic questions that has arisen in the recent literature dealing with the 
intellectual property/competition law interface. The issue is a fundamental one that 
exemplifies the difficulty of the intellectual property/competition law interface. 
Different commentators take different views on the interface, and essentially, these 
approaches fall into one of two categories: 
• the antitrust-immunity approach, whereby holders of intellectual property are 
given complete immunity from antitrust laws. Under this approach, holders of 
intellectual property would be entitled to refuse to license any party on any 
basis; and 
• an approach that attempts to balance the immunity granted by intellectual 
property laws with the effects of competition intervention. Under this 
approach, intellectual property holders would not be granted carte blanche 
immunity, but under exceptional circumstances, may be compelled to license 
their intellectual property. 238 
As will become evident from the discussion in Chapter 7, various courts in the EU 
and the US have taken different approaches to determining the issue of refusals to 
license. While some have adopted the first approach, others have advocated the 
limited intrusion of competition law into the right of an intellectual property holder to 
refuse to license. 239 This has invariably led to controversy. 
238 These approaches are usefully summarised in Sergio Baches Opi, 'The Application of the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are 
Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?' (2001) 11 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and 
Entertainment Law Journal 409, 443-451. 
239 The first approach has, as its genesis, Chicago school economics while the second is predicated on 
mainstream economics. As discussed above, 1.8, US antitrust administration is entering a post-Chicago 
phase, with a return to mainstream theory evident in many facets of their operation; see, for example 
James Kobak Jr, 'Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Hidden Choices Between Original and 
Sequential Innovation' (1998) 3 Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, 6, 19-22. 
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The views of commentators mirror these approaches. 24° Gallini and Trebilcock, for 
example, support the second approach. They support the general right of a patent 
holder to exclusively exploit that patent and refuse to license others because this right 
is consistent with patent law and the second principle of the framework outlined 
above!' At the same time, they acknowledge there could be circumstances where it is 
desirable to compel licensing. 242 
Despite these criticisms, it will be argued in the following chapters that the right of a 
patentee to refuse to license a patent should not be unfettered, and that a patent holder 
should be subject to competition law for a refusal to license. Despite the difficulties in 
determining the exact bounds of a patent holder's right to refuse to license, it is 
submitted that the antitrust-immunity approach is overly simplistic and ignores the 
negative effects refusals to license may sometimes have on diffusion of technology. 
These considerations are particularly pertinent in medical biotechnology where most 
refusals to license are likely to occur in the context of a vertical relationship where 
access to potentially non-rivalrous technology is sought. 
As foreshadowed during the course of this chapter, it is submitted that a refusal to 
license a patent should be subject to the reach of competition law. There is some 
doubt as to whether an exemption for any form of intellectual property dealing from 
competition law necessarily promotes efficiency, but the focus of this thesis is on 
refusals to license. Therefore, it is submitted that it is entirely appropriate that refusals 
to license be subject to the misuse of market power provisions in each of the 
jurisdictions discussed. 
A strong basis for this assertion is that refusals to license intellectual property have 
never been exempt from s 46 of the TPA. Despite this, there is limited empirical 
evidence to date of refusals to license in medical biotechnology, an industry in which 
it would be expected that refusals to license might be an issue for downstream 
researchers and companies. Further, there have been no litigated refusals to license, 
which may be indicative that refusals to license are not unduly hindering research. Of 
course, it may also indicate perceived deficiencies with s 46, an issue that will be 
explored further in Chapters 6 and 8. 24' 
2.4o Relevant viewpoints will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
241 Gallini and Trebilcock, above n184, 41. 
242 Ibid, 42. 
243 Particularly relevant is the fact that there have been a number of cases litigated in both the US and 
the EU. It is difficult to say why this may be the case, but it may be due to lower rates of litigation 
generally in Australia. It may also be due to the fact that considerably more upstream research has 
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At the same time, it is recognised that there will be few instances in practice where a 
refusal to license intellectual property contravenes competition law. This is because in 
most cases, a legitimate business justification will operate to exonerate the 
conduct. 245 It will be argued in Chapter 8, however, that there may be some 
circumstances where it is difficult to establish that a refusal to license is predicated on 
efficiency grounds. This will particularly be the case where the holder of a legislated 
privilege seeks to expand the scope of the privilege, or extend it into a discrete market 
not covered by the privilege. 
Accordingly, the following framework should guide policy makers and courts, and 
will form the basis for argument in subsequent chapters of this thesis: 
[I] 
	
	Generally speaking, a refusal to license intellectual property will not 
contravene competition law. 
[2] A refusal to license will, however, become examinable under competition 
law where the refusal is for the purpose of (i) expanding the scope of the 
intellectual property or (ii) extending market power into another distinct 
market not covered by the intellectual property. 246 
[3] Where a refusal becomes examinable under [2](ii), the refusal should be 
examinable whether or not the holder of the intellectual property is 
currently exploiting the separate market, 247 and the reservation of another 
market for its own (actual or potential) use should not necessarily allow it 
to foreclose competition by others. 
Because of its focus on downstream innovation, this framework is particularly 
relevant to a cumulative industry such as medical biotechnology, where there is 
traditionally been conducted in Australia, as is exemplified by an industry such as medical 
biotechnology. These issues will be examined in more detail below; see especially 8.1. 
2A4 See further below, 6.4.1, 83. 
245 In addition, the additional elements of each of the misuse of market power provisions must also be 
established. 
246 See also Adams and McLennan, above n9, 16-17. Abraham I van Melle, 'Refusals to License 
Intellectual Property Rights: The Impact of RTE v EC Commission (Magill) on Australian and New 
Zealand Competition Law' (1997) 25 Australian Business Law Review 4, 14-16. 
247 Cf Tucker, above n188, 86. 
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potential for follow-on research to be impeded. m The third limb of the framework is 
proposed precisely because many upstream biotechnology patents may be useful for a 
number of downstream uses, some of which may indirectly compete. The framework 
is, however, generalisable to dealings in other forms of intellectual property?" At the 
same time, it is recognised that patent protection has special characteristics that mean 
that refusals to license patents may have greater anti-competitive implications. 25° 
Copyright protection provides a case in point's' First, the statutory requirements for 
obtaining patent protection are higher and unlike copyright protection, patent 
protection will only be granted after a process of examination. Secondly, a patent 
monopoly grants a more complete monopoly than copyright protection, and unlike 
copyright protection, precludes independent invention.252 In high-technology 
industries this may operate to limit researchers operating in a particular field. 
Following from this, it may be more difficult to substitute a patented invention than to 
substitute a copyrighted work!'" 
Use of the framework can also be tailored to take into account characteristics peculiar 
to specific industries. It is submitted that competition law is well equipped to focus on 
inter-industry differences, given that it evolves largely on the basis of case laW. 254 
Policy forms an integral part of competition law jurisprudence. 255 Recent 
248 Indeed, the primary concern in medical biotechnology is likely to be the situation where a patent 
holder seeks to prevent research in a downstream market. 
249 Of course, there are important differences between the various forms of intellectual property, and 
the anti-competitive implications of refusals to license patents may be greater than refusals to license 
other forms of intellectual property. See further below, 
250 See also van MeIle, above n246, 25-27. 
251 Many of the comparative cases that will be discussed in Chapter 7 involved copyrighted works. In 
contrast, few have involved patented inventions. The applicability of principles from these cases to 
refusals to license patents will be discussed further below, 7.2.4, 7.3.4. 
252 This is despite the fact that the period of patent protection at 20 years is shorter than the period of 
copyright protection at 70. 
253 See, eg, Robert J Hoemer, The Antitrust Significance of a Patent's Exclusionary Power (1992) 60 
Antitrust Law Journal 867. 
254 As stated in respect of US antitrust law in the FTC Report, [t]hat antitrust law develops largely 
through case law gives it the flexibility, to incorporate the goals of patent law into the antitrust analysis 
of conduct with respect to patents' FTC Report, above n106, ch 6, 1. A similar claim can be made in 
relation to Australian competition law. 
255 Burk and Lemley make a related argument in relation to patent law, arguing that the use by courts of 
'policy levers' that tailor the application of a uniform patent system to particular industries in order to 
take account of industry-specific or invention-related variations, is desirable; Dan L Burk and Mark A 
Lemley, 'Policy Levers in Patent Law' (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 1575. The application of policy 
levers in different industries has resulted in the development of some industry specific rules in 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and software; at 1675-1695. Burk and Lemley assert 
that the setting of rigid or 'bright-line' rules by the legislature in areas where levels of innovation are at 
stake, is inappropriate; Ibid. They acknowledge that this argument may be contentious. There is debate 
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jurisprudence in relation to s 46 of the TPA, for example, has been characterised by 
the adoption of increasingly restrictive interpretations of the elements of s 46. A 
distinct policy basis for decision-making would be preferable to ad hoc decision 
making. 256 The adoption of flexibility in the application of s 46 combined with the 
proposed framework would ensure that Australian competition law regulators and 
courts have at their disposal appropriate tools for the regulation of refusals to license 
intellectual property. 
It should be emphasised, therefore, that rigid adherence to the above framework is not 
proposed. Because it has been argued that refusals to license be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis, the framework should be applied with a degree of flexibility. Refusals 
to license patents (and indeed other forms of intellectual property) may be predicated 
on a number of grounds, and it is difficult to decree a definitive test that takes account 
of all circumstances. 257 The framework is therefore proposed on the grounds that it 
provides an adaptable guide for regulators and courts in assessing when a refusal to 
license should receive more detailed consideration. 
In the Australian context, the proposed framework would be in line with the law 
relating to refusals to supply tangible property. 258 It is partly a reflection of the 
position taken by the former TPC in their Background Paper on Misuse of Market 
Power,259 that s 46 may be infringed where ' ... a corporation with a substantial degree 
of market power seeks to obtain an advantage greater than that conferred by the 
relevant statute or seeks to extend the monopoly conferred by the relevant statute into 
markets other than those protected by the statute.' The logical implication from this is 
in the economics literature over the advisability of setting bright-line rules as opposed to allowing 
judges to apply flexible standards, and scholarly argument in favour of judicial minimalism over 
judicial precedent incorporating policy choices; at 1668-1670 and the references cited therein. 
Nevertheless, they contend that informed policy making in the area of patent law is preferable to forced 
adherence to strict rules; at 1670. 
256 See further below, 6.3, 6.4. 
257 See generally Carrier, above n49. 
258 See also Van Melle, above n246, 16. In this respect, Corones submits that on the basis of a seminal 
Australian refusal to deal case, Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 'Just as BHP was condemned for extending its market power from 
one market to another, an owner of intellectual property rights is likely to be condemned for seeking to 
extend its monopoly into markets other than those covered by the relevant statute granting those rights', 
Stephen G Corones, 'Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law: The Magill TV 
Guide Case' (1992) Australian Business Law Review 265, 269. As will become apparent from the 
discussion in the following chapters, however, based on recent judicial determinations on s 46, this is 
by no means 'likely'. 
259 Trade Practices Commission (1990) Misuse of Market Power, Background Paper, 35. 
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that there should be some mechanism for ensuring that competition in downstream 
markets is not adversely affected by upstream intellectual property. 
To some extent, this framework applies an approach that considers the scope of the 
patent grant. Carrier has criticised 260 the application of rules that apply a 'scope of the 
grant' approach, or that focus on whether intellectual property affects multiple 
markets.261 In relation to the scope of the grant approach, Carrier points out that the 
primary criticism of this approach is its elevation of patent law over competition law. 
Further, it fails to account for inter-industry differences, and results in difficult 
questions regarding patent scope. 262 In relation to tests that question whether a 
separate market is affected by the conduct of the holder of an intellectual property 
privilege, Carrier alleges there are difficulties. These relate to problems in defining 
markets, and in accounting for differences between markets. 263 
It is submitted that the flexibility inherent in the framework proposed would 
overcome many of these difficulties. Application of the framework is intended to be 
flexible, on the basis that refusals to license are dealt with on an individual basis. In 
this respect, many of the issues that Carrier raises could be addressed. It would leave 
the way open for courts to apply competition law over patent law if appropriate. It 
would also allow courts to tailor decisions to account for variations in industry 
characteristics, and to consider whether the application of competition law would be 
likely to enhance welfare through increased innovation. 264 Although the framework 
makes reference to the scope of the grant test, it is not solely dictated by it and leaves 
sufficient room for conduct to be found to be anti-competitive in other 
circumstances. 265 Further, as a matter of practical reality, there are likely to be very 
260 In an attempt to overcome difficulties inherent in current approaches to determining when a 
licensing restriction will be anti-competitive, Carrier proposes a test that focuses on innovation, inter-
industry characteristics and behaviour. It applies a series of presumptions and rebuttals; see generally 
Carrier, above n49. Carrier acknowledges that the test may be criticised on the basis that it is difficult 
to apply, and contends that economic studies on the role of innovation within particular industries 
should assist courts in applying the test; Ibid, 841-844. This may be open to question on the grounds 
that these studies have offered inconclusive evidence; see above, 2.2.2.1. 
261 In this sense, Carrier is referring to tests that challenge activity in a market outside that 
contemplated by the intellectual property; ibid 791. Note that Carrier's test applies to licensing 
restrictions generally, and not simply to refusals to license. 
262 Ibid, 788-791. 
263 Ibid, 791-793. 
264 Courts in the EU, for example, have already indicated a willingness to take into account the 
characteristics of particular forms of intellectual property under consideration; see further below, 7.3.1. 
265 Indeed, it will be argued that there are few circumstances where a refusal to license a patent in a 
primary medical biotechnology market is anti-competitive. The only scenario might be where a patent 
holder obtains and uses a patent for defensive purposes. In refusing to license an innovator in a 
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few instances where a refusal to license a patent in an upstream market inhibits 
innovation, 266 and few matters that fall within this category are litigated. Defining 
markets is often an arduous undertaking, and this is unlikely to be resolved by 
avoiding the question of whether innovation in a downstream market is affected. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Section 51(3) of the TPA exempts certain restrictive conditions in intellectual property 
licence agreements from a number of the provisions in Part IV condemning anti-
competitive conduct. This exemption is somewhat unique, in that it differs from the 
treatment of restrictive conditions in the other jurisdictions discussed, the US and EU. 
It is also limited in its scope in that it does not apply to certain Part IV provisions, 
notably s 46, and it does not (and will not as a result of amendment) encompass 
refusals to license intellectual property. 
There are fundamental questions as to whether any exemption from competition law 
for intellectual property is warranted, and answers to these questions were sought by 
the Hilmer Committee but remain unanswered by subsequent reviews addressing the 
issue. The lack of exemption in other jurisdictions, especially the US, raises doubts as 
to whether removal of the exemption would dramatically impact on levels of 
innovation within Australia. Certainly the failure to provide an exemption in respect 
of refusals to license patents would not appear to have resulted in high levels of 
litigation or to have had an overly detrimental impact on investment in innovation or 
levels of innovative activity in medical biotechnology. Indeed, the industry has taken 
on a similar structure in each of the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis. 
It is appropriate, therefore, that refusals to license continue to be subject to the rules 
governing anti-competitive conduct, and be assessed on an individual basis. There is, 
however, scope for clarifying the treatment to be given to refusals to licence and the 
circumstances most likely to give rise to anti-competitive concerns. The framework 
outlined in this chapter aims to provide some clarification of these circumstances. It is 
not an attempt to provide a precise indicator of when a refusal to license will 
contravene s 46, but it does provide a flexible guide as to when a refusal to license 
should receive further consideration as a possible misuse of market power. 
downstream market, a patent holder may seek to expand the scope of a patent privilege; see further 
below, 8.3.3, 8.3.4. 
266 See further below, 8.3.2, 8.3.3. 
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Chapter 6 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
If patent law has deficiencies in fulfilling its role of promoting innovation, there is a 
question as to what the role of competition law is in filling that gap. Chapter 5 
presented a framework designed to assist policy makers, regulators and courts in 
determining when a unilateral and unconditional refusal to license is likely to be anti-
competitive. Section 46 is the provision most likely to be invoked where it is alleged a 
unilateral refusal to license a patent is predicated on anti-competitive grounds. Section 
46 is one of the shortest, most cryptic sections contained in Part IV of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA). Its elements have been interpreted extensively 
but restrictively in a number of recent Australian High Court decisions. 
This chapter will consider s 46(1) of the TPA. The policy objectives and elements of s 
46 will be explained, and High Court jurisprudence and government responses to that 
jurisprudence will be analysed in detail. This analysis will demonstrate that particular 
elements of s 46 have been narrowly interpreted. A very literal approach to analysis of 
s 46 has been taken, with the result that s 46 is likely to apply in very limited 
circumstances, most likely where a corporation is monopolistic or near-monopolistic 
and has engaged in clearly predatory behaviour. This chapter does not attempt to 
apply s 46 to refusals to license patents. That task is undertaken in Chapter 8. Given 
the complexities of recent High Court elucidations of s 46, this Chapter analyses the 
manner in which the elements of s 46 have been interpreted for the purposes of 
discussion in Chapter 8 on how s 46 is likely to apply to refusals to license in medical 
biotechnology. 
Section 46(1) of the TPA contains a prohibition against the misuse of market power 
by corporations with a substantial degree of power in a market. The section provides 
as follows: 
A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take 
advantage of that power for the purpose of — 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a 
body corporate that is related to the corporation in that or any other market; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or 
any other market. 
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Exclusionary conduct by a corporation with substantial market power will only be 
caught by s 46(1) where that market power leads to the exclusionary conduct.' A 
corporation may possess market power, and utilise economic efficiencies harming 
competitors in the process. This conduct will not be penalised under s 46(1) unless all 
of the elements of that section are established. The elements that must be proved in 
order to establish a contravention of s 46(1) are: 
• a corporation must possess substantial market power; 
• it must take advantage of that market power; and 
• the taking advantage of market power must be engaged in for one of the 
proscribed anti-competitive purposes referred to in s 46(1). 
As will become evident, the courts have laid down stringent requirements in relation 
to the section and have established a high threshold for satisfaction of the elements of 
s 46. Before considering in detail the elements of s 46(1), the policy objectives behind 
s 46(1) will be briefly discussed. These policy objectives are reflected in the 
approaches that have been taken by various courts in analysing the elements of s 46, 
and account to some degree for divergences in opinions as to how s 46 should be 
construed. Critically, the policy objectives will reflect in the approaches likely to be 
taken in determining the balance between intellectual property and competition law. 
6.2 POLICY OBJECTIVES BEHIND SECTION 46(1) 2 
The policy objective behind the TPA generally is to enhance public welfare by 
prohibiting anti-competitive conduct. 3 In addition to the somewhat ambiguous 
wording of s 2, the focus in the purpose provisions on the protection of individual 
competitors has given rise to some confusion as to the policy objectives of s 46. 4 
1 Conduct will not be caught where it results in a corporation that did not possess market power, 
attaining that market power. In other words, a crucial element of s 46(1) is that the corporation possess 
market power at the time the conduct alleged to breach s 46(1) is engaged in; Boral Besser Masonry 
Limited (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 
609. See also Geoff Edwards, 'The Hole in the Section 46 Net: The Boral Case, Recoupment Analysis, 
the Problem of Predation and What to do About it' (2003) 31 Australian Business Law Review 151. 
2 A comprehensive discussion of the issues inherent in discerning the policy objectives of s 46 is 
contained in Stephen Corones, 'Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act: Boral, the Dawson Committee 
and the Protection of Small Business' (2003) 31 Australian Business Law Review 210. 
3 See s2, TPA. The objects and policy objectives of the TPA are discussed further, above 5.2.1. 
4 Stephen Corones, 'The Characterisation of Conduct under Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act' 
(2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 409, 410-411; Warren Pengilley, 'Misuse of Market Power 
in Australia: Are the Tests Now Those of Fairness, Efficiency or Business Justification?' (2001) 8 
Canterbury Law Review 70. In relation to the purpose provisions, see further below, 6.5. 
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Section 46 itself contains no explicit statement of the policy behind the section. 5 
Accordingly, there has been some debate over whether the section is intended to 
protect small business, or the interests of consumers and the competitive process. 6 
Although the view that s 46 operates to protect individual (usually small and medium-
sized) competitors has gained some limited judicial support,' recent High Court 
jurisprudence has firmly established that the primary policy objective of s 46 is that of 
protecting consumers through the promotion of a competitive environment and the 
advancement of economic efficiency. 8 Arguably the purpose provisions can be 
reconciled with this aim of s 46 if the view is taken that consumer welfare is 
maximised through a competitive market which results in goods and services being 
provided to consumers as cheaply and efficiently as possible. 9 This assists in 
explaining the composition of the purpose provisions, in that these provisions are 
aimed at promoting a competitive environment in a market for goods and services. 
Arguably, however, this interpretation of s 46 places its focus outside the sphere of 
conduct it was intended to regulate. Concern has been expressed that s 46 fails to give 
any protection to small and medium-sized entities who are subjected to the market 
power of large, powerful corporations. w This will have implications where a small 
company alleges that a refusal to license a patent by a large, vertically-integrated 
5 At the time the amended s 46 was inserted into the Trade Practices Act, the Attorney-General stated 
in the Second Reading Speech that ... an effective provision controlling misuse of market power is 
most important to ensure that small business are given a measure of protection from the predatory 
actions of powerful competitors.'; House of Representatives Debates, Trade Practices Revision Bill, 19 
March 1986 (Oh), 1626. 
6 
See, eg, Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 410-411; Corones, Protection of Small 
Business, above n2; Frank Zumbo, 'The Boral Case: Has the High Court Done Justice to s 46?' (2003) 
11 Trade Practices Law Journal 199. 
7 
Corones, Protection of Small Business, above n2, 211-215 provides a discussion of these decisions. 
See especially, Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd v ASX Operations Ply Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 385 upheld on 
appeal, ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 27 FCR 460; Taprobane Tours v 
Singapore Airlines Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 405; Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 
205 CLR 1, 37-38 (Kirby J in dissent); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd 
(2001) 106 FCR 328, 390 (Merkel J); Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALM 274, 296 (Kirby J in 
dissent). 
8 Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 191 (Mason C.1 
and Wilson J), 194 (Deane .1); Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 
13 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry 
Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 625 (Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J), 640 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). C,orones suggests that while the second view of s 
46 is now firmly entrenched, there is still some support for the first view, with the result that the matter 
cannot be considered to be finally settled; Corones, Protection of Small Business, above n2, 226. 
9 
Brenda Marshall, 'The Relevance of a Legitimate Business Rationale Under Section 46 of the Trade 
Practices Act' (2003) 8 Deakin Law Review 49, 61. 
10 Zumbo, The Boral Case: Has the High Court Done Justice to s 46, above n6. 
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company is anti-competitive. The focus of courts in construing s 46 will be on 
whether there is some consequent impact on competition within the relevant market, 
not on protection of the company requesting a licence. 
In addition, it has been argued that the lack of clearly stated policy objectives in s 46 
leads to difficulty in characterising conduct as anti-competitive or legitimate. 11 
Section 46 has undergone a number of reviews, 12 the most recent of these being the 
review conducted by the Trade Practices Review Committee (the Dawson 
Committee), which provided its report in early 2003,' and the report of the Senate 
Economics References Committee (the Senate Committee) released in early 2004. 14 
Despite increasing concern regarding the efficacy of s 46 in protecting small 
businesses, the Dawson Committee endorsed the view of s 46 espoused in 
Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (Queensland Wire), 15 
Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (Melway) 16 and Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd (Bora0, 17 and recommended that 
s 46 remain in its current form without amendment. 18 
Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 410-411. 
12 Note that few of these reviews have resulted in amendment to s 46. Indeed, the most recent changes 
to s 46 were those made in 1986 in the Trade Practices Revision Bill. These arose as a result of 
proposals contained in Commonwealth of Australia, Trade Practices Act: Proposals for Change (1984) 
which explored recommendations made by the Trade Practices Consultative Committee, Small 
Business and the Trade Practices Act, December 1979 (AGPS, Canberra 1979). 
13 Trade Practices Review Committee, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
(January 2003) (The Dawson Committee Report). The Report is available at: 
<http://www.tpareview.treasury.gov.au/content/report.asp > (at 15 July 2004). 
14 Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, The Effectiveness of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business, (2004) (Senate Committee Report). 
15 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177. Queensland 
Wire involved a refusal by BHP to supply 'Y-bar', a component of 'star picket' fence posts, to a 
competitor of BHP's subsidiary, which was supplied with the product. Queensland Wire was successful 
in the High Court. 
16 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1. Melway involved the 
termination of a distributorship arrangement by Melway, a publisher of street directories, and the 
appointment of another. A subsequent refusal to supply that distributor was justified by Melway on the 
basis of adherence to a long-standing distribution system. The High Court found that Melway did not 
contravene s 46. 
17 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 328. Boral involved 
an allegation of predatory pricing in respect of concrete masonry products. Boral was successful before 
the High Court. The Report was released prior to the High Court's determination in Boral, and the 
Dawson Committee was asked to re-examine s 46 issues in light of this decision. The substance of the 
Dawson Committee Report remained unchanged as a result of these further deliberations. 
18 See Dawson Committee Report, above n13, Chapter Three. 
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Continuing concern as to the effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act in protecting 
small business prompted the inquiry by the Senate Committee and the subsequent 
release of the Senate Committee Report!' The Senate Committee Report highlighted 
the contrasting views within business, regulatory and academic circles as to the role of 
s 46 and its utility in fulfilling this role. Diverging conclusions were reached by the 
Senate Committee, comprised of Labor and Democrat senators on the one hand, and 
the Government Senators on the other. 2° For the most part, the Government accepted 
the recommendations of the Government Senators in advocating few substantive 
amendments to s 46. 21 
Thus, the focus of courts in interpreting s 46 is on the competitive process rather than 
the protection of individual competitors, although as recognised in the Senate 
Committee Report, competition requires competitors, and the retention of a certain 
number of competitors in a market is necessary in order to maintain competitiveness 
in a market. 22 
It is submitted that this policy aim of s 46 is the correct one — s 46 should be aimed at 
protecting the competitive process rather than promoting or entrenching the position 
of individual participants in a market. 23 But even if this is accepted, the standards that 
have been set in relation to each of the s 46 elements are prohibitive, and will mean 
the elements will be established in only a very few cases." Indeed, s 46 has been 
successfully invoked only rarely. Difficulty in establishing the elements of s 46 is 
19 Senate Committee Report, above n14. The Senate Committee relied heavily on the submission of the 
ACCC in reaching and framing its recommendations; see Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, Submission to the Senate Economics References Committee Inquiry into the Effectiveness 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business, (2003). 
20 Government Senators, Government Senators' Report in Senate Economics References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, The Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small 
Business, (2004), 81 (Government Senators' Report). Specific recommendations by the Senate 
Committee and Government Senators will be considered in the context of each element. 
21 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government Response to the Senate Inquiry into the 
Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business (Government Response to 
Senate Committee Report). See also Lynden Griggs, 'Small Business and the Operation of the Trade 
Practices Act — Another Review, Another Election, and the Battle Lines Between Big and Small 
Business are Once Again Redrawn!' (2004) 11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 348. 
22 Senate Committee Report, above n14, [1.18]-[1.26]. See also Government Senators' Report, above 
n20, 81-82. 
23 See also the interesting comments in Justice Robert Shenton French, 'Competition Law — Covering a 
Multitude of Sins' (2004) 12 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 125, 136-139. 
24 An empirical study of s 46 cases from the commencement of the TPA until 2003 discerned that of the 
33 cases which have proceeded to final judgment in either the Federal Court or High Court, 
contraventions have been established in just four cases; Alexandra Merrett, 'The Court Speaks for 
Itself: What Australian Decisions Say About Assessing Market Power for the Purposes of s 46 of the 
TPA' (2004) 11 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 330, especially 221-332, Annexure 1. 
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likely to be exacerbated where an alleged misuse of market power involves the use of 
patents. Chapter 8 will demonstrate that a party alleging that a refusal to license a 
patent contravenes s 46 will have additional hurdles above those faced by general 
litigants alleging a breach of s 46. Accordingly, there must be some doubt as to 
whether s 46 fulfils its role of defending the competitive process. 
The elements of s 46 will now be evaluated in turn. As this analysis will reveal, recent 
High Court jurisprudence has focused on the first two elements, that is, the substantial 
market power standard and the 'take advantage' test. 
6.3 SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER 
A corporation must possess a substantial degree of market power before s 46 will 
come into play. This test was introduced into s 46 by virtue of the Trade Practices 
Revision Act 1986 (Cth). These amendments significantly altered the composition of 
the misuse of market power provision in the TPA. Prior to the amendments, s 46 
required that a corporation be in a position substantially to control a market, with the 
result that the section effectively applied only to monopolists or those with 
overwhelming dominance in a market. 25 The Attorney-General stated in his Second 
Reading Speech that: 
The amendments proposed ... are designed to make s 46 much more effective. The 
test for the application of the section is to be reduced from that of a corporation being 
in a position substantially to control a market to a test of whether a corporation has a 
substantial degree of market power. As well as monopolists, s 46 will now apply to 
major participants in an oligopolistic market and in some cases, to a leading firm in a 
less concentrated market. 26 
As will become apparent, this attempt to increase the effectiveness or reach of s 46 
would appear to have met with limited success. The concept of substantial degree of 
market power will now be examined in greater detail. 
25 House of Representatives Debates, Trade Practices Revision Bill, 19 March 1986 (Oh), 1626, 1626. 
Recourse to extrinsic materials such as Explanatory Memoranda and Second Reading Speeches may be 
had by virtue of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901(Cth), section 15AB where a statutory provision is ' 
ambiguous or obscure', or where the ordinary meaning conveyed by provision ... leads to a result that 
is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable.' 
26 House of Representatives Debates, Trade Practices Revision Bill, 19 March 1986 (ctio, 1626, 1626. 
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6.3.1 THE SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POVVER THRESHOLD 
The threshold test in establishing a contravention of s 46 is market power. The High 
Court recently confirmed that the appropriate starting point in any analysis of s 46 
liability is an assessment of market power. The Full Court of the Federal Court (the 
Full Court) in the recent cases of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
v Boral Ltd27 (Bora!) and Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd 
(Melway) proceeded directly from a finding of an exclusionary purpose, to a 
conclusion about taking advantage of market power. 29 For example, the Full Court in 
Boral viewed intent as being central to a fmding of s 46 liability. 30 
The High Court majority in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission m (Boral) considered the Full 
Court to be in error in their primary focus on the purpose element. As Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J commented: 
To a substantial extent, the reasoning of the Full Court appears to have been affected 
by an error of the same kind as was corrected by this Court in Melway. The Full 
Court began with the purpose of eliminating or damaging a competitor, and reasoned 
inferentially from that. The dangers involved in such a process have already been 
mentioned. 32 
The High Court majority in Melway had cautioned against such an approach, stating 
that ' ... there are cases in which it is dangerous to proceed too quickly from a finding 
about purpose to a conclusion about taking advantage. That is especially so when, in a 
context such as the present, the purpose as referred to in s 46 is relatively narrow: 33 
The High Court held that even if a finding about purpose has been made, it is 
27 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 328. 
28 Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-693. 
29 A similar approach was taken by Deane J in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty 
Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 197-198. 
30 See, eg, the judgment of Finkelstein J, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral 
Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 328, especially 397-398. 
31 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609. 
32 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 636 (Gleeson Cl and Callinan J). See also the judgments of 
Gaudron Gummow and Hayne JJ, 649 and McHugh J, 664. 
33 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 18 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
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necessary in every case to ask whether the conduct could have been engaged in, in a 
competitive market. 34 
An analysis that has purpose as its starting point may be flawed as conduct that may 
appear to be exclusionary may in fact be competitive. In this respect, anti-competitive 
exclusionary conduct and competitive rivalry that has the effect of enhancing 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare may be indistinguishable, highlighting the 
ambiguous nature of purpose. 35 As Gleeson CJ and Callinan J pointed out in Bora1: 36 
...where the conduct alleged to contravene s 46 is competitive pricing, it is especially 
dangerous to proceed too quickly from a finding about purpose to a conclusion about 
taking advantage of market power. Indeed in such a case, a process of reasoning that 
commences with a finding of a purpose of eliminating or damaging a competitor, and 
then draws the inference that a firm with that objective must have, and be exercising, 
a substantial degree of power in a market, is likely to be flawed. 
Thus, the preliminary inquiry where liability under s 46 is in issue is the possession of 
substantial market power, and an examination of market power must occur outside the 
context of the impugned behaviour." This structural approach to market power 
analysis raises a temporal issue. If consideration of market power must take place 
before consideration of the impugned conduct, strategic conduct undertaken with the 
aim of creating the ability to engage in anti-competitive conduct cannot be considered 
in assessing market power. 38 Thus, in the case of an allegation of a refusal to license a 
patent, market power must be considered independently of that refusal to license. This 
would render it unlikely that a finding of market power would be made where a patent 
holder refuses to license to a company that would compete in the same market as the 
patent holder in the event that a licence were granted. 
34 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 48 (Gleeson CT, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
35 Stephen G Corones, Competition Law in Australia (3rd ed, 2004) 344-345. 
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 632 (Gleeson CJ and Callinan J). Although this comment was made 
in the context of predatory pricing, it is clear from the judgment of Gleeson CJ and Callinan J that it 
can be generalised. 
37 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 634 (Gleeson Cl and Callinan J). 
38 Merrett, above n24, 341-342. See also Kirby J's dissenting judgment in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd 
(now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 
693-694. 
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6.3.2 WHAT IS A 'MARKET'? 
In determining whether a corporation possesses substantial market power, the relevant 
market must be defined. 39 In doing so, a purposive approach will be adopted in that 
the purpose of the provision alleged to have been contravened will be borne in mind 
in determining the boundaries of the particular market in which the anti-competitive 
conduct is alleged to have taken place. 4° Focusing on a purposive approach will assist 
in correctly determining the appropriate functional market level, or whether the 
market in question comprises the upstream or downstream market segments, or some 
combination thereof!' Thus, there is no requirement in the legislation that markets be 
either narrowly or widely defined. 42 It also mirrors the approach taken in overseas 
jurisdictions, particularly the United States (US) and European Union (EU). 43 There 
are four requisite steps in a purposive analysis of market definition: 44 
First: 	Start with a specification of the conduct claimed to be unlawful... 
Secondly: Study the precise terms governing breach, in light of the policy of the 
Act and remedy sought. 
Thirdly: 	Identify the firm(s) or division(s) of the firm(s) that undertake the 
conduct. 
39 Note however that defining a market and determining whether a defendant possesses substantial 
market power in that market are part of the same process and are separated to simplify and facilitate the 
market power analysis: defining the relevant market is a subsidiary inquiry to that of evaluating market 
power; see Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 187-188 
(Mason CT and Wilson J). 
40 Neville R Norman and Philip L Williams, 'The Analysis of Market and Competition Under the 
Trade Practices Act: Towards the Resolution of Some Hitherto Unresolved Issues' (1983) 11 
Australian Business Law Review 396, 400-401; Maureen Brunt, 'Market Definition Issues in Australian 
and New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation' (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86. Indeed, 
market definition is, as Professor Brunt points out, a tool to facilitate further analysis; at 126-127. See 
also Geoff Edwards, 'From Super-League to the Super-Market? The Appropriate Emphasis in Market 
Definition' (1996) 4 Competition and Constuner Law Journal 220, 223; Lynden Griggs, 'A 
Teleological Approach to Market Definition — Has it Led to Single Product Market Definition?' (2002) 
4 University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 77, 78 -79. 
41 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 44-46; Griggs, A Teleological Approach, above 
n40, 81. But see generally the caution sounded in Rhonda L Smith and Jill E Walker, 'Australian Trade 
Practices and the Emerging Role of 'Commercial Reality' versus Substitution in Market Definition' 
(1997) 5 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1, 3-4. 
42 As pointed out by Smith and Walker, above n41, 18. 
43 Griggs, A Teleological Approach, above n40, 78-79. 
44 See Brunt, above n40, 127. 
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Fourthly: Ascertain the effective market-place constraints upon the firm(s)' 
conduct through identifying the relevant market. 
In other words, while substitutability retains an important role, commercial realism is 
infused into the process of market definition:* 
The dangers of placing too heavy an emphasis on market definition have been 
stressed, 46 and some commentators have denounced the tendency in some judgments 
to employ an overly legalistic approach to market definition. ° Ideally market 
definition should not occupy too much of a court's time, but should be treated as a 
contextual issue.48 
63.2.1 SUBSTITUTABILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF MARKETS 
'Market' is defined in s 4E of the TPA as: 
... a market in Australia and, when used in relation to any goods or services, includes 
a market for those goods or services and other goods or services that are substitutable 
for, or otherwise competitive with, the first-mentioned goods or services. 
This definition is based on the economic premises of demand and supply-side 
substitutability. A market will be defined to include products that are substitutable for 
the product in issue in a particular case. Substitutability is assessed using the SSNIP 
(small but significant and non-transitory increase in price) or price incentive test 
initially expounded in Australia in Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association 
Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (Re QCMA), 49 which requires a consideration of the 
likely effect of an increase (generally five to 10 percent) in the price of the product in 
issue.5° This assessment requires consideration of the likely effect of the price rise on 
45  Smith and Walker, above n41, especially 21. 
46 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 187 (Mason CJ 
and Wilson J); Brunt, above n40, 126-7; Edwards, The Appropriate Emphasis in Market Definition, 
above n40, 157. 
47 See, eg, Robert Baxt, The Australian Concept of Market — How it Came to Be' in Megan 
Richardson and Philip Williams (eds), The Law and the Market, (1995) Federation Press, Sydney, 10, 
27; Edwards, The Appropriate Emphasis in Market Definition, 221-222. 
as Geoff A Edwards, 'Sub-Markets as Competition Law Markets: the Appropriate Approach to the Sub- 
market Concept in Market Definition' (1998) 6 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 156, 157. 
49 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
190. 
50 The SSN1P test has been 'borrowed' from US jurisprudence, and has a number of limitations. Most 
notably, it is subject to the 'cellophane fallacy', which emerged after the United States decision of 
United States v E I du Pont de Nemours & Co 351 US 377 (1956). The cellophane fallacy refers to the 
difficulty in applying the SSNIP test in cases involving anti-competitive conduct other than mergers; 
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demand for substitutable products (the cross-elasticity of demand), as well as a 
consideration of the ability of the supplier of a product to produce alternative products 
using the same production facilities (the cross-elasticity of supply). 51 As the Trade 
Practices Tribunal stated in Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v 
Defiance Holdings Ltd (Re QCMA): 52 
A market is the area of close competition between firms or, putting it a little 
differently, the field of rivalry between them... Within the bounds of a market there is 
substitution between one product and another, and between one source of supply and 
another, in response to changing prices. So a market is the field of actual and 
potential transactions between buyers and sellers amongst whom there can be strong 
substitution, at least in the long run, if given a sufficient price incentive ...Whether 
such substitution is feasible or likely depends ultimately on customer attitudes, 
technology, distance and cost and price incentives. 
It is the possibilities of such substitution which sets the limits upon a firm's ability to 
'give less and charge more'. Accordingly, in determining the outer boundaries of the 
market we ask a quite simple but fundamental question: If the firm were to 'give less 
and charge more' would there be, to put the matter colloquially, much of a reaction? 
In practice, application of this test involves identification of the narrowest set of 
goods or services that are substitutable for the goods or services that are the subject of 
complaint.53 Only close substitutes will be considered in examining the 
interchangeability (or cross-elasticity) of the product or service in issue with other 
whereas it is appropriate in the case of mergers to measure the effect of a price rise on prevailing 
prices, in other cases of anti-competitive conduct, an accurate result requires measurement at 
competitive prices (which are likely to be lower) rather than prevailing prices; see, eg, John D Heydon, 
The Law Book Company Limited, Trade Practices Law, vol 1, [3.395]++3.410]. Quantitative 
computation of hypothetical competitive prices is bound to be complicated by the cellophane fallacy; 
see, eg, Cento Veljanovsld, 'The Economics of the Relevant Market in EC Competition Law' (1998) 
International Review of Competition Law 4, 8-9; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Merger Guidelines (Canberra 1999); Note that the SSNIP test is only applied in the United States in 
merger analysis. On the operation of the test in the US and its application in Australia, see Deidre L 
Hay, 'A Lesson from the US Hypothetical Monopolist about Market Definition Timeframes and 
Thresholds and the QCMA Test' (1998) 6 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 73. 
51 See Queensland Wire Industries Pry Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 199 
(Dawson J), 210 (Toohey J). 
52 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
190. This passage was most recently approved by the High Court in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now 
Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 643 
(Gleeson a and Callinan J). Gaudron, Gununow and Hayne JJ agreed with Gleeson CJ and Callinan J 
in relation to the issue of market definition, at 638. 
53 On evidence that may be relied upon in defining markets, see the detailed exposition in Caron 
Beaton-Wells, Proof of Antitrust Markets in Australia (2003). 
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products or services, and the fact that consumers will consider some products to be 
alternatives for others will not necessarily result in those products being substitutes in 
the sense that they constitute a single market. 54 In order to be a substitute, a product 
must be so closely related to another product that an alteration to the price of one 
product impacts on demand for (or supply of) the other. Substitutes should not be 
confused with complementary products.55 The High Court majority in Boral recently 
confirmed the importance of employing a narrow approach to the question of 
substitutability. 56 
The relevance of the definition of market in s 4E to a 'market in Australia' should also 
be noted. As a result of this definition, the ACCC and relevant courts have jurisdiction 
to investigate contraventions of the TPA in Australia only. 57 There may be an issue, 
where licences are requested from overseas companies, as to whether a refusal to 
license occurs within the context of an Australian market. The remainder of this thesis 
will proceed on the basis that refusals to license a patent that are intended to be 
worked in Australia, will fall within the confines of the definition of market contained 
in the TPA. 
6.3.2.2 MARKET DIMENSIONS 
A market may have a number of dimensions. Substitutability is relevant in the context 
of determining the product bounds of a market, but it will also be applied in 
determining the geographical limits of a market, the functional dimension of a 
market,58 and the time period over which substitution possibilities should be 
measured. 
The primary consideration in the context of the geographical confines of a market will 
be the effect of an incentive price rise in one location, on a competitor in another 
location. If consumers can source substitutes from an alternative location, this will be 
54 Arnotts Limited and Others v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313, 332. 
55 David K Round, 'Market Definition in Australian Antitrust: Time for a Changed Approach?' (1996) 
9 Corporate and Business Law Journal 193, 221. 
56 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 635 (Gleeson GI and Callinan J), 638 (Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ), 662-663 (McHugh J). The High Court accepted the judgment of the Full Federal Court on 
this point; see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 328, 
377 (Beaumont J), 408 (Finkelstein J). 
57 See Warren Pengilley, 'Patents and Trade Practices — Competition Policies in Conflict? (1977) 5 
Australian Business Law Review 172, 191-193, 201-202. 
58 Although its usefulness may be limited for identifying the functional dimensions of a market; see 
Smith and Walker, above n41, 20. 
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strong evidence these two locations comprise one market. 59 It is unlikely, however, 
that foreign imports will be included within a market, as Australian courts have been 
reluctant to define the scope of a market beyond Australia as a whole and in many 
cases the reach of a market will be defined on a considerably more conservative 
basis.6° 
It may also be necessary in a given case to determine the extent of a market on a 
functional level whereby various functional levels of an industry may constitute 
separate markets. 61 This may be particularly important in a cumulative industry such 
as the medical biotechnology industry where innovation occurs on a sequential basis, 
and trade in very upstream products with a number of potential applications occurs. 
Careful definition of the functional dimension of a market will be crucial in order to 
ensure that markets are not defined too broadly, thus distorting analysis of market 
power. 
As detailed, the Trade Practices Tribunal in Re QCMA defined a market as ' ... the 
field of actual and potential transactions between buyers and sellers amongst whom 
there can be strong substitution, at least in the long run, if given a sufficient price 
incentive.' 62 This reference to 'the long run' connotes a temporal element in relation 
to the evaluation of substitution possibilities available to customers. 63 In other words, 
an assessment of the time required to redeploy existing capacity in response to a price 
incentive is an integral component of market definition." Determination of a relevant 
time dimension will vary according to the particular facts of the case at hand. 65 
Edwards suggests that: 
59 Although as Deane J observed in Queensland Wire, The outer limits (including geographic 
confines) of a particular market are likely to be blurred'; Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken 
Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 196 (Deane J). 
60 See, eg, Howard Smith Industries (1991) ATPR (Corn) 50-111. 
61 See, eg, Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v A-G (Cth) (1994) 49 FCR 211. See also Smith and Walker, above 
n41, 20-21. 
62 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
190. 
63 Re AGL Cooper Basin Natural Gas Supply Arrangements (1997) ATPR 41-593, 44-210 quoting 
Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 3 NZ BLC 102 340, 102 363. 
64 Ibid. 
65 For example, a fairly long-term view of the market was taken in Re AGL Cooper Basin Natural Gas 
Supply Arrangements (1997) ATPR 41-593. In this case, the Trade Practices Tribunal acknowledged 
that there were 'three dated markets of interest: the market in 1986, the market today, and the market in 
"the future" ... perhaps ten or fifteen years hence'; at 44-210. 
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The question of how long a period should be considered in market definition is a 
question how long a period of discretionary power we are willing to afford firms the 
ability to use. This is unlikely to be much more than a year, and may well be only a 
few months.66 
In reality, temporal components of market definition are likely to vary with the facts 
of particular cases, and this aspect of market definition has been relatively unexplored 
by the Australian judiciary.° It may be, however, that longer time dimensions may be 
more appropriate in respect of innovative high technology industries where innovation 
is fast-paced, 68 or industries typified by long-tern contractual arrangements. 69 This will 
have implications for an industry such as medical biotechnology, where technological 
developments are proceeding at a rapid pace. Medical biotechnology is an industry in 
which long-term contractual arrangements are likely to be commonly encountered 
given the preponderance of patents over research products and processes. 
6.3.2.3 THE SUB-MARKET CONCEPT 
The sub-market concept has been recognised as being somewhat problematic in 
Australian trade practices law, 7° although the concept has not been dispensed with 
entirely. A sub-market is a smaller segment of a particular market!' While some have 
supported the use of sub-markets as an aid to analysing the functioning of a particular 
market,72 others have cautioned against the use of sub-markets because sub-market 
analysis may displace analysis in respect of the market as a whole. 73 In reality, sub- 
66 Edwards, The Appropriate Emphasis in Market Definition, above n40, 235. 
67 Mitchell Landrigan, 'The Temporal Dimension of a Market: Illustrations from Case Law and the US 
Merger Guidelines' (1997) 5 Trade Practices Law Journal 242. See also Donald Robertson, 'Time and 
Risk: The Temporal Dimension of Competition Analysis and the Role of Long-term Contracts' (1998) 
26 Australian Business Law Review 273, 296-297. Note, however, the relationship between the 
temporal dimension of market definition and the time period used for competition analysis; Rhonda L 
Smith and Rachel Trindade, 'It's Time: The Temporal Dimension of Competition Analysis' (2004) 12 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 142. 
68 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 73. See also Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd v 
Commerce Commission (1991) 3 NZ BLC 102 340, 102 365 - 102 366. 
69 Robertson, above n67, 288. 
70 In US antitrust law, a sub-market has been recognised as being an area of a product market that is 
capable of attracting liability independently of that market; see Brown Shoe Co v US (1962) 370 US 
294, especially 325-6. 
71 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
190-191; Brunt, above n40, 119. 
72 See, eg, Brunt, above n40, 117-119; Norman and Williams, above n40, 404-405; Singapore Airlines 
Limited v Taprobane Tours WA Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 158, 181 (French J). 
73 See, eg, Edwards, Sub-Markets as Competition Law Markets, above n48; Mitchell G Landrigan, 
'The Delineation of Sub-Markets Under TPA Part IV' (1997) 5 Competition and Consumer Law 
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markets are likely to play a subsidiary role in market definition, and may be useful in 
'...pointing to a particular characteristic, a structural dimension, of the market, i.e. 
how the market works, once the market has been defined'. 74 
6.3.2.4 SINGLE PRODUCT MARKETS 
It follows from a purposive approach to market definition that in some instances a 
single product or product brand may constitute a separate market. 75 Because market 
definition is necessary only to the extent that it contextualises the issues at the heart of 
the section at issue, whether or not a narrow or wide, or short-run or long-run market 
definition is relevant will vary with the circumstances of each case. Narrow market 
definition is not uncommon, and judgments that have insisted that s 4E requires 
consideration of the widest possible range of substitution possibilities regardless of 
the facts of the case at hand, 76 are potentially flawed!' 
Accordingly, courts have been willing to find that a single product is capable of 
constituting a market in a number of cases. 78 The key issue will be that of 
Journal 58, especially 70-71. Note that Edwards argues that if a sub-market can be identified, that sub-
market should be identified as the relevant market, and the sub-market concept dispensed with. On the 
other hand, Landrigan argues that sub-market analysis may be useful, but that the Tribunal and courts 
should start from the basic proposition that a firm cannot exercise market power in a sub-market 
because a sub-market constitutes an area of intense competition. See also ACCC v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442, 521 (Hill J). In this case Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd 
(Universal) and Warner Music Australia Pty Ltd (Warner) supplied compact discs in the Australian 
wholesale market, and each held a one-sixth share of the market. Retailers began to import copies of 
compact discs into Australia upon removal of parallel importation restrictions from the Copyright Act 
1968 (Oh). Universal and Warner threatened to remove trading benefits and ceased trading with some 
retailers as a result. Both Universal and Warner were successful before the Full Court on the basis that 
they did not possess substantial market power; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v ACCC 
(2003) 131 FCR 529. 
74 ACCC v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442, 521 (Hill J). For an analysis of the 
cases in which sub-market analysis has been employed, see Landrigan, The Delineation of Sub-
Markets; above n73; Baxt, above n47. 
75  Griggs, A Teleological Approach, above n40, 94-96; Edwards, Sub-markets as Competition Law 
Markets, above n48, 160-163. 
76 See, eg, News Ltd v Australian Rugby League Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-466. 
77 See, eg, Griggs, A Teleological Approach, above n40, 77-84; Edwards, The Appropriate Emphasis in 
Market Definition, above n40, 226-230. Section 4E was inserted into the TPA in order to remedy the 
situation in Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Qld) Ply Ltd (1975) ATPR 40-004, in which 
the market was confined to one make of car. There is nothing in the words of the section or in the 
report of the Swanson Committee which recommended the change, to support any particular view on 
market definition; see Trade Practices Review Committee (1976) Report to the Minister for Business 
and Consumer Affairs, [5.19-5.22]. 
78 See, eg, Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) ATPR 40-089; Regents Ply Ltd v 
Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 84 FCR 218 (Regents Case), 228 (RD Nicholson J). Corones points out 
that the facts of Regents Case would appear to contradict RD Nicholson J's assertion that in 
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substitutability. 79 It is submitted that the possibility of a single product being defined 
as a separate competition law market should not be discounted,8° although the 
circumstances in which a single product will be a market in itself are likely to be 
limited.81 Where, however, it is difficult to duplicate a particular product, that product 
may constitute a monopoly and should rightfully be defined as a market in itself. The 
same might apply for medical biotechnology products that are difficult to invent 
around, and are key to development in a research area. 
6.3.2.5 DOWNSTREAM OR SECONDARY MARKETS 
The Senate Committee noted in their Report that it seems unlikely as a result of the 
recent High Court decision in Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (Rural Press) 82 that a finding of market power in one market 
can lead to a finding that that market power has been taken advantage of in another 
market. 83 The Senate Committee considered that leveraging market power should be 
caught by s 46, and recommended legislative clarification of this matter.' This 
recommendation of the Senate Committee was endorsed by the Government 
Senators, 85 and the Government in its response to the Senate Committee Report. 86 This 
appropriate circumstances, a market for an individual brand name product might exist, although these 
circumstances did not exist here; see Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 60-61. 
79 Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) ATPR 40-089, 48,797, (Wilcox J). 
80 See Edwards, Sub-markets as Competition Law Markets, above n48, 160-163. Cf Baxt, above n47, 
10. 
81 For commentary on the holding of Hill J at first instance in ACCC v Universal Music Australia Ply 
Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442 that individual compact disc title were capable of constituting 'temporary 
monopolies', see Stephen G Corones, 'Temporary Monopolies and s 46 of the Trade Practices Act' 
(2002) 30 ABLR 246. 
82 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 284 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). The case 
involved a threat by Rural Press, a local newspaper publisher, against a rival publisher that began 
circulating in the area in which Rural Press circulated. Rural Press essentially threatened to establish a 
rival business in the other publisher's traditional circulation area unless it withdrew from the 
circulation area of Rural Press. Rural Press was successful in the High Court. 
83 Prior to the High Court's decision in Rural Press, it was generally understood as a result of the 
Federal Court's decision in Victorian Egg Marketing Board v Parkwood Eggs Ply Ltd (1978) ATPR 17 
789 (Parkwood Eggs), that leveraging market power from one market into a second market would be 
caught by s 46. The Full Federal Court in Rural Press distinguished Parkwood Eggs (and declined to 
follow it in any case given that it was an interlocutory decision), holding that market power must be 
found to have been taken advantage of in the market in which substantial market power exists. The 
High Court observed these comments but failed to provide any further clarification of them; Rural 
Press v ACCC (2002) 118 FCR 236, 278. 
84 Senate Committee Report, above n14, Recommendation 5. This recommendation reads: 'The 
Committee recommends that s 46 be amended to state that a corporation which has a substantial degree 
of power in a market shall not take advantage of that power, in that or any other market, for any 
proscribed purpose in relation to that or any other market.' 
8.5 Government Senators' Report, above n20, 88 
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could have implications in cases of refusals to license intellectual property where 
innovation in a downstream or secondary market has the potential to be affected by 
market power in an upstream market. 
It should also be noted that a market may exist where a product or service exists, even 
though there has been no trade to date in that product or service. As stated by Deane J 
in Queensland Wire: 87 
[A] market can exist if there be the potential for close competition even though none 
in fact exists. A market will continue to exist even though dealings in it be 
temporarily dormant or suspended ... [and even if] there is no supplier of, nor trade 
in, ... goods at a given time — because for example, one party is unwilling to enter 
any transaction at the price or on the conditions set by the other. 
The matter was most recently confirmed by the High Court in NT Power Generation 
Ply Ltd v Power and Water Authority (NT Power). 88 This has applicability to any case 
involving a refusal to supply, including a refusal to license a patent." 
6.3.3 THE CONCEPT OF MARKET POWER 
It has been widely recognised that the concepts of competition and market power are 
heavily interrelated, and that there is an inverse relationship between the two. 9° The 
structural conditions of a market will be indicative of whether or not a corporation 
possesses market power, or whether competitive conditions prevail. 91 The Trade 
Practices Tribunal in Re QCMA highlighted the importance of considering structural 
indicators, in enunciating the following, seminal definition of competition: 
Competition expresses itself as rivalrous market behaviour ... In our view effective 
competition requires both that prices should be flexible, reflecting the forces of 
demand and supply, and that there should be independent rivalry in all dimensions of 
the price-product-service packages offered to consumers and customers. 
86 Government Response to the Senate Committee Report, above n21, 8. 
87 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 196 (Deane J). 
See also Dawson J, 200 and Toohey J, 211-212. 
88 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312, 341-342 
(McHugh ACJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
89 See below, 8.2.1.2(b). 
90 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 40. There is significant international literature 
dealing with this issue. Of most influence on Australian competition law has been Carl Kaysen and 
Donald F Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959). 
91 Kaysen and Turner, above n90, 73. 
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Competition is a process rather than a situation. Nevertheless, whether firms compete 
is very much a matter of the structure of the markets in which they operate. The 
elements of market structure which we would stress as needing to be scanned in any 
case are these: 
(i) 
	
	the number and size distribution of independent sellers, especially the degree 
of market concentration; 
the height of barriers to entry, that is the ease with which new firms may 
enter and secure a viable market; 
(iii) the extent to which the products of the industry are characterised by extreme 
product differentiation and sales promotion; 
(iv) the character of 'vertical relationships' with customers and with suppliers 
and the extent of vertical integration; and 
(v) the nature of any formal, stable and fundamental arrangements between firms 
which restrict their ability to function as independent entities. 
Of all these elements of market structure, no doubt the most important is (i), the 
condition of entry. For it is the ease with which firms may enter which establishes the 
possibilities of market concentration over time; and it is the threat of the entry of a 
new plant into a market which operates as the ultimate regulator of competitive 
conduct?2 
Market power, on the other hand, is the antithesis of competition or the ability to 
' ...raise prices and exclude entry: 93 Market power may, however, be exhibited by 
practices unrelated to price and is therefore defined more broadly than simply the 
ability to raise prices in an unconstrained manner. 94 Accordingly, 
92 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
188-189. These structural elements have been repeatedly applied by the courts in competition cases 
since Re QCMA in order to determine the level of competitiveness of a market; in relation to s 46, see, 
eg, Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177. The courts 
have adopted an essentially mainstream approach in relation to s 46, relying on a modified structure-
conduct-performance approach; see the discussion in Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above 
n35, 32-34. 
93 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
188. 
94 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 200 (Dawson J); 
Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
188-189. 
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A firm possesses market power when it can behave persistently in a manner different 
from the behaviour that a competitive market would enforce on a firm facing 
otherwise similar cost and demand conditions. 95 
Any constraints on market power inherent in the structure of the market must be 
considered in order to determine whether a corporation's actions are subject to these 
constraints. If they are, the market will generally be considered to be competitive. If 
the corporation is able to act in an unconstrained manner, it may be that the market 
power element contained in s 46(1) will be satisfied. This notion of market power is 
reflected in s 46(3); 96 in determining degree of market power, s 46(3) requires that 
regard be had to the extent to which the conduct of the corporation is constrained by 
the conduct of competitors or potential competitors, suppliers or customers within the 
market: 
In determining for the purposes of this section the degree of power that a body 
corporate or bodies corporate has or have in a market, the court shall have regard to 
the extent to which the conduct of the body corporate or of any of those bodies 
corporate in that market is constrained by the conduct of: 
(a) competitors, or potential competitors, of the body corporate or of any of those 
bodies corporate in that market; or 
(b) persons to whom or from whom the body corporate or any of those bodies 
corporate supplies or acquires goods or services in that market. 
Thus, a number of matters may be relevant to the determination of market power 
including 'the number of competitors, their strength and size, the height of barriers to 
entry and the stability or volatility of demand As discussed in Chapter 1, barriers 
to entry are strong determinants of the level of competition within a market." Indeed, 
barriers to entry have been identified under Australian competition law as being the 
95 Kaysen and Turner, above n90, quoted with approval in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v 
Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 200 (Dawson J). This passage has been quoted with 
approval in subsequent High Court decisions; see Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd 
(2001) 205 CLR 1, 21 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) and Boral Besser Masonry Ltd 
(now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 
664 (McHugh J). 
96 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 21 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
97 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 643, (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also above, 1.8. 
98 See the discussion on barriers to entry and their relevance to market structure and market power 
above, 1.8.1. 
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key indicator of market power and the presence or absence of competitive 
conditions." A corporation may have a large market share, but this will not preclude 
entry by potential competitors in the absence of barriers to entry as Mason CJ and 
Wilson J observed in Queensland Wire: 
A large market share may well be evidence of market power ... but the ease with 
which competitors may enter the market must also be considered. It is only when for 
some reason it is not rational or possible for new entrants to participate in the market 
that a firm can have market power. There must be barriers to entry. ... Barriers to 
entry may be legal barriers — patent rights, exclusive government licences and tariffs 
for example. Barriers to entry may also be a result of large "economies of scale". 
Where the economies of scale in a market are such that the minimum size for an 
efficient firm is very large relative to the size of the market, it may be that potential 
competitors will be dissuaded from entering the market by the apprehension that only 
one firm would survive. lw 
It has now been recognised in Australia, however, that barriers to entry may be 
'structural', or they may be 'strategic' in that they stem from the practices and 
policies of incumbent market participants. m Both should be considered in evaluating 
market power, 1°2 and it is important to bear in mind that not all barriers to entry may 
be socially undesirable. m The need to obtain an intellectual property licence may 
" Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd v Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169, 
188-189; Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 189-190 
(Mason CJ and Wilson J); Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 27 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 635 (Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J). 
100 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 189-190 
(Mason CJ and Wilson J). See also Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 635, (Gleeson CJ and Callinan J). 
101 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 328 per 
Finkelstein J. See also Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 673 (McHugh J), 690 (Kirby J). See also the 
discussion on barriers to entry in Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 20-32, 98-104. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also adopted an expansive 
definition of barriers to entry in line with Bain's work, and has categorised barriers to entry as being 
either structural or innocent (or economic), or strategic (or behavioural); Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law 
(undated), 13; Joseph Bain, Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries (1965). 
102 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 104; Mark L Burton, David L 1Caserman and 
John L Mayo, 'Modeling Entry and Barriers to Entry: A Test of Alternative Specifications', (1999) The 
Antitrust Law Bulletin 387, 387-388. 
103  F Michael Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (3rd 
ed) (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1990), 361, their n27. 
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constitute a structural barrier to entry, lw but rewards for innovation are an example of 
a socially advantageous barrier to entry. 1°5 The manner in which an intellectual 
property right is exercised may in some circumstances constitute a strategic barrier to 
entry. Australian courts, and the Tribunal and Commission have generally taken an 
intuitive (as opposed to an analytical economic) approach to assessing the 
significance of barriers to entry, 106 and arguably any assessment of the implications of 
conduct that may operate to deter entry should be undertaken over a reasonable period 
of time,m in order to ensure that market power operates on a persistent or long-term 
basis. 1°8 
Australian courts have maintained a generally structuralist approach to analysing 
market power. 1°9 The test that results from High Court jurisprudence would appear to 
be a series of cumulatively applied economic analyses that focus on: 
(1) the ability of a corporation to raise its prices above competitive levels; 
(2) the ability of a corporation to act persistently in a manner unconstrained by 
competition in circumstances of workable competition; and 
(3) consideration of whether it is rational or possible for new entrants to enter the 
market. 11° 
In considering the issue of market power, a court will give considerable weight to 
evidence that points to ease or difficulty of entry, and assess this in light of other 
relevant factors."' 
104 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 98. 
105 Scherer and Ross, above n103, 361, their n27. 
106 Hood points out that the method adopted is generally to consider 'evidence of actual successful or 
failed entry attempts.'; Antra Hood, 'Barriers and Impediments to Entry in Australian Health Care 
Markets After Stirling Harbour, Boral and Melway' (2002) 20 Australian Business Law Review 6, 12. 
See also Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 104-106. 
107 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 104-106. Corones suggests consideration of 
attempts at entry over a period of at least five years. 
108 See also Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC (2003) 131 FCR 529, 565. 
109 Merrett points out that Queensland Wire was the first case in which clear tests for market power 
were defined, although market power was never in issue in that case. The Queensland Wire tests were 
applied in Melway, and further developed in Boral. An absence of competitive constraint became the 
key factor in the High Court's judgments in Boral, and the issue was frequently stated in absolute 
rather than relative terms. This would appear to preclude a finding of market power in cases of 
oligopoly; Merrett, above n24, 332-343. 
110 Ibid, especially 340. For examples of an application of this approach see Emmett J (dissenting) in 
ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Ply Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 339, and the Full Court of the Federal 
Court in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC (2003) 201 ALR 636. 
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6.3.4 THE MEANING OF 'SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE' OF POWER IN A MARKET 
As part of determining whether a corporation possesses market power, a court must 
analyse whether that market power is substantial. The term 'substantial' is not defined 
in the Trade Practices Act, and is a relative concept. 112 In assessing degree of market 
power, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the legislation that amended s 
46(1) to its current form explains that 'substantial' is intended to signify 'large or 
weighty' or 'considerable, solid or big'!" The Trade Practices Commission adopted 
this meaning of 'substantial' in a Background Paper issued in 1990. 114 
Although clarifying to some extent the interpretation that should be given to the 
phrase 'substantial degree of power', the Explanatory Memorandum does not 
delineate with any precision, the circumstances in which a corporation is likely to 
possess a substantial degree of market power. Limited guidance is available by way of 
judicial interpretation of the term, with several different interpretations being placed 
on it.n5 While it is apparent from the Explanatory Memorandum and the Second 
111 For a useful discussion on various factors that may point to market power, see Heydon, above n50, 
[5-110-5-260]. 
112 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986 (Cth), [40]. Lockhart and Gummow 
JJ observed that 'substantial degree of market power' operates on a relative basis, and that the difficulty 
lies not in its definition, but in the application of the concept to the circumstances of particular cases; 
Eastern Express Ply Ltd v General Newspapers Ply Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 43, 63 (Lockhart and Gummow 
JJ). 
113 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986 (Cth), [41]. Recourse to the 
Explanatory Memorandum is arguably justified, as the term is ambiguous and not subject to its 
ordinary meaning. As discussed above, the Attorney-General also indicated in his Second Reading 
Speech that the amended s 46(1) was intended to have a lower threshold for application than the 
previous provision which required that a corporation be in '...a position substantially to control a 
market.'; see above n26 and accompanying text. 
114 Trade Practices Commission, Misuse of Market Power Background Paper (1990), section E, [44]. 
115 Contrast, eg, the definition provided by Dawson J in Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken 
Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 200 (substantial market power constitutes 'the advantage which 
flows from monopoly or near monopoly'), with that provided by Wilcox J in Eastern Express Pty Ltd v 
General Newspapers Ply Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 385, 403-404 ('real or of substance and not insubstantial 
or nominal'). The term is likely to be given a more intermediate interpretation in line with the judgment 
of Lockhart and Gummow JJ in Eastern Express Ply Limited v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) 35 
FCR 43, 46, who observed that 'significant' in the context of s 46 means substantial or large. Their 
judgment in this respect was cited with approval by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Universal 
Music Australia Ply Ltd v ACCC (2003) 131 FCR 529. 
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Reading Speech that something less than monopoly power is required, 116 the extent of 
market power connoted by the term is unclear. 117 
6.3.5 THE CURRENT MARKET POWER STANDARD 
The Explanatory Memorandum does provide some further assistance in relation to the 
approach to be taken in assessing market power, and in particular to the approach 
envisaged via the application of s 46(3). 118 It points out that s 46(3) reflects the 
approach of the European Court of Justice in three major decisions, and that these 
cases afford guidance as to how market power should be assessed pursuant to s 
46(3). n9 In light of these decisions, an evaluation of whether a corporation possesses 
market power will focus on the market share, structural features and level of 
independence of a particular corporation, and also on other matters, such as the 
impact of competitors' market share and behaviour, and potential levels of 
competition. 
Findings of substantial market power in s 46 cases have been relatively rare. 12° It has 
been contended that the High Court majority's decision in Boral has resulted in a 
reversion in the meaning of market power to monopoly or near monopoly.121 The High 
Court in Boral required evidence of an absence of competitive conditions in 
establishing market power, and evidence pointing to competitive conditions (which 
will tend to be present even in oligopoly markets) will tend to preclude a finding that 
any corporation possesses market power. Zumbo suggests that in the absence of 
116 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986 pro, [35], [37]; House of 
Representatives Debates, Trade Practices Revision Bill, 19 March 1986 (Cth), 1626. 
117 Hay suggests that an assessment of whether a corporation possesses 'substantial' market power must 
hinge on market share; George A Hay, 'Market Power in Australasian Antitrust: an American 
Perspective' (1994) 1 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 215, 223-225. 
118 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986 (Cth). 
119 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986 (Cth), [46]. The cases referred to in 
the Explanatory Memorandum are Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] CMLR 
199, United Brands v Commission [1978] 1 CMLR 429 and Hoffman-La Roche v Commission [1979] 3 
CMLR 211. Note that Article 86 (now Article 82) of the Treaty of Rome requires a position of 
dominance in a market, which is stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to be greater than the 
threshold degree of market power required under s 46(1); at [46]. 
120 Merrett points out that 	[T]he only findings of market power since 1987 will have occurred 
where the issue has been — in fact or in effect — conceded.', Merrett, above n24, 333, 343, Annexure 2. 
Indeed, Merrett's analysis indicates that there have been fewer findings of market power since the 1986 
amendments than there had been prior to the amendments. The notable exception is the decision of the 
Full Federal Court in ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 339. Merrett 
suggested the decision of the Full Court was unlikely to escape a reversal by the High Court, Merrett, 
343. Leave to appeal to the High Court was, however, refused; see below, n124. 
121 See the Senate Committee Report, above n14, [2.11]-[2.17]; Zumbo, The Boral Case: Has the High 
Court Done Justice to s 46, above n6. 
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collusion, an 'absence of competitive conditions' is likely to exist only in situations of 
monopoly, near monopoly or where a corporation is in a controlling or dominant 
position in a market. 122 
In considering the question of substantial market power, The Senate Committee 
concluded that amendment to s 46 was required in order to reinforce the 
Parliamentary intention behind the 1986 amendments, despite the fact that an appeal 
in the case of ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Ply Ltd (Safeway) 123 case was 
pending to the High Court. 124 The Senate Committee consequently recommended that 
s 46 be amended to state that the threshold of "a substantial degree of power" is lower 
than the former threshold of substantial contro1. 125 They also recommended that a 
declaratory provision be included in s 46 outlining matters to be considered in 
determining the issue of substantial market power. Thus, the recommendation 
proposed by the Senate Committee was as follows: 
1. the threshold of 'a substantial degree of power in a market' is lower than 
the former threshold of substantial control; 
2. the substantial market power threshold does not require a corporation to 
have an absolute freedom from constraint — it is sufficient if the 
corporation is not constrained to a significant extent by competitors or 
suppliers; 
122 Zumbo, The Boral Case: Has the High Court Done Justice to s 46, above n6. See also Merrett, 
above n24, 343. Kirby J made a similar point in Boral when he stated that the operation of s 46 is now 
'in effect, ... confined to monopolists and near monopolists. In substance, the notion of "control" of the 
market ... [has been] restored'; Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 689 (Kirby J). 
123 ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 339. The case involved a number of 
incidents where Safeway, a supermarket chain, deleted from their supermarkets products from 
particular bread bakers. The deletions occurred either to deter the bakers from supplying independent 
retailers, or to assist in negotiating satisfactory case deals for Safeway. 
124 The Senate Committee referred to a submission by the Law Council of Australia that denied that the 
test for substantial market power had been raised to one of dominance. The Law Council pointed to the 
decision of the Full Federal Court in Safeway where a corporation with 16 percent market share was 
found, on the basis of a number of factors, to have substantial market power, and contended that any 
amendment to s 46 should be deferred pending the outcome of the Safeway appeal; see the Senate 
Committee Report, above n14, [2.15]. Note that Safeway was found to have market power on a number 
of other grounds, including 'excess capacity' in the market, barriers to a participant of similar size 
entering the market and the fact that Safeway's actions resulted in one baker refusing to supply 
discounted bread to retail customers on a number of occasions; ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Ply 
Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 339, [310-324]. Leave to appeal to the High Court in respect of a number of issues 
including that of market power, was recently refused; see 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/registry/slresults/10-09-04M.htm > at 8 August 2005. 
125 Senate Committee Report, above n14, Recommendation 1. 
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3. more than one corporation can have a substantial degree of power in a 
market; 
4. evidence of a corporation's behaviour in the market is relevant to a 
determination of substantial market power. 126 
The Government Senators doubted the utility of the first proposal, but accepted that 
the remaining three proposals may be effective in clarifying the scope of s 46. 127 The 
Government disagreed that the judgments in Boral required a total absence of 
competitive constraint, 128 and declined to accept any aspect of this recommendation. 129 
While they considered the second proposal would be likely to generate further 
complexity, the remaining proposals were rejected in that the Government considered 
them to be redundant. 130 
The Senate Committee also recommended that s 46 be amended to state that: 
in determining whether or not a corporation has a substantial degree of power in a 
market for the purpose of s 46(1), the court may have regard to whether the 
corporation has substantial financial power. 
'Financial power' should be defined in terms of access to financial, technical and 
business resources.' 31 
Again, the Government Senators were reluctant to interpose further requirements into 
s 46 that they considered to be unnecessary and that could result in an extension to the 
scope of s 46. 132 The Government endorsed the finding of the Government Senators. 133 
The Government did, however partially accept a further recommendation by the 
Senate Committee in relation to the combined market power of separate entities. The 
Government agreed that s 46 should be amended to allow a court to 'take account of 
any market power the corporation has that results from contracts, arrangements or 
126 Ibid. This recommendation was based on a proposed recommendation by the ACCC; see the ACCC 
Submission, above n19, 19. 
127 Government Senators' Report, above n14, 85-86. 
128 The Government also pointed to the decision in Safeway in support of this contention; Government 
Response to the Senate Committee Report, above n21, 4. 
129 /bid, 3 _4. 
130 ibid. 
131 Senate Committee Report, above n14, Recommendation 4. 
132 Government Senators Report, above n20, 88. 
133 Government Response to the Senate Committee Report, above n21, 7. 
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understandings with others.' 134 This may be relevant where companies are institutions 
vertically integrate in order to shore up access to patents. In instances where this 
occurs, market power may be judged not on the basis of the power possessed by a 
single entity, but with respect to market power possessed as a result of licence 
arrangements with other parties. 
6.3.6 SUMMARY 
In determining questions of substantial market power under s 46, a court must initially 
discern the relevant market in which a corporation operates, and then determine 
whether that corporation possesses substantial market power in that market. In 
assessing market power, courts will consider the presence or absence of barriers to 
entry, and then take into account other relevant factors. Arguably, the High Court has 
interpreted the market power standard in a restrictive fashion, so that a finding of 
substantial market power will necessitate a complete absence of competitive 
conditions. Accordingly, the Full Federal Court's decision in Safeway should be 
considered to be an anomaly in the recent line of jurisprudence interpreting the market 
power standard. In that case, competitive conditions were present but a finding of 
market power was made on the basis of a number of relevant factors. D5 
Establishing substantial market power in respect of intellectual property ownership is 
difficult. It will be argued in Chapter 8 that on the basis of current, narrow 
interpretations of substantial market power, there are unlikely to be any circumstances 
where Australian courts would be likely to make a finding of market power in respect 
of the ownership of medical biotechnology patents. This is despite the fact that it has 
been recognised in Australia that intellectual property is capable of giving rise to 
market power.'" 
6.4 `TAKING ADVANTAGE' OF MARKET POWER 
The second element of s 46 is that a corporation 'take advantage' of market power 
possessed in the relevant market. This element has also been subject to extensive 
interpretation by the High Court. Despite this, the precise meaning of the test 
contained within this element remains unclear. 
134 	. Ibid. 8 in response to Recommendation 6, Senate Committee Report. Recommendation 6 was 
slightly broader than the Government's preferred amendment, which essentially restates the law as 
established by Justice Lockhart in Dowling v Dalgety Australia Limited and Others (1992) 34 FCR 
109. 
135 See above, n124. 
136 See below, 8.2.2.1. 
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6.4.1 THE HIGH COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 'TAKE ADVANTAGE' 
In Queensland Wire the High Court, by majority, held that the term 'take advantage 
of' in the context of s 46 simply means 'use' and is not to be interpreted in a 
pejorative sense. m In undertaking this objective assessment of whether a corporation 
has 'used' its market power, the majority 138 in Queensland Wire determined that it is 
necessary to consider whether the corporation would have been in a position to 
engage in the conduct in question in a competitive market.'" 
The correctness of this approach was affirmed 14° by the High Court majority in 
Melway, 141 who stated that it is necessary to consider whether the conduct would have 
been engaged in, in a market in which there is ... a sufficient level of competition to 
deny a substantial degree of power to any competitor in the market.' 142 In other words, 
a hypothetical inquiry must be undertaken in which a consideration of the impugned 
conduct under conditions of workable competition is required. m In so doing, the 
137 Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 190-191 
(Mason CJ and Wilson J), 194 (Deane J), 202 (Dawson J, agreeing with Deane J), 213 (Toohey J). 
138 Deane J took a different approach in that he proceeded directly from a finding that BHP were 
refusing to supply for a proscribed purpose, to a conclusion that BHP were taking advantage of their 
market power; (Deane J), and see above, 6.3.1. 
139 Queensland Wire Industries Po, Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 192 (Mason Cl 
and Wilson J), 197-198 (Deane J), 202 (Dawson J), 216 (Toohey J). 
140 It has been argued that Melway effectively goes beyond the High Court's judgment in Queensland 
Wire, in that Queensland Wire is not clear authority for an approach that asks whether the conduct 
'would' have been engaged in under workably competitive conditions; see Daniel Clough, 'Misuse of 
Market Power — "Would" or "Could" in a Competitive Market?' (2001) 29 Australian Business Law 
Review 311, 335. Indeed, it was unclear after Queensland Wire whether the conditions under which the 
corporation's conduct had to be considered were perfectly competitive, or workably competitive 
conditions; at 335. 
141 The dissenting judge, Kirby J, held that the term 'take advantage of' simply means 'use', and stated 
that it is unnecessary to ... pose the hypothetical questions (sometimes difficult to resolve) as to 
whether such corporation could, or would, acting rationally, have engaged in the forbidden conduct if it 
were subject to effective competition.'; Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 
CLR 1, 43 (Kirby J). Kirby J retreated from this position to an extent in Rural Press Ltd v ACCC 
(2003) 78 ALJR 274, 301, in that he conceded that the expression means more than simply 'use'. 
142 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 23 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
143 In this respect, Melway expands on Queensland Wire; see Ray Steinwall, `Melway and 
Monopolisation — Some Observations on the High Court's Decision' (2001) 9 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 93, 98-99, 100. Zumbo contends that the High Court has placed inappropriate 
focus on the hypothetical enquiry as to whether the corporation would have engaged in the same 
conduct in the absence of market power at the expense of attention on the nature of the conduct, and 
whether or not market power would allow that conduct to be sustainable over a period of time; Zumbo, 
The Boral Case: Has the High Court Done Justice to s 46, above n6, 222. Cf Lynden Griggs and 
Samantha Hardy, `ACCC v Boral — the High Court Awaits Another Section 46 Case!' (2001) 9 Trade 
Practices Law Journal 201, 207-212 
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majority recognised that it is not appropriate to consider the likelihood of a 
corporation's conduct taking place in '...circumstances that are completely divorced 
from the reality of the market." 46 
The High Court appears in effect, to have implicitly incorporated a 'business 
rationale' 145 justification into the 'take advantage' element. 146 If a corporation is able 
to demonstrate, through evidence, that the conduct would have been engaged in under 
workably competitive conditions on economic efficiency grounds, 147 this may provide 
a legitimate business explanation for the conduct which will negative the 'take 
advantage of' test, and exonerate the corporation from liabi1ity. H8 At the very least, 
the court will consider this evidence as an additional factor militating against a 
finding that the 'take advantage of' element has been established. If a decision to 
engage in a course of conduct can be supported on economically efficient grounds, 
there is no reason why the conduct should be labelled as being anti-competitive. 149 
Accordingly, many commentators have applauded the High Court's inclusion of 
144 Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 25 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). This confirms that a consideration of the conduct under conditions of 
workable, rather than perfect competition is required. 
145 It has been pointed out that there is likely to be little practical difference between the terms 
'legitimate' and 'rational' as used to describe business 'justifications', 'explanations' and 'rationales'. 
Although varying combinations of these terms are evident in s 46 jurisprudence and academic 
commentary, they represent essentially the same concept; Marshall, above n9, 62. 
146 See also the High Court decision in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 625 (Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J). Cf Kirby J (in dissent) in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 
CLR 1, 41, arguing that debates about proscribed as opposed to permissible conduct arise in relation to 
the identification of purpose, and not in characterising the acts as 'taking advantage'. 
147 Marshall, above n9, 63 Efficiency considerations were taken into account in relation to the take 
advantage element prior to Melway; see Michael O'Bryan, 'Section 46: Law or Economics' (1993) 1 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 64, 84; Frances Hanks and Philip L Williams, 'Implications 
of the Decision of the High Court in Queensland Wire' (1990) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 
437, especially 445-446. Cf Lawson, who argues that the effect of Melway was to introduce the 
consideration of efficiency arguments, as a result of which the operation of s 46 was narrowed; Charles 
Lawson, 'Patenting Genes and Gene Sequences and Competition: Patenting at the Expense of 
Competition' (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 97, 123-128. 
148 Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 414-420. Corones points out that there is no 
consensus in the Federal Court as to the relevance of rational business justifications to the 'take 
advantage of' test. Corones supports the inclusion of an explicit requirement that business justifications 
be taken into account in objectively considering this element; at 419-420. 
149 For detailed analyses of the economic bases for the decision in Melway, see, eg, Daniel Clough, 
'Law and Economics of VertiCal Restraints in Australia' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 
20; Edwards, `Melway — a TCE Perspective' (2002) 10 Trade Practices Law Journal 77; Michael 
O'Bryan, above n147. See generally Karen Yeung, 'The Courtroom Economist in Australian Anti-trust 
Litigation: An Underutilised Resource?' (1992) Australian Business Law Review 461; Maureen Brunt, 
'The Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation: Australia' (1986) Australian Business Law 
Review 261. 
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efficiency considerations into s 46 analysis, although there has been some debate over 
whether these considerations are more appropriately taken into account in relation to 
the take advantage element, or the purpose element. m 
The High Court's jurisprudence in relation to s 46 has generated an extensive body of 
commentary, based primarily on the lack of prospective certainty provided in relation 
to the 'take advantage' test. 151 Proponents of recent judicial pronouncements that have 
dealt with the 'taking advantage' test contend that these judgments provide businesses 
with a sufficient level of certainty to allow them to gauge whether or not anticipated 
behaviour is likely to contravene s 46. 152 Still other commentators have praised early 
High Court decisions on s 46, but lamented the application of the principles laid down 
in these cases by lower courts!" 
The 'take advantage' test would appear to have been further modified in Rural Press, 
where the High Court (by majority) held that it may be possible to determine whether 
a corporation had taken advantage of its market power by considering whether it 
'could' have acted in the way in which it acted in competitive conditions. 154 This 
change in focus arguably removes the requirement that a commercial explanation for 
'50 A number of relevant articles are discussed in this section, and below, 6.5 	Proscribed Purpose. 
Note that some commentators have cautioned against relying solely on economic efficiency as a 
determinant of liability in s 46 cases; see, eg, Peter Prince, 'Queensland Wire and Efficiency — What 
Can Australia Learn From US and New Zealand Refusal to Deal Cases?' (1998) 5 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 237. 
151 See, eg, Warren Pengilley, 'Thirty Years of the Trade Practices Act: Some Thematic Conclusions' 
(2004) 12 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1; Henry Ergas and Mitchell Landrigan, 'Not 
Another Article About Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act!' (2004) 32 Australian Business Law 
Review 415; David Meltz, 'Market Entry — See Adjoining Map": Melway and the Right Not to 
Supply' (2002) 10 Trade Practices Law Journal 96; Clough, above n140; Weeliem Seah, 'Fair 
Competition or Unfair Predation: Identifying the Misuse of Market Power Under Section 46' (2001) 9 
Trade Practices Law Journal 236; Warren Pengilley, 'Misuse of Market Power: The Unbearable 
Uncertainties Facing Australian Management' (2000) 8 Trade Practices Law Journal 56; Richard 
Dammery 'Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act: The Need for Prospective Certainty' (1999) 6 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 246; Kathryn McMahon, 'Refusals to Supply by Corporations 
With Substantial Market Power' (1994) 22 Australian Business Law Review 7; Warren Pengilley, 
'Queensland Wire and its Progeny Decisions: How Competent are the Courts to Determine Supply 
Prices and Trading Conditions?' (1991) 21 Western Australia Law Review 225; 
152 Marshall, above n9; Rhonda Smith and David K Round, 'The Puberty Blues of Competition 
Analysis: Section 46' (2001) 9 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 189; Roger Featherston and 
Geoff Edwards, 'Recent Developments in Misuse of Market Power' (2000) 8 Trade Practices Law 
Journal 79; Brenda Marshall, 'Refusals to Supply Under Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act: Misuse 
of Market Power or Legitimate Business Conduct?' (1996) 8 Bond Law Review 182; Sandra Weisman, 
'In Queensland Wire, The High Court has Provided an Elegant Backstop to "Use" of Market Power' 
(1995) Competition and Consumer Law Journal 189. 
153 See, eg, O'Bryan, above n147. 
154 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 285-286, (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
276 
Chapter 6 
the conduct be provided in order to exonerate a corporation from s 46 liability, and 
places emphasis on physical capacity. This may have the effect of undermining the 
objectives of s 46 and removing economic considerations from analysis of the 'take 
advantage' test. Provided it can be established that a corporation could not have 
engaged in conduct in a workably competitive market, the take advantage test will not 
be satisfied. As the dissenting judge Justice Kirby observed: 
[T]here is a great difference between a test of physical possibility and one of 
commercial likelihood. There may be few forms of commercial conduct that are 
physically impossibly, with or without substantial market power. However, such a 
criterion affords no assistance in distinguishing conduct that involves "taking 
advantage of market power", in a way forbidden by s 46 of the Act, from that which 
does not (Kirby J's emphasis).m 
This shift in emphasis from 'would' to 'could' is, however, one that has been evident 
in Federal Court and High Court judgments for some time since Queensland Wire. 156 
Clough suggests that in the long-run and assuming economic rationality, what a 
corporation 'would' do in a perfectly competitive market will coincide with what that 
corporation 'could' do. 37 It is submitted that not only is perfect competition an 
inappropriate standard by which to measure a defendant's conduct, 38 it is not always 
reasonable to assume economic rationality. This is particularly the case in relation to 
bargaining for the exchange of patents, as outlined in Chapter 3• 39 For this reason, 
there will be implications if a court chooses to apply one test over another. 16° 
As discussed below, 161 the Government Senators' Report addressed this point, and 
recommended that s 46 be amended to require specifically that courts consider, in 
relation to the 'take advantage' test, whether the corporation 'would' be likely to 
155 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 301 (Kirby J). See also Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting 
Small Business: Second Supplementary Submission to the Senate Economics References Committee, 14 
January 2004, Submission 30b, 4. 
156 See Clough, above n140. 
157 Ibid, 314. 
158 Indeed, the High Court has confirmed that it is inappropriate to consider the conduct of a defendant 
under perfectly competitive conditions; see above, n144 and accompanying text. 
159 See above, 3.3.3. 
160 Indeed, Clough points out that the distinction between the tests becomes important where conduct 
takes place in imperfect market conditions, or where the relevant time period is the short-run; Clough, 
above n140, 314-317. 
161 See below, 6.4.3. 
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engage in the conduct in question if it lacked a substantial degree of market power. 
The Government refused to endorse this recommendation. 
The result is that it is unclear whether the High Court in Rural Press has overruled 
Melway on this point, or whether the High Court has used the terms 'would' and 
'could' interchangeably. In Rural Press, the majority stated that: 
The Commission's criticism of the Full Federal Court for asking whether Rural Press 
and Bridge "could" engage in the same conduct in the absence of market power must 
be rejected. A majority of this Court in [Melway] adopted the same test in saying: 
"Bearing in mind that the refusal to supply the respondent was only a 
manifestation of Melway's distributorship system, the real question was 
whether, without its market power, Melway could have maintained its 
distributorship system." 
The Commission did not demonstrate either that that did not mean what it said, or 
that what it said should be overruled. 162 
However, despite this use of the word 'could', the majority in Melway were clear that 
a 'would' approach should be taken when considering the action likely to be taken by 
a corporation under competitive conditions. The majority preferred the reasoning of 
the dissenting judge, Heerey J in the Full Court who explicitly adopted a 'would' 
approach. 163 Thus, the High Court majority held that: 
The only purpose of the hypothesis is to seek to test whether Melway has taken 
advantage of its degree of market power. It is one thing to compare what it has done 
with what it might be thought it would do if it lacked that power. It is a different 
thing to compare what it has done in circumstances that are completely divorced from 
the reality of the market. 164 
In expressly rejecting the 'could' approach proposed by the respondent, 165 the majority 
stated that: 
162 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 285-286, (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) 
referring to Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 26 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (full references omitted). 
163 Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 (1999) 90 FCR 128, 134-135. 
164 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 25 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
165 The respondent argued in its written submissions that 'the Appellant had a substantial degree of 
market power. Necessarily it took advantage of that power when it refused to supply the Respondent. 
What it may or may not have done, in a competitive market, was nothing to the point.'; Melway 
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The argument denies that, where the case is one of refusal to supply, in determining 
whether a corporation is taking advantage of its power in the market, it can ever be 
relevant to consider how the corporation would have behaved without such power. 
However, such a proposition is directly contrary to the reasoning of four of the five 
members of the Court in Queensland Wire.' 
Thus, the High Court clearly adopted an approach that asked whether the conduct 
would have been engaged in under workably competitive conditions. 167 The evidence 
in this case allowed the Court to answer this inquiry by considering actual evidence as 
to how Melway had behaved prior to attaining market power. The majority in Rural 
Press applied a 'could' test without undertaking a rigorous analysis of the approach of 
the High Court majority in Melway. With respect, it is not clear whether the High 
Court in Rural Press were aware of the implications of choosing one approach over 
the other. This is particularly perplexing given the constitution of the majority in each 
case. ' 
An examination of jurisprudence since Queensland Wire, however, indicates that 
courts would appear to have used the terms interchangeably, 169 or at least without 
evidence of a clear understanding of the implications of employing one test over the 
other.'" Indeed since Queensland Wire (which is arguably not clear authority for 
either approach), 171 variously constituted federal courts have demonstrated a tendency 
to apply a 'could' approach to the resolution of the 'take advantage' test.'" Melway 
clarified the position,'" which must now be taken to be once again subject to 
uncertainty. 174 
Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 27 (reported in judgment of Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
166 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 27 (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
167 See also, Clough, above n140, 335-336. The High Court majority in Rural Press made no attempt to 
overrule Melway on the requirement that the conduct of the corporation be examined under workably 
competitive conditions. 
168 Gummow and Hayne JJ formed part of the majority in both Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert 
Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 and Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 AIJR 274. 
169 Law Council of Australia, Supplementary Submission by the Trade Practices Committee of the 
Business Law Section of the Law Council of Australia to the Senate Economics References Committee, 
26 May 2004, Submission 18b, 8. 
170 See generally Clough, above n140. 
171 Ibid, 317-319. 
172 Ibid, 319-333. 
173 Ibid, 333-36. 
174 Cf Law Council of Australia, Supplementary Submission, above n169, 8. 
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It is submitted that the 'would' approach serves to base s 46 far more thoroughly in 
economic reasoning and commercial considerations. As Kirby J pointed out in Rural 
Press, a test grounded in physical possibility is contrary to the policy behind the TPA 
of protecting competition for the good of consumers. 175 Amendment is arguably 
necessary to shift the emphasis from what has become a formalistic interpretation of s 
46 to a more transaction-based approach.'76 The 'could' approach invariably reduces 
the section's effectiveness by increasing the difficulty for plaintiffs to establish the 
counterfactual test under s 46.' 77 
A 'could' test would mean that the circumstances in which s 46 applies are likely to 
be limited, as theoretically it is possible to engage in almost any form of conduct 
regardless of whether a corporation possesses market power. It has been argued that 
the High Court's latest interpretation of the 'take advantage' test may mean that s 46 
will apply only to corporations with a minimum of near monopoly power; provided a 
corporation can demonstrate that conduct was possible without market power, the test 
will not be made out. 178 
If a 'could' approach is taken in relation to the take advantage test, the ability to 
consider efficiency considerations will be removed from the take advantage element 
because a 'could' test does not enquire into the economic legitimacy of conduct. 179 
This may not be problematic if there is room for these considerations with regard to 
the purpose element. 18° It may also be appropriate where conduct is assessed on the 
basis of perfectly competitive conditions and a long-run analysis is applied. 181 
However, under conditions of workable competition, the 'take advantage' test would 
175 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 296, 300, 302 (Kirby J). Unless the 'could' approach 
is taken as effectively meaning 'would', which seems precluded by the majority judgment; see Warren 
Pengilley, 'Rural Press: A Controversial High Court Decision on Misuse of Market Power and Other 
Issues' (2004) 19(10) Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Law Bulletin 137, 145. 
176 See Pengilley, Thirty Years, above n151, 14-17; 
177 Ergas and Landrigan, above n151, 428. 
178 ACCC Submission to Senate Economics References Committee, above n19, 4. See also Frank 
Zumbo, 'The High Court's Rural Press Decision: The End of Section 46 as a Deterrent Against Abuses 
of Market Power?' (2004) 12 Trade Practices Law Journal 126. 
179 Clough, above n140, 314-315, 339. The decision also has other implications. First, it may insulate 
particular assets from consideration of market power, a result that seems manifestly unfair. It many also 
prevent conduct that protects market power from falling within the ambit of s 46; see Pengilley, Rural 
Press: A Controversial High Court Decision, above n175, 144. 
180 Clough, above n140, 338-340. Cf Marshall, above n9, 63. See further below, 6.5.1. 
181 See Clough, above n140, 314. See also Ergas and Landrigan who criticises the could test in that it 
'invites speculation as to what behaviour may or may not be observed under particular market 
structures', Ergas and Landrigan, above n151, 416-417. Ergas and Landrigan also criticise the use of a 
perfectly competitive market standard; at 416-417. 
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never be satisfied and s 46 would be rendered otiose. 182 On the basis of Melway, the 
appropriate benchmark against which to measure conduct is that of workably 
competitive conditions, and the majority in Rural Press did not overrule this finding. 
Thus, it is difficult to state with any precision the exact interpretation to be placed on 
s 46 with respect to the take advantage test, and this leaves doubt as to how efficiency 
or commercial considerations should be pleaded as exonerating factors. It is submitted 
that consideration of these factors is necessary in order to consider whether a 
competitive environment has constrained the conduct of a firm with market power. It 
is also entirely consistent with the policy objective of s 46, that is, protection of the 
competitive environment. Arguably, application of a 'could' test fails to incorporate 
this policy objective into the 'take advantage' test. 183 
The High Court has given a number of apparently conflicting judicial statements on 
the issue, and it is not clear which of these is likely to be preferred in future 
determinations. The section must be amended to clarify which approach applies. 184 At 
present, the position must be taken to be unclear, and there has been an over-emphasis 
by variously constituted courts on the semantics of the section m at the expense of 
consideration of the economic basis of conduct. 
6.4.2 TAKING ADVANTAGE AND CAUSATION 
The High Court majority's judgment in Melway also confirmed that, in satisfying the 
'take advantage of' element, a causal link between market power and the conduct in 
issue must be made out! 86 The majority acknowledged (in obiter) that this causal 
connection may be established where the market power of the corporation 'materially 
facilitated' the conduct in question, even though it may have been possible to engage 
in the conduct without market power.'" This test was also applied by the High Court 
182 See Clough, above n140, 314, 340. 
183 See also Ergas and Landrigan, above n151, 430. 
184 Pengilley supports legislative amendment to clarify which test applies; see Pengilley, Thirty Years, 
above n151, 13-14. See also Clough, above n140; Ergas and Landrigan, ibid, especially 430. 
185 See also Pengilley, Thirty Years, above n151, 13-14. 
186 Natwest Australia Bank Ltd v Boral Gerrard Strapping Systems Ply Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 631, 637 
(French J). See also Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 21 (Gleeson 
CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609, 632 (Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J); Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 286 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
187 Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 23 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ), applied by the Full Federal Court in Full Federal Court in ACCC v 
Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 339. The High Court accepted that this test would 
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in Rural Press.' 88 This low threshold has been criticised as reducing the amount of 
certainty that s 46 provides. 189 The test will be considered on a relative basis, as a 
result of which considerable variance in views is likely. 190 
As a result of the recent High Court decision in Rural Press, the Senate Committee 
recommended amendment to s 46 to clarify the elements of the 'take advantage' test 
as follows: 
'In determining whether a corporation has taken advantage of its market power, the 
courts should consider whether: 
• the conduct of the corporation is materially facilitated by its substantial 
degree of market power; 
• the corporation engages in the conduct in reliance upon its substantial degree 
of market power; 
• the corporation would be likely to engage in the conduct if it lacked a 
substantial degree of market power; or 
• the conduct of the corporation is otherwise related to its substantial degree of 
market power. 191 
The Government Senators rejected the need for such amendment on the basis that the 
'take advantage' test is not hindered by current judicial interpretation of the term,' 92 
and this rejection was endorsed in the Government Response. 193 As such, s 46 will not 
be amended in the near term, and the High Court's latest pronouncement on the 'take 
advantage' test will stand. It may be that the matter will be considered further in due 
course, and that a watching brief in respect of this issue will need to be maintained. 
Arguably, the High Court is unlikely to consider that the issue requires further 
be satisfied where the market power 'made it easier for the corporation to act for the proscribed 
purpose than would otherwise be the case.'; Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 
205 CLR 1, 23. 
188 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 AIJR 274, 286 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
189 Marshall, above n9, 55. It has also been pointed out that it is somewhat paradoxical that satisfaction 
of the counterfactual test has been made more difficult while the standard of proof required for the 
'taking advantage' test has been reduced; Ergas and Landrigan, above n151, 428. 
190 Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct above n4, 420. See also Ergas and Landrigan, above 
n151, 428. 
191 Senate Committee Report, above n14, [2.28]. See also Recommendation 2. 
192 Government Senators' Report, above n20, 86. 
193 Government Response to the Senate Committee Report, above n21, 5-6. 
282 
Chapter 6 
clarification, 194 and the High Court's refusal to allow special leave to appeal in the 
Safeway case may evidence this.m 
6.4.3 SUMMARY 
In considering the 'take advantage' element, Australian courts will seek to determine 
the answer to a counter-factual question, and will consider the likelihood of the 
impugned conduct occurring under workably competition conditions. What is not 
clear is whether the courts will apply a test asking whether the corporation 'would' 
have engaged in the conduct under competitive conditions, or whether a court will ask 
whether the corporation 'could' have engaged in the conduct under competitive 
conditions. 
While the application of a particular test will have implications in proving that a 
corporation took advantage of market power in any alleged contravention of s 46, 
parties who are refused patent licences are likely to find it particularly difficult to 
make out this element. Upon the application of a 'would' test, efficiency 
considerations will operate to justify the conduct in most cases. The application of a 
'could' test would, however, make it virtually impossible to establish a taking 
advantage of market power, even in the circumstances outlined in limbs [2] and [3] of 
the framework proposed in Chapter 5. Asking whether conduct was physically 
possible under competitive conditions will almost always yield a positive answer!' 6 
6.5 PROSCRIBED PURPOSE 
It is necessary under s 46 to establish that conduct has been engaged in for an anti- 
competitive purpose!'" Purpose is an 'intention to achieve a result: 198 Purpose will be 
examined objectively m in the absence of evidence that points to a subjective intent. m 
194 Zumbo, The High Court's Rural Press Decision, above n178, 127. 
195 See above n124. Although s 46 was considered in the NT Power case, this aspect of the 'taking 
advantage' element was not discussed; see NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority 
(2004) 210 ALR 312. 
196 Discussed further below, 8.3. 
197 Thus it is irrelevant whether or not the conduct had the effect intended; what is required to be 
proved is that the conduct was carried out for one of the purposes listed in 
s46. 
198 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 18-19 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) citing Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Ply 
Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 214 (Toohey J). 
199 See Donald Robertson, The Primacy of "Purpose in Competition Law — Part 1 (2001) 9 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 101, especially 121-122. 
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An anti-competitive purpose need not be the sole purpose for engaging in conduct; 
provided it is a substantial purpose this will be sufficient to satisfy the purpose 
element.m 
6.5.1 THE PROSCRIBED PURPOSES 
While ss 46(1)(b) and (c) deal with potential competition, s 46(1)(a) (eliminating or 
damaging a competitor) is aimed at damage to current competitors. 202 Section 46(1)(c) 
potentially has the widest reach of any of the proscribed purpose provisions, and does 
not appear to require that the corporation engaging in the proscribed conduct be in a 
directly competitive relationship with the party deterred or prevented from engaging 
in competitive conduct. m 
The purpose provisions have been criticised on the basis that they are ... so widely 
drawn and ill-defined as to be unhelpful in drawing the distinction between 
competitive and predatory conduct.' 204 McMahon argues that the proscribed purposes, 
as formulated, attack competitive conduct. 205 She alleges that this has led to a failure 
in s 46 cases dealing with refusals to supply to establish a suitable framework for 
dealing with refusals to supply under the provision. 206 
A number of attempts have been made to introduce an 'effects' based test into s 46. 207 
The introduction of an effects-based test was most recently considered and rejected by 
the Dawson Committee,m and the Senate Economics Committee. 2°9 A number of 
commentators support an effects-based test as an alternative to or substitute for the 
200 General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164. Purpose may be objectively 
ascertained by inference from the conduct of the corporation or any other person, or from other relevant 
circumstances; Trade Practices Act 1974 (Oh), s 46(7). See also Zumbo, The Boral Case: Has the 
High Court Done Justice to s 46, above n6, 212-213; Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices 
Revision Bill 1986 (Cth). 
201 Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Oh), s 4F(1)(b). For criticism of the application of this test, see Corones, 
The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 412-413. 
202 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 354-5-366 citing Victorian Egg Marketing 
Board v Parkwood Eggs Pty Ltd (1978) 33 FLR 294, 304 (Bowen CD. 
203 Corones, Competition Law in Australia, above n35, 366. 
204 McMahon, above n151, 18. 
2°5 Ibid. 
206 Ibid, 19. 
207 A summary of these attempts is contained in Mitchell Landrigan, A Peters and J Soon, 'An Effects 
Test Under s 46 of the Trade Practices Act: Identifying the Real Effects' (2002) 9 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 258, 261-269. See also Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 
411-413. 
208 Dawson Committee Report, above n13, 77-84. 
209 Senate Economies Report, above n14, 27-28. 
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current purpose-based test, primarily on the ground that the policy objective of s 46 
(the protection of competition) is more readily achieved through examination of the 
effects of conduct on competition rather than on the purpose for which the corporation 
undertook the conduct. 21° Although establishing the third element under s 46 may be 
simplified by the introduction of an effects test, it is submitted that its introduction 
would only serve to intensify the concerns of McMahon expressed above, that 
legitimate, competitive conduct falls within the purview of the section. The existing 
purpose test may be far from satisfactory, but an effects test is likely to catch efficient 
conduct that may otherwise circumvent the operation of the section. 
Post Queensland Wire, courts generally focused on purpose in assessing the 
legitimacy of conduct. 211 Melway shifted the emphasis back to the take advantage 
element. It is evident from the High Court's decision in Melway that the existence of a 
rational business explanation may operate to exculpate a corporation in terms of the 
'take advantage' test. Consideration of business justifications did, however precede 
this decision, but they were taken into account, if at all, in relation to the purpose 
element. 212 
Clough suggests that the purpose test becomes more important if a 'could' test is 
employed in relation to the 'take advantage' element. 213 Because the application of a 
'could' approach means that economic efficiency considerations will not be taken into 
account in relation to the 'take advantage' element, it will be necessary to take them 
into account under the purpose element. In contrast, a 'would' approach takes 
efficiency considerations into account under the 'take advantage' element, leaving 
questions as to how the purpose test should be characterised.214 
Marshall has argued that business justifications are relevant to both elements,215 
although the fact that these elements raise different enquiries means that different 
justifications will be relevant to each element. 216 As discussed earlier, 217 Marshall 
210 See, eg, Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 411-413. An effects test would 
examine the likely, effect of conduct on competition, rather than the purpose for which the corporation 
undertook the conduct. 
211 Clough, above n140, 319. 
212 Marshall, above n9, 62-62; ibid, 319. 
213 Clough, above n140, 338-340. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Cf Corones, The Characterisation of Conduct, above n4, 415 who argues that business justifications 
are relevant to the purpose element as opposed to the 'take advantage' test. See also McMahon, above 
n151, 32-35; Meltz, above n151, 108-109. 
216 Marshall, above n9, 63. 
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categorises those justifications that are relevant to 'taking advantage' as 'efficiency' 
justifications, but broadly classes those that are relevant to the purpose element as 
'quality control/consumer welfare' and/or 'reputation/bottom line' considerations. 218 
The court must examine the validity of any justification advanced on an objective 
basis, but subjective evidence may be relevant to the enquiry. 219 It is submitted that 
Marshall's conclusions on the irrelevance of efficiency considerations to the purpose 
element seem very reasonable in light of recent High Court jurisprudence. 22° If 
efficiency considerations are relevant to the 'take advantage' element, it is difficult to 
see how they can also be relevant to the purpose element. The justifications that 
Marshall proposes to be relevant to the purpose element would certainly seem to be 
concerned with disproving the pejorative element of s 46. 
6.5.2 SUMMARY 
In establishing the purpose element, one of the proscribed purposes must be a 
substantial purpose for the conduct. A justification along the lines of those proposed 
by Marshall will likely exonerate a defendant. There may be a number of 
justifications advanced to justify conduct, and particular justifications will also be 
relevant to refusals to license intellectual property. In particular, quality control 
considerations and the prevention of free riding may be accepted by Australian courts 
to justify an otherwise anti-competitive purpose. These justifications will be discussed 
further in Chapter 8.221 
217 See above, 6.4.1. 
218 Marshall, above n9, 63. See also Heydon, above n50, vol 1, [5-410]. 
219 Brenda Marshall, 'The Resolution of Access Disputes Under Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act' 
(2003) 22(1) University of Tasmania Law Review 9, 37-38; Seah, above n151, 248. 
220 As such, Marshall summarises various justifications that may, where there is appropriate evidence, 
allow a corporation to disprove purpose as 'past unsatisfactory dealings with a customer, a customer's 
poor credit record, a lack of confidence in a customer's business ethics, a customer's inability to 
maintain accurate records or propensity to engage in deceptive advertising or unfair practices, concerns 
about the quality of a customer's after sales service or other matters affecting the commercial 
reputation of the supplier'; Marshall, above n219, 41-42. 
221 See below, 8.4. 
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6.6 THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 222 
Section 46 provides an obvious mechanism to enable access to a competitor's service 
or facility necessary to conduct business. However, difficulties in establishing a 
contravention of s 46 led the Hilmer Committee to recommend the enactment of a 
national access regime within the context of the TPA? 23 As a result of its 
recommendations, Part IIIA of the TPA was enacted. Part IIIA contains a procedure 
through which competitors may seek access to infrastructure facilities. 224 
The use of intellectual property is specifically excluded from the scope of Part IIIA. 225 
As such, a refusal to license intellectual property will not fall within the access 
provisions. In the next chapter, the development of essential facilities doctrines in US 
and EU jurisprudence will be discussed. Despite the limitations of these doctrines, 
there may be circumstances in which they may allow intellectual property to 
constitute an essential facility. 226 It is therefore necessary to consider whether there are 
any circumstances in which s 46 227 will continue to operate to enable access to 
services or facilities despite the existence of Part IIIA. 
222 The topic of essential facilities in Australia has been the subject of a considerable number of 
articles. A number of these articles are referered to in this section, although there is no attempt to be 
exhaustive in coverage of commentary on the topic. In addition to the articles cited in this section, see, 
eg, Ross H Patterson, 'Making Hilmer Clear: The Essential Facility Recommendation and the New 
Zealand Experience' (1994) 2 Trade Practices Law Journal 131; Rhonda Smith and Jill Walker, 'Part 
MA Efficiency and Functional Markets' (1998) 5 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 183; Warren 
Pengilley, 'The Privy Council Speaks on Essential Facilities Access in New Zealand: What are the 
Australasian Lessons?' (1995) 3 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 26. 
223 Independent Committee of Enquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, National Competition 
Policy (1993) (the Hilmer Report),s 266-268. The Hilmer Report cited a number of concerns in relying 
on the general competitive conduct rules, primarily citing difficulties in showing a proscribed purpose, 
and in courts determining the terms on which access should occur, at 243-244. 
224 Described in the Hilmer Report as 'electricity transmission grids, telecommunication networks, rail 
tracks, major pipelines, ports and airports'; Hilmer Report, above n223, 240. For consideration of the 
requirements of Part IIIA see, eg, Brenda Marshall and Rachel Mulheron, 'Declarations of Essential 
Services Under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act: A 'Discipline' on Access Reform' (2003) 31 
University of Western Australia Law Review 226. 
225 See the definition of 'service' in Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 44B. 
226 Note that access regimes in relation to particular facilities have been introduced in the US and the 
EU. This was a factor in the Hilmer Committee's recommendations to enact a specific statutory regime 
rather than to continue to rely solely on s 46; Hilmer Report, above n223, 247. 
227 It was accepted by the Hilmer Committee that s 46 was potentially applicable to access disputes; 
ibid, 243. 
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A number of commentators have addressed this issue, and come to varying 
conclusions. In relation to the applicability of s 46 to essential facility disputes 
subsequent to the enactment of Part IIIA, Pengilley posited three possible positions: 228 
• section 46 and Part IIIA are both applicable; 
• the proposed access regime is a complete access code making s 46 
inapplicable in cases where Part IIIA applies; and 
• s 46 and Part MA are each applicable where they do not overlap. 
It seems clear that s 46 will continue to play some role in access disputes, and a 
number of commentators have supported a continued role for s 46. Pengilley 
considered the first of the options outlined above to be the most likely, 229 while other 
commentators have envisaged more of a 'residual' role for s 46 (in line with either the 
second or third of Pengilley's scenarios). 230 That is, s 46 will continue to operate 
where Part IIIA does not apply, but will not operate where Part IIIA is predominant. 
The Hilmer Committee stated that facilities that are not nationally significant should 
continue to be dealt with under s 46. The only contentious point, therefore, was 
whether facilities that fell within Part IIIA could also be dealt with under Part N. 
In the recent case of NT Power, 231 the High Court put the matter beyond doubt, 
confirming that they did not view Part IIIA as precluding the operation of s 46, so that 
Part HIA and s 46 play a parallel role. 232 In line with this, s 46 provides an alternative 
process to that provided for under Part MA. This also allows s 46 to be utilised where 
access to intellectual property is sought. As the majority in NT Power stated, 
228 Warren Pengilley, 'The National Competition Policy Draft Legislative Package: The Proposed 
Access Regime' (1995) 2 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 244, 251. 
229 Ibid. See also Michael O'Bryan, 'Access Pricing: Law Before Economics?' (1996) 4 Competition 
and Consumer Law Journal 20; Valentine Korah, 'Access to Essential Facilities Under the Commerce 
Act in the Light of Experience in Australia, the European Union and The United States' (2000) 31 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 231, 233-242. 
230 See, eg, Alister Abadee, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and the National Access Regime: A 
Residual Role for Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act?' (1997) 5 Trade Practices Law Journal 27; 
Marshall, The Resolution of Access Disputes, above n219, 16-18. See also the Full Federal Court 
decision in NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2002) 122 FCR 399, 
particularly 404-405 (Lee J), 422 (Branson J). The essential facilities doctrine was also rejected in 
obiter comments by the Full Federal Court in Queensland Wire, although these comments were not 
commented on by the High Court; see Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd (1988) 
ATPR 40-841, 49,076-49,077. 
231 /VT Power Generation Ply Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312. 
232 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312, 333-335. 
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'provided the notoriously difficult task of satisfying the criteria of liability can be 
carried out, s 46 can be used to create access regimes ... '233 
Without commenting on the efficacy of Part ITIA, 234 it is submitted that the High 
Court's ruling on this point is perfectly logica1.235 It is consistent with the Hilmer 
Committee's recommendations that claims under s 46 should be excluded upon 
declaration of a facility. 215 This recommendation does not contend that the choice 
between s46 and a specific access regime be removed entirely, 237 merely that upon the 
invocation of Part lilA, s 46 ceases to become applicable. Prior to this point, an 
applicant has a choice of avenues for seeking access. It is also consistent, as the High 
Court has pointed out, with the structure of the act given that s 44ZZNA which 
provides that Part MA is to have no effect on the operation of Part IV. 238 
The important point, however, for the purposes of this thesis, is that there is no doubt 
that s 46 will apply to facilities that do not fall within Part IIIA to enable access to be 
granted. Thus, s 46 provides a general access regime pursuant to which access to 
intellectual property may be sought.2" Whether or not it proves to be an effective 
233 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312, 334. 
234 See, eg, Abadee, above n230, 40-47; Daniel Clough, 'Economic Duplication and Access to 
Essential Facilities in Australia' (2000) 28 Australian Business Law Review 325; Warren Pengilley, 
`Hilmer and "Essential Facilities" (1994) 17 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
235 Cf, eg, Nicole Calleja, 'Access to Essential Services — Have the Hilmer Reforms Been Successfully 
Implemented?' (2000) 8 Trade Practices Law Journal 206, especially 222. 
236 Hilmer Report, above n223, 260, 267. 
237 Cf Marshall, above n219, 16. Abadee also relies on the Explanatory Memorandum, National 
Competition Policy Draft Legislative Package (1994) [1-11] for his contention that Part IHA precludes 
the operation of s 46 where it is applicable: 
[s 46] is proscriptive by nature ... By contrast, a legislative access regime would largely 
operate in a non-proscriptive manner, seeking to facilitate agreement between the parties ... and 
... providing an arbitration mechanism to settle the issues in dispute. Such a regime should be 
able to deal with access disputes in a more timely manner than through court action for a 
purported contravention of s 46. 
See Abadee, above n230, 38. See also Marshall, above n219, 16. It is submitted that it can equally be 
inferred from this passage that the role envisaged for s 46 would be that it would operate alongside Part 
MA, and that the comments on s 46 relate merely to the difficulty in establishing a contravention of s 
46 rather than on the primacy of Part MA. 
238 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312, 334. 
239 As noted by the ALRC, the TPA appears to permit compulsory licensing as a remedy for anti-
competitive conduct. Section 87(1) of the TPA empowers a court to make such order as it thinks 
'appropriate' to compensate a party for loss or damage suffered as a result of a breach of Part IV. 
Although it is not clear whether this would include an order for a compulsory licence, the grounds 
listed (in s 87(2)) are examples and are not exhaustive; see Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Parliament of Australia, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, Report No 99 
(2004) (ALRC Report), 621. 
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access regime depends on whether courts are willing to extend the ambit of an already 
restrictively interpreted provision, to intellectual property. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
There are acknowledged problems with Part IV as a whole, and this has prompted 
numerous reviews of s 46. Despite these reviews, which have considered many of the 
Part IV provisions in great detail, it seems unlikely that major reform of the 
competition provisions will eventuate in the foreseeable future. The Intellectual 
Property and Competition Review Committee acknowledged that they were 
hamstrung to a degree in the recommendations they made, by the structure of the Part 
IV provisions and the problems inherent in them!" It is undeniably difficult to 
address the intellectual property/competition law balance until the imbalance between 
the policy objectives of Part IV and the manner in which Part IV achieves those 
objectives are resolved through legislative reform. 
Section 46 provides a salient example. The recent spate of High Court cases and 
reviews of s 46, and the plethora of commentary that has resulted partly as a result of 
these processes, exemplify long-standing problems with the section. There has been a 
An alternative basis for granting a compulsory licence would exist under s 80(5). Section 80 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Oh) empowers a court to make an order for an injunction for a 
contravention of, inter alia, Part IV. A court may draft an order in such terms as it determines to be 
appropriate (s 80(1)), and the power conferred by s 80 is broad; see generally John D Heydon, The Law 
Book Company Limited, Trade Practices Law, vol 2, [18.1010]. Section 80(5) gives a court the power 
to grant a mandatory injunction to do an act or thing; A V Jennings Ltd v First Provincial Building 
Society Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-494. Section 80(5) relevantly provides as follows: 
The power of the Court to grant an injunction requiring a person to do an act or thing may be 
exercised: 
(a) whether or not it appears to the Court that the person intends to refuse or fail again, or to 
continue to refuse of fail, to do that act or thing; 
(b) whether or not that person has previously refused or failed to do that act or thing; and 
(c) whether or not there is an imminent danger of substantial damage to any person if the first-
mentioned person refuses or fails to do that act or thing. 
References to persons include references to bodies corporate: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Oh), 
s 22(1)(a). The broad powers granted by s 80(5) would enable a court to make an order for a 
compulsory licence. It is acknowledged that difficulties would invariably arise in setting a commercial 
supply price, although consideration of this specific issue is outside the scope of this thesis. See 
generally Stephen G Corones 'Remedies Under the Trade Practices Act for Refusal to Supply' (1993) 
10(3) Australian Bar Review 259. 
240 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review of 
Intellectual Property Legislation Under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2002) 
(IPCRC Report), 210. See also Ian Eagles and Louise Longdin, 'Competition in Information and 
Computer Technology Markets: Intellectual Property Licensing and Section 51(3) of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974' (2003) 3 Queensland University Journal of Technology Law and Justice Journal 
28, 29. 
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marked lack of success in actions brought under s 46, and despite commendable 
efforts to develop economically sound tests in relation to s 46, it remains difficult at 
this point to discern clearly applicable principles from the major cases. Current doubt 
over the relevant tests to be applied in respect of s 46 mean these issues are likely to 
remain unresolved. In particular, there is some doubt as to what the current market 
power standard is, and the appropriate test to be applied in attempting to satisfy the 
'take advantage' element. On the basis of recent reviews, s 46 will not undergo any 
significant amendment. This is not to say that amendment or clarification of the 
provision is not warranted, and this is explored further in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 8 evaluates the likely impact of intellectual property dealings and in 
particular the probable treatment of refusals to license medical biotechnology patents, 
in terms of the current composition and interpretation of the section. Clear issues exist 
in relation to intellectual property dealings and s 46. Comparative case law discussed 
in Chapter 7 will be referred to during the course of this analysis. It will be concluded 
that there are unlikely to be any circumstances where a refusal to license a patent 
constitutes a misuse of market power pursuant to s 46. 
In Chapter 5, it was stated that there are limited circumstances where a refusal to 
license a patent should be capable of falling within s 46. This formed the basis for the 
second and third limbs of the framework outlined in Chapter 5. 241 In Chapter 8, it will 
be argued that in even in these circumstances, Australian courts would be unlikely to 
find that the elements of s 46 are made out. The high threshold imposed in respect of 
the s 46 elements will be intensified when these elements are applied to a refusal to 
license a medical biotechnology patent. While this will be entirely appropriate in a 
majority of cases, it leaves no room for the small sub-set of refusals to license that 
could be classed as a misuse of market power, to receive adequate consideration under 
s 46. 
241 See above, 5.5.5. The second and third limbs provided that: 
[2] A refusal to license will, however, become examinable under competition law where the 
refusal is for the purpose of (i) expanding the scope of the intellectual property or2,cii) extending 
market power into another distinct market not covered by the intellectual property. 1 
[3] Where a refusal becomes examinable under [2](ii), the refusal should be examinable whether 
or not the holder of the intellectual property is currently exploiting the separate market, 241 and 
the reservation of another market for its own (actual or potential) use should not necessarily 
allow it to foreclose competition by others. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having considered in detail s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) and the 
key High Court cases interpreting that provision, this chapter attempts to draw themes 
from the comparative case law. United States (US) case law has conventionally 
received considerable attention by Australian courts in contemplation of competition 
law matters. This has particularly been the case in relation to s 46 and its US 
equivalent, section 2 of the Sherman Act.' The European Union (EU) legislative 
scheme is also of growing importance to Australia, and is giving rise to a growing 
body of case law. 2 The provision that is relevant to the issues discussed in this thesis 
is Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.' The issue of 
refusals to license has been the subject of litigation on a number of occasions in both 
jurisdictions. This case law has resulted in a significant body of commentary. 
Australian courts have rejected a parochial approach that fails to consider case law 
from other jurisdictions. In particular, the cases that will be discussed in this chapter 
would be likely to be relied upon by Australian courts should the issue of refusals to 
license arise in relation to s 46. It is important to consider this growing body of case 
law given that there is no Australian case law to guide Australian courts. 4 
This chapter considers differences in treatment between the jurisdictions in which 
case law exists, and the relevance of these differences. At the outset it is important to 
note that the basic position in relation to licensing intellectual property is uniform 
across all three jurisdictions: there is no general duty to license intellectual property. 
Sherman Act 15 USC (1890). 
2 Space constraints mean that these discussions will necessarily be brief. The discussion that follows is 
intended to be an overview of international positions, sufficient to enable consideration of the 
implications of this jurisprudence for Australian policy. 
3 Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/65. 
4 Although there are two instances where the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) alleged that a refusal to license intellectual property constituted a misuse of market power. 
The first involved proceedings against the Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology for refusing to 
supply copyrighted reports necessary for use in the downstream market for newspaper meteorological 
graphics. The second involved customer database information owned by Telstra, which may have been 
subject to copyright, and which was required for use in the downstream market for telephone 
directories. The first case settled, while in the second, Telstra provided court enforceable undertakings 
to the Commission. There is, therefore, no established precedent from either case. Although this is 
certainly not indicative of the position likely to be taken by courts, these requirements by the ACCC to 
give undertakings does demonstrate that there have been instances where upstream intellectual property 
has impacted had the potential to impact negatively on downstream markets. The matter has also been 
considered by the Trade Practices Commission in their 1991 Background Paper, although the guidance 
given is limited; see Trade Practices Commission (TPC) Background Paper: Application of the Trade 
Practices Act to Intellectual Property (1991) (TPC Background Paper), 15-18, 20-21. 
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This is consistent with the right of an intellectual property holder to exclude others. 
As will become evident, however, this principle is not absolute and is subject to some 
important exceptions. As a result of recent case law in the US and the EU, it has 
become evident that quite divergent approaches are being taken to antitrust regulation 
of refusals to license intellectual property within these jurisdictions, and the impact of 
this divergence has yet to be assessed.' 
As Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis point out, there are important distinctions between 
the provisions that are the subject of this chapter. 6 First, section 2 and Article 82 
emanate from 'fundamentally different historical and political contexts ... 7' Article 
82, unlike section 2, is part of an attempt to harmonise and integrate the European 
economy.8 Secondly, the structural and conceptual frameworks within which the 
respective laws operate differ considerably. 9 Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter 
is to present an evaluation of cases that would be considered by Australian courts 
should the matter of refusals to license arise. It analyses two bodies of case law from 
the perspective of their relevance in the Australian context and is not an attempt to 
undertake a comparative analysis. 
7.2 UNITED STATES JURISPRUDENCE" 
The following section will discuss US jurisprudence dealing with refusals to license 
intellectual property. There are a significant number of cases that are potentially 
5 See James B Kobak Jr, 'Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two 
Sides of the Atlantic' (1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journal 341, especially 365. 
6 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark A Lemley and Mark D Janis, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2002), (Hovenkamp Lemley and Janis), vol II, 
[45.34 
7 Ibid. 
8 thid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 There is a vast literature on this topic, and reference has been made to only a few of the many 
important articles relevant to the field. In addition to the articles cited during the course of this section, 
see, eg Jeffrey Mackie-Mason, 'What to do About Unilateral Refusals to License?' (2002) Paper 
prepared for the DOJIFTC Hearings, Washington DC; Scott A Stempel and John F Terzaken, 'Casting 
a Long IP Shadow Over Antitrust Jurisprudence: The Federal Circuit's Expanding Jurisdictional 
Reach' (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 711; Ronald S Katz and Adam J Safer, 'Should One Patent 
Court be Making Antitrust Law for the Whole Country?' (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 687; J Venit 
and J ICallaugher, 'Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach' [1994] Fordham Law Institute 
315. The discussion in Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark A Lemley and Mark D Janis, IP and Antitrust: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2002), (Hovenkamp Lemley and 
Janis), vol I, Chapter 13, was particularly useful, and references to this work are made throughout the 
following sections. 
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relevant. This section does not attempt to discuss all of this case law, but is limited to 
consideration of the leading cases. 
7.2.1 UNITED STATES CASE LAW DEALING WITH REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
As set out in Chapter 5, section 2 of the Sherman Act (1890) 11  is the provision that 
will apply to unilateral refusals to license intellectual property. 12 Section 2 applies to 
dealings in intellectual property!' 
7.2.1.1 THE BASIC PosrrioN 
It is a fundamental principle of US intellectual property law that a holder of 
intellectual property has no general duty to license, or to use its privilege at a11!4 
Further, the Patents Act's provides that a patent owner will not be guilty of patent 
misuse by virtue of its refusal to use or license a patent. 16 In a number of cases 
concerning refusals to license intellectual property, US courts have stated, however, 
that intellectual property protection will not provide immunity from antitrust laws. 
Refusals to license have generally been dealt with through application of principles 
similar to those applied in refusal to deal cases. There exists a vast body of US case 
law dealing with refusals to deal, although application of systematic principles to 
these cases has arguably been lacking!' Glazer and Lipsky categorise US refusal to 
"Sherman Act 15 USC (1890). 
12 To reiterate, Sherman Act 15 USC § 2 (1890) provides: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ... 
The elements of § 2 were discussed above, 5.4.1.1. 
13 See, eg, United States v Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co 226 US 20 (1912) and Motion Pictures 
Patents Co v Universal Film Manufacturing Co 243 US 502 (1917). 
14 The relevant authority in relation to patent law is Continental Paper Bag v Eastern Paper Bag 210 
US 405 (1908). See also Standard Oil Co v United States 283 US 163 (1931). This principle is 
embodied in the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property, (1995) (US Licensing Guidelines) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm> at 27 October 2003, § 2.2. 
15 Patent Act 35 USC (1952). 
16 Patent Act 35 USC § 271(d)(4) (1952). 
17 For a useful analysis of the development of the refusal to deal doctrine, see, eg, Kenneth L Glazer 
and Abbott B Lipsky Jr, 'Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under Section 2 Of the Sherman Act' (1995) 63 
Antitrust Law Journal 749. 
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deal cases generally into three main groups based on their objective competitive 
characteristics: 18 
• cases where a monopolist in a single, identified market refuses to deal; 
• cases where a monopolist refuses to deal to gain or protect a monopoly in 
another market; 19 and 
• cases where the monopolist refuses to deal with a party with which it does not 
compete. 
Glazer and Lipsky provide this detailed examination in order to develop an analysis 
dependant on the particular characteristics of specific refusal to deal scenarios. 
Refusals to license intellectual property have traditionally fallen within the first and 
second groups. In relation to the first group, there have been some cases where 
intellectual property holders have refused to license technology to their competitors. 2° 
Glazer and Lipsky further refine the second group by dividing the cases into those that 
have involved vertically integrated markets, and those involving complementary 
markets. Cases where refusals to license have been alleged in vertical markets have 
typically fallen into the category of essential facility cases!' With respect to 
complementary markets, refusal to license cases can generally be grouped into 
refusals to share proprietary information with competing suppliers, 22 and cases 
involving aftermarkets for complementary products. 23 
18 Ibid, especially 765-766. Glazer and Lipsky undertook this analysis by examining refusal to deal 
cases that had been decided by the courts. 
19 Note that 'leveraging' is recognised by some US courts as an independent violation of § 2 in that a 
violation may occur when a monopolist uses its position in one market to gain a competitive advantage 
(as opposed to a monopoly) in another market (eg, Berkey Photo Inc v Eastman Kodak Co F2d 263, 
276 (2d Cur 1979). Other courts have been more reluctant to accept this expansive view of leveraging 
theory and require monopolisation in the second market. See Marina Lao, 'Unilateral Refusals to Sell 
or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal' (1999) 9 Cornell Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 193, fn 12, 198-209. Further, Lao points out that this matter is far from settled in the 
literature, with a number of notable Chicago school scholars questioning whether a monopolist can 
earn more than one monopoly rent; see, eg, Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 
(1976) 181-183. In turn, their position has been criticised by scholars who view monopoly leveraging 
as potentially anticompetitive, see eg, Louis Kaplow, 'Extension of Monopoly Power Through 
Leveraging' (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 515. 
20 See, eg, El du Pont de Nemours & Co (1980) aff'd 698 F2d 1377 (9th Cir) cert denied 464 US 955 
(1983). 
21 These cases are discussed below, 7.2.3. 
For example, Berkey Photo, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 603 F 2d 263 279-285 (2" Cir 1979) cert 
denied, 444 US 1093 (1980); BellSouth Advertising v Donnelley Information 719 F Supp 1551 (SD Fla 
1988) rev'd on other grounds, 999 F 2d 1436, 1566-1567 (11 th Cu 1993). 
23 See, eg, Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9th Cir 
1997), cert denied, 523 US 1094 (1998); Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v 
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This is not to say that refusals to license are not capable of falling into the third group. 
It could be envisaged, for example, that the holder of a patent right that constitutes an 
input into a number of downstream applications, may refuse to license downstream 
users because the patent holder wishes to reserve those downstream markets for its 
own use, or because an exclusive licence prevents the patent holder licensing to 
another downstream user. In general, however, these examples are not being 
encountered, or not being litigated. In addition there is no clear answer as to exactly 
when a refusal to license will fall foul of section 2. The following sections provide a 
brief overview of the primary US cases dealing with refusals to license intellectual 
property. 
7.2.1.2 THE CASE LAW— REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 24 
Liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act will only arise where a refusal to deal 
'extends, preserves, creates or threatens to create significant market power ... '. 25 Even 
under these circumstances, it will be difficult for a plaintiff to show that a refusal to 
license is anticompetitive given the general right of an intellectual property holder to 
deal with that privilege as they please. It has become clear that the refusal must extend 
the scope of the intellectual property in order to contravene section 2. 26 
There have been many cases dealing with refusals to deal with tangible property. 
Although a property owner may refuse to deal with a competitor that right is not 
unlimited. Section 2 may be violated where: 
• the defendant acts with anticompetitive intent; 
• there is no business reason for the refusal; or 
• the property involved is an essential facility!' 
A number of cases have considered refusals to license intellectual property. Various 
circuits have taken different approaches to the issue,28 with the result that it is not 
Grumman Systems Support Corporation 761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and 
remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1 s1 Cir 1994). 
24 The following discussion follows generally the format adopted by Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, 
above n6, and references to their work are made throughout the following sections where appropriate. 
25 Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.23]. 
26 Ibid, [13.23]. 
27 See Ronald Myrick and Jonathon Gleklen, 'Antitrust Liability for the Exercise of Intellectual 
Property Rights Under US Law' (Paper presented at a meeting of the International Association for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property, Lisbon, 20 June 2002) 
<www.aippi.org/reports/Vortrag_Myrick.pdf> at 28 August 2005 (citations omitted). 
297 
Chapter 7 
clear what course the US Supreme Court would take were it required to consider the 
issue. 29 The following sections consider the leading cases in the area." 
(i) 	Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation31 
Intergraph manufactured computer workstations. Intergraph Corporation v Intel 
Corporation (Intergraph) concerned a claim that Intel had discontinued supply to 
Intergraph of advance proprietary information, chips and technical supportn in breach 
of section 2. The Federal Circuit heard the matter on appeal and held that there was no 
evidence of a section 2 violation in this case. Its decision was based on the grounds 
that Intel and Intergraph did not compete, and that Intel was justified in discontinuing 
preferential supply arrangements to Intergraph given that Intergraph had sued Inte1. 33 
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that a refusal to deal could constitute a 
violation of section 2 where the refusal is directed against competition and its purpose 
is to 'create, maintain, or enlarge a monopoly' 34 and there was no valid business 
justification for the conduct. 35 
28 US Federal Courts (Federal Trial Courts are also referred to as US District Courts) hear disputes that 
arise under US statutes. Appeals from the District Courts are heard by the US Courts of Appeals or 
Circuit Courts. At present, there are 11 regional Circuit Courts as well as the DC Circuit Court and the 
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit was specially created to hear patent and copyright appeals. 
Decisions from the US Circuit Courts are appealed to the Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court 
grants few petitions of certiorari. Thus, for the bulk of federal matters, the Circuit Courts are effectively 
courts of final resort. 
29 See Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.28-13.29]. Note that the matter went before the 
Supreme Court before being remanded for trial. The Supreme Court did not have to consider the issue 
of Kodak's intellectual property, but commented that a manufacturer with 'inherent power' in one 
market is not immunised from the antitrust laws in another market, and that 'power gained through 
some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright ... can give rise to liability if a seller 
exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.'; Image Technical 
Services Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 504 US, 451 (1992), n29. 
30 Note that there are a considerable number of relevant authorities however this section considers only 
the leading, recent judicial pronouncements in the area. 
31 Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation 195 F 3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999) (hereafter Intergraph). 
32 Despite that fact that the case concerned products protected by intellectual property (proprietary 
information and patents) the court made no reference to this intellectual property and treated the case as 
a refusal to deal case. The District Court, on the other hand, expressly referred to Inters patents, and 
concluded that Intel had 'no legitimate intellectual property basis with which it can refuse to supply 
': Intergraph Corp v Intel Corp 3 F Supp 2d 1255, 1279 (ND Ala 1998). 
33 Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation 195 F 3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999), 1358-1359. 
34 Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation 195 F 3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999), 1358. 
35 Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation 195 F 3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999), 1358. 
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Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman 
Systems Support Corporation 36 
Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems 
Support Corporation (Data General) This case involved a group of independent 
service organizations (IS0s) who argued that Data General had refused them access to 
copyrighted diagnostic software for use in repairing computer hardware. The ISOs 
argued that Data General was attempting to monopolise the market for service of its 
computer hardware. The ISOs used the software in any event and were sued for 
copyright infringement. The ISOs alleged that Data General had breached section 2. 
The First Circuit held that the relevant inquiry was whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support a monopolisation claim." It held that a refusal to license by a 
monopolist could support a monopolisation claim, but a desire on the part of a 
copyright holder to exclude others constituted a 'presumptively valid justification for 
any immediate harm to consumers.' 38 It was necessary to examine whether there was 
evidence to rebut the presumption in each case, and in this case there was no such 
evidence. The market for repair had not been significantly more competitive when 
Data General had supplied the ISOs. It was therefore impossible to conclude that Data 
General's former market practices satisfied demand under competitive conditions." 
Data General's intent was not a relevant consideration. 4° 
(iii) In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC 
and Others v Xerox Corporation 41 
In the case of In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC 
and Others v Xerox Corporation (Xerox), Xerox commenced a policy of refusing 
36 Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1st  Cir 1994). 
37 Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1'1 Cur 1994), 
1185-1186. 
38 Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1' s Cir 1994), 
1187. 
39 Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1 st Cir 1994), 
1188. 
40 Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1 st  Cir 1994), 
1188-1189. 
41 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001). 
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supply of its patented copier parts to Independent Service Organisations (IS0s) and 
their customers, with the result that the business of servicing Xerox copiers was 
reserved to Xerox. Xerox counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement, 42 
arguing that it was under no duty to license the ISOs. 
The Federal Circuit refused to impose liability on Xerox, holding that a patent holder 
was under no duty to license its patent except where: 
• there was evidence of illegal tying; 
• the patent was obtained by fraud; 
• a lawsuit to enforce the patent was a sham; or 
The ISOs argued that Xerox had sought to extend its patents beyond the scope of the 
statutory grant by attempting to control the market for service of its copiers in 
addition to the market for manufacture. The Court rejected this claim, holding that 
Xerox had not sought to illegally extend the scope of its patent protection beyond the 
statutory patent grant:* It observed that patents could cover more than one market, 
and the patent protection afforded to Xerox extended to the market for service. 4 The 
Court considered it unnecessary to consider Xerox's subjective motivation for 
refusing to license, and the result of their ruling was the creation of a per se rule of 
legality, with three very narrow exceptions. 45 
In relation to the copyrighted material, the Court endorsed the presumption created in 
Data General. 46 The Court refused to consider Xerox's subjective motivation for 
refusing to license in the absence of evidence that the copyrights were obtained by 
unlawful means or used to gain monopoly power beyond their statutory grant.47 
42 Xerox had copyright over its service drawings. 
43 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 
44 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 
45 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 
46 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 
47 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 
CSU, LLC and Others 
(2001), 1327-1328. 
CSU, LLC and Others 
(2001), 1328. 
CSU, LLC and Others 
(2001), 1327. 
CSU, LLC and Others 
(2001), 1329. 
CSU, LLC and Others 
(2001), 1329. 
✓ Xerox 
✓ Xerox 
✓ Xerox 
✓ Xerox 
✓ Xerox 
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(iv) Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 48 
The facts in Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co (Image 
Technical) closely resembled those in Xerox, in that Kodak discontinued supply of 
photocopier parts to a number of ISOs. Kodak did not sue for patent or copyright 
infringement, but eventually defended the claim on the basis that its parts and 
software were protected by intellectual property. 49 
In finding against Kodak, the Ninth Circuit applied the rebuttable presumption laid 
down in Data General" (which had been restricted to copyright) to the refusal by 
Kodak to license its patented and copyrighted parts.'" They held that the presumption 
had been rebutted in this case on the grounds that: 
• only a very small portion of Kodak's parts were actually patented;" and 
• Kodak's intellectual property justifications were clearly not the genuine basis 
for the refusal to license." 
In considering the second ground, the Court looked to Kodak's intent in refusing to 
license, stating that 
[N]either the aims of intellectual property law, or the antitrust laws justify allowing a 
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive 
conduct.54 
as Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9 th Cir 1997), cert 
denied, 523 US 1094 (1998). 
49 Note that the matter went before the Supreme Court before being remanded for trial. The Supreme 
Court did not have to consider the issue of Kodak's intellectual property, but commented that a 
manufacturer with 'inherent power' in one market is not immunised from the antitrust laws in another 
market, and that 'power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright 
... can give rise to liability if a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire 
into the next.'; Image Technical Services Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 504 US, 451 (1992), n29. 
50 To reiterate, the presumption applied in that case was that a desire on the part of a copyright holder 
to exclude others will constitute a presumptively valid business justification for harm to consumers. 
See above, 7.2.1.2(h). 
51 Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9 th Cir 1997), cert 
denied, 523 US 1094 (1998), 1219-12 20. 
52 Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9 th Cir 1997), cert 
denied, 523 US 1094 (1998), 1120. 
53 Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9th Cir 1997), cert 
denied, 523 US 1094 (1998), 1219-12 20. 
54 Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9th Cir 1997), cert 
denied, 523 US 1094 (1998), 1219. 
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Thus, the Court considered intent to be a relevant factor in rebutting the presumption 
that ownership of intellectual property creates a presumptively valid justification for 
immediate harm to consumers. It would appear that the Court considered that findings 
such as the one it made would be rare in that they commented that they had 'serious 
concern' about the effect of claims such as this. 55 
(v) 	Subsequent Cases 
It is worth noting two decisions subsequent to Xerox. The first, United States v 
Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft), 56 was not a unilateral refusal to deal case, but the 
DC Circuit made the following comment that would fail to exempt refusals to deal 
from antitrust liability: 
[Microsoft] claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as 
it wishes: "If intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired," it says, then 
"their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability." ... That is no more 
correct than the proposition that use of one's personal property, such as a baseball 
bat, cannot give rise to tort liability. 57 
The other is a decision of the Supreme Court, Holmes Group Inc v Vornado Air 
Circulation Systems Inc, 58 where the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court is limited to cases involving patent claims, and does not extend to 
patent counterclaims to antitrust claims. This divests the Federal Circuit of exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent law matters,59 and casts doubt on the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court to determine issues such as those that arose in Xerox and Intergraph. 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has begun transferring decision to the Circuit Courts on 
the basis of Vornado. 66 It also renders uncertain the precedential value of Xerox and 
Intergraph, and a recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit has stated that the decision 
only has persuasive authority. 61 The decision has been criticised 62 and has been the 
55 For a critique on the effect of Image Technical Services Inc and Others v Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 
3d 1195 (9th Cur 1997), cert denied, 523 US 1094 (1998) see Michael H Kauffman, 'Image Technical 
Services Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling 
Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust Liability' (1999) 34 Wake Forest Law Review 471. 
56 United States v Microsoft Corporation 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir 2001). 
57 United States v Microsoft Corporation 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir 2001), 63. 
58 Holmes Group Inc v Vornado Air Circulation Systems Inc 122 S Cr 1889 (2002). 
59 See, eg, Arti K Rai, 'Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform' (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1035, 1125. 
60 See, eg, Telecom Technical Services Inc and Others v Rolm Company and Others 388 F3d 820 (11 th 
Cir 2004); Medigene AG v Loyola University 2002 WL 1478674 (Fed Cir June 27 2002) 
61 Telecom Technical Services Inc and Others v Rolm Company and Others 388 F3d 820 (11 th Cir 
2004), 826. 
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subject of a Congressional Hearing.63 As yet, no legislation has been passed to 
overturn the decision. 
(vi) Reconciling US Case Law 
Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis offer suggestions as to how these different approaches 
might be reconciled:64 
• consider the decisions in light of the subtle differences presented by their 
individual factual scenarios. For example, Kodak's actions in Image Technical 
were clearly not motivated by a desire to protect their intellectual property, 
and the decision was probably intended to reflect this; 
• analyse the rules laid down in the decisions in terms of the risks of error posed 
by the various rules. For example, a per se rule may provide business certainty 
but removes the ability to analyse individual cases on their facts with the risk 
that some possibly anti-competitive behaviour will be allowed. Choosing one 
rule over another necessarily involves weighing up various risks of error. ° 
Other commentators are more skeptical that the decisions can be reconciled, because 
the differences arose from fundamental variance in the manner in which the courts 
viewed the limitations of a patent grant. 66 While the Court in Xerox considered that 
patent protection extended to the market for service, the Court in Image Technical 
would appear to have considered the patent grant to be restricted to the market for 
62 Primary complaints are that the decision conflicts in Congressional intent in creating the Federal 
Circuit, and will result in decreased uniformity in hearing patent matters and 'forum shopping' by 
plaintiffs; see, eg, Elizabeth I Rogers, 'The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of Regional 
Circuit Jurisdiction Over Patent Appeals and the Need for a Considered Congressional Response' 
(2003) 16 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 411; Larry D Thompson, 'Adrift on a Sea of 
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal 
Circuit' (2004) 92 Georgetown Law Journal 523. 
63 Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, US 
House of Representatives, One Hundredth Ninth Congress, Holmes Group, The Federal Circuit and 
the State of Patent Appeals (March 17 2005) Serial No 109-7 
<http://judiciary.house.gov/Oversight.aspx?ID=117 > at 9 August 2005. 
64 See Ibid, vol I, [13.29-13.30]. Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis point out that the factual situations in 
each of the three cases did not give rise to truly unilateral refusals to deal in that they technically 
involved tying arrangements. The cases may have been decided differently had they involved purely 
unilateral refusals to license; at [13.30]. 
65 See also A Douglas Melamed and Ali M Stoeppelwerth, 'The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism and the 
Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property' (2002) 10 George Mason Law Review 407, 424. 
66 See, eg, Lao, above n19, 204. See also Michael A Carrier, 'Unravelling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox' 
(2002) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 761. 
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parts." Some commentators have questioned the correctness of the position in Xerox, 
on the basis of its breadth.68 
7.2.2 SYNTHESIS AND SUMMARY OF THE US APPROACH TO REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
Consideration of the cases discussed in the preceding section makes it evident that 
different courts in the US have laid down different tests to be applied in ascertaining 
whether a refusal to license intellectual property. While the First Circuit in Data 
General laid down a rebuttable presumption, the Federal Court in Xerox appears to 
have established a per se rule of legality for patents. The approach of the Ninth Circuit 
in Image Technical follows that in Data General to an extent, but is, in effect, an 
extended version of the Data General presumption in that it applies to patents as well 
as copyright, and allows consideration of a defendant's subjective intent. ° 
The holding in Xerox has garnered a considerable amount of support. Proponents of 
the rule argue that holders of intellectual property should be free to refuse to deal with 
any party." Although the decision in Xerox is unlikely to be considered to be binding 
precedent at the present time due to the decision in Vornado,71 Congressional 
amendment may result in its reinstatement as an authoritative precedent.n Further the 
decision remains persuasive authority!' 
The decision in Xerox has many critice While it would appear that some agree in 
principle with the right of a holder of intellectual property to refuse to license in a 
67 See Lao, above n6, 204. 
68 See, eg, James Kobak Jr, 'The Federal Circuit as a Competition Law Court (2001) 83 Journal of the 
Patent and Trademark Office Society 527; Suzzette Rodriguez Hurley, 'Failing to Balance Patent 
Rights and Antitrust Concerns: The Federal Circuit's holding in In re Independent Service 
Organisations Antitrust Litigation' (2004) 13 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 475, 493-494; ibid, 205. Lao 
also questions its consistency with the statements of the Supreme Court in Image Technical Services 
Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 504 US, 451 (1992), n29. 
69 See Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.28]. 
70 See, eg, Jonathon I Gleklen, 'Per Se Legality For Unilateral Refusals to License IP is Correct as a 
Matter of Law and Policy' (2002) July, The Antitrust Source 1, 
<http://www.abanet.orgiantitrust/source/ > at 8 November 2004. 
71 Holmes Group Inc v Vornado Air Circulation Systems Inc 122 S Cr 1889 (2002). 
72 See above, n63 and accompanying text. 
73 See Telecom Technical Services Inc and Others v Rolm Company and Others 388 F3d 820 (11 th Cir 
2004). 
74 See, eg, Robert Pitofsky, 'Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust 
and Intellectual Property' (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 913; Nicolas Oettinger, 'Sherman Act 
Violations: Refusal to License Intellectual Property: In re Independent Service Organisation Antitrust 
Litigation (2001) 16 Berkley Technology Law Journal 323; James B Gambrell, 'The Evolving Interplay 
of Patent Rights and Antitrust Restraints in the Federal Circuit' (2001) 9 Texas Intellectual Property 
Law Journal, 137. 
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narrow set of circumstances, many have argued75 for exceptions, 76 particularly in cases 
where privileges are leveraged from one market into another in order to expand the 
scope of the privilege, 77 and cases of conditional refusals to license that seek to 
expand the scope of those privileges. 78 A number of commentators have also criticised 
the Court's treatment in Xerox of intellectual property as different to other forms of 
tangible property,79 and the lack of sound economic analysis by the Court!' 
In relation to the leveraging issue, 81 Gleklen argues that a patent gives the patent 
holder a right to leverage their patent into other markets, and the right to exploit a 
75 In response to these arguments see Jonathon Gleklen, 'Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusals to 
License Intellectual Property: Xerox and its Critics' (Paper presented to the Department of 
Justice/Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Washington DC, 1 May 2002) 5-15. A previous version 
of this paper was published at (2001) 2(1) Antitrust and Intellectual Property 11. 
76 The arguments advanced by parties on both sides of the debate are complex and focus on the relevant 
statutory scheme, principles of statutory construction and legislative history. While it is not necessary 
to examine these arguments in detail for the purposes of this thesis, they are usefully contrasted in Lao, 
above n19 and Glelden, Per Se Legality for Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, above 
n70. 
77 See, eg, Lao, above n19; Mark R Patterson, 'When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging 
Problem' (2000) 73 South California Law Review 1133. 
78 See, eg, Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.31-13.32]; Jeffrey K Mackie-Mason, 
'Antitrust Immunity for Refusals to Deal in (Intellectual) Property is a Slippery Slope' (2002), July, 
The Antitrust Source 1, <http://www.antitrustsource.com> at 1 November 2004. 
This thesis does not deal directly with conditional refusals to deal, but does assert by virtue of limbs [2] 
and [3] of the framework proposed in 5.5.5 that attempts to expand the scope of intellectual property 
should be subject to competition law. 
79 See, eg, Melamed and Stoeppelwerth, above n65; Mackie-Mason, above n78. There are a number of 
Limitations on the right of the owner of tangible property to refuse to deal; see above, 7.2.1.1. Melamed 
and Stoeppelwerth note that the effect of Xerox is to 'effectively immunise from antitrust liability a 
dominant firm's decision to deny rivals access to inputs or facilities they need, merely because those 
inputs or facilities contain patented or copyrighted materials, regardless of the competitive effect of the 
denial.'; Melamed and Stoeppelwerth, above n65, 409. Note that the competitive implications may be 
graver where access to inputs is denied to non-competitors. 
80 See, in particular, Kobak, above n5, 533-535, 539-541; Maureen O'Rourke, 'Striking a Delicate 
Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract and Standardisation in the Computer Industry' 
(1998) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 1, 31-35, Suzzette Rodriguez Hurley, 'Failing to 
Balance Patent Rights and Antitrust Concerns: The Federal Circuit's holding in In re Independent 
Service Organisations Antitrust Litigation' (2004) 13 Federal Circuit Bar Journal 475, 493-495; Peter 
M Boyle, Penelope M Lister and J Clayton Everett Jr, 'Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light 
or Green Light at the IF-Antitrust Intersection?' (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 739. Specifically, the 
Federal Circuit is alleged to have failed to undertake sufficient analysis of the relevant market, the 
degree of market power, and the effect on the market of the refusal to license, see, especially, Maureen 
O'Rourke, 'Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract and Standardisation 
in the Computer Industry' (1998) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 1. It is difficult to see 
how factual analysis would be necessary upon application of a per se rule of legality, and this may 
assist in explaining this omission. The Court did, however, fail to provide a thorough economic 
evaluation of its rationale for implementing a per se rule. 
81 On the general requirements of establishing a leveraging claim, see Maurits Dolman, 'Restrictions on 
Innovation: An EU Antitrust Approach' (1998) 66 Antitrust Law Journal 455, 471-472. 
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patent may extend to more than one economic market because it is limited only by the 
claim language. 82 Accordingly, a broad scope of claims, read literally, could result in a 
number of antitrust markets being encompassed. 83 Enabling a patent holder to refuse 
to license these patents in these markets, regardless of whether they represent a crucial 
input, would be a legitimate exercise of the patented privilege." 
On the other hand, a particular economic monopoly, which is important for antitrust 
purposes, does not automatically follow from a patent monopoly. 85 Further, the patent 
right conveyed by statute is not intended to be unfettered. In the US, for example, 
there is no argument among commentators that tying arrangements should be (and are 
in fact) subject to antitrust scrutiny. If tying protected to unprotected patents falls 
outside the bounds of a patented right, it is submitted that leveraging a monopoly in 
one market into another secondary market is also capable of falling outside the patent 
holder's exclusive right. Indeed, leveraging and tying arrangements may have similar 
competitive outcomes,86 and should be subject to similar antitrust standards. 
Many commentators, despite advocating intellectual property as a presumptively valid 
business justification for refusing to license, recognise that there may be 
circumstances where holders of intellectual property seek to extend the scope of those 
privileges." A rebuttable presumption would operate effectively in cases involving 
straightforward refusals to license. Intellectual property protection should not, 
however, provide an automatic justification for refusing to deal with another party 
where that refusal deals with property to which the intellectual property holder is not 
entitled by virtue of the privilege. 88 A rebuttable presumption should not protect a 
82 Gleklen, Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, above n75, 7-8, 
discussing In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001), District Court decision, 
1136, 1138. In addition, commentators such as Gleklen are not swayed by arguments in relation to 
footnote 29 of the Kodak decision; at 6-7 and see above, n49, n68. 
83 Gleklen, Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, above n75, 7-8. 
Note that even some critics of the decision do not believe that the decision should be unfettered and 
should be subject to exceptions; see the discussion below, 7.2.1.2(vi). 
84 ibid. 
Patterson, above n77, especially 1155-1156. Patterson points out that a defendant should be required 
to show that a patent is the source of its economic leveraging power; at 1156. 
86 Lao, above n19, especially 220. 
87 See also, Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.31-13.32]. 
ss Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis point out that an important requirement in the application of the 
irrebuttable presumption is proof that the allegedly infringing use falls within the scope of the right, or 
does in fact infringe the right. This is more likely to be in issue in the case of copyright than patent law, 
because there are more limitations on a copyright holder than there are on a patent holder; ibid, [13.34- 
13.38]. 
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patent holder, in circumstances where that patent holder, for example, simply refuses 
to license a party in a separate downstream market in which the patent holder does not 
operate. 89 
At the same time, considering evidence of subjective intent is bound to be 
problematic, in that it fails to take account of the competitive effects of a refusal to 
license. It is also likely to lead to evidentiary issues where allegations of 'pretext' are 
made,9° and is illogical in that the effects of a desire to protect intellectual property are 
closely aligned with the effects of actions taken on the basis of a desire to eliminate 
competition!' In any event, it may be that the decision in Image Technical will be 
read narrowly so that evidence of intent will only be taken into account in cases where 
there is clear evidence (as there was in Image Technical) that a refusal to license was 
predicated on grounds other than intellectual property as asserted by the privilege 
holder. 
Ultimately, very few claims are likely to be successfully upheld. Nevertheless, 
Melamed and Stoeppelwerth contend that there are compelling reasons for ensuring 
that an appropriate standard is in place for evaluating the legality of refusals to 
license. Specifically, they argue that a per se rule of legality is inappropriate because: 
• some unilateral refusals to deal are in fact anticompetitive and damaging and 
warrant intervention by competition law; 
• it is often difficult to distinguish between unilateral refusals to deal and other 
forms of exclusionary conduct. Implementing a per se rule is likely to 
encourage intellectual property holders to seek to exploit this fact; 
• an immunity for intellectual property holders in the antitrust laws would be 
likely to distort business behaviour by discouraging licensing and undermining 
innovation; and 
• a per se rule of legality ignores developments in US Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that base antitrust decisions on economic reasoning and fact-
based analysis.92 
89 Note that there may be justifications for this conduct, and these are canvassed in more detail below, 
8.3.4.1. 
90 Gleklen, Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, above n75, 8. 
91 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001), 1329; Kauffman, above 
n55, 523-524; Myrick and Gleklen, above n27, 30-31. 
92 Melamed and Stoeppelwerth, above n65, 423-425. See also Pitofsky, above n74. 
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Although it is not clear which of the approaches taken above would be likely to 
predominate were the Supreme Court required to consider the issue, the arguments 
advanced by critics of Xerox are certainly compelling. It was argued in Chapter 5 that 
the application of an antitrust-immunity approach in respect of this issue is 
inappropriate, because it ignores the fact that refusals to license may have anti-
competitive implications.93 They should, therefore, be subject to competition law. The 
governing factor in any assessment of a refusal to license by a patent holder that 
possesses the requisite degree of market power is whether that refusal to license is 
justified by efficiency considerations. A per se rule of legality with very narrowly 
defined exceptions leaves no room for this approach. 
The framework presented in Chapter 5 is proposed on the basis that refusals to license 
be subject to competition law, and those refusals to license falling into limbs [2] and 
[3] be particularly subject to scrutiny. It is also intended that the framework be 
flexibly applied and refusals to license assessed on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, 
limb [I] does not preclude closer inspection by regulators of a refusal to license in a 
primary market. Exceptional circumstances would, however, need to exist for such a 
refusal to license to contravene section 2 of the Sherman Act. US courts have 
generally taken a conservative view of refusals to license, and a finding of liability for 
a refusal to license falling within the second and third limbs would be rare. However, 
an approach that leaves scope for a finding of liability under limbs [2] and [3] of the 
framework is to be preferred. 
While many refusals to deal are likely to escape antitrust scrutiny, it will often be the 
case that there is a fine line between legitimate and anticompetitive behaviour. The 
imposition of a blanket rule is therefore arguably inappropriate. 94 At the present time 
Xerox is unlikely to be followed, however, this may not be the case indefinitely. 95 It is 
submitted that the approach taken in Data General is to be preferred, and is more 
consistent with the framework. This approach could equally be applied to patents so 
that evidence that a patent holder was seeking to expand the scope of its privilege, or 
93 Above, 5.5.5. 
94 It may be that the decision in In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, 
LLC and Others v Xerox Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001) 
was intended to be, and will be interpreted to be, a narrowly operating rule that covers only purely 
unilateral refusals to license and does not operate in relation to other forms of conduct such as 
conditional refusals; see, eg, R Hewitt Pate, 'Refusals to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights' (2002) 
10 George Mason Law Review 429; Boyle, Lister and Everett, above n80, 747-7484. Cf MacKie-
Mason, above n10, especially 9. Even if this is the case, it is debatable whether or not a per se rule is 
appropriate. 
95 This will depend on whether Congress takes any action to overturn the result. See above, n63 and 
accompanying text. 
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refusing to license into a downstream market without any efficiency justification, 
would result in the rebuttal of the presumption of validity." 
It must also be borne in mind that different considerations do apply in respect of the 
various forms of intellectual property, as each confer different privileges and 
protection." While copyright merely protects against the right to copy, patents 
provide a temporary monopoly and convey a far broader privilege. It is submitted that 
for this reason, they are likely to be accorded greater protection under competition 
law, and that US cases that have distinguished between the two regimes have 
invariably had these considerations in mind. Nevertheless, there could be 
circumstances where a refusal to license a patent has anti-competitive implications, 
and courts should take this into account. 
7.23 ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis point out that the essential facilities doctrine is, in 
some respects, broader than the narrow refusal to deal claim." While the remedy 
available for a refusal to deal would be limited to the specific act complained of by 
the competitor, an essential facilities claim provides a basis on which to seek an order 
that an intellectual property holder license all potential competitors." 
7.23.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN THE US 
The essential facilities doctrine originated in the US in order to deal with cases where 
access to physical facilities and infrastructure were required in order to compete in a 
particular industry. It comprises a sub-set of the more general refusal to deal claims 
dealt with under section 2 of the Sherman Act, and as such is not an independent 
cause of action. w° The doctrine has evolved via an extensive body of case law, which 
is too voluminous to discuss fully in this thesis. Instead, this section will simply seek 
to give a brief overview of the operation of the doctrine, and point to its import in 
terms of intellectual property. 
96 Nevertheless, the presumption is likely to result in findings of liability in fewer circumstances than 
would be likely under the framework, because the framework specifies general circumstances in which 
the scope of privileges conferred by intellectual property are likely to be expanded. 
97 This point was made in Telecom Technical Services Inc and Others v Rolm Company and Others 388 
F3d 820 (11 th Cur 2004), 826. 
98 Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [12.22-13.23]. 
99 
ibid. 
too See the discussion in Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathon Hooks, 'The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine Under US Antitrust Law' (2002) 70 Antitrust Law Journal 443, 446-447. 
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There are certain preconditions laid down in MCI Communications Corp v AT&T 
Cowl that require satisfaction before the essential facilities doctrine will operate: 
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability 
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of 
the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 102 
A corollary to the fourth requirement is that a defence of legitimate business 
justification is also available to a defendant. w3 A plaintiff will need to show that more 
than mere inconvenience has been created by denial of access to the facility. K4 In 
addition, access to the facility must be indispensable in order to compete with the 
owner of the facility in a downstream market, and in most cases the facility will be an 
input of some kind necessary to produce a product in a downstream market in which 
the parties compete. 105 It would appear that competition must be foreclosed in a 
separate but related market before the doctrine will operate. 106 Vertical integration on 
the part of a monopolist is thus a cornerstone of the doctrine. 
Commentators have endorsed the retention of these preconditions, and there is 
consensus even among advocates of the doctrine that strict conditions must govern its 
continuance. m Supporters of the doctrine assert that the courts have been far more 
willing to endorse it than most commentators, although only under the specific 
101 MCI Communications Corp v AT&T Co 708 F 2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7 th Cir 1983), cert denied, 464 
US 891 (1983). 
102 MCI Communications Corp v AT&T Co 708 F 2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7 th Cir 1983), cert denied, 464 
US 891 (1983). 
103 See City of Anaheim v S Cal Edison Co 955 F 2d 1373, 1379 (9 th Cir 1992). 
1°4 Alaska Airlines v United Airlines 948 F 2d 536, 544-546 (9 th Cir 1991). 
1°5 For example, the court in MCI Communications Corp v AT&T Co 708 F 2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7 th 
Cir 1983), cert denied, 464 US 891 (1983) stated (at 1132) that: 
[A] monopolist's control of an essential facility (sometimes called a "bottleneck") can extend 
monopoly power from one stage of production to another, and from one market into another. 
Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation 
to make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms. 
Cf Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp v Aspen Skiing Co 738 F 2d 1509 (10 th Cir 1984), which is the only 
clear authority supporting a contrary proposition; Paul D Marquardt and Mark Leddy, 'The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks (2003) 70 
Antitrust Law Journal 847, 854-855. 
106 See, especially, Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application (211" ed, 2002) [771(a)]; Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, 
[13.13]. Cf Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, above n100, 458-461. In response to this assertion by 
Pitofsky and Others, see Marquardt and Leddy, above n105, especially 855. 
107 See, eg, Mark A Lemley, 'Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem' (1996) 28 
Connecticut Law Review 1041, 1085-1086. 
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conditions that govern its application in exceptional circumstances. th8 Many 
commentators, however, have argued for the abolition of the doctrine on the basis that 
it has evolved without clear limiting principles.' 109 The doctrine continues to operate 
but has been very narrowly construed by US courts. n° 
7.2.3.2 THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Some commentators have supported the operation of the doctrine in cases involving 
intellectual property.m In a limited number of cases the doctrine has been argued in 
relation to intellectual property. For the most part, these attempts have been 
unsuccessful. Intellectual property privileges are unlikely to constitute an essential 
facility because they will rarely satisfy the requisite grounds from the MCI 
Communications case: 112 
• intellectual property privileges are unlikely in most cases to confer a 
monopoly, which is a necessary component of an essential facilities claim; 
• a finding that intellectual property constitute a barrier to entry is unlikely to be 
made given that exclusion is the incentive provided by intellectual property; 
• the holder of the intellectual property and the firm seeking access must 
compete in a downstream market; and 
• in many cases, it is questionable whether intellectual property is essential for 
competition. 
Although courts have not gone so far as to hold that intellectual property can never 
form the basis of an essential facilities claim, 113 no US court has explicitly held that 
108 . Pttofsky, Patterson and Hooks, above n100. 
109 See, eg, Philip Areeda, 'Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles' (1989) 58 
Antitrust Law Journal 841, although see his n21 (noting that MCI Communications Corp v AT&T Co 
708 F 2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7th Cur 1983), cert denied, 464 US 891 (1983) is probably correct in 
enforcing provision of an essential facility in some circumstances). See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, 
above n106, [771c]. 
110 See, eg, the discussion in McCurdy, Gregory McCurdy, 'Intellectual Property and Competition: 
Does the Essential Facilities Doctrine Shed Any New Light?' (2003) 25(10) European Intellectual 
Property Review 472, 473-475. 
tit See, eg, Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, above n100, 452; Lao, above n19, especially 218 (noting 
that the refusal of a patent monopolist to deal with competitors in complementary markets would have 
the effect of eliminating competition and reducing innovation and consumer choice in those 
complementary markets). 
112 See generally Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.18]. 
113 Instead, courts have concluded that on the facts of the particular case in dispute the essential 
facilities doctrine was inapplicable. See, eg, Data General Corp v Grumman Systems Support Corp 761 
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intellectual property is essentia1. 114 Most claims that intellectual property constitutes 
essential facilities have been made on the basis that a privileged level of access to a 
particular competitor was discontinued. 115 This basically refutes any claim that a 
facility is essential for competition generally in a particular market. It is also 
conceivable that in many cases the holder of intellectual property will be able to 
successfully argue that the availability of some substitute for that privilege will defeat 
an argument that it constitutes an essential facility. u6 
Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis suggest that claims that intellectual property privileges 
are essential facilities should be denied outright, although exceptions to this rule 
should be made where intellectual property is incidental to the control of a particular 
facility.' One commentator has suggested that it will only be established that 
intellectual property constitutes an essential facility where the holder of the 
intellectual property has gained control of a market that extends 'above and beyond 
the control that naturally flows from the exercise of the [intellectual property] rights 
themselves" Further, it would need to be virtually impossible for competitors to 
attain any market share without the facility. 119 This may pave the way for 
F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1g Cir 1994). Note that 
the court in this case concluded that if: 
[M]anufacturers of complex and innovative systems were required to share with competitors 
the development of accessories, because they had a possibly absolute advantage through 
producing the system, the incentives of copyright and patent laws would be severely 
undermined. Not only would the manufacturer, who is in the best position to create these 
accessories, have less incentive to do so, but also the impetus for competitors to reverse 
engineer and produce competing solutions would be reduced. 
114 See, eg, David L Aldridge Co v Microsoft Corp 995 F Supp 728, 751-756 (SD Tex 1998); 
Intergraph Corp v Intel Corp 195 F 3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999). Note, however, BellSouth Advertising v 
Donnelley Information 719 F Supp 1551 (SD Fla 1988) rev'd on other grounds, 999 F 24 1436, 1566- 
1567 (11th Cir 1993), where the district court held that the essential facilities doctrine was capable of 
applying to 'information wrongfully withheld', in this case, a copyrighted telephone directory. 
115 See, eg, Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, vol I, [13.3c]; David L Aldridge Co v Microsoft 
Corp 995 F Supp 728, 751-756 (SD Tex 1998); Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation 195 F 3d 
1346 (Fed Cir 1999). 
116 Although arguably some patented medical biotechnology tools are difficult to substitute or invent 
around; see below, 7.2.4 Application of US Case Law to Refusals to License Medical Biotechnology 
Patents. 
117 Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n6, vol I, [13.18]-[13.22]. See also Abbott B Lipsky Jr and J 
Gregory Sidak, 'Essential Facilities' (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 1187, 1193. 
118 McCurdy, above n110, 476 referring to the judgment in Data General Corp v Grumman Systems 
Support Corp 761 F Supp 185 (D Mass 1991), aff'd, 36 F 3d 1147 (V Cur 1994). See also Hovenkamp, 
Lemley and Janis, above n6, [13.20.e] 
119 McCurdy, above n110, 477. 
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consideration of medical biotechnology patents as essentially facilities, although it is 
acknowledged that the possibility of the courts applying the doctrine to any form of 
intellectual property is remote. The restriction of the essential facilities doctrine to 
very exceptional cases has been supported by commentators, and finds support in the 
case law. It is very unlikely that a US court would apply the doctrine to a refusal to 
license intellectual property. This may operate to preclude a breach of section 2 where 
a patent holder refuses to license into a vertically integrated market. In this case, there 
must be some doubt as to whether liability under limbs [2](ii) and [3] of the 
framework could be established. 
7.2.4 APPLICATION OF US CASE LAW TO REFUSALS TO LICENSE MEDICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 
Issues at the intersection of intellectual property and antitrust have been widely 
discussed in relation to the information sector, 12° primarily in relation to copyrighted 
information technology (such as peripheral hardware and support systems) and 
software information. The biotechnology industry shares many of the characteristics 
of these industries. Both are characterised by a fast pace of technological innovation, 
a large number of market entrants at the initial stages of industry development, and 
efforts on the part of market participants to create and expand monopoly positions. 
Many of these efforts have not gone unrewarded, with progressive concentration 
being the hallmark of both industries. 121 
It would probably be fair to say, however, that the medical biotechnology industry 
offers smaller market participants a greater chance of continued innovative activity 
despite the presence of larger players on the market. Concentration has not necessarily 
precluded competition, although vertical integration is becoming increasingly 
common and is in fact desirable for many smaller companies and research institutions. 
There has also traditionally been a higher threshold for obtaining patent protection 
than copyright protection, 122 although with the vast numbers of patents being granted, 
patent protection appears to be increasingly attainable. 
120 See, eg, John H Barton, 'Paradigms of Intellectual Property/Competition Balances in the 
Information Sector' Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Competition 
Policy and Intellectual Property Rights (1998), 295; O'Rourke, above n80. Note also the examples 
cited in the European context below, 7.3.4. 
121 In relation to information industries see, eg, Alessandra Narciso, 'IMS Health or the Question 
Whether Intellectual Property Still Deserves a Specific Approach in a Free Market Economy' (2003) 4 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 445, especially 450-451. 
122 Copyright protection is also conferred without a requirement that it be applied for, whereas as 
discussed earlier, obtaining patent protection involves a rigorous process of application and 
examination. 
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In comparison, there is surprisingly little discussion in the context of the medical 
biotechnology sector. This may be due to the fact that issues in relation to the 
information sector have been in existence for longer, and have been litigated, or that 
they have not yet been recognised in relation to medical biotechnology. It may also be 
due to the fact that the biotechnology industry is comprised of small, start-up 
companies for whom the costs of litigation are prohibitive. 123 Empirical evidence 
indicating that restrictive licensing is not especially problematic at the current time for 
the US biotechnology industry may also assist in explaining this absence of litigation. 
It is difficult to predict the future direction US courts (and in particular the Supreme 
Court) are likely to take in relation to the issue of refusals to license intellectual 
property. If the approach taken by the Federal Court in Xerox is followed (and there is 
some doubt as to whether it will be), then a refusal to license a patented medical 
biotechnology research tool would be unlikely to ever contravene section 2. If, 
however, the approach in Image Technical is followed, the rebuttable presumption 
may provide stronger grounds for arguing that a refusal to license a patented 
biotechnology product or method constitutes a section 2 violation. Nevertheless, it 
will be difficult in a vast majority of cases to establish the elements of section 2 where 
access to a patent is refused. 
It is submitted that a rebuttable presumption may well be applied to a refusal to 
license copyrighted information. 124 The question is whether this is also likely to be the 
test that will apply to a refusal to license a patent. Although the Court in Image 
Technical applied this presumption to patents, it is not clear that a subsequent court 
would follow this decision. 125 Nevertheless, it would be open to a court to apply the 
presumption in respect of patents, and consider objective evidence justifying the 
refusal to license. 126 Objective justifications for a refusal to license a patent may be 
123 Above, 1.5.2. 
124 	. In line with the decision in Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman 
Systems Support Corporation 761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 
F 3d 1147 (1st  Cir 1994). See above, 7.2.1.2(b). Note that the Federal Circuit in In re Independent 
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox Corporation 203 F3d 1322 
(Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001) applied this presumption (in respect of copyright) but 
in limiting the circumstances in which the presumption could be rebutted effectively reduced it to a per 
se rule. 
125  Primarily on the basis that evidence of subjective motivation was taken to rebut the presumption. 
126 In Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support 
Corporation 761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1 si 
Cur 1994), competitive conditions prior to the conduct were considered by the Court, and it was 
concluded that the market for repair was not considerably more competitive before the refusal to 
license. 
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present in most cases but it is submitted that there is unlikely to be an adequate 
efficiency justification where a refusal to license prevents the development of a new 
product in a separate downstream market. 127 Thus, the application of the rebuttable 
presumption laid down by the First Circuit in Data General to patents may pave the 
way for consideration of refusals to license gene patents and other research tools 
necessary to conduct follow-on research, as contraventions of section 2. 
This would depend on whether principles from general refusal to license cases, or 
essential facilities analysis, were applied to this factual scenario. Principles from the 
refusal to license cases discussed would probably be applied to a refusal to license a 
party with whom the patent holder does not compete. 128 It does not follow from this 
that establishing a contravention of section 2 would be an easy matter, but it is 
submitted that it would be possible to establish a contravention. If a vertically 
integrated patent holder refused to supply a downstream competitor, essential 
facilities principles would probably be employed. 129 Although some authors have 
argued the US essential facilities doctrine is capable of applying to intellectual 
property, this has been far from universally accepted. m It is submitted that it is very 
unlikely that a US court would find that a patent, even a broad patent whose claims 
encompass a number of uses, would constitute an essential facility. 131 Consequently, 
while limb [2](ii) of the framework may be made out under US law, it is extremely 
unlikely that a contravention of section 2 would be established in respect of a factual 
scenario in line with limb [3]. 
7.3 EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 
This section considers EU cases dealing with refusals to license intellectual property, 
and discusses the most important cases that have dealt with this issue. The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has considered the matter on a number of occasions and 
established relatively firm grounds on which a refusal to license will be anti- 
127 	. This matter is explored in greater detail in Chapter 8 in the context of the application of s 46 to 
refusals to license medical biotechnology patents; below, 8.3.4.1. 
128 	i It s a requirement of the essential facilities doctrine that the party refusing to deal compete in the 
downstream market with the party seeking supply; above, 7.2.3.1. This would preclude its application 
where the parties do not compete. 
129 Although where complementary markets are involved, general refusal to license principles would be 
employed. See the categorisation of cases by Glazer and Lipsky, above n17, discussed at 7.2.1.1. Note 
that complementary markets cannot be classified as separate downstream markets. 
130 See the discussion above, 7.2.3.2. 
131 US principles relating to refusals to license will be discussed further in the context of medical 
biotechnology patents in Chapter 8. 
315 
Chapter 7 
competitive. This contrasts with the position in the US where a number of Circuit 
Courts have been required to consider the same issue, resulting in conflicting rules. 
7.3.1 EUROPEAN CASE LAW DEALING WITH REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
Chapter 5 provided a basic overview of Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, 132 the provision that will be invoked in the case of a unilateral 
refusal to license intellectual property. Article 82 clearly applies to dealings in 
intellectual property.'" 
7.3.1.1 THE BASIC POSITION 
European jurisprudence dealing with refusals to license intellectual property offers an 
interesting point of comparison with the likely Australian position under s 46 (and 
indeed with the position under US law). The specific provisions in Article 82 most 
likely to be invoked are Article 82(b), which prohibits a dominant company from 
limiting the production, markets or technical development of its competitors to the 
prejudice of consumers, and Article 82(c), which prohibits discrimination with trading 
partners. This list is not, however, exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 
It will become evident that refusals to license are treated more strictly in the EU than 
they are likely to be under the TPA (and indeed under section 2 of the Sherman Act), 
although there are important limitations to the extent to which an intellectual property 
132 Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/65. Article 82 was discussed in 
Chapter 5 and provides that: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in 
a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts. 
The elements of Article 82 were briefly discussed above, 5.4.2.1. Note that Article 82 was formerly 
Article 86, and earlier cases that consider Article 86 instead of Article 82, will refer to Article 86. Thus, 
these references are intended to refer to the same provision. 
133 See generally Steven D Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Regulation of Innovation (1998), 148-150. 
134 	. Joined cases C-395/96P, Compagnie Maritime Belge, March 16, 2000. 
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owner will be compelled to license. Article 82 had been interpreted in favour of 
protecting competitors rather than consumers generally for a considerable period of 
time during which intellectual property was viewed with a degree of hostility. m The 
basic position is accurately summarised as follows: 
When a licence of an intellectual property right is asked for, the refusal to license is 
unlawful only if the effect of a refusal would be exploitative or anti-competitive in 
some way not merely resulting from the refusal to license itself. There must be some 
seriously undesirable element in the situation in addition to the natural result of the 
refusal to license, This usually is, and perhaps must be, some specific loss caused to 
parties other than the competitors which may be excluded from the market by the 
intellectual property right. 136 
Prior to considering the case law in relation to refusals to license intellectual property, 
it is worth noting that the Commission generally defmes markets fairly narrowly, 
whether the subject matter is intellectual property or some other form of property. 
This trend on the part of the Commission is prompted by a desire to control abuse by 
de facto monopoly holders. 137 
The starting point in any analysis of European case law dealing with refusals to 
license intellectual property is Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd (Volvo v Veng). 138 In 
Volvo v Veng, the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) stated that the right to refuse to 
license intellectual property constitutes the very subject-matter of intellectual 
property, and that a refusal to license an exclusive intellectual property privilege will 
135 See generally Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, 195- 
196; Valentine Korah, 'The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European 
Experience' (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 801, 808, 839. 
136 John Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in the European Community 
Antitrust Law, Paper Prepared for the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Hearings, 
Washington DC, 19 April 2002. 
137 Steven D Anderman 'Microsoft in Europe', (Paper prepared for the Department ofJustice/Federal 
Trade Commission Hearings, Washington DC, 22 May 2002) 10; John Temple Lang, 'Defining 
Legitimate Competition: Companies Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities' 
[1994] Fordham Corporate Law Institute 245. 
138 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122. See also CICRA v Renault [1988] ECR 6039. 
In Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122, the limitations of the existence/exercise 
dichotomy were acknowledged by the ECJ, and this case marked the beginning of the end of the 
utilisation by the European Commission and Courts of the distinction. See further Thomas C Vinje, 
'The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the EC.I' (1995) 17(6) European Intellectual Property 
Review 297, 299-300; above, 5.4.2.2. 
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not, in itself, constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 139 This general principle, 
however, is not without qualification. 
73.1.2 MA GILL 
The ECJ stated in Volvo v Veng that the presence of some additional element by way 
of abusive conduct could result in a finding that there had been an abuse of a 
dominant position. 14° This proviso was taken up in Radio Telefis Eireann and 
Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission (Magill). 141 
In Magill, an Irish publisher (Magill) prepared the first weekly television guide that 
included weekly listing information for all six channels operating in the area. Three 
television broadcasters operated in the area, and each ran two channels. Prior to the 
release of Magill's guide, there was no single source of this weekly information: 
viewers obtained listings from three separate guides produced by the respective 
broadcasters, which each gave listing information for their particular channels. 
The broadcasters refused to license further listings information to Magill, and sought 
an injunction preventing the publication of further weekly guides by Magill on the 
basis of breach of copyright. Magill had, however, filed a complaint with the 
European Commission alleging breach of a dominant position by the broadcasters. 
The ECJ upheld the ruling of the Commission 142 and The Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities (CFI), 143 in finding that the broadcasters had abused a 
dominant position by virtue of their refusal to license their copyright in the listings 
information. 
The ECJ applied the ruling of the CFI and held that a refusal by a copyright holder 
occupying a dominant position' 44 to grant a licence to that copyrighted information, 
139 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122, [8] (Judgment). Note that the case concerned 
Article 86, now Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/65. 
140 Examples given in that case were a refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, 
discontinuing the manufacture of parts for models in widespread use, or charging 'unfair' prices for 
spare parts; Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122, [9] (Judgment). 
141 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 
CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416. 
142 Magill TV Guide Ltd v Independent Television Publications Ltd, British Broadcasting Corporation 
and Radio Telefis Eireann (Case IV/31.851) [1989] 4 CMLR 757. 
143 Radio Telefis Eirann v EC Commission [1991] 4 CMLR 586; British Broadcasting Corporation and 
BBC Enterprises Limited v EC Commission [1991] 4 CMLR 669; and Independent Television 
Publications Limited v EC Commission [1991] 4 CMLR 745. Although the court gave separate 
judgments, they are very similar in content. 
144 The ECJ devoted little explanation to the issue of dominance, which is probably due in part to the 
fact that this issue was not appealed from the decision of the CFI. Dominance will ordinarily be tested 
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would not, in itself, amount to an abuse of a dominant position. However, in 
'exceptional circumstances' a refusal to grant access to intellectual property will 
constitute abusive conduct. The ECJ adopted the reasoning of the CFI, in laying down 
three such circumstances as the basis for their decision that the broadcasters had 
engaged in abusive conduct: 
• the lack of an effective substitute for the weekly guide offered by Magill, and 
the 'specific, constant and regular ... ' potential consumer demand for this 
new product; 1" 
• there was no objective justification for the refusal to license Magill; 146 and 
• the broadcasters used their de facto monopoly in one market to preserve a 
monopoly in a secondary market by denying access to the raw material 
indispensable to the publication of a weekly guide!'" 
It was also clear from the ruling of the ECJ in Magill that exceptional circumstances 
must be present in order to ground a finding that a refusal to license intellectual 
property constitutes abusive conduct. The court failed however to elaborate on the 
application of these special circumstances, and whether they must be treated as 
cumulative or alternative requirements. 
Potential application of the exceptional circumstances test demarcated by the ECJ 
certainly involved a considerable amount of ambiguity. While some commentators 
post-Magill argued that the conditions listed in Magill were required to be imposed 
by the ability of a firm to act independently of competitors and consumers; Vinje, above n138, 299. 
The ECJ held that the broadcasters occupied a dominant position because they effectively held a de 
facto monopoly over information as to the channel, day, time and title of television programmes and 
were able to prevent effective competition on the market in weekly television magazines, Radio Telefis 
Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] 
All ER (EC) 416, [47] (Judgment). 
145 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 
CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416, [52-54] (Judgment). 
146  Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 
CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416, [55] (Judgment). As Anderman points out, the implication 
following from this reasoning is that the mere possession of intellectual property will not amount to an 
objective justification; Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, 
209. 
147 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 
CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416, [56] (Judgment). That product being a weekly guide containing 
not only listings material, but also non-listings material such as articles, readers' letters and advertising 
material; see Radio Telefis Eirann v EC Commission [1991] 4 CMLR 586, [8]. 
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cumulatively, 148 others favoured an interpretation that treated the conditions as 
alternative, 149 or considered that satisfaction of the third requirement could be 
sufficient's° Another possibility was that the conditions listed in Magill were merely 
examples of conduct capable of constituting abusive conduct' s ' The Court had found 
all three conditions to be present in Magill, t52 but it remained unclear whether this was 
essential in any case where the exceptional circumstances test was likely to be 
applied. In reality, even a close reading of the ECJ's decision fails to afford 
significant guidance as to the Court's intention. As Anderman points out, a non-
cumulative reading of the conditions listed in Magill would have led to the conclusion 
that the exceptional circumstances test applied in two main situations: 153 
• where the intellectual property holder possessed a de facto monopoly in one 
market and refused to license an indispensable input into a secondary market 
in which its competitor intended to introduce a new product; and 
• where the intellectual property holder possessed a de facto monopoly in one 
market but refused to license that intellectual property in order that a 
secondary market be reserved for its own use. This could possibly constitute 
an abuse regardless of whether the competitor intended to introduce a new 
product. 
Consequently, the judgment gave rise to immediate alarm as to the scope of the 
decision. 154 Many commentators voiced concern that a broad reading of the 
circumstances enunciated by the ECJ could have ramifications for owners of 
intellectual property, particularly where those rights involved copyright protection 
148 See, eg, Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European 
Experience, above n135, 814; Hedvig K S Schmidt, 'Article 82's "Exceptional Circumstances that 
Restrict Intellectual Property Rights' (2002) 23(5) European Competition Law Review 210, 214-5. 
149 See, eg, Rosa Greaves, 'Magill Est Arrive ...RTE and ITP v Commission of the European 
Communities' (1995) 16(4) European Competition Law Review 244, 246; Frank Fine, `INIDC/IMS: A 
Logical Application of Essential Facilities Doctrine' (2002) 23 European Competition Law Review 
457, 460-462 who asserts that it is clear from subsequent interpretations (in Ladbrolce and Bronner) 
that the existence of two markets is not necessary for the application of Article 82. 
150 Greaves, above n149, 246. 
151 It may be that the Court intended to preserve flexibility in this respect and not limit itself as it had 
conceivably done in Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122; Vinje, above n138, 301. 
152 The ECJ stated that 'in the light of all those circumstances the Court of First Instance did not err in 
law in holding that the appellants' conduct was an abuse of a dominant position ... ' [57] (Judgment). 
153 Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, 211-214. See also 
Anderman, Microsoft in Europe, above n137, 13-14. 
154 See, eg, Schmidt, above n147; Dolman, above n81. 
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over information technology or software. 155 Similar issues arise in respect of patents, 
and instances where upstream patent owners could be compelled to license their 
inventions could be envisaged. 156 The decision also paved the way for consideration of 
intellectual property privileges as essential facilities, 157 being an area in which the EC 
Commission had already become active. 158 
It would appear however, from subsequent decisions, that the potentially very broad 
scope of Magill has been limited. 
7.3.13 THE NARROWLVG OF THE SCOPE OF MA GILL 
The issue of refusals to license was next considered in Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC 
Commission (Ladbroke),'" when Ladbroke's subsidiary was refused a license to show 
films of French horse races after bets on those races had been shown in its betting 
shops in Belgium. The CFI held that Magill was distinguishable on the following 
grounds: 160  
• Ladbroke had the largest share of the market for betting services in Belgium 
and did not require the use of films to enter the market. 161 The refusal to 
license did not restrict competition by preventing the appearance of a new 
product for which there was consumer demand; 162 
155 See, eg, Narciso, above n121; Vinje, above n138. Cf Ulrika Bath, 'Access to Information v 
Intellectual Property Rights' (2002) 24(3) European Intellectual Property Review 138. 
156 See Valentine Korah, 'Patents and Antitrust' (1997) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 395. See 
further below, 7.3.4. 
157 Although the ECJ did not use the term 'essential facility', it effectively applied the doctrine in this 
case by holding that an undertaking with a dominant position in a market may be compelled to license 
the intellectual property that allows it to maintain a position of dominance. See further below, 7.3.2. 
158 See the examples in the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v 
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112. 
159 Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC Commission [1997] 5 CMLR 309. 
160 See also Valentine Korah, The Ladbroke Saga' (1998) 19(3) European Competition Law Review 
169, 173. 
161 The CFI endorsed the view of the Commission that the product market was the market for 
transmissions, or films of races, but determined that this market was ancillary to the principal market of 
betting. Because they considered betting to be a national market, they declared that the ancillary market 
for films should correspondingly be treated as national; see Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC Commission 
[1997] 5 CMLR 309, [82-89]. The CFI's decision in relation to Article 82 was therefore influenced by 
this somewhat restrictive definition of the relevant market; ibid, 169-171, 173. 
162 Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC Commission [1997] 5 CMLR 309, [130]. 
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• Although films of French races were an 'additional, and ... suitable ... ' 
service for bettors, they were not essential to Ladbroke in operating betting 
shops; 163 and 
• since films are shown after the placing of bets, they did not affect the choices 
made by bettors and were not indispensable to bookmakers' activities!" 
Consequently, the Court provided some clarification of what the term 'exceptional 
circumstances' in Magill, meant. 165 Although not expressly addressing the issue of 
whether the requirements in Magill were cumulative or alternative, the implication 
from the ECJ's judgment in Ladbroke is that they were alternatives. 166 Indeed, the 
judgment has been read to mean that the appearance of a new product is unnecessary 
provided the product or service in question constitutes an essential product or service 
for the activity in question. 167 
The ECJ stated more clearly that the conditions were cumulative in Oscar Bronner 
GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG and 
Others. 168 Although this case did not concern intellectual property, the comments of 
the ECJ in relation to Magill can be generalised to provide guidance as to the 
application of the 'exceptional circumstances' test. 169 In this case, Oscar Bronner 
sought access to Mediaprint's nationwide newspaper home-delivery network in 
Austria. The ECJ accepted Mediaprint's arguments that although it occupied a 
dominant position in the relevant market, it had not abused that position by failing to 
provide access to Oscar Bronner. 
The ECJ stated that previous judgments had regarded a refusal to supply as abusive 
only where that refusal 'was likely to eliminate all competition on the part of that 
163 Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC Commission [1997] 5 CMLR 309, [131-132]. 
164 Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC Commission [1997] 5 CMLR 309, [132]. 
165 Fine, NDCIIMS, above n149, 460-461. 
166 See, eg, Darren Fitzgerald, 'Magill Revisited (1998) 20(4) European Intellectual Property Review 
154, especially 160-161. 
167 See, eg, National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [68], [180]; Fine, NDC/IMS, above n149, 461; John Temple Lang, 'The 
Principle of Essential Facilities in European Community Competition Law — The Position Since 
Bronner' (2000) 1 Journal of Network Industries, 375, his n2. Fine's view is that this is the correct 
position and entirely consistent with US case law on essential facilities; see Fine, NDCIIMS, above 
n149, 461. See also generally Frank Fine, `NDCIIMS: In Response to Professor Korah' (2002) 70 
Antitrust Law Journal 247. 
168 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112 [1999] 4 CMLR 112 (Oscar Bronner). 
169 Pat Treacy, 'Essential Facilities — Is the Tide Turning?' (1998) 19 European Competition Law 
Review 501, 504. 
322 
Chapter 7 
undertaldng.' 1" In the event that Magill applied to a case such as this where access to 
tangible property was sought, 171 on the surface it would appear that the ECJ indicated 
that they considered the conditions laid down in Magill were to be interpreted 
cumulatively. 172 Thus, in this case Oscar Bronner would need to establish: 
[N]ot only that the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery be likely to 
eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person 
requesting the service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively 
justified, but also that the service in itself be indispensable to carrying on that 
person's business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence 
for that home-delivery scheme (emphasis added). 173 
The ECJ held that these conditions were not satisfied in this case. Specifically, the 
court found that the delivery service was not indispensable to Oscar Bronner's 
business, because other distribution methods were available. u4 Further, there was no 
technical, legal or economic barrier preventing Oscar Bronner, either alone or in 
170 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschrtftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, [38] (Judgment). The court referred to two judgments: Istituto 
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v EC Commission [1974] 1 
CMLR 309 (Commercial Solvents) and Centre Beige d'Etudes de Marche-Tele-Marketing SA v 
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion SA and Information Publicite Benelux SA [1986] 2 
CMLR 558 (the Tele-marketing Case). See further below 7.3.2. 
171 It is arguable that the ECJ did not intend its Judgment to apply to refusals to license intellectual 
property: see the wording at [41] of the Judgment; Estelle Derclaye, 'Abuses of Dominant Position and 
Intellectual Property Rights: A Suggestion to Reconcile the Community Courts Case Law' (2003) 
26(4) World Competition 685, 694-696. 
172 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, 40-41] (Judgment). Note, however, that it is less clear that there is a 
requirement for two markets as was required in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416. There is also no 
reference to a requirement for a new product, which was specifically required in Magill. Fine points out 
that this leaves the judgment in Oscar Bronner as entirely consistent with Magill; Fine, NDC/IMS, 
above n149, 461 It did, however, leave some doubt as to the application of the 'exceptional 
circumstances' test in Magill, and whether a new product requirement was an alternative to an essential 
facility requirement; Fine asserts that a new product requirement was clearly not a constituent element 
of the Magill test as clarified in Tierce-Ladbroke SA v EC Commission [1997] 5 CMLR 309. 
173 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, [41] (Judgment). 
174 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, [43] (Judgment). Korah suggests that although the ECJ failed to 
specify the basis for their finding on indispensability, this places a further limitation on the essential 
facilities doctrine in that the doctrine will not apply once there are two firms with a particular facility; 
Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European Experience, above 
n135, 819. 
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conjunction with other publishers, from establishing a nationwide home delivery 
scheme.'" 
7.3.1.4 THE IMS DECISION 
(i) 	NDC v IMS: The Commission Decision 
A subsequent decision by the EC Commission (the Commission) reignited debate 
over the duty of intellectual property holders to license their intellectual property. The 
facts of National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health 
Inc (IMS) 176 were that IMS developed a system for supplying information to 
pharmaceutical companies, on sales and prescription of pharmaceutical products. The 
system divided particular territories into small 'bricks', which each incorporated 
information about several pharmacies. Although the pharmaceutical companies had 
been partially responsible for establishing the system, IMS had expended considerable 
resources and effort in designing and maintaining the structure. 
Because IMS held a dominant position in the market and indeed had been the only 
firm providing sales data (on the basis of the brick structure) for some time, NDC 
found when it entered the market that customers were unwilling to accept information 
based on a different structure, and it was therefore unable to compete with IMS. NDC 
and another new entrant used the brick structure and were sued by IMS for breach of 
copyright. IMS successfully obtained an injunction, but NDC appealed the decision 
that found that they were in breach of copyright. 
On an interim basis, m the EC Commission determined that IMS should license its 
brick structure to the new entrants pending a final decision on the breach of copyright 
issue given the inability of new market entrants to compete with IMS in the absence 
of the availability of the structure.'" This decision was based on the fact that NDC 
would be likely to go out of operation without use of the structure, which was 
175 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, [44-46] (Judgment). The ECJ indicated that in this respect it was not 
open to Oscar Bronner to argue that the small circulation of their newspapers made it economically 
unviable to establish an equivalent home-delivery service; at [45] (Judgment). 
176 	. National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3. 
177 The Commission has the power to grant interim relief where there is a likelihood of serious and 
irreparable harm to an applicant and urgency: see Camera Care v Commission [1980] ECR 119. 
178 National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [184-185]. 
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'incapable of being replicated by means of a non-infringing parallel creation.' 179 In 
other words, it constituted a 'de facto industry standard.' 18° In interpreting Magill, the 
Commission stated that: 
The Court ... recognised that in exceptional circumstances the exercise of an 
exclusive right deriving from an intellectual copyright may be abusive even in the 
absence of abusive additional conduct when, inter alia, it prevents the appearance of 
a new product. 181 
However, the Commission referred to later cases and held that this condition was not 
an essential component of the exceptional circumstances test laid down in Magill!' 
The fact that competition would be reduced in the market in which IMS operated, and 
that there was no objective basis for the refusal to license, was considered to be 
sufficient to establish that exceptional circumstances existed in this case.'" The 
Commission's decision gave rise to a flurry of commentary, but the decision was 
predictably appealed to the CFI. 
(ii) The Appeal to the CFI 
On appeal to the CFI, 184 the President suspended the Commission's decision on the 
basis that there was a serious doubt 185 as to the correctness of the legal proposition 
underlying the Commission's decision. 186 First, there were important differences 
between the facts of this case and the facts of Magill, centred around the fact that 
NDC was offering merely 'new variations of the same services and on the same 
market as the dominant undertaking ... ,187 
Secondly, the President briefly considered the authorities dealing with refusals to 
license, and questioned whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying the 
179 National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [184]. 
180 National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [180]. 
181 National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [67]. 
182 National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [67-70], [180-184]. 
183 National Data Corporation Health Information Services (NDC) v IMS Health Inc (Interim 
Measures) [2002] 4 CMLR 3, [75-174]. 
184 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001). 
185 This would justify suspension of the Commission's decision. 
186 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [106]. 
187 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [101]. 
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imposition of a duty to license where the holder of intellectual property was itself 
offering the same product as the complainant. 188 As noted by the CFI, in deciding this 
issue the Commission would appear to have relied upon a non-cumulative 
interpretation of the conditions listed in Magill as regarding exceptional 
circumstances.' 89 This, the CFI observed, is an expansive interpretation of the concept 
of exceptional circumstances, 19° and the possibility that these conditions must be 
concurrently established, remains. 191 Accordingly, only a final determination by the 
CFI on this problematical issue, could justify an order compelling IMS to license its 
competitors! 92 The ECJ confirmed the suspension without making specific comment 
on the content of the CFI's decision. 193 
The Commission subsequently announced that its interim measures decision against 
IMS had been withdrawn on the basis that a German national court had permitted the 
development by competitors of structures that could be deemed to have been derived 
from IMS's structure.' 94 There was, therefore, no urgency in relation to access. 
(iii) The Reference to the ECJ 
The national court then requested that the ECJ provide it with a preliminary ruling on 
the interpretation of Article 82. The ECJ's ruling 195 confirmed that the conditions in 
Magill must be treated as cumulative, 196 and emphasised the importance of 
establishing an upstream and a downstream market: 
188 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [101-105]. 
189 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [100]. 
190 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [102]. 
191 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [103-104]. 
192 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [106]. In this 
respect, the President observed that although the interpretation adopted by the Commission may be 
correct, the alternative interpretation was equally capable of finding support in the case law. 
193 The ECJ upheld the CFI's suspension of the Commission's order pending review of the main 
copyright action; NDC Health Corporation and NDC Health GmbH & Co KG v EC Commission 
[2002] 5 CMLR 1. 
194 See 'Commission Intervention no Longer Necessary to Enable NDC Health to Compete with IMS 
Health', Press Release, 13 August 2003, 
<http:europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1159&format=HTML&aged=0&lan 
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en> at 20 September 2004). See also 'Commission Withdraws Interim 
Measures in NDC HealthlIMS Health Case' (2003) EU Focus 4. 
195 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28. 
196 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 [38] 
(Judgment). 
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[lit is determinative that two different stages of production may be identified and that 
they are interconnected, the upstream product is indispensable in as much as for 
supply of the downstream product. 197 
In considering the indispensability of intellectual property, the Court held that: 
[I]t must be determined whether there are products or services which constitute 
alternative solutions, even if they are less advantageous, and whether there are 
technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible or at least 
unreasonably difficult for any undertaking seeking to operate in the market to create, 
possibly in cooperation with other operators, the alternative products or services ... 
on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking which controls the existing product 
or service. 198 
The ECJ established that a refusal to license intellectual property will constitute 
abusive conduct contrary to Article 82 where the following conditions are fulfilled: 1" 
• [T]he undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer ... new 
products or services not offered by the [intellectual property right] owner and 
for which there is a potential consumer demand;" 
• the refusal is not justified by objective considerations; [and] 
• the refusal is such as to reserve to the [intellectual property right] owner the 
[downstream] market ... in the Member State concerned by eliminating all 
competition on that market. 
The ECJ thus reiterated the requirements laid down in Magill, and confirmed the 
importance of these requirements in determining whether a product protected by 
intellectual property constitutes an indispensable or essential requirement for entry 
into a market. The case reverted to the national court for determination of this issue. 
197 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 [45] 
(Judgment). 
198 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 [28]. 
199 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 [48-52] 
(Judgment). 
200 Note that the Advocate General in his opinion reworked this concept slightly by stating that the 
undertaking seeking the licence must intend 'to produce goods or services of a different nature which, 
although in competition with those of the owner of the right, answer specific consumer requirements 
not satisfied by existing goods or services.'; IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & 
Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 AG62 (Advocate General's Opinion). Thus, while the Advocate General 
refined the test laid down in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC 
Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416, the ECJ declined to adopt this condition 
and reverted to the wording laid down in Magill. 
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The /MS case highlights the difficulty in determining the circumstances in which 
access to intellectual property should be compelled, and the difficulty in interpreting 
judicial pronouncements on the matter. Nevertheless, there were some marked 
similarities between the facts of /MS and Magill2m which probably aids in explaining 
the Commission's decision.' There was however, an important difference" that 
assists in explaining the ECJ's reluctance to uphold the Commission's decision: in 
/MS, NDC did not offer a fundamentally new product. 204 Moreover, /MS did not 
involve a downstream market in the sense of a leverage of power into a market 
secondary to that in which exclusivity had been granted. 205 In laying down the 
requirement that a licence will only be compelled where a new product on a 
downstream market is offered, the ECJ effectively restricted the applicability of 
Magill to a very limited set of circumstances. 
7.3.2 THE STATUS OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
Under EU law, an essential facilities doctrine operates which is derived from US 
essential facilities principles. 206 In /MS, the issue arose as to whether an order that the 
copyrighted information be declared an essential facility, would mean that European 
law conflicted with US law. In response to this question, some commentators have 
submitted that the Commission's ruling was entirely consistent with established US 
201 Ian S Forrester, 'Compulsory Licensing in Europe: A Rare Cure to Aberrant National Intellectual 
Property Rights?' (2002) Paper Prepared for the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission 
Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
Comparative Law Topics, 22 May 2002, 22. Forrester points out that there was one important factor 
relied upon by the Commission that set /MS apart from Magill: in IMS, the brick structure represented 
an industry standard in that it had been developed by industry participants as an open standard. 
Exclusion by IMS based on this standard therefore constituted an abuse; at, 12-15, 22. The law relating 
specifically to industry standards will not be discussed in detail in this thesis, although reference may 
be made to the concept at various points. 
202 Not only was the intellectual property 'questionable' or 'unusual' in both cases, but in both cases 
there was some discrimination in supply where refusals were directed only at competitors. Also, in both 
cases the Commission found that all competition would be eliminated in the absence of an order 
compelling licensing; ibid n22; David Aitman and Alison Jones, 'Competition Law and Copyright: Has 
the Copyright Owner Lost the Ability to Control his Copyright?' (2004) 26(3) European Intellectual 
Property Review 137, 141. 
203 Forrester, above n201, 22. 
204 In another respect, however, NDC had a stronger case in that it was merely seeking a delivery 
vehicle for information it had obtained. In contrast, Magill simply sought to use information compiled 
independently of it; ibid 22. 
205 See also Aitman and Jones, above n202, 141. 
206 On the development of the doctrine in the EU see Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition, 
above n137. This article has been widely cited and influential. See also Derek Ridyard, 'Essential 
Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors Under the UK and EC Competition Law' (1996) 
17(8) European Competition Law Review 438; 
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jurisprudence on the subject of essential facilities!'" Arguably, the EU doctrine is, 
however, more likely to be applied to dealings in intellectual property than the US 
doctrine. 
7.3.2.1 THE DOCTRINE'S EVOLUTION FROM GENERAL REFUSAL TO SUPPLY CASES 
The essential facilities doctrine in the EU is well entrenched, and had its genesis in a 
number of refusal to deal cases, most notably Istituto Chemioterapico Italian° SpA 
and Commercial Solvents Corporation v EC Commission (Commercial Solvents)" 
and Centre Beige d'Etudes de Marche-Tele-Marketing SA v Compagnie 
Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion SA and Information Publicite Benelux SA 
(Telemarketing)." As such, the Commissionm has stated that the essential facilities 
doctrine will operate in the following circumstances: 
An undertaking which occupies a dominant position in the provision of an essential 
facility and itself uses that facility (ie a facility or infrastructure, without access to 
which competitors cannot provide services to their customers), and which refuses 
other companies access to that facility without objective justification or grants access 
to competitors only on terms less favourable than those which it gives its own 
services, infringes Article 86 if the other conditions of that Article are met. An 
undertaking in a dominant position may not discriminate in favour of its own 
activities in a related market. The owner of an essential facility which uses its power 
in one market in order to protect or strengthen its position in another related market, 
in particular, by refusing to grant access to a competitor, or by granting access on less 
favourable terms than those of its own services and thus imposing a competitive 
disadvantage on its competitors, infringes Article 86.211 
207 See Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, above n100. 
208  Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v EC Commission 
[1974] 1 CMLR 309 (Commercial Solvents). See also United Brands Co v Commission, Case 27/76 
[1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
209 Centre Beige d'Etudes de Marche-Tele-Marketing SA v Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de 
Telediffusion SA and Information Publicite Benelux SA [1986] 2 CMLR 558. 
210 Although the Commission has used the term 'essential facilities', as Advocate General Jacobs noted 
in his Opinion in Oscar Bronner, the ECJ has not; Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint 
Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, 124 [35] (Opinion). 
211 Commission Decision 94/19 Relating to A Proceeding Pursuant to Article 86 EC (Sea Containers v 
Stena Sealink — Interim Measures) [1994] OJ L 15/8, [66]. 
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The doctrine operates under fairly strict conditions, and a number of preconditions to 
its operation exist. Temple Lang has usefully summarised the operation of the 
essential facilities doctrine in the EU as follows: 212 
• as was illustrated in Oscar Bronner, 213 indispensability will be assessed on an 
objective basis rather than on the subjective characteristics of a particular 
company requesting access; 
• there is a need for two markets in order for the doctrine to operate, and a 
legitimate competitive advantage in a single market should not constitute an 
essential facility; 214 
• there must be a substantial effect on competition in a downstream market, and 
it is probably the case that competition must be eliminated entirely; 23 
• there must be scope for competition in a downstream market; and 
• the dominant company must generally be present on the downstream market. 
It is evident from the case law that essential facilities principles are being applied by 
the judiciary in a narrow set of circumstances and within the bounds of the strict 
conditions that have evolved in the US in relation to the doctrine, 216 and calls for a 
strict application of the doctrine in relation to intellectual property have been made. 217 
7.3.2.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
The doctrine undoubtedly has a number of limitations, but has now been held to apply 
to intellectual property dealings. Essential facilities analysis was a hallmark of most 
of the cases discussed above.218 In Magill, for example, the third ground or condition 
212 See generally Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing, above n136, 8-18. 
213 See, in particular, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co KG and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112, [41-47]. 
214 Cf Fine, NDCIIMS, above n149, 459-460. Fine contends that the requirement for two markets has 
proved to be 'troublesome', and that in most cases the essential facility merely constitutes a tool rather 
than a market in which discrete trade takes place. He therefore commends the Commission's decision 
in /MS in dispensing with this requirement; at 459-460. 
215 But see the discussion by Christopher Stothers, 'Refusal to Supply as Abuse of Dominant Position: 
Essential Facilities in the European Union' (2001) 22(7) European Competition Law Review 256, 258- 
259. 
216 See generally Treacy, above n169. See also Alan Overd and Bill Bishop, 'Essential Facilities: The 
Rising Tide' [1998] 19(4) European Competition Law Review 183. 
217 See, eg, Steven D Anderman, 'Copyright, Compulsory Licensing and EC Competition Policy' in 
Eric Barendt (ed), Yearbook of Media and Entertainment Law (1995) vol 1, 215. 
218 Despite the fact that the ECJ has not explicitly used the term 'essential facility', it is clear that the 
Court has engaged in essential facility analysis. 
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is the essential facility ground. This confirms that in intellectual property cases, strict 
preconditions must be present before the essential facilities doctrine will operate. 219 In 
strictly circumscribed instances, intellectual property holders will be under a duty to 
deal with competitors with whom they may, 22° or may not, have previously dealt. On 
the basis of the case law discussed above, the following comments can be made about 
intellectual property and the essential facilities doctrine: 
• in relation to the test of indispensability, a competitor seeking access to a Jr 
patent will need to demonstrate on an objective basis that it was not possible to 
invent around the patent. 221 This will often be difficult to establish in relation 
to a single patent,222 but may be easier when access to a group of patents is 
required in order to compete; 
• competition in a downstream or secondary market must be precluded by the 
refusal to grant access. In other words, the intellectual property must constitute 
an input into a product in a market that is outside the scope of the intellectual 
property; 223 
• in intellectual property cases, the requirements that there be a substantial effect 
on competition, and that there be scope for competition in a downstream 
market, would appear to require that the development of a new product for 
which there is consumer demand, is curtailed; 224 and 
• similarly, it would appear that access to intellectual property required for the 
development of a new product which the holder of the right is also capable of 
developing, must have been denied. 
219 Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, 209. 
220 On the general duty to supply existing customers, see Romano Subiotto and Robert O'Donoghue, 
'Defining the Scope of the Duty of Dominant Firms to Deal with Existing Customers Under Article 82 
EC' (2003) 24 European Competition Law Review 683. In the area of refusals to deal with tangible 
property, there is a distinction between new and existing customers that has been described as arbitrary: 
see, at 686-689. So, in relation to new customers, it would appear that a duty to deal will only be 
imposed where the conditions set out in Oscar Bronner are met. In relation to existing customers, there 
is more likely to be a duty imposed, particularly where supply to another party is taking place; at 686- 
689. 
221 Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing, above n136, 10. 
222 Although it may be the case in relation to a number of the foundational research tools discussed in 
Appendix 2, as well as other biotechnology inventions such as gene sequences, that it is impossible to 
invent around these patents; see further below, 7.3.4. 
223 Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing, above n136, 13-14. 
224 Ibid, 15. 
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Generally, the essential facilities doctrine will be invoked in cases involving 
intellectual property where leveraging into a downstream market takes place. 225 A 
compulsory licence will ordinarily constitute the most effective remedy, although the 
right to utilise the protected product in the upstream market after grant of a 
compulsory licence will be an important consideration. 226 In practice however, it has 
been suggested that the main obstacle to a person seeking access will be that, although 
a finding of dominance may be made, a refusal to license intellectual property will be 
capable of being objectively justified. 227 The issue will be whether the intellectual 
property gives rise to a position of dominance, or whether it is merely a component of 
a position of dominance. 
7.3.3 SYNTHESIS AND SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO REFUSALS TO 
LICENSE 
Academic commentary post-Magill focused on whether strong competition regulation 
of intellectual property could have a deleterious effect on incentives to produce those 
rights. 228 It correspondingly questioned the basis on which Magill had been decided, 
and sought to clarify whether a cumulative or concurrent interpretation of the 
conditions listed in Magill would, in future, be employed. 
It would now appear to be settled that the conditions listed in Magill as constituting 
the 'exceptional circumstances' test must be cumulatively applied. The ECJ's 
preliminary ruling in /MS v Commission should be taken as clear authority that Magill 
set out a series of cumulative tests that must be satisfied prior to the imposition of a 
finding of abuse pursuant to Article 82. At the same time, there can be taken to be a 
duty to continue to deal with existing competitors: this follows from the ruling in 
Commercial Solvents and cannot be said to be precluded from the exceptional 
circumstances test laid down in Magill and /MS. 229 Thus, the conditions laid down in 
these cases may not be exhaustive on the circumstances in which exceptional 
circumstances pursuant to Article 82 will exist. 23° 
It is evident from this that the essential facilities doctrine does not constitute an 
alternative ground on which an Article 82 claim may be grounded, but is an integral 
part of a claim that a refusal to license intellectual property violates Article 82. 
225 Ibid, 19. 
226 
ibid. 
227 Stothers, Refusal to Supply, above n215, 261-262. 
228 See, eg, Vinje, above n138, 297. 
229 Anderman, Microsoft in Europe, above n137, 17-19. 
no Ibid. 
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Consequently, any claim that a refusal to license intellectual property breaches Article 
82 must be based partly on essential facilities principles. This arguably makes more 
stringent the requirements for establishing an Article 82 contravention in these 
circumstances, but nonetheless leaves some scope for competition intervention in 
cases of market failure. 231 
It is submitted that this is the correct position, and that although preserving incentives 
to patent holders to innovate is an important consideration, their right to refuse to 
license should not be unfettered. Competition law should play an equally important 
role in providing incentives to innovate. The ECJ in /MS apparently recognised this in 
retaining a role for competition law in 'exceptional circumstances'. It has been argued 
that to require less than satisfaction of all three conditions would have a detrimental 
effect on innovation in that:232 
• incentives to undertake initial investment may be undermined if intellectual 
property holders are not afforded adequate protection under both intellectual 
property and antitrust laws; and 
• incentives to create competing products or to 'invent around' existing 
privileges protected by patent law would be reduced if access to existing 
privileges are too readily granted. 
In line with this, to require satisfaction of each of the cumulative requirements is the 
minimum that a competitor should be required to establish before access to 
intellectual property is granted. 233 Viewed this way, Magill and /MS have not radically 
changed existing precedent. 234 The ECJ in /MS did, however, curtail the operation of 
the 'exceptional circumstances' test, although it remains unclear whether other 
circumstances justifying the intervention of competition law may exist. Nonetheless, a 
number of issues remain undarified and unresolved, and recent literature has 
identified a number of difficulties in application of the 'exceptional circumstances' 
test: 
231 See Christopher Stothers, 'IMS Health and its Implications for Compulsory Licensing in Europe' 
(2004) 26(10) European Intellectual Property Review 467, 470. 
232 See also Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing, above n136, 29-30 discussing the implications of 
some of the 'very surprising and controversial' features of the Commission's ruling in /MS. 
233 Cf Fine, NDCIIMS, above n149, 457, 460-462. 
234 	. Ilmd, 466-467; Fine, In Response to Professor Korah, above n167, 253. In relation to the 
implications of Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission 
[1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416, see Greaves, above n149. 
333 
Chapter 7 
• the ECJ in /MS made it clear that the existence of a potential or hypothetical 
market will be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a downstream or 
secondary market, 235 arguably giving rise to uncertainty in the minds of 
intellectual property holders as to what might constitute a new product in a 
'separate' market; 236 
• some commentators have questioned the need for a second market in essential 
facility or leveraging cases on the basis of Magill; 237 
• there is an issue as to when an input will constitute an indispensable input, and 
when it will simply constitute part of a product. 238 The ruling in /MS will 
invariably lead to problems in identifying what constitutes a new product; 239 
• the status of the essential facilities doctrine in European law (and in particular 
intellectual property law) remains subject to some uncertainty given the 
requirement in /MS for two markets; 
• pricing may be difficult to determine if a compulsory licence is ordered and 
there will be associated difficulties in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable royalty rate;24° and 
• the European Commission and courts have failed to articulate what might 
constitute an objective justification for refusing to license intellectual 
property. 241 
235 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 [44]. 
236 David W Hull, 'Compulsory Licensing of IP Rights: The ECJ's Judgment in the /MS Case' (2004) 
Competition Law Insight 10, 12-13. This analysis will need to be industry specific; Steven D 
Anderman, 'The Aftermath of Magill' in Eric Barendt (ed), The Yearbook of Media and Entertainment 
Law (1996) vol 2, 235, 245. 
237 Forrester, above n201, 22; Fine, NDCIIMS, above n149, 458-460. 
238 Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, above n133, 213; 
Brenda Sufrin, 'The /MS Case' [2004] Competition Law 18, 24-25, 27-28. 
239 See, eg, Sufrin, above n238, 24-25; Aitman and Jones, above n202, 141. See also Stothers, IMS 
Health above n231, 470-471. 
240 Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, 214. Often it will be 
difficult to determine what constitutes a reasonable royalty rate, as holders of intellectual property 
would prefer the unfettered freedom to use a right over a royalty; Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing, 
above n136, 20, citing Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122. The corollary of this, 
however, is that in some cases, the possibility of a generous royalty rate will not be sufficient to induce 
licensing, as it will be worth more to the holder of intellectual property to maintain that privilege as a 
competitive asset. 
241 See AG Jacobs in Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co KG and Other [1999] 4 CMLR 112 [47] who lists some objective justifications from US 
case law (such as legitimate technical or commercial reasons, efficiency grounds). See also Temple 
Lang, Compulsory Licensing, above n136, 22-23; Sufrin, above n238, 28; Temple Lang, The Principle 
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In relation to this last requirement, a number of possible justifications have been 
suggested, and these generally fall into efficiency, quality or safety grounds. 242 In any 
case, the greatest difficulties from this succession of judgments are likely to stem 
from the requirements that there be a new product that constitutes an indispensable 
input, and that there be two markets, one of which feels the impact of the refusal to 
license. 
It is unlikely, given the conditions that must be met, that there will be many factual 
scenarios that are found to contravene Article 82. There is a general suggestion in the 
literature that both Magill and /MS involved intellectual property privileges that were 
'questionable', and that this may go some way towards explaining why findings of 
abusive conduct were made by the ECJ and Commission respectively. 243 These 
decisions could thus be seen as responses to aberrations in the application of national 
copyright laws, coupled with discriminatory conduct. 244 
In most cases, it will be difficult for a party who has been refused a licence to make 
out the stringent preconditions for a finding of abuse. Frequently, the requirement of 
indispensability will be an onerous hurdle for those seeking access to intellectual 
property. The principles may potentially be applicable in situations where a patent 
thicket prevents entry into a downstream market, 245 or where truly unique and 
essential intellectual property is used by a vertically integrated monopolist to maintain 
control of a downstream market. 
It is submitted that the ECJ in /MS significantly limited the circumstances in which an 
intellectual property holder will be required to license under EU law. Nonetheless, it 
does not preclude determinations that refusals to license fall within limb [2] of the 
proposed framework. It is less clear that a refusal to license a party with whom the 
of Essential Facilities in European Community Competition Law, above n167, 375, 385-388; Dolman, 
above n81, 469-471. 
242 The review of Article 82 that is in progress will consider the issue of objective justifications for 
abusive conduct that allegedly contravenes Article 82; see above, 5.4.2. Chapter 8 contains a discussion 
of efficiency justifications that might be raised in a case involving a refusal to license a medical 
biotechnology patent; below, 8.3.3. This discussion takes place in the context of s 46 of the TPA, but 
business justifications that are relevant to s 46 would also be relevant in respect of the 'objective 
justification' limb of the ECJ's test. 
243 See, eg, Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European 
Experience, above n135, 830-831; Forrester, above n201, 12; Cf Anderman, The Aftermath of Magill, 
above n236, 244; Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights above n133, 211 
(`There is little doubt that the decision in Magill means that Article 86 reaches more widely into the 
realm of the exercise of [intellectual property rights)). 
244 Cf Hull, above n236. 
245 Stothers, IMS Health, above n231, 471. 
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patent holder may indirectly compete (and falling into limb [3]), would be examinable 
under EU law. For example, a patent holder may be involved in using its patented 
technology to develop a particular cancer vaccine. A party who wishes to use the 
technology to develop a vaccine for a different type of cancer may be held to operate 
in the same economic market as the patent holder. Consequently, there could not be 
said to be a new product for which there was unsatisfied consumer demand. Despite 
this, it would appear that the specific factual matrix of each individual case will be 
determinative of whether a finding of abuse is made, and the circumstances in which 
the exceptional circumstances test will apply are not completely rigid. 
As a final point, it is worth noting the Commission's decision in Microsoft, m6 in which 
the Commission found inter alia, that Microsoft was dominant in the market for server 
operating systems, and ordered Microsoft to disclose information (some of it 
protected by intellectual property) that would enable interoperability between non-
Microsoft servers and Windows PCs and servers. 247 The matter is on appeal, and the 
principles from the series of cases culminating in /MS will be applicab1e.24 It must be 
considered to be doubtful, on the basis of the requirements confirmed in /MS, that 
disclosure by Microsoft will be compelled, because it is difficult to see how 
Microsoft's competitors are introducing a new product to the market. 249 
In any case, this line of authority has left no doubt that competition regulation 
operates as a 'second tier of regulation of the exercise of intellectual property in the 
new economy as in the old.' 25° EU Competition authorities are clearly concerned to 
preserve competition even where monopolies would appear to be fragile and prone to 
a temporary existence. 251 
zaa Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
(Case COMP/C-3/37.792 — Microsoft) (unreported) 24 March 2004, C (2004) 900 final, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf > at 17 November 2004. 
247 For further detail see Sven B Volcker, 'The Implications of Microsoft and IMS Health: Interesting 
Times for Dominant Intellectual Property Holders in Europe' (2004) Competition Law Insight 14, 
especially 14-16. 
248 Although as Volcker points out, the Commission in Microsoft did not rely on the test in Radio 
Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; 
[1995] All ER (EC) 416, consequently /MS may be of limited precedential value on appeal; Ibid, 18. 
249 See, in particular, Hull, above n236, 13. 
250 Steve Anderman, 'EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property. Rights in the New Economy' 
(2002) Summer-Fall The Antitrust Bulletin 285. 
251 Ibid, 308. 
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7.3.4 APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES FROM EU CASE LAW TO REFUSALS TO 
LICENSE MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 
As a consequence, it would be difficult to establish that the owner of a valuable patent 
should be compelled by the European Commission or Courts to provide a licence to 
that patent to a competitor operating in a related or downstream market. The EU can 
probably be considered to be the most stringent of the three jurisdictions in terms of 
enforcing competition law against intellectual property holders. Even so, it is 
probably only in extremely rare cases that a holder of a patent over a medical 
biotechnology invention will be required to license it to competitors. 
An initial question is whether the principles espoused in the cases discussed above 
can be generalised to apply to patents. All of the cases dealt with protected 
information,252 and the factual scenarios were fairly specific. While some 
commentators consider that the principles may extend to other forms of intellectual 
property protection such as patents, 253 others are more skeptical that the principles are 
analogous in cases where other intellectual property is involved. 254 Korah suggests 
that it might be appropriate to extend the principles from Magill to privileges other 
than copyright in information only in extremely limited circumstances, that is, where 
there is a genuine bottleneck and the third party is able to produce a very novel and 
valuable invention.255 She cites the enormous investment required to produce a 
patentable invention, and the differences between the nature of the protected 
information in Magill, and patents. 256 
Difficulties inherent in essential facilities cases, in particular, are magnified in cases 
involving high technologies where it is difficult to predict the outcome of a refusal to 
license on the development of technology. 257 There has been some analysis of the 
implications of this case law for copyrighted interface information. 258 In any case 
252 Further, that protected information was applied in an industrial context; Vinje, above n138, 302. 
253 See, eg, Korah, Patents and Antitrust, above n156, 403-405; Abraham I van MeIle, 'Refusals to 
License Intellectual Property Rights: The Impact of RTE v EC Commission (Magill) on Australian and 
New Zealand Competition Law' (1997) 25 Australian Business Law Review 4, 12. 
254 See, eg, Treacy, above n169, 503-505; Derclaye, above n171, 704; Forrester, above n203201, 24. 
See also the judgment of Laddie J in Philips Electronics NV v Ingman Limited and Another [1998] 2 
CMLR 839, [63-66]. 
255 Korah, Patents and Antitrust, above n156, 403-405. 
256 Ibid, 404-405. 
257 John Temple Lang, 'European Community Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets and High 
Technology Industries' (1997) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 717, 812. 
258 A number of commentators have considered the applicability of the principles espoused in the cases 
discussed in the preceding sections, to information technology. See, eg, Narciso, above n121; 
Anderman, The Aftermath of Magill, above n236; Vinje, above n138. 
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where a refusal to license intellectual property is alleged to contravene Article 82, 
there will be a number of obstacles including: 259 
• the expense involved in alleging a contravention of Article 82 and the fact that 
the Commission is likely to attack only breaches with grave consequences; 
• the difficulty of demonstrating dominance; 260 
• the high threshold required to establish abuse in light of the nature of the 
relevant markets and the surrounding circumstances of the refusal would have 
to be examined. 
Holders of copyright over computer software are also subject to the interoperability 
provisions contained in the Council Directive for the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 261 so that those wishing to use copyrighted software may reproduce it 
without permission in order to write and produce a new independent program that will 
nonetheless be interoperable with it.262 In contrast, there is no such obligation in 
respect of patents. 263 The conditions listed in Magill and confirmed in /MS arguably 
reinforce these obligations 264 by providing an additional ground under competition law 
by which to access copyrighted software. 265 They provide the sole possible method of 
attaining access to gene and biotechnology patents required for follow-on innovation. 
The obstacles facing those alleging a contravention on the basis of a refusal to license 
a gene patent or other biotechnology patent are likely to be even greater. Patents 
confer stronger privileges than other forms of intellectual property such as copyright. 
This may mean that they should be accorded greater protection under competition 
law, so that a refusal to license a patent will be dealt with more leniently than a refusal 
259 	. . Vinje, above n138, 303. 
260 Note that it is now established that dominant positions may be joint; see Compagnie Maritime Beige 
Transports SA v Commission [2000] 4 CMLR 1076. See also Richard Whish, Competition Law (4 th ed, 
2001), 163; Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (7 th ed, 
1997), 92. 
261 Council Directive for the Legal Protection of Computer Programs OJ 1991 L 122/42. 
262 Council Directive for the Legal Protection of Computer Programs OJ 1991 L 122/42, art 6(1). On 
the operation of this obligation, see Anderman, Microsoft in Europe, above n137, 21-22; Anderman, 
The Aftermath of Magill, above n236, 245-246; Vinje, above n138, 302-303. 
263 Note that the European Parliament recently voted by a very significant majority to reject a software 
patents directive, known as the Directive on the Patentability of Computer Implemented Inventions 
which sought to harmonise the patentability requirements of individual EU members. See 'EU 
Software Patent Directive Rejected' Financial Times (July 6 2005) 
<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/028f5b2e-ee43-11d9-98e5-00000e2511c8.html > at 11 August 2005. 
264 See also Anderman, The Aftermath of Magill, above n236, 246. 
265 The provisions operate in respect of copyright rather than as a product of competition law; 
Anderman, Microsoft in Europe, above n137, 22. 
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to license copyrighted information. It is submitted, however, that the implications of 
abuse of patents may be far graver. As a result, their use should be subject to the same 
restrictions under competition law as any other form of intellectual property. 
It is possible to envisage situations where research will be precluded because gene 
sequences and research tools that constitute indispensable inputs into future 
applications are not licensed. On the face of it, the requirements laid down in Magill 
and subsequent cases could be established under these circumstances. Very broad 
patent rights have the potential to give rise to liability under Article 82. It has been 
suggested that broad patents in the biotechnology area are unlikely to be a problem in 
the EU because they are unlikely to be granted. 266 It is submitted, however, that it will 
depend on the technology or product in question, and that many research tool patents 
in medical biotechnology have potentially very broad application. Further, many 
broad patents have already been granted, and it is unlikely that all of these patents will 
be subject to challenge. 
Finally, broad individual patents are unlikely to be as problematic as narrower rights 
upstream that are essential for research in a downstream market that is not currently 
being exploited, or patent rights amassed for the purpose of foreclosing downstream 
research by others. 267 A group of patents may preclude research, making inventing 
around potentially impossible. Strategic patenting may prevent a competitor from 
continuing to engage in useful research that would appear to be leading to the 
development of a new product for consumers. In circumstances such as these, the 
requirements reiterated in /MS would appear to be capable of satisfaction. This will 
depend primarily on whether a finding that an objective justification excuses the 
conduct, is made. 268 It will also depend on whether a finding that the patented product 
or technology constituted an indispensable input into the downstream product was 
possible. 
Patents block independent invention, and the concept of indispensability confirmed in 
/MS may be important in demonstrating that a patent constitutes an indispensable 
input into downstream research. Given that their claims limit their scope they will 
block entry in very few cases. 269 There will often be substitutes, and in many cases it 
266 Korah, Patents and Antitrust, above n156, 397. 
267 See also Temple Lang, The Principle of Essential Facilities in EC Competition Law, above n167, 
388-389. 
268 The matter of efficiency justifications for refusals to license in downstream markets will be 
discussed further below, 8.3.4.1. 
269 Stothers, IMS Health, above n231, 470. 
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will be possible to invent around the patented technology. Establishing that a patent 
gives rise to an economic market and does not have substitutes will also be difficult.27° 
Concern has been expressed, however, that many biotechnology patents are not 
substitutable. Gene patents, in particular, are difficult to invent around,271 as are many 
of the foundational research tools discussed in Appendix 2. The nature of 
biotechnology research suggests that it will be difficult to establish a contravention 
pursuant to Article 82, particularly where the patent is useful for research that is still 
fairly upstream. A third party wishing to use the patent would need to show that 
either: 
• there is an unsatisfied demand for a new product that the patent holder is not 
producing; or 
• competition on the downstream market is lacking in some other way, for 
example, the patent holder occupies a dominant position in that market and 
abuses that position, or there are a significant lack of competitors in that 
market. 272 
The difficulty where a party wishes to use a licence for upstream or intermediate 
research, is in demonstrating a lack of competition. Similarly, much biomedical 
research is carried out without a definite end product in mind. Much of this research is 
far removed from an end product in the sense of a product that will be available to 
consumers. In many cases, it will be difficult to show that consumers have suffered 
detriment, and the most that could be established is that there is a possibility that a 
new product could be available for on-licence. In this case, it is possible that a stricter 
analysis would need to be employed than that developed in the case law. 273 It has been 
pointed out that antitrust issues arising from new technologies will necessitate a return 
to 'basic principles of antitrust law or antitrust economics.' 274 
A decision of the English Court of Appeal provides some indication of the position 
that might be taken where licences to broad biotechnology patents are refused. In 
Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics (No 2)275 the applicability of Article 86 as a 
270 Christopher Stothers, 'The End of Exclusivity: Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in the EU' 
(2002) 24(2) European Intellectual Property Review 86, 92. 
271 See Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, Discussion 
Paper (2002), 54. 
272 Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing, above n136, 14-17. 
273 Stothers, Refusal to Supply, above n215, 260. 
V4 Temple Lang, Innovation Markets and High Technology Industries above n257, 816. 
275 Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics (No 2) [1994] 1 CMLR 410. 
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defence to patent infringement276 was considered. Essentially, Chiron patented the 
genome of the Hepatitis C virus and exclusively licensed those patents to just two 
parties. This enabled those parties to produce diagnostic HCV kits for detecting 
Hepatitis C in blood samples. m When Murex manufactured and parallel imported its 
own HCV kits, Chiron instituted proceedings for infringement. Murex alleged abuse 
of dominant position by virtue of Chiron's failure to license the patents to Murex. 278 
The Court of Appeal refused to disturb the holding of Aldous J at first instance who 
struck out this defence, affirming that: 
• the relevant market was the market for HCV kits; 
• it was doubtful (but still possible) that Chiron occupied a dominant position in 
this market; 
• there was no abusive conduct because there was doubt as to whether Murex 's 
kit was better than Chiron's or whether using two kits would be better than 
using one. There was therefore no abusive conduct sufficient to render a 
refusal to license an abuse; 
• there was sufficient nexus between the alleged abuse and the relief sought; 
but 
• the alleged abuse of charging unfair prices was not capable of affecting trade 
between member states. 
The decision is indicative of the fact that a patent holder will rarely be denied its 
exclusive rights of exploitation where a downstream market in which a licence is 
sought (in this case the market for HCV kits) is being positively exploited by either 
the patent holder or a licensee. 279 Despite the breadth of Chiron's patents and the 
power these patents gave Chiron to control the manufacture and distribution of HCV 
kits, the fact that Chiron was active in the same market as Murex was probably 
enough to preclude a finding of abuse. In contrast, it is submitted that had Murex been 
involved in developing, for example, a pharmaceutical treatment for HCV using the 
276 Patent infringement was alleged due to the parallel importation of an allegedly infringing product. 
Recall that Article 86 is the predecessor to Article 82. For a brief explanation of parallel importation, 
see above, 4.3.3.1. 
277 For further details of the invention patented by Chiron, see Appendix 2. The decision will be 
discussed further below, 8.2.1.2(ii) in the context of market definition. 
278 Murex also alleged abuse of dominant position by virtue of Chiron charging excessive prices for 
their kits. 
279 See also Phillip Tucker, 'Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights and Misuse of Market 
Power — Where is the Line in the Sand?' (1999) 10 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 78, 86. 
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HCV antigens, it is possible that this may have constituted an abuse of dominant 
position. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to construct a rigid framework for dealing with refusals to license 
intellectual property. Economists have long grappled with the issue of how to provide 
a framework for assessing the legality of refusals to license. 28° The issue is essentially 
one of facts versus formalism — whether to apply (or attempt to apply) guidance based 
on rules (as in Xerox), or whether fact-based analysis is more appropriate.' As Glazer 
and Lipsky have recognised, there are many different fact situations that can give rise 
to a refusal to 1icense. 282 The fundamental premise behind the framework set out in 
Chapter 5 is that it be applied flexibly, but provide a general guide as to when a 
refusal to license is most likely to be anti-competitive. 283 It attempts to provide 
guidance but recognises that fact-based analysis is appropriate in any allegation that a 
refusal to license is anti-competitive. 
The foregoing review of US and EU case law indicates that there has been no 
cohesive position adopted by US courts. By contrast, EU law on the matter would 
appear at the present time to be relatively settled. These jurisdictions have a 
significant body of case law dealing generally with refusals to license intellectual 
property. It can be tentatively said that they are likely to adopt slightly different 
positions to the position that is likely to be adopted under Section 46. Australian 
courts would be likely to consider case law from these jurisdictions if they were 
required to consider the issue of refusals to license intellectual property. It will fall to 
the next chapter to consider in some detail how Section 46 is likely to be applied if 
Australian courts are required to consider a refusal to license scenario in relation to 
medical biotechnology patents. 
It is difficult to assess the impact this body of case law is likely to have on Australian 
competition law regulation of refusals to license. Because of the uncertainty over 
which approach the US Supreme Court is likely to follow, it is difficult to say whether 
or not US case law on refusals to license is likely to be applied by Australian courts. 
The decision of the ECJ in Magill understandably led to a flurry of articles discussing 
280 See, eg Mackie-Mason, above n10. 
281 See Melamed and Stoeppelwerth, above n65. 
282 Above, 7.2.1.1. 
283 See above, 5.5.5. 
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the implications of the decision in Europe. Several commentators also considered the 
likely impact of the decision under the TPA. 284 Whatever the potential scope of Magill, 
it would appear that it has been restricted in subsequent cases, particularly by the ECJ 
in /MS. It is submitted that the implications of Magill have consequently been 
narrowed, and the effect of this jurisprudence on refusals to license patents in the 
Australian context are discussed in the following chapter. 
This raises important issues about the role that regulation should take, and the 
message that regulators should send to intellectual property holders about refusals to 
license. Conclusions about the role that competition law should play provide 
important guidance as to how policy in this area should be shaped. Given that 
Australia has no precedent in this area, an opportunity exists to undertake careful 
consideration of the how refusals to license intellectual property should be dealt with. 
284 See, in particular, van Melle, above n253; Tucker, above n279. See also Charles Lawson, 'Patenting 
Genes and Gene Sequences and Competition: Patenting at the Expense of Competition' (2002) 30 
Federal Law Review 97, especially 118-120; Australian Law Reform Commission, Genes and 
Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health Report 99 (2004), 562-565. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two previous chapters have considered in some detail the application of 
competition law to refusals to license intellectual property. Chapter 6 provided a 
detailed analysis of s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and its current status. 
First, it considered the current interpretations of the provision and argued that courts 
are likely to interpret the market power standard as involving close to monopoly 
power. Secondly, it argued that the 'take advantage' test may not require consideration 
of efficiency considerations. Chapter 7 considered comparative case law with a view 
to obtaining some guidance as to how this issue is likely to be resolved under 
provisions that correspond to s 46. 
This chapter combines these themes and gives detailed consideration to how refusals 
to license medical biotechnology patents are likely to be treated under s 46. It draws 
on principles from the comparative jurisprudence in attempting to determine whether 
or not s 46 is likely to be applied consistent with the framework outlined in Chapter 5. 
Although there is some doubt as to whether this framework would be adhered to in 
other jurisdictions, there is reason to believe that recent interpretations of s 46 render 
it largely ineffectual. This concern is likely to be heightened when the difficult issue 
of refusals to license intellectual property is contemplated. It will be argued that a 
position close to that adopted by United States (US) courts is likely to be adopted in 
Australia. Specifically, the position in Xerox is the position most likely to be adhered 
to. 
As indicated in Chapter 7, there is no Australian case law dealing with the issue of 
refusals to license intellectual property. 2 There may be a number of reasons for this. 
First, costs of litigation are high, which is likely to discourage litigation, particularly 
where many industry participants are either publicly funded or small, start-up 
companies. Secondly, litigation rates in Australia are generally low. Thirdly, it may be 
that refusals to license are not being encountered. As the first three chapters of this 
thesis indicate, .there are a number of factors suggesting that an industry such as 
medical biotechnology may be particularly prone to restrictive licensing practices 
such as refusals to license patents. Despite this, empirical evidence presented in 
Chapter 4 suggests that refusals to license medical biotechnology patents are currently 
impacting on research only rarely. It may be that refusals to license in other industries 
I In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001). 
2 Above, 7.1. 
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are not occurring, with the result that there has been no litigation in respect of this 
issue. 
Finally, it may suggest that mechanisms for dealing with refusals to license under 
Australian law are inadequate, which would tend to militate against action pursuant to 
those mechanisms. An absence of jurisprudence may point to deficiencies in 
provisions such as s 46, and raises questions as to whether statutory modification is 
required. Even where companies are able to change research direction in order to 
accommodate existing patents in an area to which they are unable to gain access, there 
may be negative implications for follow-on research. A specific issue that this chapter 
addresses is whether the lack of case law in this area could be attributed in part to 
deficiencies in s 46. 
To recapitulate, research tools in medical biotechnology were divided into three 
categories. 3 In considering the applicability of s 46, it is important to bear in mind that 
there appear to be few cases in which category three technologies are not freely 
licensed. Thus, if a refusal to license in medical biotechnology is alleged it is likely to 
be in respect of a technology falling into category one or two. While discussion in this 
chapter will necessarily be general, it will attempt to draw on some concrete examples 
of conduct that may attract an allegation of a refusal to license and bear in mind these 
categories. An evaluation of a refusal to license pursuant to s 46 will be fact-based, 
and the structure of this chapter recognises this. The framework set out in Chapter 5 
guides this fact-based analysis. 4 In this context the specific issues examined are: 
3 The categories were: 
1. technology that is being used by the patent holder and another researcher to conduct similar 
research, and one researcher subsequently finds the technology is already patented (category 
one); 
2. patented technology that is useful for a range of follow-on uses, the products of which may 
ultimately compete (category two); and 
3. patented technology is useful for a range of non-competing, follow-on uses (category 
three). 
See further above, 4.3.2. 
4 The framework is as follows: 
[1] Generally speaking, a refusal to license intellectual property will not contravene 
competition law. 
[2] A refusal to license will, however, become examinable under competition law where the 
refusal is for the purpose of (i) expanding the scope of the intellectual property or (ii) 
extending market power into another distinct market not covered by the intellectual property. 
[3] Where a refusal becomes examinable under [2](ii), the refusal should be examinable 
whether or not the holder of the intellectual property is currently exploiting the separate 
market, and the reservation of another market for its own (actual or potential) use should not 
necessarily allow it to foreclose competition by others. 
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• how the question of market definition is likely to be resolved in cases 
involving medical biotechnology patents; 
• the circumstances in which a holder of a patent is likely to be held to have 
market power; 
• whether a refusal to license a medical biotechnology patent will constitute a 
'taking advantage' of market power; and 
• whether there are any circumstances in which evidence is likely to support a 
finding that a patent licence is refused for a proscribed purpose. 
8.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET POWER 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that any plaintiff bringing an action under s 46 has a number 
of hurdles to overcome. As this section will demonstrate, patent holders face an 
additional obstacle: in order to demonstrate that a patent owner has market power, a 
very narrow market definition must be employed. Indeed, it will virtually involve a 
finding that a patent encompasses a market in itself. Once the market has been 
defined, it must be shown that the patent (or group of patents) conveys market power, 
a notoriously difficult impediment in a competition claim involving intellectual 
property. This section explores possible trends in market definition and debate on 
market power where access to medical biotechnology research tools is refused in line 
with the framework. Its focus is on refusals to license that have some consequent 
impact on downstream competition in a particular market. 
8.2.1 MARKET DEFINITION AND MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 
It is difficult to state with any degree of precision how market definition issues are 
likely to be resolved in cases involving medical biotechnology, particularly those 
involving research tools. Each case will need to be individually assessed. It is 
possible, however, to make some generalisations to assist in argument relating to 
patented medical biotechnology patents, particularly research tools. 
8.2.1.1 THE APPLICABILITY OF OVERSEAS PRINCIPLES OF MARKET DEFINITION 
The principles of market definition engaged in by US courts are relatively similar to 
those utilised by Australian courts, with substitutability being the key consideration. 
EU case law has also influenced the way markets are defined under Australian 
See further above 5.5.5. 
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competition law, in that the method of assessing market power espoused in EU case 
law have been enshrined in the TPA via s 46(3).5 Each of these jurisdictions adopts a 
purposive approach to market definition. 6 As a consequence, there are likely to be 
similarities in the way that courts in each of these jurisdictions embark on the process 
of market definition. 
8.2.1.2 MARKET DEFINITION AND MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA 
There is no doubt that market definition will be critical in any evaluation of a refusal 
to license under s 46. 7 The more broadly a market is defined, the more difficult it will 
be to establish market power. Conversely, a narrowly defined market may lead to a 
finding of market power, but may make it more difficult to establish that conduct was 
anti-competitive. 
(i) 	The Appropriate Focus in Market Definition 
Market definition is an important step in quantifying market power, but recall that the 
TPA requires that markets need to be defined in light of the conduct that allegedly 
places the corporation in breach. 8 There may be two avenues open to plaintiffs in 
respect of market definition. First, the concept of sub-markets may be utilised in the 
case of complex markets where there are a number of inputs into a final product. As 
discussed above, the concept of sub-markets has gained favour with some 
commentators who suggest they may be utilised as a tool of analysis in some 
circumstances. 9 A recent judicial pronouncement on the subject of sub-markets, 
however, indicates the concept is unlikely to gain universal acceptance as an 
analytical tool. w 
The biotechnology area would be one area where the concept could conceivably be 
relevant. It is unlikely to play a significant role, however, given its limited acceptance. 
It is also unlikely that it would result in significantly narrower primary market 
definition, but may operate to allow a finding that a particular intellectual property 
privilege constitutes a sub-market of a particular market. Although this would allow 
s See above 6.3.3. 
6 Above, 6.3.2. 
7 Phillip Tucker, 'Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights and Misuse of Market Power — Where 
is the Line in the Sand?' (1999) 10 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 78, 86-88. 
8 See above, 8.2.1. 
9 Above, 6.3.2.3. 
10 ACCC v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442,521 (Hill J). 
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more detailed analysis, it would not assist a plaintiff in making an argument that a 
patent generates market power. 
A better argument may be to focus on narrow market definition in respect of the 
market in which the intellectual property is held. If markets were defined, as they 
have been in some areas, very broadly, this would generally operate to preclude a 
finding of market power. Indeed, the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) observed in 
their 1991 Background Papern that: 
It may be that on occasions a new development will be so advanced as to establish a 
new market as that concept is applied under the Trade Practices Act. However, such 
examples will be rare. In the majority of cases, intellectual property rights protect a 
new development in an established market. Competition will exist from existing 
products ....[T]he existence of intellectual property rights is an important element in 
assessing the barriers to entry to a market. 12 
It should be noted, however, that courts are currently favouring defining markets 
narrowly, particularly in relation to s 46 matters. For example, in Boral Besser 
Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission° (Boral), the Full Federal Court rejected the finding of the primary judge 
that the market comprised all materials used in the construction of walls, and defined 
the relevant market more narrowly as the market for concrete masonry products in 
Melbourne. In doing so, the court focused on demand substitutability, close 
competition and the appropriateness of particular building products for certain tasks. 14 
Similarly, in Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ° 
(Rural Press) the Full Federal Court was prepared to accept the trial judge's finding 
that the market in that case was the Murray Bridge regional newspaper market. They 
declined to adopt a broader definition that also encompassed radio advertising. 16 
11 Trade Practices Commission, Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual Property, 
Background Paper (1991) (ITC Background Paper). 
12 TPC Background Paper, above n11, 15. In relation to assessing intellectual property as a barrier to 
entry, the TPC highlights this factor as being particularly important, and suggested some considerations 
in assessing whether intellectual property has created barriers to entry; at 16. 
13 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609. 
14 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Boral Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 328, 377 
(Beaumont J, Merkel and Finkelstein JJ agreeing). 
15 Rural Press v ACCC (2002) 118 FCR 236. 
16 Rural Press v ACCC (2002) 118 FCR 236, 268-272. This finding was upheld on appeal to the High 
Court; Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 78 ALJR 274, 284. 
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A purposive approach to market definition means that markets could foreseeably be 
defined narrowly, 17 and even conceivably as single brand markets. Where the single 
issue for determination is a refusal to license a patent, the court must examine the 
constraints inherent upon the corporation by ascertaining the market. This would tend 
to dictate that the subject matter of the patent would become crucial, as the scope of 
the patent would direct the court as to the level of competition faced by the 
corporation. 
For this reason, it is submitted that narrow market definition would (and should) be 
the preferred line of argument in respect of a refusal to license. Of course, in some 
cases, a purposive approach to market definition will preclude narrow definition. But 
in the case of many research tools, narrow market definition should be more readily 
employed due to a lack of substitutability on both the demand and supply sides. It 
should be noted that in the limited number of cases where Australian courts have 
considered market definition in the context of intellectual property, they have 
demonstrated a tendency to define markets widely!' For example, there have been 
several cases where courts have refused to recognise markets for individual 
intellectual property and have defined markets more broadly. 19 In Regents Ply Ltd v 
Subaru (Aust) Ply Ltd2° (Regents Case) RD Nicholson J recognised that it is possible 
to establish a single brand market at law, but declined to do so on the facts of the case 
at hand. 21 Instead, his Honour held that the relevant market was the general market for 
supply of motor vehicles, parts and ancillary services. 22 
'7 A good example is ACCC v Australian Safeway Stores Ply Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 339. In that case, the 
majority adopted a purposive approach to market definition, and determined that the real issue to be 
determined was the ability of Safeway to influence the terms of trade at the wholesale level. This 
precluded any consideration of Safeway's power at the retail level, and so the market was restricted on 
a functional level to the market for sale and acquisition of bread by wholesale in Victoria. 
18 See also Charles Lawson, 'Patenting Genes and Gene Sequences and Competition: Patenting at the 
Expense of Competition' (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 97, his n204. 
19 See Ah Toy Ltd v Thiess Toyota Ply Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 271, where Forster Cl defined the relevant 
market as the wholesale market for Toyota vehicles and parts in the Northern Territory; Broderbund 
Software Inc v Computermate Products (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) ATPR 41-155, where Beaumont J 
defined the relevant market as the national product market for computer software having either an 
educational or entertainment character. 
20 Regents Ply Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 84 FCR 218. 
21 Regents Pry Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Ply Ltd (1998) 84 FCR 218, 228. His Honour was required to 
consider whether a separate wholesale market for Subaru spare parts existed. 
22 Regents Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Ply Ltd (1998) 84 FCR 218, 228, 236. The market for parts at 
wholesale level and the market for parts for Subaru vehicles at wholesale level were determined by RD 
Nicolson J to be sub-markets of the market as defined; Regents Ply Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 
84 FCR 218, 228, 236. For commentary on this finding, see Stephen G Corones, Competition Law in 
Australia (31(1  ed, 2004), 60-61. 
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Commentary on the matter takes a similar line of reasoning. For example, some 
specific comments have been made in relation to market definition in 
pharmaceuticals!' The National Competition Council suggested that a patented 
pharmaceutical product such as a headache tablet is likely to compete in the same 
market as herbal and other alternative therapies. 24 Hanks and Williams assert that it 
may be more appropriate in some circumstances to consider a patented 
pharmaceutical product with no close alternatives in the context of the broader range 
of activities of the patent owner (such as research and drug production), rather than as 
an individual market.25 They acknowledge that this would entail taking a long-term 
view of competition, which, it has been submitted would be appropriate in high-
technology industries or industries in which long-term contractual arrangements are 
evident. 26 The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries certainly fall into these 
categories in a large number of instances. 
In contrast, Edwards argues that there should be no impediment to finding a market 
exists in respect of a single pharmaceutical drug produced by one company. 27 It is 
contended that the issue will really depend on the particular patented product in 
question. Many pharmaceutical drugs will compete with a number of other products, 
but often these products will be complementary rather than substitute products. Many 
consumers will refuse to substitute a pharmaceutical product for an herbal remedy, 
and in reality the drugs that are appropriate to treat a specific condition or a particular 
23  It is recognised that markets for pharmaceuticals have different characteristics to markets for more 
'upstream' biotechnology products and technologies. Nevertheless, the following discussion is 
intended to be illustrative of the issues that may arise in relation to market definition in areas involving 
human health. 
24 	. National Competition Council, Parliament of Australia, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974: Final Report (1999) (NCC Report), 171. The Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee also pointed out that in the normal course of trade there are almost 
always alternative or suitably equivalent products or processes in the market place, and instances in 
which IP dealings likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition likely to be rare; Intellectual 
Property and Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation Under the Competition Principles Agreement: Final Report (2002) (IPCRC Report), 214. 
Clearly, this will also have implications for market definition. 
25 Frances Hanks and Philip L Williams, 'Implications of the Decision of the High Court in Queensland 
Wire' (1990) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 437, 452-453. The basis of this assertion is the 
reasoning of the High Court of New Zealand in Tru Tone & Ors v Festival Records Retail Marketing 
Ltd CCH (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,081, 103,089, affirmed on appeal, [1988] 2 NZLR 352, that record 
distributors did not run their businesses on the basis of one album, therefore it was unrealistic to 
examine market power on the basis of one album. See also Universal Music Australia Ply Ltd and 
Others v ACCC (2003) 131 FCR 529. 
26 See above, 6.3.2.2. 
27 Geoff A Edwards, 'Sub-Markets as Competition Law Markets: the Appropriate Approach to the Sub-
market Concept in Market Definition' (1998) 6 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 156, 161. 
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patient are extremely limited. Pharmaceutical products undergo rigorous therapeutic 
testing and quality control procedures. 22 Thus, there is limited supply-side 
substitutability in respect of many pharmaceutical products. 
(ii) Defining Markets in Medical Biotechnology 
Similarly, many medical biotechnology companies engage in specific areas of 
research and are discerning about research tools they are prepared to license-in. 29 
Markets for patents with broad claims are likely to be much more broadly defined. 
This may mean that some patented biotechnology research tools with broad claims 
would be considered to have useful application in a broad economic market, resulting 
in wide market definition. Many category three technologies would fall into this 
category. Indeed, if their potential application as indicated in their claims is far-
reaching, they may encompass more than one economic market. 3° On the other hand, 
narrower patents, or patented research tools for which the full range of applications 
are not yet known, will compete with a smaller number of other products. 
To take a well known example, Chiron's hepatitis C virus (HCV) patents were the 
subject of a claim in respect of Article 8631 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community32 for a refusal to license the patents to Murex. 33 This litigation was 
discussed in Chapter 7. 34 It is interesting to note the finding of the Court of Appeal in 
relation to the relevant market. The markets pleaded were `(a) the market for licences 
under the patent; (b) the market for antigenic material used in the manufacture of 
HCV kits; and (c) the market for HCV kits.' 35 
22 In Australia, this monitoring and assessment is undertaken by the Therapeutic Goods Administration 
unit of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing pursuant to the Therapeutic Goods Act 
1989 (Cth). 
29 In many respects, issues in relation to market definition in pharmaceutical goods are merging with 
market definition issues in medical biotechnology given the diversification of both pharmaceutical and 
genomics companies into biopharmaceutical research and development. 
30 A good example is the Intron Sequence Analysis or 'junk DNA' patents discussed in Appendix 2. 
Use of this technology is necessary in a considerable amount of biomedical research. Thus, markets for 
this patented technology are likely to be widely defined. 
31 Now Article 82. 
32 Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/65. 
33 Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Limited (No 2) [1994] 1 CMLR 410. Discussed above, 
7.3.4. 
34 Above, 7.3.4. 
35  Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Limited (No 2) [1994] 1 CMLR 410, 415. 
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The Court of Appeal refused to disturb the fmding of the trial judge that the relevant 
market was the market for HCV kits. 36 As to the other markets pleaded, the trial judge 
found that these markets simply did not exist. The number of licences granted had 
been limited, and there was no supply of the material used to make the kits other than 
in kit form." As a result, the relevant market was held to be fairly broad, making it 
difficult for Murex to establish dominance. Even though the patents in question 
encompassed the genome of the HCV virus, this did not necessarily impact on the 
antitrust market pleaded or found. This finding is a good demonstration of how an 
upstream market is not likely to impact to any great degree on how a downstream 
antitrust market is defined. 
A similar position would probably be reached under s 46. However, in adopting a 
purposive approach to market definition the conduct in issue was a refusal to licence 
the patents that would allow Murex to use the antigenic material necessary to 
manufacture HCV testing kits. It is submitted that it would surely be possible to argue 
that a market for the antigenic material existed, given that Murex sought access to that 
material. From the perspective of both demand and supply-side substitutability, this 
would seem to be an equally appropriate market. Chiron used the antigenic material to 
manufacture testing kits. Without the patented material, making HCV kits was 
impossible, and without a licence Murex was guilty of infringement. It is clear that 
under s 46 a market may exist if there is the potential for transactions and despite the 
fact that is currently no market for a product or service. 38 The patent over the genome 
constituted a barrier to entry that prevented Murex entering a potential market. If such 
a narrow market could be successfully pleaded, this may facilitate a finding of market 
power. 
This example serves to highlight the disparities that may exist in market definition, 
and the difficulty of predicting how market definition issues are likely to be resolved. 
Many patented biomedical products and technologies would be equally difficult to 
categorise. Chiron's Hepatitis C patents fit into the class of a Category 2 technology, 
which would seem to lend itself to narrower market definition." The approach that 
36 See Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Limited (No 2) [1994] 1 CMLR 410, 415-416. 
37 Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Limited (No 2) [1994] 1 CMLR 410, 415-416. 
38 Above, 6.3.2.5. 
39 The technology could also be categorised as a Category 3 technology given that the patented 
technology is potentially useful for not only diagnostic application, but also therapeutic and 
pharmaceutical application. This would tend to suggest that wider market defuuition might be 
appropriate. On the basis of a purposive approach to market definition, however, the function for which 
the material was requested (and for which Chiron itself used the material) would be relevant, and it is 
submitted, would narrow the requisite market. 
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will be taken to market definition will depend on the patented research tool or 
technology in question, and the conduct complained of. 
A patent owner may refuse to license a gene sequence useful for research into cancer 
to a downstream corporation because the sequence has been exclusively licensed to a 
corporation undertaking research into heart disease. As has been demonstrated by the 
empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4, many patents in the biotechnology area are 
exclusively licensed. 40 This will often be because this allows the realisation of 
maximum value for the patented technology,4i but it may also be because a licensee 
demands exclusivity. There is nothing to prevent licensees seeking restrictions on the 
use of a patented technology by others, even where that use does not conflict with the 
use made of the technology by the licensee. 
In the event of an allegation of misuse of market power, the downstream corporation 
would need to attempt to establish that a fairly narrow market existed. From the point 
of view of demand substitutability it may be possible to establish a market for 
research into a specific form of cancer (or more specifically, for the licensed 
technology necessary to undertake this research), 42 although this would depend on 
whether other parties were also engaged in similar research, and demand for the 
particular patented product. Category three technologies are most likely to comprise 
markets in themselves, as they are not substitutable and many parties use them for 
different research purposes. 43 In contrast, a gene that was broadly useful for research 
into a particular kind of cancer would be likely to fall within a broader market, and 
would compete not only with other genetic technologies, but also other alternative 
forms of treatment. 
ao Above, 4.4.3. 
41 The exception is broadly applicable research tools that are non-exclusively licensed. The complaint 
from potential users in relation to these technologies is frequently the fee that is charged for a licence. 
42 Under US antitrust law, market power or monopoly power may be assessed using product markets, 
technology markets or product markets; see above 5.4.1. Technology markets are markets for 'the 
process and output of the act of innovating'; Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark A Lemley and Mark D Janis, 
IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2002), 
(Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis), vol I, [4.3c]. Innovation markets are markets for research and 
development; see US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines 
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, (1995) (US Licensing Guidelines) 
<http://www.usdoj.goviatr/publiaguidelines/ipguide.htm > at 27 October 2003; §3.2.3. In the case of 
medical biotechnology, it may be necessary to employ similar methods of defining markets under the 
TPA, because it will not always be possible to define a market by an end product. Indeed, much 
research output will be intermediate in the sense that it will still not be clear exactly what applications 
the output will be useful for. Consequently, markets should be capable of being defined as 'markets for 
research', and 'markets for licences' to use particular patented technologies. 
43 Examples might be recombinant DNA technology and PCR Taq Polymerase; see Appendix 2. 
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As far as supply-side substitutability is concerned, an important consideration would 
be whether the downstream corporation had other research opportunities open to it. If 
it could be demonstrated that the downstream corporation could obtain another gene 
or alternative product that did not rely on gene sequence information that enabled it to 
undertake similar research activities, this may also preclude such narrow market 
definition. Note that the market may be more broadly defmed as the technology 
necessary to undertake both forms of research, with the result that the patent holder is 
far less likely to have market power. It may also be defined more generally as the 
market for licences to use the patented technology. It is likely that a fairly long-term 
view of these markets will be taken given the pace at which innovation is proceeding 
in biotechnology in general, and the relatively short periods of time for which 
technologies assume primacy. 
Empirical data presented in Chapter 4 indicates that at present, research is generally 
continuing despite the fact that licences to patented materials might be refused or 
unavailable." This is primarily due to the breadth of research opportunities currently 
available to downstream users of patented genomic technologies. For example, in 
Chapter 4 it was reported that some respondents to the Australian study stated that 
licences were not sought if it was perceived that they would be refused!' Although 
refusals to license may impact on innovation, narrow market definition may be 
precluded due to the difficulty that might exist in establishing that there are no 
research opportunities available to a downstream user as a result of a refusal to 
licence. This situation may well change as research areas become more cluttered and 
patent activity steadily increases. 
Despite this, it may be possible in some instances to argue that biotechnology 
products exist for which there are no effective substitutes. The WARF patents that 
have been licensed to Geron are a good example, although technological advances 
mean that this may not be the case indefinitely. 46 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
have acknowledged that many gene sequence patents are difficult or impossible to 
invent around!' Lawson argues that broad claims on gene sequences and their 
applications potentially impact on a range of products and processes because often 
they cannot be substituted or imitated. 48 The inability to imitate certain technologies 
44 Above, 4.4.2, 4.5. 
45 See above, 4.4.1.2. 
46 See Appendix 2. Note that this technology is not patented in Australia in any event. 
47 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, Discussion Paper 
(2002) (Nuffield Discussion Paper), 54. 
48 Lawson, Patenting at the Expense of Competition, above n18, 128-130. 
355 
Chapter 8 
gives effective ownership over not only the technologies, but also through any 
application that uses those technologies. 49 Lawson cites the example of Amgen's 
broad patent protection over a cloned gene that enabled them to produce 
erythropoietin and subsequently, pharmaceutical products. The patents prevented the 
development by a competitor of an alternative method of producing erythropoietin. 5° 
Where these patents are broad in scope (as are the WARF patents), this would tend to 
lead to broad market definition in any event. However, where they are more restricted 
in the scope of their claims, narrow market definition may be indicated. An example 
may be a gene sequence useful for a very limited therapeutic or diagnostic 
application, or a drug target specific to a particular disease. 51 Similarly, the 
accumulation of a group of patents may result in a narrowly defined research area 
being closed off. A refusal to license a small downstream company in these 
circumstances could have grave implications for the continuation of their research 
activities. Again, the issue of market definition would be largely determined by the 
level of demand for the patented products, and alternative research opportunities 
available to the downstream company. 
(iii) Barriers to Entry in Medical Biotechnology 
In many markets in biotechnology, patents may constitute significant barriers to entry. 
The TPC suggested that there are a number of factors that may be relevant in 
considering whether intellectual property has created significant barriers to entry: 52 
• the cost of production of substitutable, non-infringing products; 
• the lead time and sunk costs of research and development; 
• the level of technological advancement inherent in a particular protected 
product; 
• structural rigidities in the market that have resulted from the new technology. 
Patents will only constitute a barrier to entry if they completely block entry. It is 
submitted that patents will not constitute barriers to entry if downstream users have 
49  Ibid, 129. 
50 See also Charles Lawson, 'Patents, Substitution, Imitation and Competition: Amgen, TIC!' and the 
Erythropoietin Patents' (2001) 37 ACCC Journal 22. 
51 Most pharmaceutical companies have significant patent and research portfolios and aim to produce a 
number of 'blockbuster' drugs. It is unlikely that a refusal to license, for example, a patented drug 
target to a significant pharmaceutical company would ever result in that drug target constituting a 
market. 
52 TPC Background Paper, above n10, 16. 
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the ability to invent around, modify research direction, or obtain alternative 
technologies. The empirical data suggests that these courses of action are frequently 
utilised to overcome access issues in medical biotechnology." Consequently, at 
present it is probably the case that patented biomedical inventions are unlikely to 
constitute barriers to entry. Of course, the circumstances might be different if a patent 
holder strategically refuses to license that patent to prevent the continuation of a 
research program that is already underway. 54 In this instance, it may be possible to 
demonstrate that the strategic use of the patent constitutes a barrier to entry into a 
particular market. Again, market definition would be contingent on a number of 
factors, including the availability of substitute technology, the technology in question, 
and the nature of the research. 
It is also worth commenting on functional market analysis in respect of biotechnology 
products. Frequently, access will be sought to patented upstream technologies. Until 
recently, most genomics companies were simply engaged in sequencing data, but 
many are now competing with downstream users through research being undertaken 
on sequenced information. This has implications for market analysis, and may in fact 
have implications for functional market categorisation. Similarly, the fact that market 
power exists in an upstream market should not preclude a finding that s 46 has been 
contravened in respect of a downstream market, and this matter is likely to be 
clarified by way of legislative amendment to s 46." 
(iv) Some Guidelines to Defining Markets in Cases Involving Intellectual 
Property 
It is difficult to provide guidelines for defining markets where intellectual property is 
concerned. Nevertheless, in accordance with the framework identified in Chapter 5, 
any court considering whether a refusal to license constitutes a contravention of s 46 
must consider two fundamental questions. 
The first is whether or not the intellectual property privilege in question constitutes a 
separate market (and accordingly, whether the right conveys market power). This 
issue will be considered in the following section. The second is whether there can be 
53 Above, 4.5. 
54 Many research programs may be commenced without knowing exactly how 'cluttered' the 
intellectual property environment is. Thus, it is possible to conceive of a situation where a company 
learns they are infringing a patent after research on a particular project is underway. Although little 
empirical evidence of research being abandoned was obtained, some respondents did report 
commencing research projects prior to seeking licences either intentionally or otherwise; above 4.5.3. 
55 See above, 6.3.2.5. 
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said to be one market that requires analysis, or whether in reality there are two 
markets, an upstream market and a downstream market which is capable of 
constituting a separate market.56 This issue is important, because a downstream 
market may comprise part of the primary market. Alternatively, it may comprise a 
separate, downstream market into which the intellectual property is an essential 
input.57 
A refusal to license a patent will generally only constitute a misuse of market power 
in situations where a discrete downstream market is affected, and this is reflected in 
limbs [2](ii) and [3] of the framework. It follows that in order for competition law to 
be invoked, the downstream market must be capable of definition as a separate 
market, in that it must be a discrete market that is not, in reality part of the primary 
market. The main example of a downstream market that would actually comprise part 
of the primary market is an after-market for repair of a product protected by 
intellectual property. 58 
Identifying whether a truly discrete market exists, or whether a downstream market 
actually forms part of a primary market, may be a difficult task. An important issue to 
consider will be whether the intellectual property is useful as an input into a product 
in a downstream market, or whether the product in the downstream market is ancillary 
to a product in the upstream market (as for example in the case of a repair market). 59 
Research investigating the properties of a gene would probably result in single, 
market definition. Research using the gene for a particular downstream application is 
more likely to result in a separate downstream market being defined. 
56 See also Tucker, above n7, 86-88; Abraham I van Melle, 'Refusals to License Intellectual Property 
Rights: The Impact of RTE v EC Commission (Magill) on Australian and New Zealand Competition 
Law' (1997) 25 Australian Business Law Review 4, 33-35. The import of this factor was discussed in 
Chapter 7 in the context of EU case law. This case law has made it clear that the success of a refusal to 
license claim under Article 82 will hinge on whether there can be said to be two separate markets; 
above, especially, 7.3.3. 
57 During the remainder of this chapter, the terms used to describe a separate downstream market will 
be 'separate or 'discrete'. Van Melle defines a separate downstream market as a 'derivative' market; 
van Melle, above n56, 33. Consequently this term will be used when discussing arguments advanced 
by van Melle in relation to downstream markets and efficiency considerations; below, 8.3.4.1. 
58 The major US refusal to license cases have all concerned after-markets; above, 7.2.1.2. 
59 As discussed in Chapter 7, the European Court of Justice in IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC 
Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28 confirmed that a plaintiff alleging a refusal to license 
contravenes Article 82 must show that the intellectual property constitutes an indispensable input into a 
new product. It was pointed out that it may be difficult to determine in a particular case whether a 
patent in fact constitutes an indispensable input, or whether it comprises part of the product in the 
downstream market; above, 7.3.3. 
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In the case of medical biotechnology, the nature of the upstream product will be 
crucial. Although all uses of an upstream research tool may not be capable of being 
ascertained, many upstream products will be useful as inputs into a downstream 
products, and their value to the patent holder will lie primarily in licensing them. 
Licensing forms an integral part of the medical biotechnology industry, and therefore 
many products or technologies may fall into this category. In this case, it may be that 
two distinct markets can be identified. 
Accordingly, consideration of the following broad guidelines suggested by Tucker 
may usefully provide some insight into the nature of the intellectual property in 
question and the existence of a discrete market: 
1. Is the (primary market) product or service a separate (perhaps "raw") constituent 
element of a secondary market or service, or is the secondary market product or 
service better described as ancillary to a product or service created in an 
upstream market? 
2. Is the intellectual property utilised by its holder in the process of generating 
products or services, or does the holder generate a significant proportion of its 
business income by granting licences of its intellectual property? 
3. Does the respondent generate its products (or services) in separate facilities, one 
employing intellectual property, and the other(s) not? 
While these guidelines may assist in market delineation, market definition will 
invariably be problematic in some instances. Some research tools are clearly useful as 
inputs into further research, but the boundaries between markets may be blurred. 
However, the incremental nature of medical biotechnology research will tend to make 
identification of a separate downstream market difficult. There may be many steps, 
for example, between researching the properties of a gene and an ultimate consumer 
product. These intermediate markets would invariably be difficult to define and may 
be subsumed into larger markets that include the upstream, genomic research. 
The WARF patents provide another example. 61 Geron holds exclusive licences over a 
number of WARF's US patents, to undertake research and development in relation to 
a number of different tissue types. It would be difficult to discern whether a secondary 
market exists in this case due to the fact that research in the area is at an early stage. It 
is not clear whether the patents will lead to the development of products in discrete 
6o Tucker, above n7, 87-88 (references omitted). 
61 See Appendix 2. 
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markets, so that any party refused a license over the relevant patents would have 
difficulty demonstrating that they require those patents as inputs into product 
development in a separate, downstream market. Nevertheless, the guidelines provide a 
useful starting point for assessing the composition of antitrust markets. 
Summary 
This section sought to identify how markets may be defined in cases involving 
medical biotechnology patents. It has been proposed that plaintiffs would be advised 
to argue for narrow market definition where possible, but a number of factors 
including demand and supply-side substitutability will frequently militate against 
narrow market definition. Market definition will inevitably be uncertain in high 
technology industries. Markets must be defined on a case-by-case basis, and relevant 
factors will include the conduct in issue and the nature of the patented technology. 
8.2.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET POWER 
The proposition that intellectual property should not be presumed to give rise to 
market power has gained widespread acceptance. 62 In particular, the OECD has given 
unqualified support to the principle in their roundtable dealing with Competition 
Policy and Intellectual Property Rights. 63 As a result, market power should never be 
inferred from intellectual property ownership alone. 64 
Intellectual property will certainly be relevant, however, to the computation of market 
power, in that it affects the ability of rivals to respond to price increases in protected 
products, and may constitute a barrier to entry. ° Because of the difficulty in 
ascertaining whether many products protected by intellectual property produce returns 
above cost, attempting to ascertain market power from price-cost information will 
62 See the discussion above, 5.5.3.1, and the references cited therein. 
63 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Rights (1998), 8-9. 
64 Note that there is a long line of US authority which has held that a patent creates a rebuttable 
presumption of market power where a patent licence is tied to unpatented goods; see Hovenkamp, 
Lemley and Janis, above n42, vol I, [4.2e]. The canon had only been referred to in dicta over the last 
few decades until in a recent case, the Federal Circuit effectively revived it; see Independent Ink Inc v 
Illinois Tool Works Inc and Trident Inc 396 F.3d 1342 (Federal Circuit, January 25, 2005). The US 
Licensing Guidelines specifically state that the US agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright or 
trade secret necessarily confers market power; US Licensing Guidelines, §2.1. 
65 Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, von, [4.1b]. 
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have little utility. 66 Accordingly, it becomes necessary to investigate alternative 
technologies currently or potentially available. ° 
8.2.2.1 ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER IN CASES INVOLVING SINGLE MARKETS 
In assessing market power in technology markets, the US licensing Guidelines 
recognise that patent owners may operate only in markets for the patents themselves, 
that is, there may be a market for licences of the protected techno1ogy. 68 In this case, 
the Guidelines direct that the market will comprise the licensed technology together 
with its close substitutes.69 This allows an assessment of market power where the 
owner of intellectual property is seeking to charge a monopoly price for a licence to 
use its technology (or engage in other exclusionary conduct). Market power will 
depend on the value of the protected product to licensees, and the availability of 
alternatives.70 It should be remembered that the high threshold for application of s 2 of 
the Sherman Act71 is monopoly power. A similar position has been reached in the EU. 
While the standard of market power required is dominance, if a finding is made that 
intellectual property is sufficiently strong so as to convey market power, it is likely 
that a finding of dominance will follow. 72 
Under the TPA, it is now clear that market power may in some circumstances be 
generated as a result of patent ownership. The fact that market power can arise as a 
result of ownership of intellectual property was recognised in the Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the 1986 Trade Practices Revision Bill, where it was 
stated that ... market power can be derived from statutory limitations on competition 
(eg through the creation of statutory monopolies) in the same way as any other 
constraints on competition can affect the operation of the market.' 73 In the High Court, 
Dawson J in Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Ply Co Ltd 
66 Ibid, von, [4.1c]. 
Ibid, vol I, [4.1c]. 
68 Known as technology markets. See above, n42, and see US Licensing Guidelines, §3.2.2, which 
notes that it may be necessary to define markets in this manner where 'rights to intellectual property are 
marketed separately from the products in which they are used ... ' 
69 Ibid. 
Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n42, vol I, [4.3a]. 
71 Sherman Act 15 USC (1890). 
72 	
indicated i ted in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC 
Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416 and implied by other decisions discussed 
above, 7.3. 
73 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Revision Bill, 1986, [44]. This signalled an intention to 
overrule a line of Federal Court authority in which rights arising under statute or contract were held not 
to give rise to market power. See further below, 8.3.1. 
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(Queensland Wire) confirmed this by stating that it is not ... helpful to categorise 
conduct, as has been done, by determining whether it is the exercise of some 
contractual or other right', 74 and the matter was implicit in the reasoning of the other 
j udges. 75 
More recently, the High Court in NT Power Generation Ply Ltd v Power and Water 
Authoritym rejected the proposition that the ownership of a property right was 
incapable of giving rise to market power and held that a property owner who refused 
access to that property was taking advantage of its market power. As a result, it would 
now appear to be accepted that property rights and statutory rights such as those 
conveyed by intellectual property are capable of giving rise to market power. 
Under current High Court interpretations of the concept of market power, however, it 
is unlikely that a patent owner will ever be considered to possess a substantial degree 
of power in a market. Arguably, the result of the High Court's decision in Boral 
Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (Boral)77 is that near-monopoly power is required to satisfy 
the market power requirement in s 46. 78 As such, market definition becomes a crucial 
determinant of whether market power is possessed in a particular case. 
Consider the example of Chiron's HCV therapy discussed in the preceding section. 79 
In order to establish that Chiron's patents gave it market power, Murex would have 
needed to establish that a narrow market existed, a finding the UK Court of Appeals 
declined to make. Instead, the Court of Appeals assessed whether Chiron occupied a 
dominant position in a broadly defined market, a situation in which dominance will 
always be difficult to establish. Arguably the market power requirement under s 46 
now also provides a prohibitive obstacle for plaintiffs seeking to establish that a 
refusal to license a patent constitutes a misuse of market power. 
While a patent may well constitute a barrier to entry for those who unsuccessfully 
seek a licence, there are likely to be other factors that militate against a finding of 
74 Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, 202 (Dawson J). 
75 Brenda Marshall, The Relevance of a Legitimate Business Rationale Under Section 46 of the Trade 
Practices Act' (2003) 8(1) Deakin Law Review 49, 56. 
76 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312. 
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609. 
78 Above, 6.3.5. 
79 Above, 8.2.1.2(ii). 
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market power.8° Most obviously, few patent claims are likely to be broad enough to 
encompass an antitrust market. Even if markets are defined narrowly, in order to 
confer market power, the patent claims must be broad enough to include the market in 
its entirety. 81 Kitch suggests that this is only likely to occur when an invention 
involves a fundamental or basic invention, rather than an improvement on an existing 
invention. 82 While this may occur in new, high technology areas, the steps required 
before commercialisation mean that demand for the invention is limited? 
Another major impediment to establishing that a patent (or group of patents) 
comprises an antitrust market is the fact that many patents can be overcome by 
research and development." Empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 4 supports this, 
and suggests that many parties in medical biotechnology who have been refused 
licences, or have perceived that licences would be refused if requested, were 
commonly able to invent around existing patents. 85 At the same time, there are 
biotechnology patents that are difficult or impossible to invent around, and this may 
assist in demonstrating that the patent holder possesses market power. 86 
8.2.2.2 THE REQUIREMENT FOR TWO MARKETS 
In the US, there must be two distinct markets in order for the essential facilities 
doctrine to operate." Similarly, specific requirements have evolved in the EU in 
relation to when a refusal to license intellectual property will constitute a 
contravention of Article 82, although the requirements under EU case law are more 
80 See also the discussion in Geoff Adams and Dan McLennan, 'Intellectual Property Licensing and 
Part IV of the Trade Practices Act: Are the TPA's Pro-Competitive Provisions Anti-IP 
Commercialisation?' (2002) 51 Intellectual Property Forum: Journal of the Intellectual Property 
Society of Australia and New Zealand 10, 14. 
81 See Edmund W Kitch, 'Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual 
Property' (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1727, 1730. 
82 - . ima 1730-31. 
83 Ibid, 1731. Query, however, whether this is likely to be the case where a licence has been requested 
and refused. 
84 IPCRC Report, above n24, 25; Antra Hood, 'Barriers and Impediments to Entry in Australian Health 
Care Markets After Stirling Harbour, Boral and Melway' (2002) 20 Australian Business Law Review 6, 
her n 67. 
Above, 4.5.2. 
s5 For example, gene patents are difficult to invent around, as are many of the foundational research 
tools discussed in Appendix 2. See further above, 8.2.1.2(4 
87 Above, 7.2.3. As discussed, the doctrine is unlikely to operate in respect of intellectual property in 
the US. This doctrine may be applied where a vertically integrated intellectual property holder refuses 
to license to a competitor in a downstream market. If this approach is applied, it follows that a refusal 
to license to a competitor in a downstream market is unlikely to contravene US antitrust law. 
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clearly spelt out. In addition to the requirement that there be a new product for which 
there is an unsatisfied consumer demand (as well as no objective justification for the 
refusal), the essential facilities component of the conditions laid down by European 
case law demands that there be a separate downstream market that is not currently 
being exploited. It will be sufficient if there is the potential for a downstream market 
to exist.88 
This requirement that market power be leveraged from one market to another is not 
readily apparent in the Australian legislation. It appears likely that s 46 will be 
amended to allow s 46 to be invoked in a leverage situation. 89 What is not clear, 
however, is whether it is necessary that market power be extended from one market to 
another before s 46 will operate to render a refusal to license unlawful. 
It is submitted that under Australian competition law, there is no requirement that 
there be two markets before s 46 would operate in the case of a refusal to license. 
Provided a company possesses substantial market power in a market, one element of s 
46 will be satisfied. It is not clear, however, whether the two-market requirement laid 
down in Magill and /MS would be become an implied requirement of a refusal to 
license action under s 46." It was contended in Chapter 5 that it would probably only 
be in cases where market power from one market is used in another market that a 
refusal to license would contravene s 46. 91 If a plaintiff can establish the existence of 
substantial market power in these circumstances, there is a greater likelihood that the 
'taking advantage' element will be satisfied. 92 
8.2.23 SOME CIRCUMSTANCES SPECIFIC TO MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
If patents constitute a sufficiently high barrier to entry, this may lead to the accrual of 
substantial market power. The following circumstances may arise in medical 
biotechnology, and may be conducive to a finding of substantial market power in a 
particular market: 
• strategic use of a broad fundamental patent; 
• the accumulation of patents; 
• oligopolistic market structures. 
88 Above, 7.3.1. 
89 See Chapter 6.3.2.5. 
9° See Van Melle, above n56, 26-27. 
91 Above, 5.5.5. 
92 See below, 8.3.4. 
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(i) Patents Over Fundamental Research Tools 
Holding a broad, fundamental patent that precludes competing research or that may be 
used to prevent the advancement of research in a number of research areas, may result 
in a finding of market power. Not all problematic patents are capable of being 
circumvented. In biotechnology, research and development costs are prohibitive. The 
high cost of inventing around or producing competing technology may be so great as 
to inhibit potential competitors from attempting to compete. 93 It may also preclude the 
undertaking or continuation of downstream research. The significant number of 
fundamental and broad patents in medical biotechnology means that inventing around 
many of these patents is prohibitively expensive or impossible. While new 
technologies may emerge in time, this may be a long-run phenomenon, and research 
(and market entry) opportunities may be lost as pioneer technologies are withheld 
from competitors or downstream companies. 
(ii) Accumulation of Patents 
Further, the accumulation of patents through defensive patenting strategies may have 
the effect of protecting whole research areas. The accumulation of patents through 
vertical integration could produce a similar result. In this case, the structure of the 
medical biotechnology industry in itself is problematic, because it lends itself to the 
accumulation of patents, which may give rise to market power. 
All of the patents held by a corporation will be relevant in assessing market power. 
Section 46(2) of the TPA also provides: 
If: 
(a) a body corporate that is related to a corporation has, or 2 or more bodies 
corporate each of which is related to one corporation together have, a substantial 
degree of power in a market; or 
(b) a corporation and a body corporate that is, or a corporation and 2 or more bodies 
corporate each of which is related to that corporation, together have a substantial 
degree of power in a market; the corporation shall be taken for the purposes of 
this section to have a substantial degree of power in that market. 
While expressly stipulating that market power may arise through the aggregation of 
bodies corporate, this provision is limited to related bodies corporate. It does not 
apply to the accumulation, through any means, of market power between unrelated 
93 Adams and McLennan, above n80, 14-15. 
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corporations. It is clear from this provision, however, that vertical integration that 
allows the collection of patents that collectively account for a whole area of research 
will be relevant in assessing market power. 
Due to the requirement that corporations be related, licensing agreements among 
unrelated corporations that facilitate the accretion of market power would not fall 
within the ambit of the provision. Arrangements that result in competitors within a 
market accruing a monopoly position may attract a charge of monopolisation in the 
US? 4 There is no authority on this point in Australia, and it is unclear whether a 
similar position would apply. It would certainly be relevant, however, to a 
consideration of market power, to take into account all of the patents and licence 
agreements held by a corporation, in assessing the degree of market power held by 
that corporation. 95 
This was confirmed by Hill J in ACCC v Universal Music Australia Ply Ltd,96 who 
held that a temporary monopoly could be conferred by an aggregation of intellectual 
property privileges for which there was no substitutable altemative.97 Aggregation of 
biotechnology patents has been revealed by the empirical evidence to be a common 
practice, and is frequently undertaken for the sole purpose of closing off areas of 
research.98 If it has the effect of foreclosing research in a downstream segment, it may 
attract s 46. This would hinge on the temporal view taken of the relevant market, and 
whether a 'temporary monopoly' would be sufficient to give a patent holder 
substantial market power in the relevant market. 
(iii) Oligopoly Markets and Market Power 
The cumulative nature of the industry also highlights the potential for research 
blockages if access to an important technology is withheld from a downstream party 
(as it may be if exclusively licensed to another party). Technologies falling into all 
three research categories may be capable of conveying market power in certain 
circumstances, although the withholding of category one technology from competitors 
94 See the discussion in John D Heydon, The Law Book Company Limited, Trade Practices Law, vol 1, 
[5.720]. The acquisition of patents leading to an overly strong patent portfolio may give rise to a claim 
under Clayton Act 35 USC §7 (1914); see In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 
(2001), and the discussion in Hovenkamp, Lemley and Janis, above n42, vol I, [13.44 ch 14. 
95 These agreements would need to relate to a specific research area in order to satisfy the market 
power requirement. 
96  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v ACCC (2003) 131 FCR 529. 
ACCC v Universal Music Australia Ply Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442,536-537. 
98 Above, 4.4.4. 
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is a natural by-product of the competitive process and unlikely to contravene s 46. 
Most category three technologies are widely licensed, and it is technologies that fall 
into category two that are most likely to be problematic from a competition law 
perspective. 
The medical biotechnology industry is exemplified by a number of large participants 
with large patent portfolios, and smaller participants with growing patent portfolios. 
To some degree, the industry exhibits elements of an oligopolistic market structure 
where corporations hold (in some cases) mutually blocking patent portfolios obtained 
primarily for defensive purposes." But the breadth of research opportunities available 
in medical biotechnology would be a factor militating against a finding of market 
power against a group of corporations, just as it would be a factor suggestive that 
market power did not exist in the case of an individual corporation. Recent 
determinations in relation to the market power standard also mean that market power 
would be unlikely to exist in an oligopoly situation. th° 
8.3 `TAKING ADVANTAGE' OF MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PATENTS 
The following section considers whether a refusal to license could constitute a 'taking 
advantage' of market power. Relevant authorities in relation to this element were 
discussed in Chapter 6. 101 Courts must apply a hypothetical competitive market test in 
determining whether this element is satisfied, and consider the conduct of the 
corporation under workably competitive conditions. What is not clear is whether 
future courts will assess this element by asking whether the corporation 'would' have 
engaged in the conduct under competitive conditions, or whether the corporation 
'could' have engaged in the conduct under competitive conditions.ma 
8.3.1 'TAKING ADVANTAGE' OF PATENTS AND MARKET POWER 
As discussed, it has been stated that intellectual property is capable of giving rise to 
market power. m A line of Federal Court authority that preceded the Trade Practices 
99 See John H Barton, 'Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios' 
(2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 851. Barton points out that these trends are evident in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry; at 855-856. However there is also evidence of broad, overlapping patents 
amongst industry leaders in medical biotechnology. 
100 Above, 6.3.5. 
101 Above, 6.4.1. 
1°2 Above, 6.4.1. 
103 See above, 8.2. 
367 
Chapter 8 
Revision Bill 1986 had held otherwise, relying on the proposition that the exercise of 
a contractual, property or statutory right involves taking advantage of the right 
conferred by contract or statute, and not market power. 104 In Warman International v 
Envirotech Australia Ply Laws for example, Warman was dominant in the market for 
slurry pumps and replacement parts. However, Wilcox J held that Warman was 
seeking to take advantage of its intellectual property rather than the market power it 
possessed. 106 
The High Court's decision in Queensland Wire,m as clarified by the High Court in 
Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ply Ltd (Melway),m8 confirms the 
incorrectness of focusing on the source of market power.'® Instead, comparing 
behaviour under competitive conditions becomes the paramount issue. 11° As a result it 
is unlikely this succession of decisions will be followed." Focusing on the 
competitive market test means that efficiency justifications will become relevant 
considerations. The implications of this for intellectual property owners must be 
considered. 
8.3.2 THE RELEVANCE OF EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS TO DEALINGS IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 'TAKE ADVANTAGE' ELEMENT 
It is not clear whether the 'would' or 'could' approach is likely to be adopted in future 
s 46 cases. If a strict 'could' approach is adopted, then given that this approach tests 
physical possibilities, technically there could never be a taking advantage for a refusal 
to license a patent. Under the hypothetical competitive market test, anything is 
104 See, eg, Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Qld) Ply Ltd (1975) ATPR 40-004; Warman 
International v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-714; Williams Papersave Ply Ltd (1987) 
ATPR 40-781. 
105 Warman International v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 40-714. 
106 Wilcox J relied on the judgment of Joske J in Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Qld) Pty 
Ltd (1975) ATPR 40-004. 
107 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, especially 202 
(Dawson J). 
108 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1. 
109 See also NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312. 
no Marshall, above n75, 56; David Meltz, "Market Entry — See Adjoining Map": Melway and the 
Right Not to Supply' (2002) 10 Trade Practices Law Journal 96, 109. 
111 See, however, the discussion by Marshall, who points out that there have been decisions subsequent 
to Queensland Wire and even Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks' Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 
that have retained the distinction; Marshall, above n75, 57-58, referring to the judgment of Lockhart J 
in Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd (1992) ATPR 41-165 and Lee J in NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v 
Power and Water Authority (2002) 122 FCR 399, 404-405. Marshall suggests this indicates 'an 
ongoing measure of judicial uncertainty'; at 58. 
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possible where a test of physical possibility is applied. If a would test is employed, the 
test would ask whether the conduct would be likely to have been engaged in under 
competitive conditions, with efficiency justifications becoming the paramount issue in 
respect of this element. 
Lawson asserts that by allowing consideration of efficiency arguments, the High 
Court's decision in Melway narrows the operation of s 46. 112 In relation to patent 
holders, Lawson argues that the very nature of patents is that they promote beneficial 
innovation, and that this tends to lay the foundation for efficiency justifications in 
respect of most patenting practices. 113 This, according to Lawson, significantly 
narrows the scope for aggrieved parties to assert that a use of patents constitutes a 
misuse of market power, although he acknowledges that this will depend on the 
attitude of particular judges toward the application of competition law to dealings in 
intellectual property. 114 
Richardson argues that there are likely to be many competing efficiency 
considerations where the exploitation of intellectual property is concerned. 115 It is 
unclear how courts are likely to weigh these efficiency considerations, and 
Richardson cautions against competition law focusing too specifically on dealings in 
intellectual property. 116 
Contrary to Lawson's argument, the test established in Melway provides a sound basis 
for assessing the legitimacy of particular practices engaged in by patent holders. 
There is no policy reason for treating intellectual property dealings differently to other 
transactions to which the competitive market test applies. Some commentators have 
argued that efficiency justifications should not be relevant to the take advantage 
element at al1. 117 Assuming, however, that efficiency justifications will be relevant if a 
112 Lawson, above n18, 127. 
113 Ibid, 127. 
114 /b.. , la 127-128. 
115 Megan Richardson, 'The High Court of Australia Revisits Misuse of Market Power: Implications 
for Australian Intellectual Property Rightholders' (2002) 24(2) European Intellectual Property Review 
81, 86. 
116 ibid. 
117 See the discussion in Stephen Corones, 'The Characterisation of Conduct under Section 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act' (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 409, 415. And note that under a 
'could' test (applied in conditions of workable competition) efficiency considerations would not be 
relevant. 
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'would' test is employed by future courts, 118 there is no reason in principle why 
restrictions on patent licensing should not be subject to the same test. 
Leaving aside the issue of parity, efficiency considerations are central to whether or 
not a particular restriction in intellectual property licensing should be permitted. It has 
been argued that intellectual property should be subject to competition law, 
particularly in an industry such as medical biotechnology where progressive 
concentration and high levels of patenting are typical. 119 It is entirely in keeping with 
the aims of intellectual property law to undertake an economic analysis of the 
efficiency basis of a refusal to license a patent in determining whether competition 
law should intervene to condemn it. 12° Licensing is an important method of 
technology diffusion. If efficiency effects outweigh the potential negative effects of 
the transaction, the dealing should be permitted. Incorporating this principle into the 
take advantage element is entirely in keeping with the balance the TPA seeks to 
achieve between intellectual property and competition law. 
8.3.3 RELEVANT EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS 
Scant guidance exists in the cases discussed, as to specific efficiency justifications 
that might be advanced to justify the use of market power. No specific guidance has 
been given in respect of statutory monopolies, either as to the operation of the take 
advantage test, or as to possible efficiency justifications for potentially anti-
competitive conduct. 121 Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage some justifications that 
might be advanced by a patent owner where they refuse to license that patent. 
Although it is acknowledged that efficiency justifications will not always be 
universally agreed upon, this problem is not unique to intellectual property dealings. 
118 And arguably even upon application of a 'could' test if the court applies the test in the same manner 
as a 'would' test. 
119 Above, 5.5.3.2. 
120 To reiterate the third principle espoused by Gallini and Trebilcock with regard to the relationship 
between intellectual property and competition dealings: 
[Principle 3] A licensing restriction should be permitted if it is not anticompetitive relative to the 
outcome that would result if the licence were proscribed; otherwise, an evaluation of the 
potential efficiency effects of the restriction on the pricing and diffusion of the intellectual 
property should be made; Nancy T Gallini and Michael J Trebilcock, 'Intellectual Property 
Rights and Competition Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Economic and Legal Issues' in 
Robert D Anderson and Nancy T Gallini, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in 
the Knowledge-Based Economy (1998) 17, 22. 
This principle has not gained universal acceptance, but does highlight that efficiency plays an 
important role in determining the legality of a particular licensing transaction. 
121 Lawson, above n18, 125-127. 
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Every s 46 case invoking arguments relating to economic efficiency must involve a 
qualitative assessmenem 
Hanks and Williams propose four possible reasons that may be advanced for a refusal 
to supply goods pursuant to s 46:' 23 
• the corporation is not maximizing profit, or acting rationally; 
• the refusal promotes efficiency; 
• the corporation refusing access has market power; or 
• pressure to refuse supply is exerted from certain downstream buyers. 
Hanks and Williams argue that the third reason is the only basis for a successful s 46 
action, and corporations will generally promote efficiency considerations to defend a 
s 46 action. 124 Indeed, the effect of Queensland Wire and subsequent cases is to 
compel the advancement of efficiency considerations. Nevertheless, there may be 
circumstances in which the evidence is not conducive to the fact that conduct would 
have been engaged in under competitive conditions. lz 
There may be a broad range of reasons for intellectual property holders refusing to 
license their rights. It has been suggested that refusing to licence is often a strategy 
engaged in by new entrants to existing markets seeking to consolidate their position in 
that market. 126 In the case of patents, simply wishing to retain exclusive use of 
technology would certainly be considered to be an efficiency consideration sufficient 
to justify a refusal to license if exclusive use provides the best method of profit 
maximisation. 127 This is likely to be a frequently pleaded justification for a refusal to 
122 See also US Licensing Guidelines, above n42, § 4.2. 
123 Hanks and Williams, above n25, 445-446. It is submitted that the same analysis can be applied to 
refusals to license intellectual property. 
124 Ibid, 446. 
125 O'Bryan suggests that where supply to an existing licensee is discontinued, or licence terms made 
more onerous, an intellectual property holder will have more difficulty in proving their conduct is 
efficient: Michael O'Bryan, 'Refusal to License Intellectual Property Under the Australian Trade 
Practices Act' (1992) May Patent World, 10, 12-13. 
126 Adams and McLennan, above n80, 15. 
127 See also, O'Bryan, Refusal to License, above n125, 10-11. More generally, Korah advocates the 
acceptance by courts of a reduction in incentive to make the original investment as a justification for a 
refusal to supply, even where it can be established that supply would have taken place in a competitive 
market; Valentine Korah, 'Access to Essential Facilities Under the Commerce Act in the Light of 
Experience in Australia, the European Union and The United States' (2000) 31 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 231, 239, 252-253. 
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license. 128 Similarly, given that many licensees seek exclusive licensing arrangements, 
such an arrangement might be the optimal method of value realisation for a patent 
holder. Refusing to license parties except those involved in existing vertical 
relationships with the patent holder may also in some circumstances constitute valid 
efficiency considerations, particularly where those arrangements are long-standing or 
serve to efficiently disseminate the technology.' 29 If efficiency justifications provide 
some off-setting benefit to consumers (or more likely in the case of medical 
biotechnology, to downstream users), conduct that may, on the face of it, be anti-
competitive, may well be tolerated. 
Van MeIle points out that even holders of intellectual property in competitive markets 
may refuse to license those rights simply out of a desire to maintain exclusivity. m He 
posits that the 'take advantage' test propounded in Queensland Wire is too narrow to 
allow a finding that a refusal to license contravenes s 46, because the test does not 
allow consideration of whether conduct is capable of being engaged in by all firms, 
even those in a competitive market.'" In this respect, particular conduct will be anti-
competitive only when engaged in by a firm with market power, even though it is 
capable of being engaged in by any firm in the market.'" In the EU, Article 82 
contains no such constraints,'" and provided the elements of dominance, abuse and an 
effect on trade between member states can be made out, Article 82 will be satisfied. 
Thus, Article 82 is more likely to be successfully invoked to condemn a refusal to 
license. 
Thus, van MeIle expresses concern that the 'take advantage' test was ameliorated as a 
result of Queensland Wire in respect of issues associated with refusals to license 
128 Indeed, the empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 4 demonstrated that in a number of cases where 
refusals to license were reported, an exclusive licensing arrangement was the reason for the refusal; see 
generally above 4.4.3. 
129 See also the obiter comments in Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (2000) 
ATPR 41-752 (French J), and on appeal Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbuty Port Authority 
(2000) ATPR 41-783 (Burchett, Carr and Healy JJ). 
130 Van Melle, above n56, 28, 30. 
131 'bid, 28-31. 
132 Ibid, 28-31. 
133 'bid, 30. Van Melle points to comments made by the Advocate-General in Radio Telefis Eireann 
and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER 
(EC) 416, that 'Many forms of commercial conduct will ... only affect the proper functioning of the 
common market insofar as they are engaged in by undertakings in a dominant position. In other words 
a number of circumstances may only be of significance if the right is being exercised by a dominant 
undertaking.'; at 30 citing Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC 
Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416, [52] (Advocate-General). 
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intellectual property."4 Since the decision in Melway, it is submitted that van MeIle's 
concerns in relation to the Queensland Wire test have proved to be unfounded. The 
test as enunciated in Melway requires consideration of whether the conduct in 
question would have been engaged in under workably competitive conditions. 
Because this hypothetical enquiry allows consideration of efficiency motives for 
particular conduct, it effectively broadens the Queensland Wire test. 
A 'would' test requires consideration of whether the conduct would have been likely 
to be engaged in had the corporation lacked market power by asking whether market 
power materially facilitated the conduct. In other words, it acknowledges that conduct 
may be lawful when engaged in by a firm without market power, but will become 
unlawful upon the acquisition of market power." 5 Of course, adherence to this 
approach depends on the application of a 'would' test in favour of the 'could' 
approach, and it is not clear which approach is likely to be adopted. In narrowing the 
test to be applied under the 'take advantage' element, Rural Press has potentially 
limited the circumstances in which s 46 is likely to apply to refusals to license 
intellectual property. 
A would approach would align s 46 more closely with Article 82, although the 
application of Article 82 generally proceeds in a more general fashion, with less 
emphasis on individual elements than is evident in s 46 jurisprudence."' Section 46 is 
not as broadly drafted as Article 82, and it should not be expected that they would 
yield the same results. It has been suggested that Article 82 will be successfully 
invoked only rarely where a refusal to license a medical biotechnology patent in a 
primary market has occurred, but case law in respect of that provision certainly paves 
the way for the application of Article 82 in circumstances where downstream research 
is negatively affected, or where patents are obtained for the purpose of preventing 
research by others."' 
134 Ibid, 31-32. 
135 Indeed, the basis of the High Court majority's reasoning in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert 
Hicks Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 (following Heerey J) was that Melway adopted its distributorship 
system before it had attained a position of market power; Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks 
Ply Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 26-27 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
136 As acknowledged by the majority in Melway with reference to Article 82, 'the (European) 
legislation is different'; Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 29 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). The majority did not elaborate on this comment, but 
generally differentiated Article 82 and s 46; Melway Publishing Ply Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 
205 CLR 1, 28-29 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
137 See the discussion above 7.3.4; and see below, 8.3.4.1. 
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Accordingly, it is submitted that where patents are obtained purely for defensive 
purposes, or to preclude research by others, there would be no justification available 
and refusing to license a patent should constitute a taking advantage of market power. 
In this case, there is a strong argument that the patent holder is seeking to expand the 
scope of the privilege, because the patent may be used to prevent various research 
applications from being undertaken. This is arguably the only circumstance in which a 
refusal to license a patent in a primary market would fall within limb [2](i) of the 
proposed framework, 138 because it is the only circumstance in which there is unlikely 
to be a clearly identifiable efficiency justification for the refusal to license. 139 
Although the empirical evidence suggests that patents that are not useful to a patent 
holder are frequently licensed, there were reported instances where suites of patents 
were obtained to close off areas of research. m In this case, it is difficult to see how 
efficiency forms the basis of the conduct, given that patents may be held that are not 
exploited. This conduct should be capable of constituting a taking advantage of 
market power, particularly where this has the result of closing off a downstream 
market not currently being exploited.m However, competition in the market in which 
the patent holder operates may also be stifled if a potential competitor attempts to gain 
access to a patent needed to conduct research in that primary market. While it is 
conceded that it would be difficult to establish that a patent holder did not intend 
exploiting patents, evidence of non-exploitation over a period of time would be a 
relevant consideration in this case. 
83.4 'TAKING ADVANTAGE' OF DOVVNSTREAM MARKETS 
This section explores the manner in which the 'taking advantage' element contained 
in s 46 is likely to be interpreted if applied to refusals to license medical 
biotechnology patents. The focus of the section is on efficiency justifications for this 
conduct. 
138 That a patent holder is seeking to expand the scope of the intellectual property. 
139 Again, this submission is made on the basis that a 'would' approach will prevail, but this may not be 
the case on the basis of current authority. 
14° Above, 4.4.4. 
141 A related issue arose in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC 
Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416. In Magill, a potential licensee was 
precluded from exploiting a downstream market for which there was consumer demand, and this was 
held to be a contravention of Article 82. See further above, 7.3.1.2. 
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8.3.4.1 DOWNSTREAM MARKETS AND EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS 
Van MeIle suggests that there can be no efficiency justification for refusing to license 
a competitor in a discrete, secondary market other than the maintenance of marketing 
and distribution arrangements, and that efficiency arguments relating to marketing 
and distribution will justify a refusal to license very rarely. 142 Van MeIle places 
emphasis on whether a market is a 'derivative' market and comprises a discrete 
secondary market. 143 In contrast, a secondary market may not constitute a market in 
itself, but may be subsumed into a primary market. An example would be an after-
market for spare parts. 144 In biotechnology, an improvement patent may be subsumed 
into a primary market while a new application may fall within a discrete market. An 
improvement may consist, for example of a method of delivery patent such as a new 
manner of administering a drug. 
A market may be discrete, but intellectual property will nonetheless be a crucial input 
into products produced in those markets. The basis of van Melle's assertion is that 
Chicago-school economics dictates that there can be only one monopoly profit in a 
given chain of production. m In this case, while it may be open to a patent holder to 
compete in a derivative market, it will not usually increase the patent holder's profits. 
If a competitor in the downstream market has production efficiency at least equal to 
that of the patent holder, the patent holder's profits will rarely increase as a result of 
entering the downstream market. 146 
In medical biotechnology, many small, niche companies do license their patents to 
downstream users, and are usually engaged in a discrete area of research. However, 
many licences involving potentially non-rivalrous technologies are exclusive, thus 
precluding the use of patented technology by others. Moreover, a considerable 
number of companies have diversified or vertically integrated, and these companies 
will frequently use their patents as barriers to entry into downstream markets. In these 
142 Although van Melle considers this issue in the context of the purpose element; see van Melle, above 
n56, especially 32-35. 
143 As pointed out above, van Melle defines discrete secondary markets as `derivative'markets; above, 
n57. 
144 See above, 8.2.1.2(iv). 
145 Note that a number of US studies have shown that there will always be an incentive for firms to 
exercise market power and charge supracompetitive prices in their proprietary aftermarkets; see, 
especially, Severin Borenstein, Jeffrey K MacKie-Mason and Janet S Netz, 'Exercising Market Power 
in Proprietary Aftermarkets' (2000) 9(2) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 157. Thus, 
there will be an economic incentive to charge monopoly rents in cases involving after-markets, even 
under competitive conditions in the primary market. 
146 Van Melle, above n56, 32-33. 
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circumstances, the ability to foreclose competition in those downstream markets will 
serve to maximise the profits of patent holders and exclusive licensees. 
It follows, therefore, that the conclusion reached by van Melle is correct and very 
relevant to medical biotechnology. However, evidence for this conclusion can be 
gleaned from a broader economic base. The problem stems from the cumulative 
nature of research in industries such as biotechnology. Studies have highlighted the 
difficulties inherent in the division of profits between initial and follow-on 
innovators."' As discussed in Chapter 3, the spill-over from initial inventions makes it 
unlikely that either initial innovators or follow-on innovators will be able to recover 
the entire social surplus from their inventions.' 8 A number of commentators have 
advocated the grant of broad patents to initial inventors on the assumption that the 
surplus profits from the initial patented invention can be redistributed through ex ante 
licensing agreements.' 49 
It was pointed out during this discussion, however, that it is not always the case that 
rational bargaining will take place. m In medical biotechnology, licensing negotiations 
are frequently conducted ex post, or after patent protection has been obtained. m 
Impediments to successful bargaining both generally and in relation to medical 
biotechnology were also identified in Chapter 3• 152 It cannot be presumed that 
upstream patent holders will behave in a rational manner with regard to licensing in 
downstream, specifically discrete markets. Where an upstream patent is necessary for 
research in a downstream market, there must be a mechanism to ensure that the 
follow-on inventor is equipped to recover an adequate social surplus to render the 
follow-on invention worthwhile. Competition law provides such a mechanism. 
This thesis proposes that s 46 should operate to ensure that inventors in discrete, 
downstream markets that require the input of upstream patents, have access to those 
patents. In other words, a refusal to license in a downstream market should be capable 
of constituting a taking advantage of market power. This is necessary to ensure that 
follow-on inventors are guaranteed an adequate social surplus, and thus have an 
incentive to innovate. Section 46 should operate where rational licensing 
142 See the discussion above, 3.3.1. 
148 Above, 3.3.1. 
149 Above, 3.3.2. 
15° Above, 3.3.3, 3.3.4.3. 
151 Above, 3.3.4.3. 
152 Above, 3.3.4.4, 3.3.4.5. 
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arrangements are for some reason not entered into, because in most cases there will be 
no other efficiency basis for refusing to license a firm in a downstream market. 
This is particularly important where the patent holder has no intention of exploiting 
the downstream market, but is attempting to reserve that market for themselves. An 
important consideration should be whether the patent holder has the resources to 
move into a downstream market, or whether to do so would constitute an inefficient 
use of resources. In this case, there may be little evidence that the patent holder has 
the ability to exploit downstream markets, and this evidence would point directly to a 
finding that the conduct would not have been engaged in under competitive 
conditions. This would mirror the position in the EU, where a refusal to license that 
inhibits competition in a downstream market will, subject to the cumulative 
preconditions laid down in EU case law, contravene Article 82.' 53 
It is not clear exactly what the position in the US is because the issue has not been 
addressed by US courts. The cases discussed in Chapter 7 involved allegations of 
monopolisation of markets for service, that is, after-markets. 154 In other words, a 
Magill type scenario, where a discrete, downstream market is monopolised in addition 
to a primary market, has never required consideration in the US. The case of Data 
General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support 
Corporation155 is instructive. The presumption established in that case arguably leaves 
room for such a situation to contravene s 2, in that efficiency justifications may 
constitute a 'presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to 
consumers' •156  It may also be consistent with the framework advocated in this thesis, 
although it is difficult to state that this is the case in the absence of specific case law. 
153 Above, 7.3.3. 
154 Above, 7.2.1.2. 
155 Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1'1 Cir 1994), 
1187. See also above, 7.2.1.2(4 
156 Note, van MeIle asserts that the computer software that was the subject of the refusal to license in 
Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support Corporation 
761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1 51 Cir 1994), 
operated in the primary market for computer repair given that that was the purpose for its development. 
Thus, although the case did not involve an after-market as such, it also did not involve a true derivative 
market. The software was not necessary in order to compete in the market for repair; van Melle, above 
n56, 20. In this case, the holding would allow a finding that s 2 has been breached in a single market 
situation provided the presumption of validity is not rebutted by evidence. Note also the consideration 
of subjective intent as a valid business justification in Image Technical Services Inc and Others v 
Eastman Kodak Co 125 F 3d 1195 (9` 11 Cir 1997), cert denied, 523 US 1094 (1998). This is the main 
basis on which the decision has been criticised. 
377 
Chapter 8 
The case of Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation (Intergraph) 157 should, 
however, be noted. In this case, it will be recalled that the Federal Circuit specified 
that a refusal to license will only be in breach of s 2 where that refusal is directed 
against competition. In this respect, this holding may be contrary to the rule laid down 
in EU jurisprudence, and the stifling of the development of a new product in a 
downstream market would be unlikely to breach s 2. It would not allow success in an 
action brought under limb [2] of the proposed framework, although success under 
limb [3] would not be precluded given the requirement for competition between the 
patent holder and potential licensee. 158 
Again, however, it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on the applicability of 
this decision, because the case involved an after-market rather than a separate 
downstream market. Similarly, its precedential value is unclear because of the 
inconsistency in approaches taken by various US courts. The specific terms of s 2 
should also be considered. Section 2 is limited in its scope and requires 
monopolisation. Article 82 and s 46 are arguably more specific in allowing a 
contravention in a separate market. 
To conclude, it is argued that the assertion by van MeIle that there is unlikely to be an 
efficiency justification for a refusal to license into a discrete or derivative market is 
correct. The exception, as van MeIle points out, may be where there is an efficiency 
justification based on marketing or distribution. Where exclusive licensing 
arrangements are entered into, this could not be an appropriate efficiency justification. 
It could also be envisaged as being a successfully pleaded justification where the 
patented technology is relatively downstream technology in any event. In medical 
biotechnology, many inventions are upstream, and few inventions have reached the 
stage of being useful 'consumer' products. In this case, claims by patent holders that 
they are protecting the marketing of their product by restricting the number of 
licensees, should not ground a justification for a refusal to license. The nature of the 
downstream market is also important. Where the patented technology is important for 
more than one downstream use (as are many genetic technologies) that may ultimately 
compete (category two technology), this should be a relevant consideration as to 
whether there has been a taking advantage of market power. 
157 Intergraph Corporation v Intel Corporation 195 F 3d 1346 (Fed Cir 1999). 
158 Although the status of this decision is open to question following the decision of the US Supreme 
Court in Holmes Group Inc v Vomado Air Circulation Systems Inc 122 S Cr 1889 (2002). See above, 
7.2.1.2(v). 
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8.3.4.2 CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE PATENT HOLDER OPERATES IN THE 
DOWNSTREAM MARKET 
A patent holder or a licensee may exploit one discrete, downstream market. This 
should not preclude a finding that there has been a taking advantage of market power 
where a license is refused to a licensee who wishes to exploit another discrete market. 
This raises complex issues, and would require consideration of a number of 
competing efficiency considerations. It really highlights the importance of the terms 
under which contractual arrangements are entered into when the full potential of 
technology is not yet known. Economic rationality should not always be assumed; 
while many patent holders will act in an economically rational manner, in some 
instances they will not, with the result that a refusal to license may occur for reasons 
unconnected with profit maximisation or cost minimisation. On the basis of this, 
however, there would be no breach of s 46 in relation to the example of Chiron and 
Murex if there was a legitimate efficiency consideration for Chiron's decision to 
exclusively license their technology and refuse to license Murex. 159 
This is particularly important where an invention constitutes a new application rather 
than an improvement. It was submitted in Chapter 3 that this is very likely to be the 
case in an industry such as medical biotechnology. 16° Further, the broad potential of 
many biotechnology applications is unknown at the time that initial inventions are 
patented. The nature of medical biotechnology research makes this industry 
- particularly susceptible to breakdowns in bargaining that could lead to new, and 
socially beneficial research. As such, it provides a useful example of how patents may 
be used in a manner that hinders the development of new products. Section 46 should 
be available as a 'backstop' to ensure that these detrimental effects are able to be 
addressed. 
Where the patent holder would compete in a particular downstream market with a 
potential licensee, the situation becomes more problematic. It may in some instances 
be difficult to conceive of efficiency justifications on which such a refusal to license 
could be based. In the context of refusals to supply tangible property, Queensland 
Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltdmi provides an analogous factual 
scenario in that BHP's subsidiary was operating in the downstream market alongside 
their would-be competitor. However, courts might be reluctant to condemn a refusal 
159 This is an example of an instance in which it might be argued that successful marketing and 
distribution are predicated on limiting competition in the downstream market. 
160 Above, 3.3.4.4. 
161 Queensland Wire Industries Ply Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177. 
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to license where a downstream or derivative market is being positively exploited, 
even if that exploitation is by the patent holder or an exclusive licensee. 162 
It was on this basis that the Court of First Instance (CFI) in IMS Health Inc v EC 
Commission i63 questioned whether exceptional circumstances existed that would 
justify the grant of a compulsory licence. Indeed, a refusal to license would not 
contravene Article 82 if the patent holder competed with the potential licensee. In 
contrast, the decision of the US decision of Intergraph, leaves room for a 
contravention of s 2 of the Sherman Act in an instance such as this. 164 Under s 46, it 
may come down to a question of whether patent protection extended to the separate 
market, and whether the ACCC or a court wished to promote competition in a 
particular market. 165 
Reference was made in Chapter 1 to conflicting studies that question whether there 
can be said to be an optimal level of competition within an industry. There is a school 
of thought that advocates competition within industries as a way of maximising 
allocative and productive efficiency outcomes, particularly in vertically integrated 
industries. 166 Following this line of argument, the ability to foreclose and monopolise 
research avenues in an industry such as medical biotechnology should be curtailed 
where there are no apparent or logical efficiency outcomes. 
83.5 CONCLUSION — THE 'TAKE ADVANTAGE' ELEMENT 
To conclude, there may be many efficiency reasons for a refusal to license that mean 
the taking advantage element will not be made out. The difficulty lies in predicting 
specifically what efficiency considerations are likely to excuse a refusal to license. On 
the basis of the empirical evidence, possibly the main instance in which the taking 
advantage will be made out is where a potential licensee wishes to exploit a 
downstream market that is not currently being exploited by the patent holder or by a 
licensee. 167 
162 See also Tucker, above n7, 86. 
163 IMS Health Inc v EC Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 2 (Order dated 26 October 2001) [101-105]. 
164 See above n157 and accompanying text. 
165 Van Melle asserts that another reason why it may be desirable to promote competition in derivative 
markets, is that it would increase the 'transparency of pricing' in those markets, particularly where the 
intellectual property is of doubtful scope and may not legitimately extend into the derivative market; 
van MeIle, above n56, 33. 
166 See above 1.8.2.2. See also ibid, 33-34. 
167 See also Adams and McLennan, above n80, 16-17; Stephen G Corones, 'Intellectual and Industrial 
Property — Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law: The Magill TV Guide Case' 
(1992) 20(3)Australian Business Law Review 265, 269. 
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An existing licensing arrangement or a desire to preserve market opportunities may 
form the basis for a refusal in this case, and it submitted that this should support a 
finding that market power has been taken advantage of where there are no substitutes 
for the requisite intellectual property. Similarly, reductions in transaction costs may 
justify the maintenance of an existing vertical arrangement. It is difficult, however, to 
predict whether such a finding is likely to be made, as there may be conflicting 
considerations a court will need to weigh up. It is likely that most courts would be 
reluctant to make a finding that a refusal to license constitutes a taking advantage of 
market power contrary to s 46 except in the most extreme cases. 
However, courts should be willing to find that a refusal to license into a discrete, 
downstream market should be capable of constituting a taking advantage of market 
power, because there are likely to be few plausible efficiency considerations in such a 
case. This is the case whether or not the patent holder is exploiting the downstream 
market, although clearly a refusal to license in the absence of exploitation by either 
the patent holder or an exclusive licensee would make it easier to prove an absence of 
an appropriate efficiency justification. Nevertheless, the operation by a patent holder 
in a derivative market should not preclude examination under s 46, given that the 
operation of the take advantage test hinges on the existence of efficiency 
justifications. Because it will be difficult to find efficiency justifications in this 
instance, s 46 should be capable of application. 
The preceding discussion is contingent upon the application of a 'would' test in 
relation to the 'take advantage' element! 68 If a 'could' test were employed, the 
opportunity to examine efficiency considerations would be removed. The application 
of a 'could' test in relation to the 'take advantage' element would never yield a 
finding that the monopolisation of a discrete, downstream, market by refusing to 
license patents necessary for innovation in that downstream market, satisfied this 
element. It is not clear, however, whether the High Court in Rural Press intended to 
apply a strict 'could' approach. Certainly Melway was never authority for this 
approach. 169 Consequently, scope may remain for application of a 'would' approach. 
8.4 ESTABLISHING THE PURPOSE ELEMENT 
If all the other elements of s 46 can be established, there remains the difficulty of 
establishing that a refusal to license was for a proscribed purpose. As discussed 
168 Above, 6.4.1. 
169 Above, 6.4.1. 
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above, all of these purposes focus on damage to competitors, potential competitors or 
persons attempting to engage in competitive conduct. It will often be difficult to 
ascertain whether a party is attempting to do damage to a rival, or simply engaging in 
competitive conduct. On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is only in rare 
circumstances that a contravention of s 46 will be found where a licence to a party in 
a straightforward competitive relationship is refused.' 7° It is more likely that a 
contravention will be established where access to the patented technology is necessary 
for the development of a new technology. That is, s 46(1)(b) is the sub-section most 
likely to be invoked. 
It will be recalled that Marshall, quite reasonably, has suggested that justifications that 
will be relevant in respect of the purpose element, fall into the category of quality 
control/consumer welfare' and/or 'reputation/bottom line considerations.'" Certain 
justifications have been contemplated in the case of intellectual property, such as 
previous unsatisfactory dealings,'" the prevention of free-riding,'" and a desire to 
maintain the integrity of a licensing system."4 Similarly, the maintenance of good 
credit arrangements may justify a refusal to license where licence fees remain 
unpaid.'" 
Of these justifications, the most likely to be pleaded is probably the prevention of 
free-riding. It is submitted that this could certainly be considered to be a justification 
under the take advantage element, given that it is based on a desire to recoup 
investment costs. It could also be contemplated as a justification pursuant to the 
purpose element given that it has as another its bases, consumer welfare and quality 
control. Note that Tucker considers that the free-rider exemption can only constitute a 
valid basis for a refusal to license in a single market situation." 6 That is, where 
competitors are denied access, there is little doubt that this is the motive for the 
refusal to license.'77 There is, however, likely to be an anti-competitive motive for a 
170 As Tucker points out, where parties are competitors in a primary market, it will be difficult to 
establish a s 46 purpose; Tucker, above n7, 85. 
171 See above, 6.5.1. 
172 Brenda Marshall, 'The Resolution of Access Disputes Under Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act' 
(2003) 22(1) University of Tasmania Law Review 9, 41. 
173 Ibid. 40, citing ACCC v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442 (Hill J). At first 
instance, Hill J was prepared, had there been sufficient evidence, to consider the prevention of free-
riding as a justification in respect of the 'take advantage' and 'purpose' elements. 
174 Australian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Ceridale Ply Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-074. 
175 Australian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Ceridale Ply Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-074. 
176 Tucker, above n7, 85-86. 
177 Ibid. 
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refusal to license in a situation where a downstream user of the technology is denied 
access, and the refusal could not be justified on the basis of protection of investment 
costs or consumer welfare considerations. 
In the case of patents, a useful example to consider is that of Myriad Genetics' patents 
over the BRCA1 gene, which prevented parties other than Myriad from undertaking 
diagnostic testing. m Consider the situation in relation to purpose if an action were to 
be brought under s 46. Evidence suggesting that Myriad's actions have been prompted 
by a desire to maintain the quality of testing procedures would negate any finding of 
purpose under s 46. On the other hand, evidence suggesting that superior testing 
procedures may be developed by other parties may result in the purpose element 
being made out. Similarly, if proceedings had been brought by Chiron against Murex 
in Australia, concern about the quality of test kits produced by a party other than 
Chiron's exclusive licensees would probably justify a refusal to license and mean that 
no anti-competitive purpose under s 46 could be made out. 
The purpose element provides a distinct requirement to be proved by a complainant. It 
effectively provides another line of defence for a patent holder, and in this respect, 
makes s 46 even more inaccessible to plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the problems brought 
about by certain US cases may be avoided. The creation of presumptions, rebuttable 
or otherwise, to a certain extent precludes fact-based analysis and flexibility in 
judicial decision-making. 179 For example, the framework established in Chapter 5 
would be incapable of application under the approach laid down in Xerox. 18° In 
contrast, Article 82 gives courts very broad scope to examine the implications of 
certain conduct alleged to be anti-competitive. In particular, courts are not limited to 
the examples of abuse listed in Article 82. 
The current absence of definitive rules in Australia should be seen as a positive factor, 
because it enables the consideration of individual cases on their merits. As such, 
courts in Australia may be willing to find the purpose element made out in the case of 
refusals to license intellectual property where it is open to infer that an anti-
competitive purpose was a substantial purpose for the conduct. 
178 See Appendix 2. 
179 Although a rebuttable presumption would allow business or efficiency justifications to be taken into 
account; see eg, Data General Corporation and Data General Service Inc v Grumman Systems Support 
Corporation 761 F Supp 185, 191-192 (D Mass 1991), aff'd in part and remanded, 36 F 3d 1147 (1 st 
Cir 1994). 
180 In contrast, Article 82 gives courts very broad scope to examine the implications of certain conduct 
alleged to be anti-competitive. In particular, courts are not limited to the examples of abuse listed in 
Article 82. 
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8.5 CONCLUSION 
There are two main reasons why refusing to license a patent will not often constitute a 
taking advantage of market power. First, there will be few cases in which a patent will 
confer market power. Second, whether or not the refusal would have occurred in a 
competitive market will be determinative of whether the taking advantage element 
will be made out. This is in accord with the analysis of Hanks and Williams, who 
stress that these factors will mean that refusals to license patents will seldom 
contravene s 46. 181 They suggest a low level of competitiveness will be a sufficient 
measure against which to evaluate the defendant's conduct. 182 
As to the market power element, it is correct that findings of market power in cases 
involving refusals to license patents will be relatively rare. Following recent judicial 
determinations in which narrow markets have been found, however, it is possible to 
conceive of circumstances in which narrow market definition will be employed in 
relation to medical biotechnology patents, making it more likely that market power 
will be found to exist. Nevertheless, recent judicial determinations have meant the 
threshold for establishing market power has been raised, making it very difficult to 
establish that a patent holder possesses market power. 
The taking advantage element has been the subject of extensive discussion since 
Hanks and Williams' analysis. It is no longer clear exactly what interpretation future 
courts will place on the phrase, or whether a 'would' or 'could' test is likely to be 
employed. If a 'would' test is applied, efficiency considerations based on the likely 
behaviour of the patent holder in a competitive market will be the benchmark against 
which to measure the behaviour of the patent holder. On the other hand, a test of 
commercial possibility may be applied in the event that a 'could' test is used. Strict 
application of this test would mean that a refusal to license will never contravene s 46. 
Much rests on this distinction, and it is imperative that the test be clarified as soon as 
possible. 
Regardless of the test employed, Hanks and Williams are correct in their conclusion 
that `Nefusals to license are common in competitive industries; and so do not 
181 Hanks and Williams, above n25, 457. Cf Henry Ergas, 'Treatment of Unilateral Refusals to License 
and Compulsory Licensing in Australia' (Paper Presented to the Federal Trade 
Commission/Department of Justice Hearings on Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in 
the Knowledge-Based Economy, Washington, 22 May 2002), 7-10. 
182 Hanks and Williams, above n25, 457 citing Tru Tone Ltd v Ors v Festival Records Retail Marketing 
Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 352 where the High Court of New Zealand found the market to be competitive 
even though exclusive licensing arrangements had been entered into. 
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necessarily constitute a 'taking advantage'!" Arguably, however, a higher level of 
competitiveness may be appropriate in the case of certain medical biotechnology 
patents, because of the lack of substitutability of many research tools and other 
patented biotechnology inventions. The availability of many research opportunities is 
not likely to be a situation that will continue indefmitely. Many downstream market 
participants are affected in some way by refusals to license. It may be only a matter of 
time before the implications of refusals to license are far graver, as research fields are 
narrowed and opportunities available to downstream companies decrease. Further, a 
distinction should be drawn between access to patents for use in the primary market, 
and access for use in downstream markets where a patent is necessary in order to 
further innovation in those downstream markets. 
There are probably few circumstances in which a patent holder should be penalised 
for a refusal to license a patent by compelling access, even in a cumulative industry 
such as medical biotechnology where follow-on research hinges on the availability of 
upstream patents. Nevertheless, there are likely to be some circumstances where it 
would be appropriate to require access, particularly where research is precluded in a 
downstream market that is not currently being exploited. This is likely to be the 
scenario that would invoke a decision in favour of the party seeking access in the EU, 
although it is difficult to state what US courts would decide in this instance as the 
issue has not required consideration. 
As currently interpreted, it is unlikely that s 46 would allow access even in these 
circumstances. If the market power issue can be overcome, it is submitted that the 
application of a 'would' approach may bring Australian law in line with EU law. The 
framework advocated in this thesis is somewhat broader than the EU position. This is 
because the third limb of the proposed framework would permit a finding that there 
has been a contravention of s 46 where the upstream patent holder operates in the 
downstream market, whether in competition with the would-be licensee or not. The 
decision in /MS v Commission specifically precludes such a finding under Article 82. 
At present, it is submitted that an Australian court would be unlikely to make a 
finding that s 46 has been contravened even in a Magill type situation. Under current 
interpretations of s 46, refusals to license are unlikely to be rendered invalid in any 
circumstance, even under the second and third limbs of the proposed framework. In 
this sense, the outcome of Xerox is the outcome most likely to be reached by 
Australian courts. Although there may be sound reasons for condemning a refusal to 
183  Ibid, 457. 
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license in some situations, the individual elements of s 46 now present formidable 
hurdles to overcome. In some respects, essential facilities type analysis would 
probably be applied to allegations of refusals to license. 
The concluding chapter considers the policy implications of this analysis, and 
considers the empirical evidence obtained in relation to the medical biotechnology 
industry. The questions it seeks to address are whether this evidence suggests that 
legal recourse is likely to be necessary for participants in the industry, and whether 
such recourse will be available under s 46. Accordingly, it considers whether any 
policy response is necessary to remedy breakdown in the form of refusals to license 
within the industry. 
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9.1 OVERVIEW 
This thesis has considered the interaction of intellectual property and competition law 
in the context of refusals to license medical biotechnology patents. Innovation is a key 
theme that runs throughout this analysis. This theme is intricately linked to the 
justifications for the patents system. High levels of innovation are desirable, 
particularly in an industry such as medical biotechnology because the development of 
new and improved products will benefit consumers. Intellectual property protection 
necessarily results in concentrated market structures, but there are important questions 
as to the role of competition in encouraging innovation. The presence of dual systems 
of intellectual property and competition law for promoting innovation leads to 
difficult questions as to whether innovation is best served by concentrated or 
competitive market structures. This sets the scene for debate over the correct 
parameters for intellectual property and competition law, and their respective roles in 
enhancing the innovative process. 
This is a difficult issue in an industry such as medical biotechnology, which can be 
characterised as high-technology and dynamic. The Australian government, like 
governments in other western countries, has endeavoured to retain and advance this 
dynamic element. An aspect of this push has been a motivation to commercialise 
upstream and downstream biomedical inventions through intellectual property 
protection. Both the public and private sectors are heavily focused on protecting 
innovative output through patent protection. Intellectual property protection is 
arguably necessary to stimulate research productivity and attract investment funding. 
At the same time, an industry with characteristics such as those possessed by medical 
biotechnology appears to have specific preconditions for restricted access to patented 
inventions necessary to engage in future generations of research and development. 
The first three chapters provided a foundation for the analysis undertaken in the 
remainder of the thesis. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 examined the presence of these factors in 
biomedical research, and analysed whether these conditions exist in Australian 
biomedical research. This investigation was undertaken by applying overseas 
literature in the context of the Australian medical biotechnology industry, and 
considering the specific characteristics of the Australian industry. 
A number of foundational empirical studies have been conducted in overseas 
jurisdictions that have assessed whether these concerns are borne out in practice. An 
important component of this thesis is an empirical study that sought to adduce 
evidence as to whether contractual breakdowns are being experienced in medical 
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biotechnology in Australia. Chapter 4 presented and evaluated the results of this 
study. Specifically, this chapter assessed whether access to patents is being refused, 
and whether associated licensing practices are resulting in difficulties in conducting 
follow-on research within the Australian biomedical research environment. This 
evidence was metered against the results of overseas studies in order to gauge the 
effects of restrictive licensing practices within the Australian industry, and provide a 
comparative basis on which to evaluate the preponderance of refusals to license in 
Australian medical biotechnology. 
This thesis then considered the role of competition law in compelling licensing where 
licences to necessary upstream patents are refused, and how effective Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA) mechanisms will be in regulating refusals to license patents. 
Chapter 5 considered the role of competition law in promoting innovation and the 
scope for the application of competition law to dealings in intellectual property. It 
concluded by considering this issue in relation to the specific situation of refusals to 
license patents, and laying down a flexible framework to be applied in considering 
this issue from a regulatory perspective. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 analysed the existing law and its limitations. This analysis drew 
on recent jurisprudence in relation to s 46, and some comparative case-law that would 
be relied on by Australian courts in the event that this issue required consideration. 
Chapter 6 gave detailed consideration to s 46 of the TPA, and current judicial 
interpretations of the section. Chapter 7 provided a critical examination of United 
States (US) and European Union (EU) case law, and the relevance of this body of 
jurisprudence to refusals to license patents in medical biotechnology. Chapter 8 
consolidated these analyses, and considered how s 46 is likely to be interpreted in the 
event of an allegation that a refusal to license a patent is anti-competitive. It 
considered whether s 46, as currently interpreted, is likely to be applied in accordance 
with the framework established in Chapter 5, and the significance of the judicial 
principles discussed in Chapter 7. 
The conclusions reached in this thesis are limited to unilateral refusals to license, as 
various restrictive licensing practices relating to patents raise unique issues that 
require individual consideration. Therefore this thesis has addressed the most 
fundamental issue at the intellectual property/competition law interface, which asks 
whether there should be limitations on the basic right of a patent holder to exclude 
others. At the same time, there are many other forms of potentially anti-competitive 
conduct involving intellectual property that are not analysed in this thesis. 
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9.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.2.1 THE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
The first three chapters of this thesis discussed the presence of a number of factors 
that mean that refusals to license in medical biotechnology are likely to have an 
impact on innovation. First, the nature of biomedical research has resulted in an 
industry structure typified by small, start-up companies that are heavily reliant on 
intellectual property protection of their research results. Vertical integration and high 
levels of concentration are increasingly evident, due primarily to the extended pre-
commercial phase of most biomedical research and intra-industry specialisation. 
Secondly, the quest to commercialise research output has resulted in massive increases 
in patent activity, diversification in industry sectors seeking to patent research results, 
and broad patent protection over many inventions with indeterminate application. 
These developments have been facilitated by uncertainty over the application of 
patent law standards to new areas of biomedical research, and the fact that patent 
holders are given the benefit of doubt during examination of patent applications. 
Finally, the need to vertically integrate and license patented inventions raises the very 
real possibility of bargaining breakdown. The presence of these preconditions has 
important implications for follow-on research. 
In this respect, this thesis has critically examined legal standards and commentary in 
relation to other jurisdictions, and applied these in the Australian context. It has 
determined that these preconditions exist to a similar extent in Australia as they do in 
overseas jurisdictions. Although a considerable amount of upstream research is 
currently conducted in Australia, there is a very real possibility that Australian 
researchers conducting intermediate and downstream research will increasingly need 
to access patented upstream products and technologies. Not only are many Australian 
patents in medical biotechnology held by non-Australians, exclusive licensing 
practices also have the potential to restrict access. As the industry progresses, more 
Australian companies are likely to find themselves engaging in downstream research. 
These issues are likely to have ongoing implications for the development of the 
industry in Australia. 
9.2.2 THE ROLE OF COMPEITTION LAW IN EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF 
REFUSALS TO LICENSE PATENTS 
The general conclusion drawn in this thesis relates to the role of intellectual property 
and competition law in enhancing the innovative process. The interaction between 
these two bodies of law is far from resolved, and this thesis has confirmed that the 
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potential for conflict becomes pronounced in the case of high technology industries 
such as medical biotechnology. It is concluded that competition law does have a role 
to play in promoting innovation. Adequate mechanisms should exist to ensure that the 
interests of innovation and consumer welfare are well served. In some circumstances, 
excessive concentration may harm welfare by reducing the number of potential 
innovators working in a particular area, and dampening innovative activity. Therefore, 
relying on patent law alone to advance innovation will not necessarily enhance 
welfare by maximising dynamic efficiencies. Competition law may, in some 
instances, recast the balance in favour of a follow-on innovator. In the case of refusals 
to license, it has been argued that exemption from the competition provisions is 
unwarranted. Competition law should treat intellectual property as it would any other 
form of property, bearing in mind the special characteristics of intellectual property 
such as its ease of appropriability and generally non-rivalrous nature. 
The circumstances in which competition law should intervene to restrict privileges of 
patent holders are limited. Each case should be assessed according to its facts. The 
framework for analysis presented in Chapter 5 takes this into account in laying down 
the circumstances whereas it is more likely that anti-competitive conduct forms the 
basis for a refusal to license.' The basis on which this conclusion is founded is 
efficiency considerations. Efficiency explanations will usually justify a refusal to 
license a patent in a primary market, but are less likely to do so in a discrete 
downstream market. The only instance in which an unconditional refusal to license in 
a primary market may be anti-competitive is the situation where patents are obtained 
for defensive purposes, and are not exploited by a patent holder. Again, the basis for 
this conclusion is that the conduct may not be justified by an efficiency rationale. 
Although establishing an anti-competitive purpose would be difficult in such a case, 
an action should be available. 
Above, 5.5.5. 
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Recommendation No 1 
of refusals to license intellectual property: 
contravene competition law. 
A refusal to license will however, become examinable under competition 
lay ydiere the refusal is for the purpose of (i) expanding 	L',ope of the 
„. 
inteliectual property or (ii) extending market power into 'an'other distinct. 
- 
market not covered by..-ffiointellectual property. 
[2] 
••••• 	 • 
Where a refusal becomes exaMinable under [.](ii), the refusal should be a 
evuninable whether or not the holder of the intellectual property is 
currenil ■ exploiting the separatemarket, and the reservatioll of another 
market Ihr its own (actual or potential) use should not iiLLLssanly allow it 
'to.10„reelose competition by others.  
'AceOrdingly, it is recommended that the following framework be flexibly applied, 
• 
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This would partly accord with the position under EU law.' Despite the potentially 
wide application of Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd v EC Commission, 3 subsequent case law has narrowed the circumstances in which 
a refusal to license is likely to be found to be anti-competitive. A refusal to license to 
a competitor in a downstream market would not be anti-competitive under current EU 
law. Nonetheless, a refusal to license to a participant in a discrete downstream market 
that has the effect of preventing the development of a new product will be potentially 
anti-competitive. 
While EU case law would permit a finding that a refusal to license intellectual 
property is anti-competitive under limb [2](ii), it is less clear that such a conclusion 
would be reached under US law because a number of diverging approaches have been 
favoured by various courts. Further, the US case law has been limited to consideration 
2 The framework would not be adhered to under US law if the approach in In re Independent Service 
Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed ar 
2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001) is applied. 
3 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] 4 
CMLR 718; [1995] All ER (EC) 416. See above, 7.3.1. 
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of after-markets and not truly discrete downstream markets. It is unclear which 
approach would be followed in the event that a US court were required to determine a 
matter falling within the second and/or third limbs. An antitrust immunity approach in 
line with the position in In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; 
CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox Corporation4 would be likely to preclude liability 
under the framework. The application of a rebuttable presumption, on the other hand, 
may leave scope for a finding of liability in the circumstances specified in limbs [2] 
and/or [3]. Depending on which approach future courts follow, there is potential for 
US law to be applied in a manner consistent with EU law. It is acknowledged, 
however, that US courts would probably take a more conservative approach to the 
issue of refusals to license than EU courts have traditionally taken. 
There is no authority in either jurisdiction as to whether a contravention of 
competition law would be likely in relation to a refusal to license a patent into a 
discrete downstream market however the possibility of such a finding has not been 
precluded. A finding that a refusal to license a patent falling within limb [3] is anti-
competitive would be extremely unlikely in either of these jurisdictions, even in the 
absence of a valid efficiency justification. 
9.2.3 SECTION 46 OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) AND REFUSALS TO 
LICENSE PATENTS 
There will be a number of hurdles for any plaintiff alleging that a refusal to license a 
biomedical patent is anti-competitive pursuant to s 46. The first is that it will be 
difficult to argue that a patent or group of patents constitutes a market. In particular, 
the ability of most potential licensees to source alternative research opportunities will 
often make establishing a lack of supply-side substitutability challenging. Secondly, 
even if narrow market definition is successfully argued, a patent(s) must give a patent 
holder market power. Thirdly, efficiency considerations may justify the conduct, with 
the result that the 'take advantage' element will not be made out. Finally, a plaintiff 
must establish an anti-competitive purpose for the refusal to license. 
The conclusions presented in 9.2.2 suggest that there are few circumstances in which 
a refusal to license a patent should contravene s 46. Nevertheless, a patent holder may 
engage in anti-competitive conduct where a refusal to license a patent expands the 
scope of the patent, or impacts on a downstream market. Therefore, there should be 
scope under s 46 for a contravention to be made out in these circumstances. The 
4 In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation; CSU, LLC and Others v Xerox 
Corporation 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1143 (2001). 
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primary conclusion reached in this thesis is that competition law treatment of refusals 
to license patents under the TPA is likely, at present, to be ineffectual. There are 
general problems with the manner in which s 46 has been interpreted, but these issues 
become more pronounced when considering issues associated with the exploitation of 
intellectual property. Specifically, plaintiffs attempting to make out the elements of s 
46 will encounter great difficulty, and recent s 46 jurisprudence means that the 
elements of s 46 are likely to be made out very rarely. 
The central problem lies in recent judicial interpretations of this section. The elements 
of s 46 will invariably be more difficult to establish where an alleged contravention 
involves intellectual property. However, there are some circumstances where refusals 
to license may be anti-competitive. Analysis presented in this thesis demonstrates that 
it would be difficult for a party to allege a breach of s 46 in respect of a refusal to 
license a patent. However, the high threshold imposed in respect of a number of the 
elements of s 46 would render it virtually impossible to establish that a refusal to 
license contravenes that provision, even where that refusal prevents the appearance of 
a new product in a discrete downstream market. In this respect, s 46 would probably 
be interpreted more narrowly than EU, and possibly US law. Refusals to license 
would not be dealt with in accordance with the proposed framework. 
As a general matter, deficiencies in s 46 must be addressed. As foreshadowed, these 
deficiencies relate to the market power standard and the 'take advantage' test 
contained within s 46. As a result of recent case law, the market power standard has 
arguably been set at the high level equivalent to near-monopoly by virtue of the 
requirement of an absence of competitive conditions. This is at odds with the intention 
behind amendments to the section that were intended to reduce the market power 
threshold from substantial market control, to substantial market power.' 
Uncertainty also surrounds the operation of the 'take advantage' element with the 
result that it is unclear whether satisfaction of this element rests on efficiency 
considerations or commercial possibility. Efficiency justifications form an important 
component of analysis in this thesis. That is, they will justify a refusal to license in a 
primary market in many instances. They are less likely to be present, however, where 
a refusal to license impacts on a separate, downstream market. High Court 
jurisprudence has established that the conduct of a defendant to an action under s 46 
must be examined under conditions of workable competition. It has been argued in 
5 Trade Practices Revision Act 1986 (Cth). See above, 6.3.1. 
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is unlikely to fulfil this objective. Issues associated with intellectual 
that the application of a 'could ' test under conditions of 
competition would render s 46 redundant.  
property are likely to exacerbate these shortcomings. A number of recommendations  
competition and enhancing economic efficiency. It is concluded that s 46, as currently  
a general need to ensure that s 46 fulfills its policy objective of promoting  
are made to address this issue.  
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a number of jurisdictions with established medical biotechnology industries. Studies 
based on empirical data have been carried out in the United States, and in a number of 
European countries. This work has provided a preliminary glimpse of the state of 
patent and licensing activity within the medical biotechnology industry. The 
importance of the work of international scholars in this area has been recognised in 
this thesis. 
This body of scholarship has demonstrated, with some qualifications that industry 
participants in overseas medical biotechnology markets are finding working solutions 
to issues associated with restricted access. An aim of this thesis was to apply a similar 
empirical approach in respect of the Australian industry in order to provide some 
basis for evaluating the operation of the national industry against the results of these 
pioneering studies. This work has, to date, been the only empirical study investigating 
the issue of patent licensing within medical biotechnology in Australia. A corollary 
aim was to consider the results in terms of their import for competition law policy. 
The results presented in this thesis formed a sub-set of the results obtained in the 
study, which considered restrictive licensing practices generally. 
The empirical results obtained offer some assistance in policy development. It can be 
concluded from the empirical evidence that refusals to license patents are occurring 
infrequently in practice. Where they do occur, industry participants are generally 
managing to overcome their effects by changing the direction of their research or 
avoiding particular research areas. Other licensing practices such as exclusive 
licensing and non-exploitation of patents are occurring, and are also having an impact 
on the research programs of some participants. On a tentative basis, however, it is 
possible to conclude that the Australian industry is overcoming most major 
difficulties associated with refusals to license patents. 
There are a number of caveats to be borne in mind. First, there is some limited 
evidence of refusals to license within the industry. Secondly, a considerable portion of 
the Australian industry is involved in what would be termed upstream research. As 
downstream opportunities present themselves, companies are likely to diversify into 
more downstream research. Vertical integration is also becoming more common 
within the Australian industry. These factors tend to suggest that there is potential for 
refusals to license to become a more pronounced issue for participants in the industry. 
Finally, given the factors outlined in the first three chapters of this thesis, the potential 
for bargaining breakdown in the form of refusals to license remains. Although 
refusals to license have not had a significant effect on research to date, this does not 
preclude this issue eventuating in future, and it is possible that it may become more 
prominent as the industry evolves and research opportunities diminish. Given that the 
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potential for refusals to license patents remains, there must be a means of addressing 
these issues. 
The empirical data presented in this thesis provides some useful insights into licensing 
behaviour within the Australian medical biotechnology industry. It is, however, by no 
means exhaustive, but is more likely to provide a portal for further study in this area. 
There are a number of reasons for this conclusion. 
The Changing Nature of the Industry 
This thesis outlined a number of factors that typify the environment in which the 
medical biotechnology industry operates. In particular, the structure of the industry 
has evolved from the cumulative research environment in which industry participants 
operate. The industry has been characterised largely by small companies heavily 
reliant on intellectual property protection, and a small number of large companies 
have been active in broad research areas. Research institutions are becoming more 
reliant on patenting research results. 
The medical biotechnology industry is an industry that is not static. It possesses 
characteristics typical of many dynamic, technology-driven industries in that it is 
moving rapidly and heavily focused on expanding innovative output. Given the rapid 
pace at which innovation within the industry is proceeding, there is no guarantee the 
industry will maintain its existing structure. In particular, there is increasing evidence 
of consolidation and alliance activity. Large companies are seeking to vertically 
integrate and boost their patent portfolios. Given the potential for change within the 
environment in which biomedical research is conducted, ongoing empirical work is 
required to assess the ongoing effects of biomedical patent licensing practices. If 
research areas become more cluttered and the industry continues to consolidate, 
restrictive licensing practices, such as refusals to license, have the potential to become 
more prominent. This highlights an ongoing role for empirical study in this area. 
Limitations of Current Empirical Data 
The empirical evidence presented is informative, but vigilance must be maintained in 
order to ensure that research is not impeded, and that implementation of the legislative 
regime keeps pace with developments in high-technology industries. This thesis is a 
small and modest step in that direction. The empirical data presented in this thesis 
formed a component of the data obtained in an empirical study assessing the effects of 
licensing within Australian medical biotechnology. It builds on overseas studies in the 
area, but has a number of limitations inherent in small studies. In particular, the 
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qualitative component of the study involved a relatively small sample size, and there 
was no systematic attempt to randomly select respondents. In addition, the survey 
results necessarily yielded a limited amount of data. As such, the study cannot stand 
as a definitive study, and ongoing research in the area is required to validate the 
results obtained. 
Secondly, ongoing empirical work is necessary in order to provide more detailed data. 
There are two aspects of further research that would be especially constructive. Data 
evaluating the longer-term effects of restrictive licensing practices such as refusals to 
license intellectual property, on innovation and research practice would be 
particularly useful. Longitudinal studies of licensing practices would therefore 
provide a useful basis for analysing the impact of refusals to license in a specific 
research area over time. Another matter that could be usefully explored in more depth 
is the areas in which industry participants are choosing to change research direction or 
avoid particular areas of research due to refusals to license or exclusive licensing. 
This data would be valuable given that these practices inevitably have some welfare 
effect, and would be relevant to the issues raised in this thesis. 
Inter-Industry Differences 
The studies discussed in Chapter 4 revealed a pattern consistent across the 
jurisdictions in which empirical work has been undertaken. At present, research 
holdups are relatively rare and few industry participants are finding that research is 
completely impeded. There are, however, subtle differences in the results of the 
various studies, and these could be usefully investigated. For example, although data 
obtained in the Nicol and Nielsen study demonstrated that Australian medical 
biotechnology companies are heavily engaged in licensing, it would appear that 
licensing practices within the Australian industry are not as prolific as licensing 
practices within overseas jurisdictions. There are many interpretations that may be 
placed on this data. It may simply suggest that Australian companies and researchers 
do not require as many in-licences as overseas counterparts, and are primarily 
engaged in out-licensing. Equally, it could indicate that Australian industry 
participants are more reticent to request licences to research inputs where there is a 
perception that licences are not available. It may also reflect the superior bargaining 
power possessed by overseas companies. Accordingly, further investigation of issues 
such as these would assist in providing further grounds for evaluating the effects of 
restrictive licensing within Australian medical biotechnology. 
It is important as ongoing research in this area is conducted in overseas jurisdictions, 
that comparative research be undertaken in Australia. This research will assist in 
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informing policy debate and regulatory imperatives. Empirical work building on the 
work presented in this thesis and the overseas studies relied on would assist in 
maintaining a watching brief in respect of the impact of refusals to license and other 
restrictive licensing practices on biomedical research in Australia. 
9.3 CONCLUDING COMMENT 
The interaction of intellectual property and competition law is far from settled, 
particularly in dynamic, innovative industries. The scholarship, policy statements and 
jurisprudence examined in this thesis have grappled with the issue of how to balance 
these areas of law, and have taken steps to endeavour to resolve the interface. This 
thesis attempts to pay due recognition to those scholars who have contributed to the 
debate, and to build on their work from the Australian perspective. It has viewed these 
issues through the lens of empirical evidence, and identified that real issues exist for 
plaintiffs in Australia asserting that a refusal to license is anti-competitive. It has not 
finally resolved these issues and further research remains to be done. However, it has 
demonstrated the complexity of these issues for plaintiffs in high-technology 
industries such as medical biotechnology, and highlighted that flexibility is imperative 
in resolving these concerns. 
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STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This study was conducted in two parts: 
• a quantitative component using survey data; and 
• a qualitative component using a semi-structured interview format. 
The aim of the study was to gather data through the surveys which would identify 
issues for further analysis within the interviews. Response rates to surveys in this 
industry are usually relatively low. For example, Hopper and Thorburn reported a 13 
percent response rate to their 2002 survey, and attributed this to 'survey fatigue.' 
Despite the likelihood that this survey would also have a modest response rate, it was 
considered that the surveys were an important component of the study and represented 
the most appropriate method of generating preliminary data for further investigation. 
SURVEYS 
The initial component of the study consisted of written surveys mailed to respondents 
falling within three sectors of the biomedical industry: private sector biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical companies, research institutions and diagnostic testing facilities. 
The surveys were conducted with a view to identifying issues on which to focus in the 
interview portion of the study. 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COMPANIES 
Respondents for survey mail-out were identified by information from a database of 
Australian biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies (including international 
companies with an Australian office). This database was compiled using data obtained 
from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, and publicly available 
information including material from company websites and industry reports. 
Companies were identified as being relevant to the survey if their activities comprised 
core biotechnology activities, or if their activities were in some way biotechnology 
related. 2 
See Kelvin Hopper and Lyndal Thorbum, 2002 Bioindustry Review: Australia and New Zealand 
(2002). 
2 Core biotechnology companies are companies whose business is entirely or substantially 
biotechnology related: See Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report (1999). 
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Although this research project was concerned with the medical biotechnology 
industry, this component of the project was not limited to the biomedical sector of the 
industry. Respondents were asked to describe their area of activity or research, and it 
was possible to identify companies involved in biomedical research and those 
involved in other activities. However, the overwhelming majority of responses were 
from the biomedical sector of the industry. Only four of the responses received were 
from companies that could not be classified as primarily biomedical. Of the four, three 
reported no patent activity and two of these reported no collaborative or licensing 
activity. Data from all of these respondents was included in the overall results, but 
specific reference to the two non-biomedical companies that reported patent, licensing 
or collaborative activity is made where appropriate. 3 
Approximately 180 surveys were mailed to companies in June 2002. 4 The same 
survey was sent to both biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. Follow-up 
letters were sent to respondents four weeks after the surveys were mailed out, and 
follow-up telephone calls were subsequently made. The survey asked 52 questions 
about the structure and activities of the company, the company's involvement in 
patenting, collaborations and licensing, and the views of the respondent on patenting 
within the industry. 
Of the surveys sent out, 49 completed surveys were returned, yielding a response rate 
of 27 percent. In addition, six respondents replied that they did not wish to participate 
in the survey either because they did not consider it to be relevant to their company's 
activities, or they considered the information sought to be commercially sensitive. A 
number of respondents who subsequently participated in face-to-face interviews stated 
that they had not completed the survey because they believed that they could 
participate more effectively in providing qualitative rather than quantitative data to us. 
Consequently, they were willing to take part in interviews. Although the response rate 
is low in relative terms, it compares favourably with other voluntary mailout surveys 
conducted within the industry.' Further, the response rate would be more favourable if 
specifically biomedical companies had been targeted in distributing the company 
survey.6 It would be fair to assume that the 45 biomedical and pharmaceutical 
3 One of these respondents appeared to some degree to be involved in biomedical applications. 
4 A number of the companies targeted in the survey had only peripheral biotechnology-related 
activities. 
5 See, eg, Hopper and Thorbum, above nl. 
6 Ernst & Young estimated that approximately 47 percent of Australian biotechnology companies are 
operating in the area of human health, including diagnostics and therapeutics. They further estimated 
that approximately 13 percent of companies are operating in the areas of genomics, proteomics and bio- 
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companies from which responses were received represents a significant proportion 
(perhaps in excess of 40 percent) of Australian companies engaged in biomedical and 
related applications. 
RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
Printed surveys were mailed out to 39 research institutions on 17 March 2003 and 
reminder letters were sent in June 2003. These institutions were identified by prior 
knowledge of the research sector and using standard search engines. The survey asked 
42 questions about research activities, the institution's involvement in patenting, 
collaborations and licensing, awareness of patents held by others and views on 
patenting. Twenty-three surveys were returned, yielding a response rate of 59 percent. 
GENETIC TESTING LABORATORIES 
Printed surveys were mailed out to the laboratories offering diagnosis of genetic 
disorders listed on the Human Genetic Society of Australia's website in November 
2002 and reminder letters were sent in December 2002. The surveys asked 61 
questions about the laboratory, its clinical activity, research and patent activity and 
collaborations. A total of 52 surveys were dispatched. Eighteen were returned (35 
percent response rate). These detailed surveys were supplemented by short telephone 
surveys conducted in March and April 2003 asking six questions about the laboratory, 
the tests it performs, payment of licence fees and/or royalties, receipt of notifications 
from patent or licence holders, responses to notifications, and views on patents. The 
six questions were only asked if respondents indicated that they had not returned the 
written survey. Hence the telephone survey respondents did not overlap with the 
written survey respondents. There were thirteen responses to the telephone survey, 
yielding a total response rate of 60 percent. 
INTERVIEWS 
Forty interviews were conducted with various respondents falling within the 
categories of private companies, research institutions and diagnostic testing facilities 
between August 2002 and July 2003. Participants were selected based on prior 
contacts, media reports, internet based search engines and databases, and snowball 
sampling. 
Within the category of private sector companies, chief operating executives, 
intellectual property personnel and bench scientists were interviewed. Within the 
informatics; Commonwealth of Australia, Ernst & Young and Freehills, Australian Biotechnology 
Report (2001) 13. 
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category of research institutions directors of research groups, bench scientists and 
technology transfer personnel were interviewed. Within the category of diagnostic 
testing facilities, interviews were conducted in respect of directors of research groups. 
A number of other respondents with expertise in the area were also interviewed, 
including patent attorneys, licensing consultants and goverment and trade 
representatives. Interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis due to the 
confidential nature of the data being gathered. Anonymity in studies in the industry is 
standard practice. It also became evident from speaking with industry contacts prior to 
the commencement of the study that a majority of respondents were unlikely to 
respond to surveys or participate in interviews unless anonymity could be guaranteed. 
During a considerable number of interviews, respondents sought assurances to this 
effect. 
Details of respondents by organisation type and occupation are contained in Table 2. 
Respondents were selected to provide a representative sample of various sectors 
within the biomedical industry, from research institutions and companies operating at 
the upstream end of the industry, through to companies involved in downstream drug 
development and therapeutic applications. 
Table 1: Interview respondents 
Respondent type Business/ 
IP/ legal 
manager 
Lab 
director/ 
scientist 
Managing 
director/ 
CEO 
Total 
interviews 
University 	Tech 
Transfer Office 
3 3 
Diagnostic 
Testing Facilities 
3 3 
Research 
Institutions 
1 4 3 8 
Tech 	Transfer 
Companies 
2 
- 
1 3 
Upstream 
Companies* 
4 1 1 4 
Intermediate 3 1 4 
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Companies* 
Downstream 
Companies* 
3 3 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
4 1 4 
Device 
Companies 
2 2 
Licensing 
Consultants 
2 
Patent Attorneys 2 
Trade Association 
Representatives 
1 
Government 
representatives 
1 
The categories marked with an * in Table 2 are fairly fluid in that some respondents 
conducted activities that could fit into more than one category. These respondents 
have been placed in the category that best fits their primary activities. Although it was 
sometimes difficult to classify the interviewees within respondent organisations, they 
have been described as accurately as possible. In several cases, interviews were 
conducted with more than one person from within an organisation. Descriptions of all 
personnel interviewed have been provided, but these interviews were included as one 
interview within the total tally of interviews. 
Within respondent organisations, business, intellectual property and legal managers 
were the group most interviewed. Nineteen interviews of personnel who fell into this 
category were conducted compared with nine laboratory directors and scientists and 
nine managing directors. It is recognised that responses may vary depending on the 
particular person within an organisation who is interviewed. There are a number of 
reasons why managers rather than scientists were frequently chosen as respondents. A 
major factor was their knowledge of intellectual property issues. In some cases 
another member of an organisation recommended that an interview be conducted with 
a business manger. Many institutions being considered were relatively small and there 
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was evidence of close contact and discussion of relevant issues between managers and 
scientists within respondent organisations. In many cases, business, intellectual 
property and legal managers came from a science background, often from within the 
organisation itself. They therefore had a good understanding of the issues associated 
with the conduct of research and intellectual property in the relevant field, as well as 
complex technology transfer issues. These personnel were often involved in 
technology transfer negotiations. Difficulty in persuading scientists to participate in 
interviews is also a common theme in some other studies.' 
Similarly, many managing directors and CEOs come from a science background and 
are well versed in the intellectual property activities of their respective companies. 
The level of knowledge of technology transfer issues of respondents falling into the 
categories of business, intellectual property and legal managers, and managing 
directors and CEOs, made them particularly valuable classes of interview 
respondents, although the relatively low numbers of scientists interviewed may mean 
that responses differed to a degree. 
The resulting sample gave some reliable insights into views and issues within the 
industry. This was not a truly random sample. Respondents were selected to enable 
broad coverage of a range of participants within the industry, but at times were 
selected fairly opportunistically. However, given the number of respondents 
interviewed and the areas of the industry covered, the sample paints a broadly 
representative picture of issues facing the industry and trends within the industry. 
Most of the respondents interviewed were involved in human genetic or biomedical 
research and/or commercialisation. However, several respondents falling outside these 
categories, or falling into more general or peripheral categories were interviewed in 
order to obtain some comparative data. One respondent was involved in a 
biotechnology CRC unrelated to human health applications. Two company 
respondents were involved in medical device research and development, and one 
respondent from the bioinformatics sector took part in the study. One of the research 
institution respondents was involved in plant studies. Some respondents were 
involved in applications related to human health, in addition to other broader 
applications. Where data from interviews with these respondents is cited, their 
specific area of research is identified. 
7 See, eg, National Institutes of Health, Report of the National Institutes of Health Working Group on 
Research Tools (1998) <http://www.nih.govinews/researchtools/index.htm > at 3 October 2002, 6. 
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The respondents were asked a series of questions that conformed to a flexible format. 
Respondents were asked generally about the patent and licensing activity of their 
company or institution, and were then asked a series of questions designed to examine 
issues particularly relevant to them in more detail. A number of questions were 
designed to elicit responses pertaining to whether or not bargaining breakdown is 
occurring within the Australian industry. The interviews were structured to allow 
consideration of whether patents and restrictive licensing practices are having an 
effect on research and/or the commercialisation of patents, and ways in which 
respondents are overcoming any such effects. 
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SOME FOUNDATIONAL BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH TOOLS AND THEIR PROPRIETARY 
STATUS IN AUSTRALIA 
The following account of foundational patents is divided into two categories: those 
that comprise broad patents but have been widely disseminated, and those that 
comprise broad patents but have been restrictively licensed. It does not provide a 
comprehensive list of foundational research tools, but it identifies those that have, for 
various reasons, become more notorious. It also identified the proprietary status of 
these research tools in Australia. 
BROADLY DISSEMINATED FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH TOOLS 
Generally, these patent holders are making their patents widely available albeit at 
some cost. The issue for licensees is their ability to meet licence fee obligations and 
continue to finance their research programs. Implications for the innovative process 
certainly exist. But solace can at least be taken from the fact that these technologies 
are being disseminated. 
PCR and Taq Polymerase 
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and Taq polymerase allow the rapid amplification 
of DNA sequences. Enforcement of the patents covering the technology' has given 
rise to considerable outcry given the importance of this technology to laboratories 
undertaking DNA replication for a variety of purposes. The technology has been 
widely licensed and made available for a fee to researchers and commercial users. 2 
The issue that has generated controversy is the quantum of royalty fees charged which 
arguably makes the technology inaccessible to many small companies and university 
1 There are three main US patents; US4,683,202 (filed 1985), US4,683,195 (filed 1986) and 
US4,889,818) Australian Patent No AU632 857 (granted in 1996). The patents were granted to Cetus 
Corporation but were subsequently assigned to F Hoffman La-Roche AG for $300 million See Paul 
Oldham, Global Status and Trends in Intellectual Property Claims: Microorganisms, Submission to the 
Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2004), 13. 
2 See further National Research Council (NRC), Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in 
Molecular Biology (1997) (the NRC Report), 43-46. 
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researchers.' The breadth of the patent claims has also been the subject of protracted 
litigation in the US, Europe and Australia. 4 Opposition proceedings successfully 
reduced the scope of the claims of the patent and are ongoing in Australia.' 
Intron Sequence Analysis 
A recent development is the debate surrounding the so-called 'junk DNA' patents 
held by Australian company Genetic Technologies Ltd. 6 Indeed, all of the studies 
discussed in this chapter predate the controversy surrounding these patents. The 
patents comprise a series of patents that claim a method of using non-coding DNA (or 
intron sequences) to predict mutations in coding regions of DNA. The patents 
potentially have wide reach given that the technology is widely used in research into 
many therapeutic and diagnostic applications. In fact, use of it in most genetic 
research is unavoidable. The patents are being actively enforced against companies 
and public research groups, for the primary purpose of generating licence fees, and a 
number of licence agreements have been entered into with companies and research 
institutions.' 
CCR5 Receptor 
In 2000 a US patent was granted to Human Genome Sciences Inc' for a chemokine 
receptor known as the CCR5 receptor. Human Genome Sciences isolated the gene 
3  Ibid, 44-46. The technology reportedly generates $100 million in licensing revenue for Hoffman La-
Roche per year; Oldham, above nl, 13. 
4 For details see <http://www.roche-diagnostics.com/ba_rmd/per_litigation_chronology.html > at 23 
June 2005. See also Oldham, above nl, 13-14. 
5 See Oldham, above n1. 
6 The Intron Sequence Analysis patents comprise Australian patents AU67519 (entitled Intron 
Sequence Analysis Method for Detection of Adjacent and Remote Locus Alleles as Haplotypes), 
AU647806 (entitled Genomic Mapping by Direct Haplotyping Using Intron Sequence Analysis) and 
AU654111 (Intron Sequence Analysis Method for Detection of Adjacent and Remote Locus Alleles as 
Haplotypes). The corresponding United States patents are US5 612 179, US5 851 762 and US5 192 
659. Genetic Technologies Ltd has also been granted one patent entitled Fetal Cell Recovery Method 
(US Patent No US5 447 842, Australian Patent AU649027) with another patent pending (Australian 
Patent Office Application No 200177352). 
7 Details of licensing deals are given on the website of Genetic Technologies Ltd at 
<http://www.gtg.com.au/index_news.asp?menuid=210> at 23 June 2005. Licence fees have been 
determined based on the status of the particular licensee, and offers 'research' licences and 
'commercial' licences: see < http://www.gtg.com.au/index_general.asp?menuid=080 > at 23 June 2005. 
See also Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Four Corners, 'Patently a Problem' broadcast on 
11 August 2003, transcript available at 
<http://www.abc.net.au/4comers/content/2003/transcripts/s922059.htm > at 5 May 2004 (ABC Four 
Corners). 
8 US Patent No U56 025 154. The patent is entitled Polynucleotides Encoding Human G-Protein 
Chemokine Receptor HDGNR10. A number of patents entitled Human G-Protein Chemokine Receptor 
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that codes for the receptor and filed a patent claiming rights over the gene and the 
CCR5 protein product. Although their claims over the protein product covered a viral 
receptor, they were unaware at the time the patent was filed that the HIV virus enters 
cells through the CCR5 receptor. Subsequent research by the NIH revealed this to be 
the case. 9 
Concern about the potential breadth of research covered by the relatively narrow 
CCR5 upstream patent gave rise to a chorus of disapproval in the research 
community.'° Use of the patent for university research purposes would not, however, 
appear to have been inhibited to any large extent," and several licence agreements for 
research into new drugs using the CCR5 receptor have been agreed to. 12 
Although an application to patent this receptor was made in Australia, a patent has not 
been granted and it is possible the application lapsed. ° At the same time, two United 
States patents have been granted to Euroscreen SA claiming a mutation of the CCR5 
receptor relevant to HIV immunity. 14 The effect of these patents on the scope of 
research controlled by Human Genome Sciences' patents is as yet unknown. 
Method of Screening Patents 
ICT Pharmaceuticals (now Housey Pharmaceuticals (Housey)) holds a series of 
patents for methods of screening substances for compounds that may potentially be 
effective as drugs.° The patents are very broad and cover a number of different 
methods. They do not, however, cover end products or drugs. Legal proceeding arose 
between Housey and Bayer AG (Bayer) when Bayer allegedly used a method 
protected by the patents to manufacture a drug in a foreign country. The results of this 
were also granted by the European Patent Office in 2001 and 2002: EP1149582, EP1148127, 
EP1148126, EP1146055, EP1366058, EP1146122, EP1145721, EP1253721, EP1263791. 
9 See further Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, 
Discussion Paper (2002) (Nuffield Discussion Paper) 41. 
10 Elliot Marshall 'Patent on HIV Receptor Provokes an Outcry' Science 287 (2000): 1375. 
12 Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n9, 41. 
13 Application No 199526632. 
14 Euroscreen SA, `CCR5 Mutant Gene Sequence Patented for AIDS Diagnosis' Press Release (27 
February 2004) available at <http://www.prweb.com/re1eases/2004/2/prweb107422.htm > at 5 May 
2004. 
15  US Patent Nos US4 980 281 entitled Method of Screening for Protein Inhibitors and Activators 
(granted in 1990), US5 266 464 entitled Method of Screening for Protein Inhibitors and Activators 
(granted in 1993) and US5 887 007 entitled Method of Screening for Protein Inhibitors and Activators 
(granted in 1999) (the Housey patents). 
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litigation are briefly discussed in Chapter 4. 16 Housey had widely licensed the patents 
to a number of other parties. 
It would appear that an application for a patent over this technology was filed in 
Australia, but subsequently lapsed!' 
RESTRICTIVELY LICENSED FOUNDATIONAL PATENTS 
Debate has arisen with respect to other patented biotechnology inventions to which 
access has in some way been restricted, or has the potential to be. There is a 
significant amount of literature containing extensive discussion on the following 
research tools and exclusionary practices surrounding them. Some of this literature is 
discussed below. 
CD3e 
A number of patents relating to CD34 are owned by Johns Hopkins University 
(Hopkins). 19 CD34 is an antigen found on undifferentiated blood cells found in bone 
marrow. The United States patents were filed following the discovery of a particular 
antibody (My-10) that selectively binds to (and detects) CD34. In one of the patents, 
all antibodies that bind to CD34 were clairned. 20 The technology employing the 
binding of antibodies to CD34 was, at the time, useful in the development of cancer 
therapies, due to its potential application as an alternative mode of carrying out bone-
marrow transplants. 21 The patents were exclusively sub-licensed to Baxter Healthcare 
Corporation. 
16 Above, 4.3.3.1. 
17 	. Applicatton No 199064271. 
18 The factual details relating to this technology are taken largely from the following case reports: 
Johns Hopkins University, Baxter Healthcare Corporation and Becton Dickinson and Company v Cell-
Pro Inc 931 F Supp 303 (D Del 1996); Johns Hopkins University, Baxter Healthcare Corporation and 
Becton Dickinson and Company v Cell-Pro Inc 978 F Supp 184 (D Del 1997). A very thorough 
analysis of the matter is also contained in Avital Bar-Shalom and Robert Cook-Deegan, 'Patents and 
Innovation in Cancer Therapeutics: Lessons From Cell-Pro' (2002) 80(4) The Millbank Quarterly 637. 
19 US Patent No US4 714 480 entitled Human Stem Cells (granted 1987); US Patent No US4 965 204 
entitled Human Stem Cells and Monoclonal Antibodies (granted 1990); US Patent No US5 035 994 
entitled Human Stem Cells and Monoclonal Antibodies (granted 1991); and US Patent No US5 130 
144 entitled Human Stem Cells and Monoclonal Antibodies (granted 1992). 
US4 965 204. 
21 Peter Mikhail, 'Hopkins v CellPro: An Illustration that Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of 
Fundamental Science is Not Always in the Public Interest' (2000) 13 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology 375, 385. 
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In the meantime, researchers at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center 
produced an alternative antibody, which displayed different properties to the My-10 
antibody. Cell-Pro was formed to manufacture two devices to purify stem cells and 
produce purified stem cell suspensions. 22 Federal Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval was granted to Cell-Pro to use its process of isolating and separating stern 
cells before approval had been gained by Hopkins or Baxter. 23 
Litigation initiated by Hopkins eventually resulted in a finding that Cell-Pro had 
infringed two of Hopkins' patents. 24 Litigation proceeded after Baxter offered Cell-
Pro a non-exclusive licence on financial terms that Cell-Pro rejected. Cell-Pro 
ultimately lost the case on appeal. 25 Despite being allowed to continue to manufacture 
its devices until Hopkins' devices received FDA approval, Cell-Pro entered 
bankruptcy. 26 Hopkins' technology was later superseded by rival technologies. 
The problems identified in relation to these patents relate to the breadth of the 
upstream patent in claiming all antibodies that bind to CD-34, 27 and the fact that the 
patent owner and the exclusive licensee were unable to develop technology under 
those patents as quickly and effectively as their rival Cell-Pro. 28 Nevertheless, they 
were able to prevent Cell-Pro from remaining in the market by exercising their patent 
rights.29 In doing so, it is asserted that Hopkins' patents and Baxter's exclusive licence 
enabled them to retard competing research and development." 
There is no record of patent applications relating to CD34 being filed in Australia. 
22 Eliot Marshall, Warmus to Rule in Fight Over Cell-Sorting Technology, 276 Science (1997): 1488. 
2.3 Mikhail, above n21, 386. 
24 Johns Hopkins University, Baxter Healthcare Corporation and Becton Dickinson and Company v 
Cell-Pro Inc 931 F Supp 303 (D Del 1996). 
zs Johns Hopkins University, Baxter Healthcare Corporation and Becton Dickinson and Company v 
Cell-Pro Inc 152 F 3d 1342 (Fed Cir 1998). 
26 John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen 'Effects of Research Tool Patenting and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation' in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds.), Patents in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy (2003) 287 (Walsh Cohen and Arora), 307. 
27 Ibid, 307. 
28 Bar-Shalom and Cook-Degan, above n18, 657-658; Ibid, 307; Mikhail, above n21, 391. 
29 Mikhail, above n21, 392. 
30  Ibid, 391-2. Hopkins and Baxter did, of course, decline to exercise their full rights until they received 
Federal Drug Administration approval in relation to their own product. 
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Cox-2 
A US patent granted to the University of Rochester in 2000 claims broad rights over 
the cox-2 enzyme, and any compounds developed to inhibit the enzyme." It now 
appears that compounds developed to inhibit the enzyme may have broad 
applicability. In addition to one of these compounds being useful as a pain medicine, 
it may also have some anti-cancer properties, 32 and the patent may give the patent 
holder the right to royalties on all drugs falling into the category of cox-2 inhibiters. 33 
In consequence, if researchers involved in researching various cox-2 inhibitors doubt 
their ability to obtain a licence, this may discourage research on a range of drug 
applications. 
Although a number of patents and patent applications relating to cox-2 technology do 
exist in Australia (including patents held by Searle & Co Inc), there is no record of the 
specific patent that has been the subject of dispute. A great number of patents relating 
to cox-2 technology exist in the US, which may be indicative of the fact that 
researchers have been able to proceed in this area relatively unhindered by the patents 
owned by the University of Rochester. 
NF-KB Messenger Protein 
A broad patent covering the treatment of diseases using the NF-K13 messenger protein 
was granted to Harvard College, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the 
Whitehead Instititute. 34 This particular protein triggers cell suicide, and many 
researchers have been actively engaged in studying factors that block the activity of 
the protein. The patent was exclusively licensed to Ariad Pharmaceuticals (Ariad), 
and is reportedly being actively enforced by Ariad?' Ariad have signalled an intention 
to derive licensing revenue from the NF-K13 patent portfolio, although they will not 
seek licences from academic institutions for non-commercial research?' They have 
31 US Patent No US6 048 850 entitled Method of Inhibiting Prostaglandin Synthesis in a Human Host. 
32 See Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n26, 297. See also their n16 outlining unsuccessful infringement 
proceedings brought by the University of Rochester against Searle & Co Inc. 
33 See the announcement on the University of Rochester's website 
<http://www.urmesochester.edu/cox-2/pr.html > at 7 May 2004. 
34 United States Patent US6 410 516 entitled Nuclear Factors Associated with Transcriptional 
Regulation (granted in 2002). 
35 Arti K Rai and Rebecca S Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 289, 302; Peg Brickley, 'New Patent 
Worries Professors' 16 The Scientist (2002) <http://www.the-
scientist.com/yr2002/jul/brickley_p19_020722.html > at 17 May 2004. 
36 See NF-KB Highlights, available on Ariad's website <http://www.ariad.com/about/about_nfkb.html > 
at 17 May 2004. 
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issued research and development licences to Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and 
DiscoveRx Corporation.37 
The concern is that some existing drugs already on the market might infringe the 
patent, as might a considerable amount of ongoing academic research with 
commercial implications." The scope of the patent means that it may block any 
therapeutic application relating to the protein, threatening many established research 
projects." It has also been pointed out that a broad patent and exclusive licence were 
not necessary to motivate downstream development given the many research projects 
founded on the generally available knowledge that the NF-KB pathway was 
implicated in multiple diseases. 4° 
There is no record of a similar patent being granted in Australia!' 
Cre- lox 
In 1990, E I DuPont de Nemours and Co (DuPont) was granted a US patent over a 
method of using site specific recombination of DNA as a genetic engineering tool by 
inactivating known genes. 42 The technology allows researchers to create 'knock out' 
mice, or mice with a deleted gene!' In 1998, DuPont entered into an agreement with 
the NIH allowing NIH affiliated researchers access to Cre-lox technology for non-
commercial research.'" Although DuPont had previously offered to licence the 
technology, for some time universities had baulked at the licence terms demanded by 
DuPont. Researchers are now required to enter into a Material Transfer Agreement if 
Cre-lox mice are transferred within the academic environment, and these agreements 
do impose some conditions on use. 45 One of the primary conditions is that researchers 
" Ibid. 
38 
 Brickley, above n35. 
" Ibid. 
40 Rai and Eisenberg above n35, 302. 
41 Ariad reports that it has exclusive licences to a portfolio of four patents relating to NF-KB, three US 
patents (including the patent referred to in n? above), and one European patent; see above n36. 
42 US Patent No US4 959 317 entitled Site-Specific Recombination of DNA in Eukaryotic Cells 
(granted in 1990). 
43 Irene Abrams and Martine Kaiser, 'Licensing Transgenic Mice: A Short Tutorial' (2000) 12 The 
Journal of the Association of University Technology Managers 
<www.autm.net/pubs/jouma1/00/transgenicrnice.html > at 24 June 2005, 1-3. 
44 The agreement can be viewed at <http://ottod.nih.govi> at 24 June 2005. 
45 For details see Abrams and Kaiser above n43, 3. 
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are forbidden from transferring Cre-lox mice to commercial entities unless the 
commercial entity first obtains a commercial research licence." 
It would appear that the Australian Patent Office has also granted a patent over this 
technology to DuPont.'" 
Oncomouse 
During the late 1980s, researchers at Harvard University (Harvard) developed a 
genetically altered mouse with an increased propensity for developing cancer. A 
transgenic mouse or Oncomouse is a mouse that has an extra gene added to its cells." 
Harvard obtained a US patent for this technology in 1988, 49 and the technology 
quickly became an important cancer research tool. The patent granted to Harvard was 
very broad, and later patents increased its scope. 5° An exclusive licensing agreement 
was entered into with DuPont. 
As with Cre-lox technology, researchers voiced concern over the terms on which 
DuPont offered licences. Again, DuPont reached agreement with the NIH for the use 
of the technology in academic, non-commercial research!' Researchers are not 
required to share royalties resulting from commercial products with DuPont and 
commercial entities are also required to enter into licence agreements with DuPont. 
The agreement does, however, require individual non-profit NIH grantees to negotiate 
separate agreements with DuPont, and DuPont is currently enforcing its rights under 
the patents against a number of universities on considerably more restrictive terms 
than those contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. 52 
46 See above n44, cl(3). 
47 Australian Patent AU639059 entitled Site-Specific Recombination of DNA in Plant Cells. 
48 Abrams and Kaiser, above n43, 1. 
49 US Patent No US4 736 866 entitled Transgenic Non-Human Mammals (granted in 1988). Patents 
were also granted in Europe and Canada. The European and Canadian patents have been the subject of 
litigation, which has since been resolved. In Europe, the patent was allowed by the EPO Examining 
Division after consideration of whether the subject matter was patentable, and whether the public 
order/morality provision should be invoked; see Case V 0006/92 Harvard (April 3, 1992). In Canada, 
the Canadian Supreme Court decide by a majority of 5-4, that the oncomouse did not constitute 
patentable subject matter under Canadian patent law; Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of 
Patents) [2002] 4 SCR 45. 
5° US Patents Nos US5 087 571 entitled Method for Providing a Cell Culture from a Transgenic Non-
Human Mammal (granted 1992) and US5 925 803 entitled Testing Method Using Transgenic Mice 
Expressing and Oncogene (granted in 1999). 
51 Above n44. 
52 Reported in Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n26, 308. 
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It would not appear that an equivalent Australian patent has been granted, although an 
application by Harvard was made in respect of transgenic non-human mammals. 53 It is 
likely that this application has lapsed. A number of other patents have been granted by 
the Australian Patent Office in respect of transgenic non-human animals. 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Technology m 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (VVARF) was issued a number of US patents 
for the isolation of human embryonic stem cells, which are useful as a tool in the 
development of various tissue types and organs. 55 Research on stem cells is a major 
area of research to which significant funding has been allocated. 56 The records of the 
Australian Patent Office do not appear to contain any record of the central patents 
held by WARF, although other applications relating to primate stem cells have been 
filed.57 The WARF patents have been viewed as being problematic due to their 
breadth,58 and because exclusive rights to develop particular tissue types (and options 
to develop the remaining tissue types) were granted to Geron Corporation (Geron). 59 
53 Application No AU199187358. 
54 Walsh, Arora and Cohen provide a useful summary of the issues surrounding the patents over 
embryonic stem cell technology, and they rely largely on two articles from The New York Times; see 
Walsh, Cohen and Arora, above n26, their n36. The following discussion uses portions of the material 
discussed by Walsh, Arora and Cohen at 308-309 and taken from those articles. See also the useful 
discussion of the issues surrounding stem cell technologies in Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Parliament of Australia, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, Report No 99 
(2004) (ALRC Report), Chapter 15. 
55 US Patents US6 200 806 entitled Primate Embryonic Stem Cells (granted in 2001) and US6 280 718 
entitled Hemotopoietic Differentiation of Human Pluripotent Embryonic Stem Cells (granted in 2001) 
(the WARF patents). Only one patent has been granted by the EPO in respect of stem cell technology, 
to Edinburgh University (EP0695351). The patent was opposed and the scope of the claims ordered by 
the Opposition Division of the EPO to be amended to exclude human and animal embryonic cells. The 
basis of this decision was that the patenting of human embryonic stem cells is contrary to public order 
(s53(a) EPC), and no further patents relating to human embryonic stem cells have been granted by the 
EPO; see ALRC Report, above n54, 384-385. The matter is currently on appeal, and a number of other 
patents relating to stem cells have been rejected; see Gretchen Vogel, 'Stem Cell Claims Face Legal 
Hurdles' 305 Science (2004): 1887. 
56 For example, significant government funding has been allocated to the Australian Stem Cell Centre. 
See above, 1.2. 
57 Applications No 199647584 entitled Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, 199938814 entitled Primate 
Embryonic Stem Cells with Compatible Histocompatibility Genes and 200138491 entitled Method of 
Making Embryoid Bodies from Primate Embryonic Stem Cells. These applications are generally 
equivalent to the following US patents: US5,843,780 entitled Primate embryonic stem cells (granted in 
1998) and US6,602,711 entitled Method of Making Embryoid Bodies from Primate Embryonic Stem 
Cells (granted in 2003). 
58 Essentially, the patents claim the cell lines and the methods for isolating them from embryos. The 
method claims are particularly broad and have far-reaching consequences for follow-on research. 
59 See, eg, Maria Freire, Statement on Stem Cell Research (1999) Hearing Before the Committee of 
Appropriations, Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related 
Agencies, 106th Congress; Christopher Carroll, 'Selling the Stem Cell: The Licensing of the Stem Cell 
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These rights effectively excluded other researchers developing for commercial 
application the tissue types encompassed by the licence. Geron's rights were further 
solidified by a number of exclusive licences granted by Johns Hopkins University. 60 
The technology itself is key to understanding the basic processes of human 
development, and is important to future generations of biomedical discovery, 61 and the 
coverage of the WARF patents is sweeping. 
WARF and Geron embarked on legal proceedings due to a dispute over the extent of 
Geron's rights. The matter subsequently settled and Geron's exclusive rights were 
limited to three cell types. They were granted non-exclusive rights to three other 
tissue types and their remaining options were removed. 62 Geron thus retains strict 
control over research in relation to certain tissue types, and has indicated that although 
academic and government scientists may use the patents for research (but not 
commercial) purposes, company researchers are not entitled to use them in the 
absence of a licence. It has been pointed out that Geron's control may be ameliorated 
to some extent by scientific advances in adult stem cell technology and the ability of 
researchers to extract stem cells from unfertilised eggs.° Certainly the fact that the 
central US patents have not been patented in Australia is significant for Australian 
companies and researchers working in the area. 
Hepatitis C Virus (HM 
Across a number of countries, the practices of patent holder Chiron Corporation 
(Chiron) have prompted considerable criticism. Scientists at Chiron successfully 
cloned the hepatitis C virus (HCV) in 1987, and since that time Chiron has been 
granted over 100 patents relating to HCV in over 20 countries.64 The initial patents 
granted to Chiron were very broad, and encompassed the viral components of the 
Patent and Possible Antitrust Consequences' (2002) University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology 
and Policy 435, 441. 
60 	. Particularly US Patent US6,090,622 entitled Human Embryonic Pluripotent Germ Cells (granted M 
2000). 
61 See Freire, above n59. 
62 The NM and the WiCell Research Institute Inc (WiCell in a non-profit institution established by 
WARF and licensed to distribute a number of WARF's stem cells) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding that permits NIFI researchers to conduct research on WiC,ell's five existing cell lines. 
The MOU provides that any intellectual property generated as a result will be owned by the NIH. For 
details see <http://www.nih.govinews/prisep2001/od-05.htm> at 24 June 2005. 
63 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n26, 309. 
64 See Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n9, 41-42. 
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HCV virus as well as their use in diagnostic and pharmaceutical applications. 65 The 
patents were exclusively licensed to Ortho Inc (Ortho), and Chiron and Ortho 
subsequently entered into an agreement with Abbott Laboratories Ltd (Abbott) on 
terms that restricted Abbott's ability to obtain antigen from any party other than 
Chiron. Murex Diagnostics Ltd (Murex) was subsequently sued for infringement. 
Their validity was the subject of litigation in several jurisdictions, including 
Australia. 66 In Australia, Murex commenced revocation proceedings against Chiron. 
Despite going to trial before Burchett J, the matter settled on confidential terms prior 
to its conclusion. Murex were eventually granted a licence to Chiron's patents. In the 
UK, proceedings were also instigated by Murex on the basis of an allegation that in 
refusing to license Murex, Chiron were in breach of competition law provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome. This litigation will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. 
BRCA1 Patent' 
Two known genes are implicated in breast cancer, BRCA1 and BRCA2. As a result of 
patents granted to Myriad Genetics Inc (Myriad), 68 Myriad has obtained broad 
protection over the BRCA1 gene and mutations of the gene, diagnostic testing for 
mutations, methods for screening samples, and therapeutic and pharmaceutical 
applications.° As a result, a number of European organisations opposed Myriad's 
European patents on a number of grounds, including lack of inventiveness, 
insufficient description and lack of industrial applicability. 70 The Opposition Division 
65 Ibid, 42. Chiron produced a diagnostic test and the patent precludes development of alternative 
diagnostic tests in the absence of a licence. It is also arguable that access to Chiron's patents would 
probably be required in order to produce an HCV vaccine; at 41-42. 
66 The original patent (European Patent 0318216) was opposed in Europe and its claims were amended 
during the course of appeal; Nuffield at 41. UK Patent 2212511 was also the subject of infringement 
proceedings which resulted in a challenge to its validity. The scope of this patent's claims were also 
reduced. In Australia, the matter settled and did not proceed to a final determination. 
67 A concise discussion of the issues surrounding the BRCA1 patents is contained in Matthew Rimmer, 
(2003) 'Myriad Genetics: Patent Law and Genetic Testing' 25(1) European Intellectual Property 
Review 20. 
68 Myriad owns a number of patents in relation to the BRCA1 gene including (in the United States) 
Patents No US5 747 282, US5 710 001 (these patent applications were jointly filed by Myriad, the 
University of Utah Research Foundation and the US Secretary of Health), US5 693 473 and US5 753 
441. In Europe, Myriad was granted two patents (EU699754 and EU705903) 2001. The first covers 
diagnostic use of the BRCA1 gene, while the second covers a method of diagnostic testing for breast 
and ovarian cancer linked to BRCAl; Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n9, 39-41. 
69 See also ibid, 39. Note that a number of the patents also give Myriad rights over other cancers in 
which BRCA1 plays a role. 
70 Discussed ibid, 40. 
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of the European Patent Office (EPO) revoked EP 699754 in 2004. 7 ' After conducting 
further opposition proceedings, the Opposition Division recently amended EP 705903 
so that the patent now relates to a gene probe of a defined composition and does not 
include claims for diagnostic or therapeutic methods. 72 Although these proceedings 
are open to challenge, the decision significantly reduces the scope of Myriad's 
European patent portfolio. 
Myriad's patents give it broad power to control diagnostic testing and the 
development of new tests and methods of predicting susceptibility to breast and 
ovarian cancers. Myriad has actively enforced its patents against public and private 
diagnostic test providers, insisting that all diagnostic testing procedures be undertaken 
by Myriad's laboratories. 73 
Concern has arisen that the implications of this practice for patients include greater 
cost for tests and the exclusion of access to tests that may be of superior quality. 74 
Patients are likely to suffer because there is less likelihood that testing will be 
associated with quality counselling services. 75 At worst, researchers will be precluded 
from developing alternative and perhaps improved tests. 76 Some testing authorities 
have continued to ignore Myriad's patents and conduct testing using test kits 
developed without licence from Myriad!' Nevertheless, the case of BRCA1 serves to 
highlight that issues surrounding restricted access to patents are often intensified 
where diagnostic testing is concerned. 78 
71  "Myriad/breast cancer" patent revoked after public hearing', European Patent Office Press Release 
(18 May 2004) <http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressre1/2004_05_18_e.htm > at 24 May 
2004. 
72 See 'Patent on Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene Amended After Public Hearing' EPO 
Press Release, 21 January 2005, <http://www.european-patent-
office.orginews/pressre1/2005_01_21_e.htm> at 24 June 2005. 
73 See Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n9, 39-40. 
74 Jon F Merz, Antigone G Kriss, Debra DG Leonard and Mildred K Cho, 'Diagnostic Testing Fails the 
Test' 415 Nature (2002): 577. Mildred K Cho and Jon F Merz, 'Letter to Nature' 390 Nature (1997): 
221. Evidence indicates that this concern has not been borne out in the UIC; see Intellectual Property 
Institute, Patents for Genetic Sequences: The Competitiveness of Current UK Law and Practice (2004) 
(The UK Study), 70. 
Merz and Others, above n74. 
76 See Debra G B Leonard, Medical Practice and Gene Patents: A Personal Perspective 77 Academic 
Medicine (2002): 1388, 1389; Rimmer, above n67, 27-29. 
77 For example, publicly based national laboratories continue to undertake testing in the United 
Kingdom, and some provinces of Canada; see Nuffield Discussion Paper, above n9, 39-40. 
78 On this point see generally John H Barton, 'Patents, Genomics, Research and Diagnostics' 77 
Academic Medicine (2002): 1339, 1339-1340; Australian Law Reform Commission, Gene Patenting 
and Human Health, (2004) Discussion Paper 68, 576-578. 
418 
Appendix 2 
Myriad has been granted a number of patents over the BRCA1 gene in Australia. 79 A 
licensing agreement has been entered into between Myriad and Genetic Technologies 
Ltd,8° although the extent to which Genetic Technologies will enforce Myriad's 
patents in Australia is not clear at present. Given Myriad's enforcement practices 
across the globe to date, however, there is certainly concern that Myriad will stipulate 
strict enforcement of its Australian patents. 81 
79 For example, AU691968. 
ao See 'Gene Screeners Test Their Patents', Business Review Weekly, 16 January 2003, 
<http://www.gtg.com.au/Media.Coverage.html> at 31 August 2005. 
81 See, eg, Dianne Nicol, 'Human Gene Patents: Under Whose Control?' (2003) 179 Medical Journal 
of Australia 181-182; Ian R Walpole, Hugh J S Dawkins, Peter D Sinden and Peter C O'Leary, 
'Human Gene Patents: The Possible Impacts on Genetic Service Providers' (2003) 179 Medical 
Journal of Australia 203. 
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